

HISTORY  
OF THE  
INDIAN MUTINY  
1857-1858

COMMENCING FROM THE CLOSE OF THE  
SECOND VOLUME OF  
SIR JOHN KAYE'S HISTORY OF THE SEPOY WAR

BY  
COLONEL G. E. MALLESON, C.S.I.

AUTHOR OF "HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA,"  
"HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA," ETC., ETC.

VOLUME II  
*THIRD EDITION (1893)*

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.  
LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

1896

*All rights reserved*

IN THE HOPE THAT THIS BOOK MAY LIVE,

I DEDICATE IT

TO THE MEMORY OF MY BROTHER-IN-LAW,

Quintin Batty,

OF THE CORPS OF GUIDES,

ONE OF THE FIRST OF THE MANY GALLANT MEN WHO GAVE THEIR  
LIVES FOR THEIR COUNTRY ON THE RIDGE BEFORE DEHLI.

THE WORDS WHICH HE UTTERED,  
WHEN, ON THE 9TH JUNE, 1857, HE RECEIVED THE WOUND WHICH  
HE KNEW TO BE MORTAL,

*DULCE ET DECORUM EST PRO PATRIA MORI,*

WERE CHERISHED

AS A MOST PRECIOUS INHERITANCE BY HIS BROTHER,

Quintin Batty,

WHO, ENTERING THE SERVICE AFTER HIS DEATH,  
WAS APPOINTED TO THE SAME REGIMENT, THE CORPS OF GUIDES,  
AND BY UNFLINCHING GALLANTRY AND DEVOTION  
WON FROM THE STERN FRONTIER MEN WHO COMPOSED IT THE  
ESTEEM AND AFFECTION

WHICH THEY HAD BORNE TO QUINTIN.

FOLLOWING THROUGHOUT HIS NOBLE LIFE

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF HIS BROTHER,

HE EMULATED HIM IN THE MANNER OF HIS DEATH,  
FOR HE TOO DIED LEADING THE GUIDES IN A GALLANT CHARGE  
AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF ENGLAND,  
AT FATHABAD, NEAR JALLALABAD, THE 2ND APRIL, 1879.

SIMILAR AS WAS THEIR LIFE,

SIMILAR AS WAS THEIR DEATH,

I WOULD NOT SEPARATE IN THIS DEDICATION  
THE TWO GALLANT BROTHERS.

*PAR NOBILE FRATRUM.*



## LIST OF PLANS.

Plan to illustrate the Operations of the British Army before Dehli in the year 1857	to face page 68
Sketch of Operations for relief and withdrawal of Lakhnao garrison . . . . .	to face page 224
Sketch of the City of Kánhpúr . . . . .	to face page 276
Plan to illustrate the Operations of the British Army before Lakhnao in March 1858	to face page 400

## PREFACE

### TO THE SECOND EDITION.

FIVE weeks after the appearance of this volume I am called upon to prepare a second edition.

It has been a matter of no small gratification to me that the critics have almost universally recognised the earnest desire by which I have been influenced to search out the truth and to record it alike without favour and without fear.

The only serious adverse criticism which has been directed against the book is that which refers to my estimate of the character of Hodson. It is, I am sure, unnecessary for me to state that I had no personal feeling against that daring soldier. On the contrary, when I knew him at Subáthú in 1846, a year after he had entered the service, he impressed me as a man born to command. I had then for him but one feeling, that of admiration. I never met him afterwards.

But, when a man undertakes to write history, he must, if he be honest, suppress his private feelings

towards individuals. He must deal with them as they proved themselves to be. I have endeavoured to act in this manner with respect to Hodson; and if my remarks upon him are severe, they are, I maintain with regret, justified by his action.

The critics who have taken up this question adversely to my view have especially blamed me for imputing a love of blood-shedding to Hodson. I shall now endeavour to prove that they were wrong and that I was right.

Leaving out of consideration, for the moment, the case of the three princes, I take that of the king. That the King of Dehli was not actively implicated in the atrocities committed in the palace, that, a feeble old man, he was merely a passive instrument, not possessing the power to resist, in the hands of others, was shown conclusively at his trial. It was known before his trial. It was believed even whilst the siege was progressing. On this point we have the evidence of Hodson himself. Before the capture of Dehli he wrote: "He" (the king) "is old and well nigh impotent, and is only used as an authority for all the acts of rebellion and barbarity committed by his sons." Would it have been possible for Hodson to record with greater clearness his opinion that the king was helpless and irresponsible—merely a lay figure?

Yet what were the feelings of Hodson regarding this helpless old man? On the 30th August he wrote: "If I get into the palace the House of Taimur

will not be worth five minutes' purchase, I ween." It may be said by his apologists that this remark applied not to the king individually, but to other members of his family. But what of the following, written four days after the capture of the king: "I would much rather have brought him into Dehli dead than living"? If this is not an expression of regret that the orders he had received alone prevented him from shedding the blood of the helpless, unarmed, king—of the man "old and well nigh impotent"—the man who, not initiating slaughter, was "only used as an authority" for the acts of others,—if it is not this, then language has no meaning. Hodson had recorded his acquittal of the king of active participation in the revolt; he knew that he was old, helpless, feeble in mind as well as in body; and yet he regretted that he had not been allowed to shed his blood!

This was no evanescent feeling. It was not a mere expression escaping a man before it had been well considered. It was a deliberate opinion. It can be discerned in many of Hodson's letters. More than four months afterwards (12th February 1858) he records his indignation that it should be supposed that he, of his own free action, had spared the king: "I see that many people suppose that I had promised the old king his life *after* he was caught. Pray contradict this."

It will thus be observed that not in the excitement of capture, not when there was before his

eyes the prospect of the danger which might be caused by the escape of the king, but after the king had been captured, when he had ceased to be dangerous or even formidable, Hodson regretted that his hand had not slain the deposed monarch.

I think I have written enough to justify the opinion I have recorded of Hodson, and which remains unaltered in this edition. I may add that this opinion is shared not only by some of the most prominent of the men who fought before Dehli and in other parts of India in 1857-58, but by men who have occupied very high positions in India, who were cognizant of all the facts of the case, who knew Hodson intimately, and whose names carry weight with them on all matters connected with our Eastern empire.

I have made but few important changes in this volume. At page 35 I have rendered justice to Captain Baynes, 8th Foot, whose name was omitted, owing to a careless misapprehension, in the first edition: at page 128 I have rectified a mistake which had crept in regarding the junction of the *Pearl* brigade with that of the *Shannon*—a junction which never took place: at page 183 I have added five words (“no other officer accompanied them”) which will leave no doubt as to the validity of the claim I have there preferred in behalf of Lieutenant Colonel Ewart and of Lieutenant Cooper; at page 420 I have supplied an omission regarding the gallantry displayed by Mr. Mayo, F.N.; at

page 440 I have given in somewhat greater detail the account of the operations in the Sambalpûr district ; and at page 498 I have placed more prominently on record the fact that the undertaking of the Rohilkhand campaign in the hot-weather months of 1858 was due entirely to the wise insistence of Lord Canning.

One word more. Objection has been taken to the statement made in the first volume, page 168, attributing to the late Sir James Outram a large credit for the plan actually followed in the relief of Lakhnao. It has even been asserted that the plan carried out by Sir Colin Campbell differed, in all respects save one, from that proposed by Outram. I do not think it can be denied, however, that the plan forwarded to Sir Colin by Outram by the hands of Mr. Kavanagh—a plan based on the very accurate map of Lakhnao drawn by Captain Moorsom—formed the basis on which Sir Colin acted. Sir Colin himself professed to have deviated from that plan in one particular only,—the particular stated at page 168 of this edition. The question, then, resolves itself into this. Outram, anxious to assist Sir Colin, sent him most valuable information at the imminent risk of a brave man's life, and Sir Colin, exercising his discretion as to the extent to which he should avail himself of it, used it largely though not blindly: that is, he did not rigidly adhere to every one of its details. Outram's plan will be found in Appendix (D). I

have ascertained that it was designed by himself alone.

At page 364 I have indicated in somewhat greater detail than in the first Edition, the influence exercised by Lord Napier of Magdala—then Brigadier Napier and Chief Engineer—in the preparation of the plan of the siege of Lakhnao. Not only was Brigadier Napier, as stated in the text, the guest of Sir Colin Campbell at Kánhpúr, there constantly consulted by him, but he accompanied Sir Colin from that place to Lakhnao. It was Brigadier Napier who recommended that the attack should take place on the east side of the city, a recommendation which was adopted. On this point I beg to refer the reader to the Chief Engineer's report, dated 31st March 1858, republished in Volume X. of *Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers*.

G. B. M.

27, West Cromwell Road,  
1st October 1879.

## PREFACE

---

IN the preface to my last volume I expressed my intention of publishing the volume which should conclude the history of the Indian Mutiny in the early part of the current year.

But after writing the six hundred pages which form the volume I now offer to the public, I found that the stirring events in the Western Presidency, including a review of the administration of Lord Elphinstone; the occurrences in southern and central India, and in Bandalkhand, including the campaigns of Sir Hugh Rose, of Sir Robert Napier, and of Whitlock; and the campaign which terminated in the pacification of Oudh, had still to be recorded. I had, too, to write a review of the policy inaugurated by Lord Canning in the later phases of the revolt.

Compelled, as I have been, to confine to the smallest space the notice of events not germane to the main threads of the story, and conscious



that even with the greatest possible compression the history of the mutiny up to the point it has reached in the present volume had occupied nearly six hundred pages, I felt that were I to condense in the same volume the occurrences still remaining to be told, either I should be forced to write them on a scale much smaller than that which their intrinsic importance demanded; or, the volume would attain an exceptional bulk, extremely inconvenient to the reader.

Under these circumstances I could not hesitate. I decided to publish the second volume at once.

The division which by these means is produced seems in other respects to be convenient. Whilst the present volume deals with the storming of Dehli; with Sir Colin Campbell's campaigns of 1857 in Oudh, and of 1858 up to the end of May of that year in Oudh and Rohilkhand; with the movements of the several columns and detachments in north-western India, in the Azamgarh district, in Bihar, in eastern Bengal, and on the south-western frontier; whilst, in fact, it deals generally with the Bengal Presidency and Rajpútáná, the volume which is to follow, and which I hope to offer to the public in the first month of the coming year, will narrate the occurrences in the sister presidencies, in Haidarábád, and in central India. I propose, too, to devote one chapter of that volume to a comprehensive review of Lord Canning's later policy; and another to a

consideration of the action of the civil officers in many of the districts which came, more or less, under the influence of the great wave of the revolt.

In the present volume I have endeavoured to render justice not less to the generals entrusted with the suppression of the mutiny than to those officers of less exalted rank whose splendid exertions enabled the generals to conquer. In the instances in which the conduct of a general has seemed to me to be open to criticism I have endeavoured to state the case with fairness and impartiality. There is not a published official document, there is not a document, relating to the events I have recorded, to which it was possible for me to have access, which I have not carefully read and noted.

Whilst expressing my acknowledgments to those who have, in this way, rendered me invaluable aid; to others who have placed at my disposal journals and letters written at the time, it is fit that I should admit the special obligation under which I lie to the writer of an article on Lord Clyde's Indian Campaign which appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine* for October 1858. If the author of that article, who, I understand, is Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, C.B., had continued his story in the same graphic and nervous style, and with the same attention to correct detail which characterises the article to which I

refer, this history would never have been written. Having traversed the same ground in Blue-books and private documents, I have shown my opinion of that writer's historical power and impartiality by the copious extracts I have made from his article, and I am desirous to place here upon record my admiration of its vigour, its truth, and its vivid reality.

I am anxious, before I conclude, to acknowledge the generous reception which the first volume of this work has met with in this country, in the colonies, and in America. It was not possible, writing of events, many actors in which survive, and to some of whom a record of their performances cannot be palatable, that I should absolutely escape hostile criticism. But the bulk of opinion in England, in Australia, and in America has been sufficiently out-spoken to encourage me to believe that with the course of time the history I have written of the occurrences of a very memorable period will meet with universal acceptance.

G. B. MALLESON.

# GLOSSARY OF PROPER NAMES.

The mode of spelling now adopted.

The old mode of spelling

Agra	Agra.
Ajmir	Ajmir.
Alambágh	Alumbagh.
Aligarh	Aligurh.
Allahábád	Allahabad.
Árah	Arrah.
Azamgarh	Azimgurh.
Baksar	Buxar.
Balamgarh	Ballumgurh.
Balandshahr	Bolundshuhr.
Banâras	Benares.
Bandalkhand	Bundelkhund.
Banni	Bunnee.
Barhâmpûr	Berhampore.
Bhâgalpûr	Bhagulpore.
Bhútân	Bhootan.
Bihâr	Behar.
Bilúchi	Beloochee.
Chaibâsa	Cheybassa.
Chátgáon	Chittagong.
Chattra	Chuttra.
Chutiá Nágpûr	Chota Nagpore.
Dákhá	Dacca.
Dánápûr	Dinapore.
Dárjiling	Darjeeling.
Dehlí, or Dihlí	Delhi.
Dilkúsha	Dilkoosha.
Faizábád	Fyzabad.
Farrakhábád	Furruckabad.
Fathgarh	Futtehgurh.
Fathpûr	Futtehpore.
Firozpûr	Ferozpore.
Gardak	Gunduck.
Ghâghrá	Gogra.

The mode of spelling now adopted.

The old mode of spelling.

Gházípur . . . . .	Ghazipore.
Gorákhpur . . . . .	Gorruckpore.
Gúmti . . . . .	Goomtie.
Gwáliár . . . . .	Gwalior.
Imámbará . . . . .	Emambarah.
Itáwa . . . . .	Etawah.
Jagdispúr . . . . .	Jugdispore.
Jaipúr . . . . .	Jeypore.
Jajhar . . . . .	Jujjhur.
Jalpáigorí . . . . .	Julpigori.
Jamná . . . . .	Jumna.
Jánpúr . . . . .	Jaunpore.
Jodhpúr . . . . .	Jodhpore.
Kálpi . . . . .	Calpee.
Kánhpúr . . . . .	Cawnpore.
Kánúj . . . . .	Canouj.
Katak . . . . .	Cuttack.
Kúsi . . . . .	Koosi.
Lakhnao . . . . .	Lucknow.
Mainpúri . . . . .	Mynporie.
Manghir . . . . .	Monghyr.
Mathurá . . . . .	Muttra.
Múltán . . . . .	Mooltan.
Naddi . . . . .	Nuddee.
Nasírábád . . . . .	Nusseerabad.
Nímach . . . . .	Neemuch.
Nipál . . . . .	Nepaul.
Orisá . . . . .	Orissa.
Panjáb . . . . .	Punjab.
Patná . . . . .	Patna.
Púrníá . . . . .	Purnea.
Rajpútáná . . . . .	Rajpootana.
Rohilkhand . . . . .	Rohilkhund.
Rúrki . . . . .	Roorkee.
Silhat . . . . .	Sylhet.
Són . . . . .	Soane.
Tirhút . . . . .	Tirhoot.
Tísta . . . . .	Teesta.

# CONTENTS

## OF

### THE SECOND VOLUME.

---

PREFACE . . . . .	Page vii
GLOSSARY . . . . .	xi

---

## BOOK X.

---

### CHAPTER I.

The siege of Dehli . . . . .	1
General Wilson doubts the success of an assault . . . . .	2
The Chief Engineer, Major Baird Smith . . . . .	3
Baird Smith's arguments in favour of an assault . . . . .	4
General Wilson yields to those arguments . . . . .	6
Description of the fortifications of Dehli . . . . .	7
Plan of the attack . . . . .	9
Effective strength of the besiegers . . . . .	10
General Wilson's order to his army . . . . .	11
The tracing of the batteries begins on the 7th . . . . .	12
Brind's battery (No. 1) opens fire . . . . .	14
And renders the Mori harmless . . . . .	15
Gallantry of Lieutenant Lockhart . . . . .	16
No. 2 battery is traced and opens fire . . . . .	18

	Page
Medley traces No. 3 battery . . . . .	19
The enemy are alive to the opportunities they had neglected . . . . .	21
The great artillery duel . . . . .	22
Splendid conduct of the Bengal Artillery . . . . .	23
The engineers are sent to examine the breaches . . . . .	24
They report them practicable . . . . .	26
The columns of assault detailed . . . . .	27
The commanders of the columns of assault . . . . .	30
The order of assault . . . . .	32
Nicholson orders the advance . . . . .	33
Storm of the first column . . . . .	34
Storm of the second column . . . . .	35
The explosion party at the Káshmir gate . . . . .	36
Gallant advance of the third column . . . . .	38
The storm of the fourth column . . . . .	40
Reid is struck down . . . . .	41
And the attack is repulsed . . . . .	43
Disastrous effect of this repulse . . . . .	44
Nicholson determines to press on . . . . .	45
After losing many officers, he leads the way, and is struck down . . . . .	47
The cavalry during the storm . . . . .	49
The third column falls back on the church . . . . .	52
The results of the day's work . . . . .	53
The losses of the day . . . . .	54
The success does not correspond to the General's hopes . . . . .	55
Neville Chamberlain urges him to persevere . . . . .	55
Baird Smith is not less peremptory . . . . .	57
On the 15th preparations are made to push on . . . . .	58
Progress made on the 16th . . . . .	59
And on the 17th . . . . .	61
The attack on the Láhor gate on the 18th fails . . . . .	62
Despondency of General Wilson . . . . .	63
Great progress made on the 19th . . . . .	64

# CONTENTS.

xv

	Page
The Jamma Masjid and Palace occupied on the 20th . . . . .	66
Lieutenant Aikman captures the Sélimgarh . . . . .	67
Dehli after the capture . . . . .	69
The King of Dehli, and the influences about him . . . . .	70
He takes refuge in the tomb of Humayún . . . . .	73
Whilst the rebel army evacuates the city . . . . .	74
Hodson of Hodson's Horse . . . . .	75
Hodson induces the king to surrender . . . . .	77
Hodson induces the princes to surrender . . . . .	79
And murders them . . . . .	80
Comments on the deed . . . . .	80
The gates of the city are secured . . . . .	81
Major Brind clears the city of the scum of the popula- tion . . . . .	82
Death and character of Nicholson . . . . .	83
Remarks on the siege . . . . .	84

## CHAPTER II.

A column is despatched south-eastwards under Greathed . . . . .	87
Greaded moves on Balandshahr . . . . .	89
Attacks and defeats the rebels at that place . . . . .	91
Death of Lieutenant Home . . . . .	92
Greaded receives letters from Agra imploring aid . . . . .	93
The condition of Agra subsequent to the 9th September . . . . .	94
Difficulties of its position increased by the storming of Dehli . . . . .	96
Greaded reaches Agra on the 10th October . . . . .	98
Encamps on the parade ground . . . . .	100
His camp is suddenly attacked by the rebels . . . . .	101
Battle of Agra and defeat of the enemy . . . . .	101
The "surprise" greater to the rebels than to the Bri- tish . . . . .	104
Greaded is superseded by Hope Grant . . . . .	105



	Page
Who takes the column to Kánhpúr, and thence to the Banni bridge . . . . .	106
Van Cortlandt re-establishes order north of Dehlí . . . . .	107
Showers is sent with a column to the districts west and south-west of Dehlí . . . . .	108
On his return another column, under Gerrard, is sent in the same direction . . . . .	109
Combat of Narnál . . . . .	110
Splendid feat of Colin Cookworthy . . . . .	116
Gerrard beats the rebels, and, while pursuing, is killed . . . . .	117
Seaton succeeds Gerrard, and returns to Dehlí, preparatory to escorting a convoy towards Kánhpúr . . . . .	118

## B O O K X I.

### CHAPTER I.

State of affairs in India on the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .	119
The enormous difficulties by which he is beset . . . . .	120
His manner of "organising victory" . . . . .	122
The China troops begin to arrive . . . . .	125
Captain William Peel and the Naval Brigade . . . . .	126
Character of William Peel . . . . .	127
Troops begin to arrive from England . . . . .	128
Sketch of the districts intervening between Sir Colin Campbell's base of operations at Allahábád, and Calcutta . . . . .	129
Mr. George Yule and eastern Bihár . . . . .	129
Captain Dalton and Chutiá Nágpúr . . . . .	134

	Page
The Madras army . . . . .	137
How that army lent its aid to Bengal . . . . .	138
Major English defeats the rebels at Chattra . . . . .	141

## CHAPTER II.

Sir Colin Campbell starts for the seat of war . . . . .	142
Colonel Powell and William Peel march towards Kánh- púr . . . . .	143
Powell hears of the enemy at Kajwá . . . . .	144
Battle of Kajwá, and death of Powell . . . . .	145
William Peel, succeeding to the command, completes the victory . . . . .	146
How the fall of Dehlí drove the Gwáliár contingent into the field against the British . . . . .	147
Consideration of Sir Colin's position at Kánhpúr, and of the reasons which prompted him to relieve Lakhnao before crushing the Gwáliár troops . . . . .	148
He leaves a force at Kánhpúr under Windham . . . . .	149
And joins Hope Grant in the plain beyond Banni . . . . .	150
Outram and Havelock at the Residency . . . . .	151
How Outram provided fresh quarters for his troops . . . . .	152
The sorties at Lakhnao . . . . .	154 to 156
Outram fails to open out the Kánhpúr road . . . . .	157
The mining and countermining . . . . .	158
Altered tactics of the rebels . . . . .	160
Some casualties of the siege . . . . .	161
Outram improvises telegraphic communication with the Alambágh . . . . .	162
Thomas Henry Kavanagh . . . . .	163
Kavanagh penetrates in disguise the enemy's lines and reaches Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .	164
Composition of Sir Colin's relieving force . . . . .	165
Sir Colin inspects his troops,—the effect . . . . .	166

	Page
His plan of operations . . . . .	168
He moves on, and encamps near the Alambágh . . . . .	169
Adrian Hope carries the fort of Jallálábád . . . . .	170
The several brigades of the relieving force . . . . .	171
The force carries the Dilkúsha and the Martinière . . . . .	173
Sir Colin holds his position that afternoon and the night, repulsing several attacks . . . . .	174 to 177
The rear-guard under Ewart, 93rd, reaches camp . . . . .	177
The 15th, and preparations for the 16th . . . . .	178
The advance on the 16th . . . . .	179
On the Sikandar Bágh . . . . .	180
Splendid gallantry of Blant, Bengal Artillery . . . . .	181
The storming of the Sikandar Bágh . . . . .	182
Richard Cooper, Ewart, and a few followers leap through the breach . . . . .	183
The daring gallantry of those officers and their fol- lowing . . . . .	184
Their gallantry gives time to their comrades to force the gate and window . . . . .	185
The Sikandar Bágh is gained . . . . .	187
The "Barracks" are captured . . . . .	188
The Shah Najíf . . . . .	188
The attack on the Shah Najíf . . . . .	189
Its obstinate resistance . . . . .	190
Infantry, artillery, and naval brigade are baffled . . . . .	192
Till Sergeant Paton, 93rd, indicates a way of which Adrian Hope takes advantage, and the place is gained . . . . .	194
The troops then bivouac for the night . . . . .	195
How the merits of officers cannot be discovered from the mention of a few in the despatches . . . . .	196
Some of the deserving stormers . . . . .	197
The action of the rebels during the 16th . . . . .	199
Sir Colin's plans for the 17th . . . . .	199
He sends Brigadier Russell to secure his left flank . . . . .	200

# CONTENTS.

xix

	Page
William Peel cannonades the Mess House . . . . .	201
And Garnet Wolseley storms it and the Moti Mahal . . . . .	202
The meeting of Outram and Havelock with Sir Colin . . . . .	204
The proceedings of Outram and Havelock to open out a communication with Sir Colin . . . . .	205 to 208
The difficulties which still remained after the commu- nications had been opened under Russell and Hale . . . . .	209
The operations on the left rear . . . . .	209 to 215
Withdrawal of the women and children . . . . .	215
And of the force . . . . .	216
The cavalry during the siege . . . . .	217
Death of Havelock . . . . .	218
His character and career . . . . .	218 to 220
Sir Colin reaches the Alambágh and reorganises his force . . . . .	217
Leaves Outram with four thousand men at the Alam- bágh, and moves towards Kánhpúr . . . . .	222
Hears on the road alarming rumours, and receives more alarming letters, regarding the state of affairs at Kánhpúr . . . . .	223
Leaving his infantry to follow, he gallops to the front with his staff and artillery . . . . .	224
And discovers the disaster by which Windham was threatened . . . . .	225

## CHAPTER III.

Explicit instructions sent to Windham at Kánhpúr . . . . .	226
Description of the ground between Kálpi and Kánhpúr . . . . .	228
Tántia Topi crosses the Jamná at Kálpi, and occupies that ground . . . . .	229
Windham asks for and obtains permission to detain the troops arriving at Kánhpúr . . . . .	230

	Page
He marches beyond the town and displays his force .	231
Increasing difficulties of his position . . . . .	232
Solicits Sir Colin's sanction to a plan of offensive defence . . . . .	233
Communication with Lakhnao having ceased, he takes up a position on the Kálpi road covered by the canal . . . . .	234
The rebels approaching him, he resolves to attack them	235
In the battle Carthew and Kelly capture three guns .	236
Windham falls back on the brick-kilns, threatened by the enemy's cavalry . . . . .	237
Windham learns that Sir Colin is marching on Kánhpúr . . . . .	237
On the 27th he prepares to stand on the defensive, when he is attacked . . . . .	238
Carthew, on the right, repulses the enemy . . . . .	239
Windham is not so fortunate on the left, but is forced by the superior artillery power of the enemy to fall back . . . . .	240
He hopes to make a stand at the brick-kilns . . . . .	241
His injudicious order, repeated, to Carthew to fall back exposes his right . . . . .	242
Carthew, nevertheless, returning, stems the advancing tide . . . . .	243
And gallantly repulses for the night the attack on the right . . . . .	244
Remarks on the manœuvres of the day . . . . .	245
Windham makes his dispositions for the 27th . . . . .	246
Does not give sufficient strength to the decisive point	247
Carthew gallantly and successfully defends the right .	248
The attack on the left, not being the decisive attack, is easily repulsed . . . . .	249
Windham orders Carthew and Wilson to advance . . . . .	250
Wilson's repulse exposes Carthew's right . . . . .	251
Windham has no supports on the decisive point . . . . .	252

	Page
Splendid tenacity of Carthew and the 34th . . . . .	253
Carthew is forced to fall back on the intrenchment . . . . .	253
Carthew and Windham . . . . .	254
Reinforcements are sent to Carthew, too few, and too late . . . . .	255
The aggressive action of Windham justified in principle . . . . .	256
Sir Colin Campbell arrives on the scene . . . . .	257

## CHAPTER IV.

Sir Colin has an interview with Windham . . . . .	258
The rebels plan the destruction of the bridge . . . . .	259
Sir Colin baffles them and crosses his army . . . . .	260
The position occupied by the enemy . . . . .	261
They attempt to harass the British . . . . .	262
Sir Colin despatches the ladies and children to Allah-ábád . . . . .	264
He detects the one weak point in the enemy's position . . . . .	265
The strength of the hostile armies . . . . .	266
Sir Colin's plan of battle . . . . .	268
Battle of Kánhpúr. Greathed threatens the centre . . . . .	269
Walpole employs the right, whilst Adrian Hope turns the right flank . . . . .	270
Desperate struggle on the canal is decided by William Peel's dash . . . . .	271
The enemy are completely beaten . . . . .	272
Mansfield is sent to cut them off at the Subadár's tank . . . . .	273
Character of General Mansfield . . . . .	274
He allows the enemy to escape . . . . .	275
Hope Grant is then sent to pursue them . . . . .	276
He attacks and destroys them near Sheorájpúr . . . . .	278



	Page
Comments on Sir Colin Campbell's tactics . . . . .	279
The part of the programme remaining to be carried out . . . . .	281

## CHAPTER V.

Sir Colin's further movements are hampered by want of carriage . . . . .	283
He detaches Walpole to Mainpúrí . . . . .	284
A few fanatics bar his way at Itáwa . . . . .	285
Bourchier clears them out, and Walpole reaches Main- púrí . . . . .	286
Seaton starts from Dehlí with his convoy for Mainpúrí	287
Suddenly hears that the rebels are marching against him . . . . .	288
He attacks and completely defeats them . . . . .	289
Finds the rebels at Pattiáli . . . . .	290
Where he again beats them . . . . .	291
And to a great extent pacifies the country . . . . .	292
Again he defeats the rebels near Mainpúrí . . . . .	294
Daring exploit of Hodson and McDowell . . . . .	295
Seaton unites with Walpole . . . . .	298

## CHAPTER VI.

Sir Colin marches from Kánhpúr towards Fathgarh . . . . .	299
The rebels lose their opportunity of breaking down the bridge over the Káli Naddi . . . . .	300
Vaughan's skilful gun practice . . . . .	302
Gallant dash of the 53rd . . . . .	303
The enemy are completely beaten . . . . .	304
The soldiers give an ovation to Sir Colin . . . . .	304
Gallant conduct of Lieutenant Roberts . . . . .	305

	Page
Reasons why the Commander-in-Chief advocated the reduction of Rohilkhand prior to an attack on Lakhnao . . . . .	306
Reasons which actuated Lord Canning in deciding to attack Lakhnao in the first instance . . . . .	307
Lord Canning's action justified . . . . .	308
The military position occupied by Sir Colin considered	309
He leaves Seaton to command at Fathgarh . . . . .	310
Deceives the Rohilkhand rebels . . . . .	311
Adrian Hope attacks and defeats them at Sútia . . . . .	312
The final preparations for an attack on Lakhnao . . . . .	313
The British army is at last in the plains between Kánhpúr and Lakhnao. Its composition . . . . .	314

## CHAPTER VII.

Jang Bahádur of Nipál offers his aid to Lord Canning . . . . .	315
The offer, after some delay, is accepted . . . . .	316
The Nipál troops are sent to Azamgarh and Jánpúr . . . . .	317
They surprise and defeat the rebels at Mandori . . . . .	318
And pacify the district . . . . .	319
Lieutenant-Colonel Longden is sent with a detachment to co-operate with the Nipál troops . . . . .	319
Combat at Chánda . . . . .	320
Longden drives the rebels from Atráolia . . . . .	320
The Governor-General concludes an arrangement with Jang Bahádur for a further supply of Nipál troops led by himself . . . . .	321
Rowcroft defeats the rebels at Sobanpúr . . . . .	322
Jang Bahádur occupies Gorákhpúr . . . . .	323
He defeats the rebels at Phúlpúr and enters Oudh . . . . .	324
Description of General Franks's column . . . . .	325
Instructions given to Franks by Lord Canning . . . . .	325



	Page
And by Mr. J. P. Grant . . . . .	326
The rebel army opposed to Franks and its positions .	326
Nature of the endeavours made to supply his want of cavalry . . . . .	327
Franks attacks and beats the rebels at Nasratpúr .	328
He returns to Badlapúr and enters Oudh . . . .	329
He attacks and defeats Banda Húsén at Chánda . .	330
And Mehndi Húsén at Hamírpúr . . . . .	331
Manœuvres between Franks and Mehndi Húsén to gain Budhayan . . . . .	331
Franks out-manœuvres his rival, whereupon the latter takes up a position beyond Súltánpúr . . . .	332
Strength and weakness of the position . . . .	333
Battle of Súltánpúr . . . . .	334
Gallantry of Macleod Innes . . . . .	334
Total defeat of the enemy . . . . .	335
Franks is joined by the Jalandhar Cavalry under Aik- man . . . . .	335
Aikman's splendid daring . . . . .	336
Franks is repulsed at Dhaorára . . . . .	337
Summary of the results of his campaign . . . .	338
Henry Havelock, Patrick Carnegy, and Venables .	339
Franks joins Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .	341

---

## CHAPTER VIII.

Description of the Alambágh . . . . .	343
Position taken up there by Outram . . . . .	343
The rebels in Lakhnao recover confidence and resolve to attack him . . . . .	344
The attack on the 22nd December . . . . .	345
Outram drives them back on the Dilkúsha . . .	346
They make another attack on the 12th January .	347
Olpherts foils them on the right, Down on the centre	348

	Page
And Outram on the left . . . . .	349
Religious influences affecting the natives . . . . .	349
The Moulvi swears an oath . . . . .	350
Olpherts forces him to break it . . . . .	351
An attack on the 16th January is repulsed . . . . .	352
Discord in the rebel camp . . . . .	353
The Moulvi attacks on 15th February, and is repulsed	353
The rebels resolve to make a grand assault on Sunday, 21st February . . . . .	354
The assault of Sunday, 21st February, is repulsed . . . . .	355
They make another and final attack on the 25th . . . . .	356
Battle of the 25th, and repulse of the rebels . . . . .	356 to 359
Service rendered to England by Outram's four months' defence of the Alambágh . . . . .	359 to 361
The men who aided Outram . . . . .	361
Sir Colin Campbell reaches the Alambágh . . . . .	363

## CHAPTER IX.

Force at the disposal of Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .	364
Defences of Lakhnao . . . . .	364 to 367
The weak point of the defence—detected by Sir Colin	367
Sir Colin's plan of attack . . . . .	367
He advances on the Dilkúsha, captures it, and esta- blishes batteries there and at the Muhammad Bágh . . . . .	369
He orders bridges to be thrown across the Gúmti . . . . .	370
And directs Outram to cross with a <i>corps d'armée</i> . . . . .	371
Outram establishes himself on the left bank . . . . .	372
The programme assigned to him . . . . .	372
Outram pushes forward to the Faizábád road on the 8th, establishes himself there, and constructs batteries . . . . .	373
He storms the Chakar Kothí, and occupies the Bádsháh Bágh on the 9th . . . . .	374

	Page
Notifies his success to Sir Colin by the hoisting of a flag . . . . .	375
Major Nicholson, R.E., establishes a battery enfilading the enemy's works . . . . .	375
He observes that the enemy's lines seem abandoned . . . . .	375
Lieutenant Thomas Butler swims the Gúmti to ascertain the fact, and occupies the lines until relieved by the Highlanders . . . . .	376
Sir Colin carries the Martinière . . . . .	377
The line from the Gúmti to the vicinity of Banks's house is occupied . . . . .	378
The British position on the evening of the 10th . . . . .	379
Outram feels his way to the iron and stone bridges . . . . .	380, 381
He occupies the positions then taken up the four days following the 11th . . . . .	382
The Sikandar Bágh is occupied without opposition . . . . .	382
By the happy audacity of three engineer officers the Kaddam Rasúl and Sháh Najíf are gained . . . . .	383
Lugard effects a breach in the Bégam Kothí . . . . .	384
Adrian Hope's brigade is ordered to storm it . . . . .	385
Description of the Bégam Kothí . . . . .	385
The Bégam Kothí is stormed . . . . .	386
Death of Hodson . . . . .	387
Position of the assailants on the evening of the 11th . . . . .	388
The 12th and 13th are given to the engineers . . . . .	389
On the 14th Franks storms the Imámbará . . . . .	390
The troops, excited by their victory, push on . . . . .	391
They turn the enemy's third line of works . . . . .	392
Splendid behaviour of the Sikhs, 10th, 90th, of Have-lock, of Brasyer . . . . .	392-3
The supports come up . . . . .	393
Franks and Napier resolve that the advantage shall be pursued, and the Kaisar Bágh is carried . . . . .	394
The scene of plunder . . . . .	394-5
Result of the day's work on the right bank . . . . .	395

	Page
Outram proposes to cross by the iron bridge and intercept the rebels in their flight . . . . .	395
Sir Colin informs him that he may cross provided in doing so he does not lose a single man . . . . .	396
Reflections on the reply . . . . .	397-8
Useless pursuit of the rebels on the 15th . . . . .	399
Outram crosses near the Sikandar Bágh and pushes on to the Residency . . . . .	399
Contrast between the defence of the Residency by Europeans and by natives . . . . .	400
Outram captures the Residency, the Great Imámbará, and the Machhi Báwan . . . . .	401
The retreating rebels attack Walpole and are repulsed . . . . .	401
An attack made on the Álambágh is repulsed . . . . .	402
Jang Bahádur advances, covering Sir Colin's left . . . . .	403
Rescue of Miss Jackson and Mrs. Orr . . . . .	403
Outram occupies Sharfu-dáola's house . . . . .	404
Lamentable accident by an explosion . . . . .	404
Outram carries the Músá Bágh . . . . .	406
William Campbell allows the rebels to escape . . . . .	406
Gallantry of Colonel Hagart . . . . .	407
Reflections on Brigadier Campbell's conduct . . . . .	408
Lord Canning's proclamation . . . . .	409
The city is cleared of the rebels . . . . .	410
Hope Grant beats them at Kúrsi . . . . .	411
Remarks on the campaign . . . . .	412 to 415

---

## BOOK XII.

### CHAPTER I.

The narrative returns to Bengal . . . . .	416
Why the interest of the history is now almost entirely with Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .	417

	Page
Lord Canning proceeds to Allahábád . . . . .	417
Panic in Calcutta on the 3rd March . . . . .	418
The 34th at Chátgáon mutiny . . . . .	419
The attempt to disarm the 73rd at Dákhá results in a conflict and the flight of the troops . . . . .	420
Loyalty of the Rájá of Tiparah . . . . .	421
Prompt action of the Government with respect to Ghát- gáon and Dákhá . . . . .	421
The Chátgáon mutineers enter Tiparah . . . . .	422
They are pursued and beaten, after a forced march, by the Silhat Light Infantry . . . . .	423
Splendid conduct of the Silhat sepoy . . . . .	423
Death of Byng . . . . .	424
Ultimate fate of the Chátgáon mutineers . . . . .	425
The difficulties in eastern Bihár are aggravated by the events in Dákhá and Chátgáon . . . . .	426
Mr. George Yule, perceiving this, marches on Púrníá . . . . .	426
He arrives just in time, for the 11th Irregulars promptly mutiny . . . . .	426
Gallant conduct of Mr. Francis Anstruther Elphinstone- Dalrymple, C.S. . . . .	427
The prompt and daring action of Yule saves Púrníá . . . . .	429
The Dákhá rebels menace Jalpáigori . . . . .	430
Yule marches against them . . . . .	431
His foresight and activity do not prevent them from escaping . . . . .	432
Yule pursues and drives the rebels into Nipál . . . . .	433
Major J. F. Richardson . . . . .	433
Jang Bahádur orders his lieutenant to co-operate with Yule . . . . .	434
The Nipál commander, by his unwillingness to divide his forces, spoils the plans of Yule and Richard- son, and the rebels escape . . . . .	435
State of Chútia Nágpúr in November 1857 . . . . .	436
Action of Lieutenant Graham in Palámao . . . . .	437



	Page
Action of Captain Leigh in Sambalpúr . . . . .	438
Splendid conduct of Mr. Cockburn, Commissioner of Katak . . . . .	439
He pours troops into Sambalpúr . . . . .	439
The rebels are defeated in Singhbhúm and Sambalpúr . . . . .	440
Dangerous position of Mr. Lushington and his compa- nions . . . . .	440
Tranquillity is gradually restored in Chútia Nágpúr . . . . .	441

## CHAPTER II.

Retrospect of affairs in western Bihár . . . . .	442
That province under Mr. Tayler's successor . . . . .	443
Kúnwar Singh returns to it . . . . .	444
The situation is aggravated by various risings . . . . .	444
False military movement of Rattray and Alonzo Money . . . . .	444
They are out-manceuvréd by the rebels, and Gayá is saved by the gallantry of Skipwith Tayler . . . . .	445
Mutiny of two companies of the 32nd Native Infantry . . . . .	445
Rattray avenges his disaster of the 8th September, and fights an indecisive combat with the 32nd . . . . .	445
The narrative proceeds to the line of communication between Allahábád and Lakhnao . . . . .	446
Carthew at Fathpúr . . . . .	447
He clears the country on the left bank of the Jamná . . . . .	448
Campbell clears the country near Allahábád . . . . .	449
Moveable columns are sent to keep open the line . . . . .	449
The effect being to secure Sir Colin's operations against Lakhnao . . . . .	450
Sotheby defeats the rebels at Chandipúr . . . . .	451
Rowcroft defeats the rebels at Amórha and establishes himself there . . . . .	452
Kúnwar Singh makes a diversion in eastern Oudh . . . . .	453
Milman attacks and drives back his troops near Atráolia . . . . .	455

	Page
The opportunity of cutting off Milman from his base is seized by Kúnwar Singh . . . . .	456
He forces back Milman on Azamgarh . . . . .	457
Lord Canning, hearing of Milman's disaster, sends Lord Mark Kerr to relieve him . . . . .	458
Lord Mark sets out with four hundred and forty-four men . . . . .	459
He encounters the enemy, four thousand strong, near Azamgarh . . . . .	460
Desperate contest, and the resolute persistence of Lord Mark Kerr, who beats the rebels, and relieves Azamgarh . . . . .	460 to 463
Great credit due on every ground to Lord Mark Kerr .	464
His victory probably saved Banáras from the clutches of Kúnwar Singh . . . . .	465
Fatal error in Kúnwar Singh's tactics . . . . .	466

### CHAPTER III.

Objects still remaining to Sir Colin to accomplish .	467
He orders a brigade under Lugard to Azamgarh .	468
Lugard defeats some rebels near Tigra .	469
State of the Azamgarh garrison .	470
Wily tactics of Kúnwar Singh .	470
Lugard forces the passage of the Tons .	471
Death of Venables .	471
The rebels fall back, unbeaten, and baffle their pur- suers .	472
Douglas is sent to pursue Kúnwar Singh .	473
Kúnwar Singh baffles him at Naghai by retreating .	473
He continues to evade a decisive action .	474
But is caught and beaten at Mannahar .	475
Notwithstanding this, outwitting Cumberlege and baffling Douglas, he crosses the Ganges into Shahábád, and reoccupies Jagdispúr .	476

	Page
The Grand attacks him there and is totally defeated .	477
Death of Kúnwar Singh, and succession of his brother Ammar Singh . . . . .	478
Lugard crosses into Shahábád . . . . .	479
He repeatedly beats and disperses the rebels, but they always reunite . . . . .	480
The rebels harry the district and defy pursuit . . .	481
Lugard cuts roads across the jungles, and succeeds in driving the rebels to a considerable distance, when he is forced to resign his command from ill-health . . . . .	482
His successor, Douglas, has not even taken up the com- mand, when the rebels return and renew their depredations . . . . .	483
Douglas determines to converge seven columns on a belt into which he proposes to drive the rebels .	484
Reasons why he deferred the execution of the plan till the conclusion of the rainy season . . . . .	485
The plan fails in consequence of the delay of one of the column commanders . . . . .	486
Sir Henry Havelock's plan of mounted infantry is sanc- tioned . . . . .	487
Great success attends the plan at the outset . . . .	488
On a second occasion Havelock drives the rebels into a position from which they escape only in conse- quence of the mistake of the infantry . . . . .	490
He again pursues them, and drives them into the Kaimúr hills . . . . .	491
Where they are finally destroyed on the 24th November	492

---

## CHAPTER IV.

Hope Grant is ordered from Lakhnáo to the districts watered by the Ghaghra . . . . .	493
---	-----



	Page
The rebels make a daring reconnoitring expedition into his camp . . . . .	494
The Moulvi devises a skilful plan to surprise Hope Grant . . . . .	495
The plan fails owing to the inability of the leaders of his cavalry to withstand temptation . . . . .	496
Hope Grant joins Jang Bahádur's camp . . . . .	497
Satiated condition in which he found the Gúrkahs . . . . .	497
Sir Colin Campbell's plans for the reconquest of Rohil- khand . . . . .	498
Seaton's position at Fathgarh . . . . .	499
He attacks, and, beating, foils the plans of, the rebels, at Kankar . . . . .	500
General Penny marches towards Rohilkhand . . . . .	501
The enemy attempt a surprise, and Penny is killed . . . . .	501
The column, commanded by Colonel Jones, joins the Commander-in-Chief . . . . .	502
Nature of the task entrusted to Walpole . . . . .	502
Character of Walpole as a general . . . . .	503
Walpole learns that the fort of Rúiya is occupied by a rebel chief . . . . .	504
Though informed by a trooper that the rebel chief intends to evacuate the place, Walpole deter- mines to attack it . . . . .	505
He sends his infantry in skirmishing order against the walls . . . . .	506
The infantry suffer great loss, and Walpole orders a retreat, which is the signal for the display of marked gallantry . . . . .	507
Adrian Hope is about to ride up to Walpole, when he is shot dead . . . . .	508
It was believed in camp that he was about to deprive Walpole of the command . . . . .	508
The rebels evacuate the fort . . . . .	508
Loud and deep invectives in the camp against Walpole . . . . .	509

	Page
Tributes to Adrian Hope . . . . .	504 and 509
Walpole drives the rebels from Sirsa, and joins the Commander-in-Chief . . . . .	510
A brigade assembles at Rúrki under the command of Colonel John Coke . . . . .	511
Previous service and character of Colonel Coke . . . . .	512
Coke is able, by his practical knowledge of the natives and their customs, to supply his force with car- riage, otherwise not procurable . . . . .	513
Coke is superseded by Brigadier-General John Jones ; the change, however, not affecting the working of the force . . . . .	514
Coke crosses the Ganges and completely defeats the rebels at Bhogniwálá . . . . .	515
Cool and resolute <sup>o</sup> feat of arms accomplished by the native officer Jamadár Imám Bakhsh Khán . . . . .	516
The rebels are again defeated at Naghína . . . . .	517
Cureton, after greatly contributing to the first defeat, administers a second the same day . . . . .	518
The deed of Cureton still the talk of the Indian army . . . . .	519
Gallantry and reward of Hanna . . . . .	519
The people of Morádábád greatly discontented with native rule . . . . .	520
Coke, splendidly aided by Angelo and others, seizes several rebel chiefs in Morádábád . . . . .	521
The Commander-in-Chief, advancing on Shajahánpúr, is baffled by the evasion of the Moulvi and his following . . . . .	522
He leaves a garrison there under Hale, and marches on Barélí . . . . .	522
Khán Bahádur Khán and Barélí . . . . .	523
Sir Colin advances on Barélí and pushes back the rebels across the Nattia Naddi . . . . .	525
The Gházis make a tremendous onslaught on the High- land brigade . . . . .	526

	Page
After maltreating Cameron and Walpole, they are slain where they fought . . . . .	527
On account of the suffering of the troops from heat, and for other reasons, Sir Colin halts for the day . . . . .	528
The Gházis attack a company of the 93rd, commanded by Richard Cooper . . . . .	528
The halt ordered by Sir Colin enables Khán Bahádur Khán to withdraw . . . . .	529
The Rúrki column advances from Morádábád and effects a junction with Sir Colin . . . . .	529
The Moulvi designs a raid on Shahjahánpúr . . . . .	531
A halt of two hours made on the road enables a spy to convey intelligence of his approach to Colonel Hale . . . . .	532
Hale baffles the Moulvi, who occupies, and levies contributions from, the town . . . . .	533
Sir Colin sends General Jones to relieve Shahjahánpúr . . . . .	534
Jones penetrates to the position occupied by Hale . . . . .	535
Then, finding himself not strong enough, applies for assistance . . . . .	536
The Moulvi, on his side, receives reinforcements from all parts . . . . .	536
On the 15th he attacks Jones and is repulsed . . . . .	537
Sir Colin was on the point of distributing his forces when he receives Jones's appeal . . . . .	537
He at once sets out for Shahjahánpúr . . . . .	538
He skirmishes with the rebels, but owing to his weakness in cavalry, is unable to obtain decisive success . . . . .	539
Sir Colin sends for Coke's brigade . . . . .	540
The rebels fall back into Oudh . . . . .	540
Conclusion of the Rohilkhand campaign . . . . .	540
Character and previous career of the Moulvi . . . . .	541
His influence in causing the mutiny . . . . .	542

	Page
The Moulvi attempts to obtain assistance from the Rájá of Powán . . . . .	543
He is shot dead by the Rájá's brother . . . . .	544
The claim of the Moulvi to the character of a patriot established . . . . .	544
William Peel gradually recovers from his wound . . . . .	545
Cordial reception prepared for him and for the Naval Brigade in Calcutta . . . . .	545
Honours conferred upon him . . . . .	545
He dies of small-pox. Universal appreciation of his noble character . . . . .	546
Venables, "the brave, self-denying English gentleman" . . . . .	547

---

## CHAPTER V.

Rajpútáná from July 1857 . . . . .	550
Effect on the Rajpúts of the suzerainty of the British as administered by General George Lawrence . . . . .	551
The disaffected few—the criminal class and the sol- diery . . . . .	552
An outbreak in the Ajmír jail is suppressed . . . . .	553
A slight military disturbance at Nasirábád is quelled . . . . .	553
And another at Nímach . . . . .	554
Mount Abú, and its inhabitants . . . . .	555
Some mutineers of the Jodhpúr legion scale Mount Abú and fire on the English soldiers as they sleep . . . . .	556
The mutineers are completely baffled and driven away . . . . .	557
The Jodhpúr legion revolts at Irinpúrah . . . . .	558
Conolly shows a daring persistence in endeavouring to recall them to their duty . . . . .	559
At last a few men rally round him . . . . .	560
The strange inconsistency of these loyal few . . . . .	560

	Page
The Anádra mutineers arrive . . . . .	561
After great vicissitudes Conolly is allowed to go . . . . .	562
The case of Abbás Ali and Monck-Mason . . . . .	562
The Rájá of Jodhpúr sends an army against the rebels . . . . .	562
The Thákur of A'wah rebels against his liege lord . . . . .	563
He offers to submit on certain terms, which Monck- Mason is unable to accept . . . . .	564
The rebels defeat the Jodhpúr troops at Palí . . . . .	565
General Lawrence marches against A'wah . . . . .	566
But is compelled to fall back on A'jmír . . . . .	567
Death of Monck-Mason . . . . .	567
The affairs of Kotá . . . . .	568
Major Burton denounces certain men to the Maháráo, who repeats his language to the men denounced . . . . .	569
The Kotá troops rise and murder Burton and his sons . . . . .	569
Excuses of the Maháráo . . . . .	570
The British are repulsed in an attack on Jíran . . . . .	571
Lawrence again attacks and captures A'wah . . . . .	572
General Roberts arrives, and marching on Kotá, com- pletely defeats the rebels . . . . .	574
Pacification of Rajpútáná . . . . .	576
Reasons why Rajpútáná so easily weathered the storm of the mutiny . . . . .	576
George St. Patrick Lawrence . . . . .	577



# HISTORY

OF THE

## INDIAN MUTINY OF 1857.

---

### BOOK X.

---

#### CHAPTER I.

I TAKE up the history of the siege of Dehlí from the 1st September. Nicholson's great victory at Najafgarh, gained the 25th August, had not only forced the enemy within their defences, but had ensured the safety of the siege-train then in progress from Fírozpúr. From that moment, then, preparations were set on foot for carrying out active operations for the capture of the place.

It was not, indeed, without much misgiving that the commander of the besieging army, Major-General Archdale Wilson, had given his consent to the carrying out of a measure the success of which, he considered, would depend on accident.\* In an elaborate letter, addressed on the 20th of

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.  
1857.  
Sept. 1.  
The siege of  
Dehlí.

\* His own words were: "It is evident to me that the results of the proposed operations will be thrown on the hazard of a die."

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

Doubts and  
fears of General  
Wilson.

August to the chief engineer, Major Baird Smith, General Wilson, dwelling with considerable emphasis on the difficulties that had attended the progress of the siege—on the fact that he and his army had in reality occupied the position of a besieged force—had announced his intention of commencing offensive operations against the city on the arrival of the siege-train from Firozpur, though with no “hope of being able to take the place until supported by the force from below.” He concluded his letter—the contents of which he intended to send to the Governor-General as a justification of his conduct—with a request that Major Baird Smith would favour him with such remarks and emendations as his experience as Chief Engineer might suggest.\*

\* The entire letter, a perusal of which will make clear the position before Dehlí at the date on which it was written (20th August 1857), runs as follows: “A letter has been received from the Governor-General urging our immediately taking Dehlí, and he seems angry that it was not done long ago. I wish to explain to him the true state of affairs: that Dehlí is seven miles in circumference, filled with an immense fanatical Músalmán population, garrisoned by full 40,000 soldiers armed and disciplined by ourselves, with 114 pieces of heavy artillery mounted on the walls, with the largest magazine of shot, shell, and ammunition in the Upper Provinces at their disposal, besides some sixty pieces of field artillery, all of our own manufacture, and manned by artillerymen drilled and taught by ourselves; that the Fort itself has been made so strong by perfect flanking defences erected by our own engineers, and a glacis which prevents our guns breaking the walls lower than eight feet from the top, without the labour of a regular siege and sap—for which the force and artillery sent against it has been quite inadequate; that an attempt to blow in the gates and escalade the walls was twice contemplated, but that it was considered,

Who and what sort of a man was he to whom the commander of the besieging army, at this

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

from the state of preparation against such attack on the part of the rebels, such an attempt would inevitably have failed, and have caused the most irreparable disaster to our cause; and that, even if we had succeeded in forcing our way into the place, the small force disposable for the attack would have been most certainly lost in the numerous streets of so large a city, and have been cut to pieces. It was, therefore, considered advisable to confine our efforts to holding the position we now occupy, which is naturally strong, and has been daily rendered more so by our engineers, until the force coming up from below could join to co-operate in the attack. That since the command of the force has devolved on me I have considered it imperatively necessary to adopt the same plan as the only chance of safety to the Empire, and that I strongly urge upon his Lordship the necessity of his ordering General Havelock's or some other force marching upon Dehlí as soon as possible. The force under my command is, and has been since the day we took our position, actually besieged by the mutineers, who, from the immense extent of suburbs and gardens extending nearly

to the walls of the town, have such cover for their attacks that it has been very difficult to repel them, and at the same time to inflict such a loss as would deter a repetition of them. They have frequently been driven back with loss, but they immediately take refuge under the grape fire of their heavy guns on the city walls, and, on our retirement, reoccupied their former positions; every such attack upon them has entailed a heavy loss upon our troops, which we can ill spare, and has done us little good. I shall be reinforced by a siege-train from Firozpur by the end of this or the beginning of next month, when I intend to commence more offensive operations against the city; but I cannot hold out any hope of being able to take the place until supported by the force from below. As an artillery officer, I have no hesitation in giving my opinion that the attack on Dehlí, garrisoned and armed as it now is, is as arduous an undertaking as was the attack on Bharatpur in 1825-26, for which 25,000 troops and 100 pieces of artillery were not considered too large a force. I enclose a return of the original force which was sent down to capture this strong place, and also a return of the



Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 1.

Baird Smith.

important conjuncture, made this earnest appeal? Major Baird Smith was an honour even to the Corps of Engineers. To a knowledge founded on extensive reading, to a mind which had thought out the several problems pertaining to Indian administration, he added a power of prompt and decisive action rarely bestowed except upon the senior wranglers of the University of Nature. He had travelled much, had mastered the several methods in which, in the countries of continental Europe, science, and especially the engineering science, had been laid under contribution to develop the latent forces of nature; and in India, had, as the administrative agent to whom was entrusted the completion of the Ganges Canal, applied the experience thus acquired to the perfection of that great work. The genius which could grasp great schemes of administrative reform, was equally at home in the performance of those duties with which the military side of his profession brought him into contact. Chief Engineer of the army before Dehlí, he had brought to the performance of his

present effective force, including sick and wounded, from which his Lordship will see how desperate would have been any attempt to take the city by assault, more especially as the mutineers keep a large portion of their force encamped outside the city walls, who, on our assaulting the city, could easily attack and capture our camp, with

all our hospitals, stores, and ammunition, unless a strong provision was made against it. Something of this sort I intend forwarding to the Governor-General, and shall be glad if you will return this with such remarks and emendations as your experience as Chief Engineer suggests."

duties the large mind, the profound knowledge, the prompt decision which had characterised him in his civil work. Neither the shock and pain caused by a wound, nor the weakness and emaciation produced by a severe attack of camp scurvy, aggravated by diarrhoea, depressed his spirit or lessened his energies. Refusing to be placed on the sick list, though assured that mortification would be the consequence of a continued use of his wounded leg, Baird Smith clung to the last to the performance of his duty. The advice which he gave to General Wilson proved that never was his courage higher, never were the tone and temper of his mind more healthy, than when, bowed down by two diseases, and suffering acutely from his wound, he seemed a livid wreck of the man he once had been.

It was to such a man that Wilson appealed. The answer was clear, emphatic, decisive. Baird Smith was for action, for prompt and immediate action. True it is, he reasoned, the besieged are more numerous than the besiegers; true it is their resources are greater, their position is formidable, their defences are strong. But in war something must be risked. In his opinion the risk of a repulse in a well-contrived and well-organised assault was infinitely less than the risk which would attend the waiting during a long and uncertain period for reinforcements from below. The waiting for reinforcements involved inaction—an inaction which might last for weeks. Such inaction, at a time when the Panjáb, denuded of its last troops, was quivering in the balance, in-

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

The reasons which influenced Baird Smith to advise immediate action.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

volved a risk greater even than the risk of a repulse before the walls of the city. Nor was this last danger so great, in Baird Smith's estimation, as the General seemed to consider. He believed that it would be possible by skilfully preparing and effectively delivering an assault, to reduce it to a small proportion. He gave the fullest expression, in his reply, to these convictions, and concluded by urging the General to prepare for and to deliver that assault without delay—before the enemy should have time to strengthen his position within and without the beleaguered city.

These arguments, forcible, clear, based on logic and reason, had their natural effect on General Wilson. Though he did not share to the full Baird Smith's opinions as to the probable result of an assault, he was brought<sup>2</sup> to regard the risk which would thus be encountered as considerably less than the risk which would be involved by inaction. He yielded \* then, and directed the Chief Engineer to prepare a plan of attack.

Wilson yields,  
though without  
being  
convinced.

The reluctant assent of General Wilson threw upon the shoulders of his Chief Engineer the responsibility for the assault. Far from shrinking from the burden, Baird Smith eagerly seized it.

\* General Wilson wrote thus on Baird Smith's memorandum: "It is evident to me that the results of the proposed operations will be thrown on the hazard of a die; but under the circumstances in which I am placed, I am willing to try this hazard—the more so as I cannot suggest any other plan to meet our difficulties. I cannot, however, help being of opinion that the chances of success under such a heavy fire as the working parties will be exposed to, are anything but favourable. I yield, however, to the judgment of the Chief Engineer."



In conjunction with his second in command, Captain Alexander Taylor, a most able and indefatigable member of the same corps, one of those men who, once tried, in difficult circumstances, are found to be indispensable, he submitted a plan—previously prepared, but subject to alteration resulting from daily-gained experience—simple, bold, and effective—easily workable, on the sole condition of hearty and zealous co-operation and obedience on the part of his subordinates. The result showed how well placed was the confidence bestowed by the Chief Engineer in the officers serving under his orders.

Before adverti<sup>ng</sup> to that plan, I propose to lay before the reader a short description of the defences of, and the approaches to, Dehlí.

The characteristic features of the place were, at the time, thus officially described by Baird Smith: “The eastern face rests on the Jamná, and during the season of the year when our operations were carried on the stream may be described as washing the base of the walls. All access to a besieger on the river front is therefore impracticable. The defences here consist of an irregular wall, with occasional bastions and towers, and about one half of the length of the river face is occupied by the palace of the King of Dehlí, and its out-work, the old Mogol fort of Sélingarh. The river may be described as the chord of a rough arc formed by the remaining defences at the place. These consist of a succession of bastioned fronts, the connection being very long, and the out-works limited to one

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

Baird Smith  
and Taylor  
prepare a  
plan of  
assault.

The fortifica-  
tions of  
Dehlí.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

crown-work at the Ajmír gate, and martello towers mounting a single gun at such points as require additional flanking fire to that given by the bastions themselves. The bastions are small, generally mounting three guns in each face, two in each flank, and one in the embrasure at the salient. They are provided with masonry parapets about twelve feet in thickness, and have a relief of about sixteen feet above the plane of site. The curtain consists of a simple masonry wall or rampart sixteen feet in height, eleven feet thick at top, and fourteen or fifteen at bottom. This main wall carries a parapet loop-holed for musketry, eight feet in height and eight feet in thickness. The whole of the land front is covered by a berm of variable width, ranging from sixteen to thirty feet, and having a scarp wall eight feet high. Exterior to this is a dry ditch, of about twenty-five feet in width, and from sixteen to twenty feet in depth. The counterscarp is simply an earthen slope easy to descend. The glacis is a very short one, extending only fifty or sixty yards from the counterscarp. Using general terms, it covers from the besiegers' view from half to one third of the height of the walls of the place. The defences, in a word, are 'modernised' forms of ancient works that existed when the city fell before Lord Lake's army in 1803. They extend about seven miles in circumference, and include an area of about three square miles. On the western side of Dehlí there appear the last out-lying spurs of the Aravelli mountains, and represented here by a low ridge, which dis-

appears at its intersection with the Jamná, about two miles above the place. The drainage from the eastern slope of the ridge finds its way to the river along the northern and the north-western faces of the city, and has formed there a succession of parallel or connected ravines of considerable depth. By taking advantage of these hollow ways admirable cover was constantly obtained for the troops, and the labour of the siege was materially reduced. The whole of the exterior of the place presents an extraordinary mass of old buildings of all kinds, of thick brushwood, and occasional clumps of forest trees, giving great facilities for cover, which, during the siege operations at least, proved to be on the whole more favourable to us than to the enemy."

Such being the place, the plan for assaulting it traced by Baird Smith and Taylor may thus be described.

It was inevitable that the attack should be made on the northern face of the fortress—the face represented by the Morí, Káshmir, and Water bastions, and the curtain walls connecting them. These connecting curtains were merely parapets, wide enough only for musketry fire. It had been in the power of the enemy greatly to strengthen these defences by pulling down the adjacent buildings, and on their ruins erecting a rampart, from which a continued fire of heavy guns should be concentrated on an attacking force. In neglecting, as a rule, to use the advantage thus open to them the rebel leaders added another example to many preceding it, of the absence from their

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

Plan of the  
attack.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

councils of a really capable commander. The neglect was likely to be fatal to the defence, for it enabled the besiegers to concentrate on the curtains a fire sufficient to crush the defenders' fire and to effect breaches through which the infantry could be launched against the town.

The plan of the Chief Engineer, then, was to crush the fire of the Morí bastion at the north-west corner of the city. That fire silenced, the advance on the extreme left, which was covered by the river, would be secure, and there the assault would be delivered.

Its simplicity  
and wisdom.

The simple wisdom of this plan will be at once recognised. In the first place the advance was effectually covered by the river on one flank, and partially so by trees and brushwood in front. The assault delivered, our men would not be at once involved in narrow streets, but there would be a space comparatively open in which to act.

Effective  
number of  
the besieging  
force.

Sept. 6.

On the 6th September all the reinforcements which could be expected, together with the siege-train, had arrived in camp. The effective rank and file, of all arms, amounted to eight thousand seven hundred and forty-eight men, of whom three thousand three hundred and seventeen were Europeans. In line with, and acting with them, were two thousand two hundred native levies from Káshmir, and some hundreds from Jhínd.

Sept. 7.

The evening of the 7th was fixed upon for the commencement of the tracing of the batteries which were to assail the northern face of the city. On that day General Wilson issued to

the troops an order, in which he announced to them that the time was drawing near when he trusted their labours would be over, and they would be rewarded for all their past exertions, and for the fatigue still before them, by the capture of the city. Much, he reminded the infantry, still remained to be accomplished. They had to aid and assist the engineers alike in the erection of the batteries and in acting as covering parties; and when the way should be smoothed for them by the scientific branches of the service, they would have to dare death in the breach. When it should come to that point it would be necessary for them to keep well together, to push on in compact and unbroken masses.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 7.

General  
Wilson an-  
nounces to  
the troops his  
intention to  
assault.

His appeal to  
the infantry,

As for the artillery, their work, General Wilson warned them, would be harder than any they had till then encountered. • He expressed, at the same time, his confidence that the members of that branch of the service would bring to the performance of that harder work the same cheerfulness and the same pluck, which had characterised their labours up to that time.

to the artil-  
lery,

Reminding the troops of the cruel murders committed on their officers and their comrades, as well as on their wives and children, General Wilson declared that whilst the troops should spare the women and children who might fall in their way, they should give no quarter to the mutineers.

regarding  
quarter to  
the foe,

Upon the regimental officers was impressed the necessity of keeping their men together, of preventing plunder, of carrying out the directions of

to the regi-  
mental offi-  
cers.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 7.

the engineers. The Major-General concluded by asserting his confidence that a brilliant termination of their labours would follow a zealous enforcement of his directions..

Before detailing the work which, on the evening of the 7th, followed the issue of this order, it is necessary to inform the reader that at the suggestion of Major Charles Reid,\* who commanded on the ridge, a light battery had been erected on the night of the 6th upon the plateau of the ridge close to the Sammy house. The object of this battery, known as Reid's battery, was to keep the ground clear and to protect the contemplated new heavy battery, No. 1, during its construction. Reid's battery contained eight light pieces, six 9-pounders, and two 24-pound howitzers, and was commanded by Captain Remmington.

Reid's  
battery.

Taylor and  
Medley trace  
No. 1 battery.

To return.—On the evening of the day on which General Wilson's order was issued the engineers commenced their work. In pursuance of the resolve to trace out a battery, the fire from which should crush the Morí bastion, Captain Alexander Taylor, assisted by Captain Medley, proceeded at sunset, accompanied by half-a-dozen sappers, to Hindú Ráo's house. A site had previously been selected to the left of the Sammy House, below the ridge on the open plain, and within seven hundred yards of the Morí bastion. Sand-bags had been taken down on the night of the 6th and covered over with grass and brushwood. These were found untouched by the enemy. The two engi-

\* Now General Sir Charles Reid, K.C.B.

neers at once set to work to trace a battery on this spot. The battery, styled No. 1 battery, was divided into two sections. The right section, commanded by Major Brind,\* intended to receive five 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, was to silence the Morí bastion, and to prevent it from interfering with the real attack on the left; the left section, and armed with four 24-pounders, under the command of Major Kaye, was designed to keep down the fire from the Káshmir bastion until the order to assault it should be given. These two sections were to be connected by a trench which, carried on beyond the left section, would communicate with the deep nullah close to the rear, and form a sort of first parallel, giving good cover to the guard of the trenches.

The tracing of this battery had but just been completed when a strong covering party of Reid's Gúrkahs arrived. Camels with fascines and gabions followed, and the work progressed rapidly during the night. The working parties were but little disturbed by the enemy, three well-directed showers of grape from the Morí alone reaching them.

In order to draw off the enemy's attention as much as possible, Major Reid, who was with

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 7.

Its right  
section.

Its left  
section.

The tracing  
completed.

\* Now General Sir James Brind, K.C.B. General Wilson's orders in writing, and verbally given by the Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery, Edwin Johnson, were to the effect that Major Brind, commanding the Foot Artillery of the Delhi Field Force, was to command the Key, or

No. 1 battery; Majors Frank Turner and Edward Kaye being attached for the subordinate command of the right and left wings. Major Turner being struck down by serious illness, the left wing was placed under charge of Major Kaye, supervised throughout by Major Brind.

## 14 THE ENEMY ATTEMPT TO IMPEDE THE WORK.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 7.

Reid diverts  
the fire from  
the Morí  
bastion.

Sept. 8.

At dawn of  
day the  
enemy dis-  
cover the new  
batteries.

Brind's  
splendid  
exertions.

The enemy's  
attempt to  
carry the

Taylor and Medley, sent directions to Captain Remmington to keep up a constant fire on the Morí bastion. This had the desired effect, for the Morí at once opened on Reid's battery and the Sammy House, and did not again molest the working parties. Indeed the enemy did not discover till the day dawned this fresh work upon which the besiegers had been engaged. Much to their dismay they beheld Brind's battery all but completed. Though great efforts had been made, however, all was not ready in it, and but one gun was in position as the morning of the 8th dawned. The rebels on the Morí bastion were not slow to notice the results of the work of that long night. Instantaneously they took measures to demolish it. With the daylight there poured on the barely armed battery showers of grape and round shot. So terrible and so incessant was the fire, that almost every man who ventured from the protection of the battery was knocked over. To this storm the defenders of the battery had but one gun to reply. Major James Brind, one of the heroes of this long siege, who, as already stated, commanded the entire No. 1 battery, noting this, dragged, by great exertion, a howitzer to the rear, and fired over the parapet at the Morí. The fire of the enemy still poured in, however, fierce, incessant, relentless. Emboldened by the weakness of the British reply, they even thought it might be possible to carry by assault the newly made battery. With this object they despatched a body of cavalry and infantry from the Láhor gate. This little



force, emerging from the gate with resolution, took at once the direction of the battery. But they had not gone far when they encountered a hot fire from the 18-pounder and howitzer in the right section of No. 1 battery, from the guns on the ridge, and the light guns on the plateau. This threw them into confusion—a confusion changed into a rout by the opportune discharge of a volley of grape from Brind's battery. This volley sent them back faster than they had come. All this time the men in this battery had been working hard, and though pelted incessantly from the Morí bastion, they soon succeeded in finishing a second platform, then a third, soon after a fourth and a fifth. On the completion of each platform the gun placed on it opened at once on the enemy. The effect of the fire, thus gradually increasing, was soon felt on the Morí. In Major Brind the officers and men possessed a commander of great perseverance, rare energy, a strong will, and a thorough knowledge of his profession. Under his skilful direction the shot from the battery told with tremendous and unceasing effect on the masonry bastion. Gradually the fire from it diminished; by the afternoon it ceased altogether. The bastion was then a heap of ruins, and although the enemy, displaying rare courage, managed to replace the heavy guns in succession to those knocked over, and to discharge them at the battery, the want of cover made it deadly work, and their fire soon languished. One part of the Engineer's plan had thus been carried out. The Morí bastion had been made harmless.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 8.

battery is  
baffled.

The right  
section is  
armed.

Major Brind  
renders the  
Morí harm-  
less.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 8.

The left  
section

is destroyed  
by fire on the  
10th.

Gallantry  
of Lieutenant  
Lockhart.

Heavy fire was, however, continued upon it from the right section and from the ridge until the night before the assault was delivered.

Whilst the right section of the battery had thus been blazing away at the Morí, the 24-pounders in the left section under Major Kaye had been doing their work well, their fire directed on the Káshmir bastion. This fire was continued day and night until noon on the 10th, when the battery caught fire from the constant discharge of our own guns. The sand-bags first caught the flame, then the fascines, made of dry brushwood, and at length the whole battery was in a blaze, which it was feared might extend to the right section and expense magazine.

Lieutenant Lockhart, now Colonel Lockhart, commanding 107th Foot, who was attached to Reid's Gúrkahs, was at the time on duty with two companies of the regiment in the connecting trench between the two sections. The necessity to extinguish the fire was so apparent to him, that he at once suggested to Major Kaye whether it might not be possible to save the battery by working from the outside and top of the parapet. Kaye replied that he thought something might be done if a party were to take sand-bags to the top, cut them, and smother the fire with the sand. Lockhart instantly jumped on to the parapet, followed by six or seven Gúrkahs, and began the work in the manner suggested. The enemy were not slow to discover what had happened, and, determined that the flames should not be extinguished, they at once brought every gun to bear on the blazing

battery and poured in a deadly fire of grape and musketry. Two of the Gúrkahs fell dead, and Lockhart rolled over the parapet with a shot through his jaw. The shot penetrating through the right cheek, passed under his tongue, and went out through the left cheek, smashing the right jaw to pieces.\* The fire was eventually extinguished by means of the sand from the sand-bags, but the section was destroyed.

BOOK X.  
Chapter

1857.  
Sept. 10.

\* The noble example set by Lockhart was witnessed by Major Reid, and mentioned as a case worthy, he considered, of the Victoria Cross. Unfortunately Reid's pencil reports, like many more despatches of his written daily from the ridge in pencil and under fire, were destroyed by General Wilson, as, being written in pencil and not in the regulated form, they were not considered "official." It thus happened that when General Wilson penned his final despatch, he had none of Reid's pencil notes and reports to refer to. Reid subsequently represented that his recommendations had not been attended to; that he had again and again brought to notice the gallant conduct of officers of the 60th Rifles and others who had served under him; and at length he himself sent in a supplementary despatch, through Colonel Norman, then Acting Adjutant-General. The reply he received was that in Lord Clyde's opinion "the time

had altogether passed for publishing any further despatches relative to services of officers at Delhi, which, however meritorious, are now of old date." This was in February 1859. Prior to this Reid had been urging General Wilson to take notice of his recommendations. But it was in vain. Neither his pencil notes written under fire, nor his reports after the siege, were ever properly attended to, and many deserving officers were consequently left unrewarded. Among these was Captain John Fisher, second in command of the Sirmúr Battalion, who was on the ridge with the regiment throughout the siege, who commanded it during the assault, and who was the only officer out of nine who escaped being wounded. This officer did not even receive a brevet. For the same reason Major Reid's appreciatory mention of the services of the Engineer and Artillery officers, expressed in the strongest language, remained unpublished.



Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 7.

Tracing of  
battery No. 2.  
Sept. 8.

To return to the 7th. At the same time that the batteries just referred to were traced on the right, preliminary arrangements for the real attack had been made on the left. On the evening of the 7th, Kúdsia Bágh and Ludlow Castle were occupied by strong pickets. No opposition was offered to this occupation, the mutineers being impressed with the idea that the real attack would be made on the Morí. With these two posts strongly occupied as supports, the engineers were able, on the evening of the 8th, to trace out battery No. 2. This trace was made in front of Ludlow Castle, and five hundred yards from the Káshmir gate. Like battery No. 1—called, after the commandant, Brind's battery—it was divided into two portions, the right-half being intended for seven heavy howitzers and two 18-pounders; the left, about two hundred yards distant, for nine 24-pounders. The fire from these two portions was intended to silence the fire from the Káshmir bastion, to knock away the parapet right and left that gave cover to the defenders, and to open the main breach by which the place was to be stormed.\*

Warned by the experience of Brind's battery,

\* These and the other details describing the plans of the engineers have been taken chiefly from a work entitled *A Year's Campaigning in India*. This book—written by Captain, now Lieutenant-Colonel, Julius George Medley, R.E., himself a distinguished actor in the scenes he describes—gives an account of the proceedings at this memorable epoch of the siege, which may be almost styled authoritative, confirmed as it has been by the testimony of distinguished officers who took part in the preliminaries to the assault.

no attempt was made to complete battery No. 2 in one night. On the 8th the tracing alone was completed. The wisdom of this cautious mode of proceeding was made clear the following day, when a sharp fire of shot, of shell, and of musketry was opened from the Káshmir and Water bastions and the Sélingarh, on the positions newly occupied. Little damage, however, was effected, and the work was pushed forward during the nights of the 9th and 10th. Before dawn of the 11th the battery had been completed and armed, and it was then unmasked. Major Campbell commanded the left section of it, and Major Kaye—transferred from the ignited left section of Battery No. 1—the right, but the former officer having been wounded on the evening of the 11th, Captain Edwin Johnson,\* Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery, then serving in the battery, succeeded to the command, and held it to the moment of assault, when he resumed his place on General Wilson's staff.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 8.

The enemy  
open fire  
upon it.

Sept. 9-11.

The third battery was not completed before that night. This battery was traced by Captain Medley the evening of the 9th. With a boldness which was not rare, but the display of which, in this instance, testified to remarkable negligence on the part of the enemy, the engineers traced this battery within one hundred and sixty yards of the Water bastion. Seeking for a fit site for the battery, the director of the attack, Captain Medley, discovered a small ruined building, an

Battery No. 3.

\* Now Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Johnson, K.C.B.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 9-11.

out-office of the Custom House—a large edifice within one hundred and sixty yards of the Water bastion, and totally unoccupied by the enemy. Captain Medley took possession of the Custom House, and determined to trace the battery inside the small ruined building referred to, the outer wall of which would conceal the work and give cover to the workmen. This daring measure completely succeeded. Though the enemy, suspecting something though not the actual truth, peppered our workmen incessantly, these never flinched. When one man fell another would take his place.\* Working in this way the battery was finished and armed by the night of the 11th.

Battery No. 4.

Another battery, No. 4, for four heavy mortars, commanded by Major Tombs, was traced and armed on the night of the 10th, in a safe spot in the Kúdsiabágh itself, ready to open fire when required.

The enemy detect the point from which the attack is to be made,

The mutineers had by this time become alive to the fact that it was not from the right but from the left that the real attack was to issue. With an alacrity worthy of the highest praise, they at once decided upon measures which, if

\* “Pandy did not know what we were at, but at any rate he knew the people were working in that direction, and he served out such a liberal supply of musketry and shell that night that the working party lost thirty-nine men killed and wounded. It was wonderful indeed to see with what courage the men worked.

“They were merely the unarmed Pioneers I have described above, and not meant to be fighting men. With the passive courage so common to natives, as man after man was knocked over, they would stop a moment, weep a little over their fallen friend, pop his body in a row along with the rest, and then work on as before.”—*Medley*.

commenced but forty-eight hours earlier, would have effectually baffled the attack. Seeing the effect which the fire from the still masked batteries must produce, they set to work to mount heavy guns along the long curtain. In other convenient nooks, out of reach of the fire of the attack, they mounted light guns. Taking advantage, too, of the broken ground before them, they made in one night an advanced trench parallel to the left attack, and three hundred and fifty yards from it, covering the whole of their front. This trench they lined with infantry.

The heavy guns could not be mounted behind the long curtain in time to anticipate the attack; but at daybreak, on the morning of the 11th, the light guns above alluded to opened an enfilading attack from the right, whilst the muskets from the infantry in the new trench began a hot and unceasing fire. For a time there was no answer. But at 8 o'clock the two sections of No. 2 battery, unmasked, replied. They began with a salvo from the nine 24-pounders—a salvo greeted by cheers from the men in the battery. The effect was marked and decisive. As the site of the breach was struck, huge fragments of stone fell, and the curtain wall disappeared in the ditch. The defenders on the Káshmir bastion attempted to reply, but in ten minutes their fire was silenced. For the rest of the day the guns of No. 2 battery continued to pound away at the walls. It was an exhilarating sight to watch the stone-work crumbling under the storm of shot and shell, the breach getting larger and larger, and the 8-inch

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 10-11.

and take  
measures to  
repel it.

They open  
fire on the  
new batteries.

Effective  
reply from  
No. 2 battery.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 11.

The enemy's  
fire works  
destruction in  
No. 1 and 2  
batteries.

shells, made to burst just as they touched the parapet, bringing down whole yards of it at a time.\*

During the night the mortars from No. 3 battery kept the enemy on the alert with incessant fire. But the rebels were by no means idle. The light guns already alluded to, reinforced by a heavy one, playing from martello towers and from holes in curtain walls, maintained a constant and most effective front and enfilading fire on Nos. 1 and 2 batteries. The batteries were constantly raked from end to end. So terrible and so effective was this fire, that, at last, one of the guns of No. 1 battery was withdrawn from playing on the breach and placed in the epaulment to keep down, if possible, the enfilading fire. But even this did not prove very effectual. At one time General Wilson was inclined to make a rush at these guns from the right† and spike or capture them. But their position, within grape-shot of the curtain wall, rendered an attack on them difficult, and certain to be attended with loss. On the other hand, No. 3 battery would be completed on the morrow, and it was hoped that the effect of the full power of the artillery would be decisive.

Sept. 12.

At 11 o'clock on the morning of the 12th,

\* Medley.

† In fact, Major Reid actually was instructed to make a night attack on the position, and four companies of Guides and Gúrkahs were told off supplied with spikes for the purpose. At the same time

the battery near the Sammy House received orders from Major Reid to cover the attack and draw off the enemy's fire. Just then orders arrived from General Wilson countermanding the attack.



Greathed, of the Engineers, aided by some native sappers, unmasked the embrasures. The battery was commanded by Major Scott, with the gallant Fagan as his second in command. In another minute the six guns of the battery opened fire. The effect was tremendous. The enemy's guns were dismounted or smashed; the Water bastion was beaten into a shapeless mass, and in a few hours the breach seemed almost practicable. But the rebels showed no faint heart. Though their guns were silenced, they continued to pour in so heavy and continuous a musketry fire that the air seemed alive with bullets. The loss of life was consequently severe. Fagan, who, in his over-anxiety to see the effect of the first salvo, had raised his head above the parapet, was shot dead. Still further to embarrass the attack, the enemy opened from the other side of the river an enfilading fire, which, though not so effective or so destructive as that carried on from martello towers, was still sufficiently annoying. But our gallant artillerymen never flinched. Throughout the day all the batteries poured in a fire from fifty guns and mortars on the devoted city. The heat was intense, the labour was severe, the danger was enormous. But during the long hours of the day, and of the night which slowly followed, those unflinching officers and men, sustained by the conviction that to their unflagging energies was entrusted a task necessary for the triumph of the British cause, stood firmly to their guns, resisting every weakness of the flesh, their hearts joined in one firm resolve, re-

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 12.

No. 3 battery  
opens fire,

with tremen-  
dous effect.

Splendid  
exertions of  
the Bengal  
Artillery.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 12-13.

Their con-  
tinued fire  
effects  
breaches in  
the defences.

Four engi-  
neers sent to  
examine the  
breaches.

Medley and  
Lang

joining in the sight of the destruction made by their guns, their mortars, and their howitzers on the walls which had so long bade them defiance.\* The fire continued that day, that night, and the day following, the enemy still responding, and with considerable effect. On the afternoon of the 13th, General Wilson, in consultation with Baird Smith, thought that two sufficient breaches had been made. He accordingly directed that they should be examined.

For this dangerous duty four young engineer officers were selected, Medley and Lang for the Káshmir bastion, Greathed and Home for the Water. The two first-named officers made one attempt as soon as it was dusk, but they were discovered and fired at. They determined, therefore, to postpone the examination till 10 o'clock. To facilitate the accomplishment of his task, Medley requested the officers commanding the batteries to fire heavily on the breach till 10 o'clock, then to cease firing. He then arranged that six picked riflemen of the 60th Rifles should accompany himself and his companion, and that an officer and twenty men of the same regiment should follow in support, halting at the edge of

\* "At different times between the 7th and 11th," wrote Major Baird Smith in his despatch, "these batteries opened fire with an efficiency and a vigour which excited the unqualified admiration of all who had the good fortune to witness it. Every object contemplated in

the attack was accomplished with a success even beyond my expectations; and I trust I may be permitted to say, that while there are many noble passages in the history of the Bengal Artillery, none will be nobler than that which will tell of its work on this occasion."

the jungle while they went on to the breach. Should the officer see that the two engineer officers and party were being cut off, he was to bring his men to their support, sounding his whistle for them to fall back. Should, on the other hand, one of the examining party be wounded, or should the party require support, they were to whistle for him.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 13.

The night was a bright starlight, and there was no moon. Just before the two officers and their party started, an 8-inch shell from the enemy buried itself deep in ground close to them, burst, and covered them with earth. A minute later and the gongs sounded 10. The firing suddenly ceased. The explorers were at once on their feet, and, drawing swords, and feeling that their revolvers were ready to hand, began to advance stealthily into the enemy's country.

set out for  
the Káshmir  
bastion.

Safely, and without discovery, the two officers and their six followers reached the edge of the ditch. Not a soul was to be seen. The counter-scarp was sixteen feet deep, and steep. Lang slid down it; Medley then passed down by the ladder, and with two of the men descended after Lang, leaving the other four to cover the retreat. In two minutes more they would have reached the top of the breach. But careful and stealthy as had been their movements, they had not been quite noiseless. Just at that moment they heard several men running from the left towards the breach. They, therefore, reascended, though with some difficulty, and throwing themselves on the grass, waited for events. Prone in the deep

They reach  
the edge of  
the ditch;

descend into  
it;

find the  
enemy on the  
alert;

return to the  
edge;



BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Sept. 13.

find the  
breach prac-  
ticable;

and run back  
in safety.

Greathed and  
Home report  
the breach at  
the Water  
bastion prac-  
ticable.

Baird Smith  
advises  
Wilson to  
deliver the

shade, they could see, without being seen, against the clear sky, not twenty yards distant, a number of dusky forms. They watched them as they loaded their muskets. The moments were exciting, but the excitement did not prevent Medley and his comrade from carefully examining, from the ground where they lay, the longed-for breach. They saw that it was large, that the slope was easy of ascent, and that there were no guns in the flanks. They had had experience that the descent was an easy one. It would be desirable, they felt, to reach the top, but the dusky figures would not move, and any attempt to surprise them would be uncertain, and would involve possibly the loss of some of their party. Besides, they had really gained the knowledge they had come to acquire. Medley, therefore, determined to be satisfied and to fall back. But how to fall back? There was but one way. Medley suddenly gave a preconcerted signal. At once they all started up and ran back. A volley followed them, but ineffectively. Untouched they gained their own batteries in safety.

Greathed and Home had not been less successful in their expedition. They had examined the Water bastion; and although they had found that the musketry parapets had not been so sufficiently destroyed as they would be were the cannonade to be prolonged, they reported the breach practicable.

With these two reports before him, Baird Smith did not hesitate. The dangers of delay, the worn-out state of the men in the batteries, far

outweighed any consideration which the condition of the musketry parapets in the Water bastion might suggest. He at once, then, advised General Wilson to deliver the assault at daybreak the following morning.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 13-14.  
assault at  
once.

In such a matter the General commanding<sup>9</sup> could not but act on the advice thus tendered him. General Wilson immediately issued the necessary orders. To Brigadier-General Nicholson, of the Bengal Army, whose triumphant march through the Panjáb and subsequent victory at Najafgarh had made him the hero of the campaign, was assigned the command of the first column, destined to storm the breach near the Káshmir bastion, and escalate the face of the bastion. This column was composed of three hundred men of H.M.'s 75th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert; of two hundred and fifty men of the 1st Fusiliers\* under Major Jacob; and of four hundred and fifty men of the 2nd Panjáb Infantry, under Captain Green; in all, one thousand men. The engineer officers attached to this column were Lieutenants Medley, Lang, and Bingham.

Wilson accepts the advice and assigns the commands of the several assaulting columns.

First column,  
Nicholson.

The second column was commanded by Brigadier William Jones, C.B., of H.M.'s 61st Regiment. It was formed of two hundred and fifty men of H.M.'s 8th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Greathed; of two hundred and fifty men of the 2nd Fusiliers,† under Captain Boyd; of three hundred and fifty men of the 4th Sikh

Second  
column,  
Brigadier  
William  
Jones.

\* Now H.M.'s 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

† Now H.M.'s 104th Bengal Fusiliers.



Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 13-14.

Third  
column,  
Colonel  
Campbell.

Infantry, under Captain Rothery; in all, eight hundred and fifty men. This column was to storm the breach in the Water bastion. The engineer officers attached to it were Lieutenants Greathed, Hovenden, and Pemberton.

The command of the third column was confided to Colonel Campbell, H.M.'s 52nd Foot. It was composed of two hundred men of the 52nd, under Major Vigors; of two hundred and fifty men of the Kamáon Battalion, under Captain Ramsay; of five hundred men of the 1st Panjáb Infantry, under Lieutenant Nicholson; in all, nine hundred and fifty men. The duty assigned to it was to assault by the Káshmir gate after it should have been blown open. The engineer officers attached to it were Lieutenants Home, Salkeld, and Tandy.

Fourth  
column,  
Major Reid.

The fourth column was commanded by Major Reid of the Bengal Army. It consisted of the Sirmúr Battalion,\* the Guide Corps, and such of the pickets, European and native, as could be spared from Hindú Rao's house; in all (of these) eight hundred and sixty men. But, in addition, there was a portion of the contingent of the Maharájá of Káshmir, commanded by Captain Richard Lawrence, and consisting of twelve hundred men. The task assigned to this column was to attack the suburb Kishanganj, and to enter the Láhor gate.† The engineer officers attached to

\* Now the Prince of Wales's Own Gúrkahs. Had Reid attempted to follow it literally, that is, to enter

† This was the plan laid down by General Wilson. by the Láhor gate, his troops would have been exposed to

this column were Lieutenants Maunsell and Tenant.

The fifth, or reserve, column was commanded by Brigadier Longfield of H.M.'s 8th Regiment. It was composed as follows: two hundred and fifty men, H.M.'s 61st Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Deacon; four hundred and fifty men, 4th Panjáb Infantry, under Captain Wilde; three hundred men, Bilúch Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Farquhar; three hundred men of the Rájá of Jhind's auxiliary force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunsford; in all, one thousand three hundred men. To these were subsequently added two hundred men of the 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel John Jones of that regiment, detailed in the first instance to cover the advance. This column, acting as a reserve, was to follow the first column. The engineer officers attached to it were Lieutenants Ward and Thackeray.

The officers appointed to the command of the five assaulting columns were, then, Nicholson, Jones, Campbell, Reid, and Longfield. They were all picked men, fitted alike by nature and

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 13-14.  
Fifth column,  
Brigadier  
Longfield.

The commanders of  
the assaulting  
columns.

the fire of the left face of the Láhor bastion, of the right face of the Burn bastion, and to the musketry fire from the loop-holed curtain connecting both bastions, which had been untouched by our artillery. Reid wrote to General Wilson to say that his column would be destroyed if he attempted anything of the

sort, and proposed that, after taking Kishanganj and the suburbs, he should leave the Jammú contingent in the fortified serai, and follow the dry bed of the canal, where his troops would be under cover the whole way to the Kábul gate, which, he had arranged with Nicholson, should be opened for him from the inside.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 13-14.  
Nicholson.

Jones.

Campbell.

Reid.

by training for the task devolving upon them. Of Nicholson it is unnecessary to say much. His exploits in the Panjáb, and but a few days before at Najafgarh, had made him the paladin of the army. The commander of the second column, Brigadier William Jones, had served at Chilianwála and at Gújrát; had co-operated in the destruction of the enemy after that crowning victory by pursuing them, at the head of his regiment and a troop of artillery, to the Khaibar pass; and, during the siege of Dehlí, had distinguished himself as brigadier of the 3rd Infantry Brigade. Colonel Campbell, commanding the third column, was the colonel of the 52nd. He had commanded his regiment with distinguished gallantry at Siálkôt, where it formed part of Nicholson's force.

Major Reid, of the fourth column, belonged to the Bengal Army. Major Charles Reid had served in Sind under Sir Charles Napier, throughout the Satlaj and Barmese wars, and had ever distinguished himself not less by energy and daring, than by readiness of resource and presence of mind. During the siege, whilst the remainder of the attacking force had occupied the old parade ground, covered by the ridge, Reid alone had held the ridge. All the pickets detached from the main force to various points on the ridge had been under his orders, and his only. The posts thus under his command had included the main picket at Hindú Rao's house, the Observatory, the Sammy House, the Crow's Nest, and the Sabzi-mandi. On the positions so indicated he had,



between the 8th June\* and the 14th September, repulsed no less than twenty-six attacks, displaying a daring, a coolness, and a presence of mind not to be surpassed. On the 17th June, with a small force of four companies of the 60th Rifles, his own regiment, the Sirmúr Battalion, and twenty-five sappers, he had stormed the strong position of Kishanganj, destroying the enemy's batteries stationed there, and returning the same evening to his position on the ridge. Brigadier Longfield, commanding the reserve column, was brigadier of the second brigade during the siege. His conspicuous services fully entitled him to the post which was assigned him on this memorable occasion.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 13-14.

Longfield.

It was 3 o'clock in the morning. The columns of assault were in the leash. In a few moments they would be slipped. What would be the result? Would the skill and daring of the soldiers of England triumph against superior numbers defending and defended by stone walls; or would rebellion, triumphing over the assailants, turn that triumph to a still greater account by inciting by its means to its aid the Panjáb and the other parts of India still quivering in the balance? That, indeed, was the question. The fate of

Sept. 14.

The enormous stake dependent on the result of the assault.

\* Major Reid's services in the mutiny commence from even a prior date. He marched with his regiment from Dehrá on the 14th May 1857, and by his vigorous action in the disturbed district of Balandshahr, opened communica-

tions with Mírath and Ali-garh, and with the seat of Government in Calcutta, a service of vital importance, for which he received the thanks of the Governor-General in Council.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 14.

The order of  
assault.

Dehlí was in itself the smallest of the results to be gained by a successful assault. The fate of India was in the balance. The repulse of the British would entail the rising of the Panjáb!

It had been decided that whilst the first and second columns should direct their attack against the breaches near the Káshmir and Water bastions, an explosion party should steal ahead and blow up the Káshmir gate, through which the third column should then effect an entrance into the city. The explosion party consisted of Lieutenants Home and Salkeld of the Engineers; of Sergeants Smith, Carmichael, and Corporal Burgess, *alias* Grierson, of the Sappers and Miners; of Bugler Hawthorne, H.M.'s 52nd Light Infantry; and of eight native sappers. It was covered by two hundred men of the 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones of that regiment. The duty devolving on the Sappers and Miners and their officers, was, it is almost needless to state, to blow up the Káshmir gate; that of Bugler Hawthorne was to announce, by means of his bugle, to the storming party, that the explosion had done its work completely.

The first,  
second, and  
third columns  
set out.

Though preparations had been made to advance to the assault a little after 3 in the morning, some slight delay occurred, and the day was dawning ere the columns were in motion. All this time the besiegers' batteries were pouring in a heavy and continuous fire—a fire which the enemy, always on the alert, answered with rockets, shells, and round shot. It was amid the din and tumult caused by this artillery duel that, just

after dawn, the first, second, and third columns started on their tremendous errand. General Nicholson had the general management of the attack. He looked quiet but anxious. General Wilson rode up just as the columns were advancing, evidently full of anxiety.\* No wonder, knowing, as he did know, the enormous issues at stake on the result of the day's work before his men.

BOOK X.  
Chapter L  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 14.

The columns advanced as far as the ground opposite Ludlow Castle. There they halted. The first column then moved sharply to the left to take up its position in Kúdsia Bágh, there to wait for the signal; the second went further to the left, and formed up behind No. 3 battery; the third remained on the high road, to await there the bugle-sound which was to summon them to the Káshmir gate. The signal for the assault of the first and second columns was to be the sudden advance of the skirmishers of the 60th Rifles.

Their progress to the ground opposite Ludlow Castle.

The columns having taken up their positions, Nicholson gave the signal. The Rifles at once dashed to the front with a cheer, extending along and skirmishing through the low jungle—which at this point extends to within fifty yards of the ditch—and opening at the same time a fire on the enemy on the walls. At the sound of their advance, the engineer officers attached to the first column, previously posted on the edge of the jungle whence the column was to advance towards the breach, waved their swords to show the way

Nicholson gives the signal to push on.

\* Medley.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

The engi-  
neers of the  
first column  
reach the  
breach.

The assail-  
ants are met  
by a terrible  
fire,

but by des-  
perate valour  
gain the  
breach.

to the stormers. The fire from our batteries had ceased, whilst that of the enemy, now thoroughly alive to the nature of the contest, continued incessant. Through this fire Medley and Lang and the ladder-men advanced at a quick walk till they reached the edge of the cover. Then, forming their ladder-men into a sort of line, they rushed to the breach, closely followed by the storming party, and in a minute gained the crest of the glacis. They were here in the open exposed to a terrific and unceasing fire from the breach and the open parapet walls, which told with fatal effect. So hot was the fire that for ten minutes it was impossible to let down the ladders. "Man after man was struck down, and the enemy, with yells and curses, kept up a terrific fire, even catching up stones from the breach in their fury, and, dashing them down, dared the assailants to come on."\* But, undaunted by these cries and by the fire by which they were accompanied, the British soldiers did push on. They succeeded at length in getting two of the ladders into the ditch, and instantly the officers led their men down them†. Once in the ditch, to mount the escarp and scramble up the breach was the work of an instant. But the enemy did not wait

\* Medley, who is my chief authority for all the details of the assault.

† "The storming parties pushed on, two ladders were thrown into the ditch, and a brave officer, Fitzgerald, of H.M.'s 75th Regiment, who

was killed directly afterwards, was the first to mount. As soon as I saw my first ladder down, I slid down into the ditch, mounted up the escarp, and scrambled up the breach, followed by the soldiers."—  
*Medley.*



for them. The insulting yells and curses ceased as the whilom utterers hurriedly vacated their position. "The breach was won, and the supporting troops pouring in fast, went down the ramp into the main-guard below."\*

Book X.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 14.

Whilst the first column was thus carrying out, with daring and success, the work assigned to it, the second, under Brigadier William Jones, C.B., had not been less occupied. Led by its engineers, Greathed and Hovenden, the column advanced towards the breach in the Water bastion. By some mistake the supporting party of the stormers pressed forward on the right of the party, and, rushing to the counterscarp of the curtain, slid into its ditch, climbed its breach, and won the rampart. The stormers of the 8th,<sup>†</sup> however, most of them carrying ladders, followed the engineers to the Water bastion. They had to make a slight detour to the right to avoid some water in the ditch, and being in the open, they were exposed to the full fury of the enemy's fire, which, at this point, was incessant and well directed. The two engineer officers fell, severely wounded, and of the thirty-nine ladder-men, twenty-nine were struck down in a few minutes. But here, as at the Káshmir gate, British valour was not to be daunted. The ladders were at length placed and the breach was carried by the survivors, twenty-five in number, headed by Captain Baynes, next to whom in seniority was Sergeant Walker.

The second column.

The bulk of it turn off to the right and gain the rampart.

The stormers of the 8th King's

gain the breach of the Water gate.

Meanwhile the remainder of the column, which

tenants Pogson and Metge,  
Baynes, Lieu- and seventy-five rank and file.

JAYAKAR LIBRARY

3 \*



052899

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

Brigadier  
Jones presses  
forward to  
the Kábul  
gate.

had entered by the curtain breach, had done wonders. Their entrance into a vital point of the defences, where an attack had not been expected, for the moment paralysed the enemy. Brigadier Jones, who, in command of the column, had displayed great gallantry, took advantage of the disorder into which they had been thrown by clearing the ramparts as far as the Kábul gate, on the top of which he planted the column flag,\* carried by a private of the 61st, Andrew Laughnan.

Before recording the proceedings of the third column, I propose to follow the explosion party, on whose action the movements of that column were to depend.

The explosion  
party.

Splendid  
audacity of  
Home.

The composition of this party has already been given. Posted in front of the third column, it advanced straight on the Káshmir gate, in the face of a very hot fire. Undeterred by this fire, Lieutenant Home and four men, each carrying a bag of twenty-five pounds of powder, pushed on through a barrier gate, which was found open, across the ditch, to the foot of the great double gate. So great was the audacity of this proceeding, that it completely paralysed the enemy. Firing only a few straggling shots, they closed the wicket with every appearance of alarm, and Home, after laying his bags, had time to jump into the ditch unhurt. Salkeld was not so for-

\* This flag was presented by Sir William Jones to Her Majesty the Queen on the 1st January 1877, the day of the proclamation of Her Majesty's title of Empress of India.

tunate. Before he could reach the gate the enemy had recovered from their panic, and, divining his object, had resolved to do their utmost to thwart it. From either side of the top of the gateway, and from the open wicket close by, they poured upon him and his party a deadly fire. Salkeld, nevertheless, laid his bags, but was almost immediately after shot through the arm and leg, and fell back disabled on the bridge. He handed the portfire to Sergeant Burgess, bidding him light the fusee. Burgess, trying to obey, was shot dead. Sergeant Carmichael then seized the portfire, lighted the fusee, but immediately fell, mortally wounded. The other sergeant, Smith, thinking that Carmichael had failed, rushed forward to seize the portfire, but noticing the fusee burning, threw himself into the ditch. The next moment the massive gate was shattered with a tremendous explosion. Home at once ordered Hawthorne to sound the bugle-call.\* Fearing that in the noise of the assault the sound might not be heard, he had it repeated three times. The 52nd, anxiously awaiting the signal, did not hear it; but their colonel, the

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

Salkeld lays  
his bags, but  
is wounded.

Burgess and  
Carmichael  
are killed.

Wonderful  
escape of  
Smith.

Home orders  
the advance  
to be  
sounded.

\* A more daring and gallant achievement than that of the officers and non-commissioned officers mentioned in the text has never been recorded. Their subsequent fate cannot but inspire interest. Burgess and Carmichael were killed on the spot; Salkeld, Home, Smith, and Hawthorne were recom-

mended by General Wilson for the Victoria Cross. But Salkeld succumbed in a few days to the severe wounds he had received; Home met his death shortly afterwards at Málaga; Smith and Hawthorne survived, to receive the honours that they had so nobly earned.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

Campbell  
does not hear  
the sound,  
but orders  
the advance  
on hearing  
the explosion.

gallant Campbell, who also commanded the column, in front of which he had posted himself, noticing the explosion, and expecting the call, asked, not hearing it himself, whether it had reached the ears of any of those about him. Though no one had heard it, Campbell felt that at so critical a moment action was better than standing still. He at once ordered the advance. The column responded eagerly. The 52nd gallantly led the way, and in less than a minute after the bugle had sounded, they dashed on over the bridge, and entered the city just as the other columns had won the breaches.\*

Campbell  
pushes on to  
within sight  
of the Jamma  
Masjid.

Colonel Campbell, on gaining the main-guard inside the gate, at once re-formed his column, and pushed on with the intention of occupying the Kótwáli, and, if possible, the Jamma Masjid. He cleared the Water bastion, within which some of the enemy were still lurking, the church, and the enclosure known as the "Delhi Gazette compound," and forced his way through the Káshmir Gate bazaar. A gun which commanded the line of advance was carried by a rush of a party of the 52nd, under Lieutenant Bradshaw, who, however, paid with his life on the spot the penalty of his daring. Still pressing forward, Campbell reached the gate opening on the Chándni Chók. Forcing this, he advanced without much opposition, except from a musketry fire from a few houses. A sudden turn of the road

\* Lieutenant Home's *Report*; Bugler Hawthorne's *Statement*; Medley; Bayley's *Assault of Dehli*.

brought him within sight of the Jamma Masjid, its arches and gates bricked up, incapable of being forced without powder-bags or guns, rendered safe against assault from mere infantry. Unwilling to forego the chance of storming this formidable position, Campbell remained in front of it for half an hour, under a fire of musketry from the houses, in the expectation of the successful advance of the other columns. But as time went on, and there were no visible signs of the approach of the one or the other, Campbell deemed it advisable to retire on the Bégam's Bágh, a large enclosure. He held this place for an hour and a half, exposed to a heavy fire of musketry, grape, and canister. Here I must leave him whilst I trace the progress of the fourth column.

Book X.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 14.

For want of  
support re-  
tires on the  
Bégam Bágh.

Much depended on the success of its attack. Commanded by Major Reid, it was designed to move from Hindú Rao's house, on the right, against the suburbs of Kishanganj and Paháripúr, with a view of driving the enemy thence and effecting an entrance at the Kábul gate after it should be taken by General Nicholson. The successful advance of the first, second, and third columns depended, then, very much on the result of this flank attack.

Attack of the  
fourth  
column.

Major Reid's column,\* composed of detachments of eight different regiments, eight hundred and sixty men in all, with a reserve of one thousand two hundred infantry of the Jammú contingent,

His column  
deficient in  
guns.

\* *Vide Appendix A.*

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

The Jammú troops, sent by Reid to make a diversion, become engaged with the enemy.

Reid  
advances.

formed up at 4.30 A.M. on the Grand Trunk Road, opposite the Sabzi Mandi picket. Before 5 A.M. all was in readiness, but the four horse artillery guns which were ordered to accompany the column had not arrived. Presently the guns came up, but the officer reported that there were only sufficient gunners to man one gun. Reid had no intention of taking one gun into action contrary to the rules of the service, so he directed the officer to obtain the full complement of gunners as soon as possible. It was now broad daylight, and he was anxiously listening for the explosion (the blowing in of the Káshmir gate), which was to have been his signal to advance, when he heard musketry fire on his right, and soon discovered that the party of the Jammú troops, four hundred infantry and four guns, which he had ordered to proceed direct from the camp at 3.45 A.M., for the purpose of making a diversion by occupying the Ídgar, had become engaged with the enemy. No time under these circumstances was to be lost, so he at once pushed on with the column without the horse artillery guns, and more than half an hour before the attack of the other columns.

The detachment of the 60th Rifles, under Captain Muter, was thrown out in skirmishing order to the right of the road, while a feeling party of the Guides was sent a short distance ahead of the column. When within sixty yards of the canal bridge, Reid discovered that the enemy had manned their breast-works across the road, as also one running parallel to the road, and that



both of them had been considerably strengthened during the night. The head of the column approached the first line of breast-works, within fifty yards, when the enemy opened with a tremendous volley. The 60th Rifles meanwhile closed to the left, and with the Sirmúr Gúrkahs, made a dash, and instantly drove the enemy from his first line of defence. They at once retreated on their second line. Meanwhile a steady fire was kept up by the enemy from the loop-holed wall of Kishanganj, eighteen feet high, which completely commanded the position now gained by the head of Reid's column, and many of his men fell. Reid, who was standing on the parapet of the canal bridge, now observed that the enemy had been reinforced from the city. They came in thousands down the dry bed of the canal over which Reid was standing, and a large body appeared on the road, hesitating apparently whether they should drive our men from the breast-work already gained, or attack the detachment of the Jammú troops on the right, which had never approached the Idgar—a result of their starting from the camp nearly an hour after the time laid down. Guns at this time, whilst the enemy stood in a mass on the road, would have been invaluable, and would have proved of the greatest service to Reid, but, though the guns had been sent, no gunners, through some unaccountable mistake, were available to man them.

Reid was just about to feign an attack in front of the Kishanganj heavy batteries, whilst he should direct a real one in their flank and rear, when he fell over the parapet of the bridge with a musket-

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

Embarrassment felt by Reid from the want of artillery.

Reid is struck down.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

On reviving  
he makes  
over com-  
mand to  
Richard  
Lawrence.

Fatal effect  
of the fall of  
Reid.

shot wound in the head, his engineer officer, Lieutenant Maunsell, who was standing near him, being also hit in the head. Up to this time, Reid states in his dispatch, "all was going on admirably, the troops were steady, and well in hand, and I made sure of success." How long he lay on the ground insensible is not known—all thought he was dead—but when he came to his senses he found himself on the back of one of his Gúrkahs. He then saw the party of the Jammú contingent on his right hard pressed. He sent for Captain Lawrence, who was his second in command, and, presently meeting him, directed him to take command and to support the right. The reserve, under Captain Lawrence, consisting of one thousand two hundred infantry of the Jammú contingent, was in rear of the column. The detached party of four hundred infantry destined for the Ídgar, became perfectly disorganised after Reid's fall. They rushed into the main column, and caused the greatest confusion, making it difficult to distinguish friend from foe.

The fall of Major Reid was an irreparable blow to the success of the fourth column. He knew every inch of the ground thoroughly: he knew the officers, he knew the men; and every officer and every man felt in his leading the most absolute confidence. The first effect of his fall showed itself in the confusion which was thereby caused in the command. Next in seniority to Reid was Captain Richard Lawrence, brother of the Chief Commissioner of the Panjáb. Captain Lawrence was in command of the body of the Káshmir

contingent, one thousand two hundred strong, which formed the reserve to that part of the fourth column which was attacking Kishanganj. Major Reid had been stunned by his wound; but, as I have already stated, on recovering his senses, he called out for Captain Lawrence, and personally made over the command to him. But before this had happened, many of the officers who had been conducting the attack under Major Reid, feeling the absence of a commander, and seeing that the attack had failed, had resolved to fall back. Falling back, they came upon Captain Lawrence, to whom they reported themselves, and who approved their conduct. Meanwhile Captain Muter of the 60th Rifles, who was with the attacking column, seeing Major Reid fall, and apparently regarding Captain Lawrence in the light only of a political officer attached to the Káshmir force, assumed the command of the portion of the column with which he was serving. This caused considerable confusion; Captain Lawrence and Captain Muter each regarding himself as commandant of the column, and each giving his own orders. As reinforcements of artillery which had been applied for failed to arrive, and as the enemy, pressing forward on the right flank of the column, seemed to threaten his rear, Lawrence retired leisurely on the batteries behind Hindú Rao's house. The attack on the Ídgar, conducted by a portion of the Káshmir troops under Captain Dwyer, was still more unfortunate. The Káshmirians, greatly outnumbered, were not only repulsed, but lost four guns.

Book X.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 14.

Captain  
Muter as-  
sumes the  
command of  
a portion of  
the column,

the attack of  
which is re-  
pulsed.



## 44 RESULT OF REPULSE OF THE FOURTH COLUMN.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 14.

Disastrous  
effect on the  
other columns  
of the repulse  
of the fourth  
column.

The repulse of the fourth column greatly aggravated the difficulties of the assault. I left the first and second columns, to which I must now return, victorious inside the breach. Nicholson at once collected the great body of his column on the square of the main-guard, then turning to the right, pushed forward along the foot of the walls towards the Láhor gate. The second column, under Brigadier Jones, had previously cleared the ramparts, and passing the Móri bastion, had planted their flag, in the manner already indicated, on the summit of the Kábul gate. Nicholson advanced beyond this in the hope of feeling the support of the fourth column. But we have seen that the attack of this column had failed, and it was this failure which now rendered the position of the advanced assailants difficult and dangerous in the extreme.

In pushing along the foot of the walls towards the Láhor gate our troops had been assailed by musketry fire from the houses in the place, and by grape and round shot from the Sélingarh and the palace. This, however, had not impeded the advance. But when the column had reached the eastern extremity of the town and ascertained that, by the failure of the fourth column, the defences there were still in the hands of the enemy, they saw that their entire position was altered, and that they had before them another struggle at least as serious as that which they had but just then overcome.

Position of  
the Láhor  
gate.

The Láhor gate of the city was the gate which led to the Chándni Chók or principal street of the

city. This gate was commanded by a bastion about two-thirds of the way between it and the Kábul gate. But to reach this bastion not only had narrow streets, the houses in which were strongly manned, to be forced, but the left of the attacking party would be exposed to a very heavy fire from the enemy now concentrating there. It was a prospect such as to make the boldest leader pause. Nicholson was a man of great daring, but there were men with him at the time, not less brave, who pointed out to him that under the circumstances in which he found himself it would be wise to be content with establishing himself in the houses which dominated the position, and await intelligence before advancing further. Seymour Blane of the 52nd, who acted as his brigade-major, strongly pressed this advice upon him. Major Jacob of the 1st Fusiliers, a most able and gallant officer, and who commanded the regiment on the occasion, supported this view. But Nicholson was impatient to press on. He believed that delays were dangerous, that the fullest advantage should be taken, at the moment, of the successful storm. More than two hours had already elapsed since his men had stood triumphant on the breach. A firm footing in the city had been gained. But this was not in itself sufficient. The repulse of the fourth column had renewed the hopes of the enemy. To destroy these it was necessary, in the opinion of Nicholson, to penetrate into the city.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 14.

The enemy concentrate in the narrow streets leading to it.

Nicholson is anxious to force them, despite of remonstrances to the contrary.

In front of the column was a lane, tolerably

Description of the posi-



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 14.

tion occupied  
by the  
enemy.

straight, about ten feet wide, but narrowed in places by projecting buttresses or towers with parapets. Where these buildings existed the roadway was narrowed to about three feet.\* The city side of the lane was bounded by houses with flat roofs and parapets. Not only were all these buildings strongly occupied by the enemy, but the lane was further defended by two brass guns; one about a hundred and sixty yards from its opening, pointed in the direction of the advance; the other, about a hundred yards in its rear, commanding it. Behind both was a bullet-proof screen, whilst projecting as it were from the wall was the bastion commanding the Láhore gate, armed with heavy pieces, and capable of holding a thousand men.

The assault.

It was this formidable position that Nicholson decided to attack whilst yet the enemy might still be under the influence of their defeat at three out of the four points attacked. On receiving the order, his men dashed gallantly up the lane, took the first gun with a rush, and then pushed on to the second. But within ten yards of this they were assailed by a fire of grape and musketry, and volleys of stones and round shot, thrown by hand, so severe that they recoiled under the terrible and ceaseless shower. There was no shelter for them, and they were forced to retire. It would be difficult to paint in colours too bright the exertions of their officers. Con-

Gallantry of  
the assail-  
ants,

\* "The 1st Bengal European Fusiliers in the Delhi Campaign," an article contributed to *Blackwood's Magazine* for January 1858.

spicuous amongst these was Lieutenant Butler of the 1st Fusiliers. This officer penetrated up to the bullet-proof screen already mentioned. How he escaped with his life was a marvel. At the screen two bayonets were thrust at him which pinned him between them as if he were between the prongs of a fork. There he stood, unable to advance or to retire, until, firing his revolver down the loop-holes, he forced the men who were thrusting at him to withdraw their weapons.\*

Book X.  
Chapter I.  
1857.  
Sept. 14.

The assailants were, I have said, forced to retire. Only, however, for a few moments. Reformed, they again advanced. Again they captured the first gun, which was spiked by Captain Greville, 1st Fusiliers; again they dashed at the second. As they rushed on, their leader, Major Jacob of the 1st Fusiliers, a cool, daring, and accomplished officer, was mortally wounded. Lying there on the ground, knowing his hour had come, the gallant Jacob called to his men to press onward. But the fire was tremendous. Wemyss, Greville, Caulfield, Speke, Woodcock, Butler, all officers belonging or attached to the 1st Fusiliers, were in turn struck down. The men, greatly discouraged, were falling back a second time, when Nicholson rushed to the front. His voice never rang more nobly, his presence was never more inspiring, than when, waving his sword, he summoned the men to follow where their general led. But the broken order could

who are  
driven back,

again.

Jacob is  
struck down,  
and with him  
many officers  
of the 1st  
Fusiliers.

Nicholson  
then rushes  
to the front,

\* "The 1st Bengal Fusiliers in the Delhi Campaign."

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

but is pierced  
by a bullet.

He still urges  
the men on.

But the men  
are ultimately forced  
to retire.

Nicholson is  
succeeded in  
command by  
Jones.

Action of the  
cavalry.

not be restored in a moment, and before a sufficient number of men could respond to the call, John Nicholson was struck down by a bullet which pierced his body.

The wound was mortal, and Nicholson knew it to be so. But neither the agony of the pain, nor the certain approach of death, could quench the ardour of that gallant spirit. He still called upon the men to go on. He insisted on lying there till the lane should be carried. But he was asking dying, as he had asked living, that which was all but impossible. Without artillery, the enemy's position was too strong to be carried. Soldiers not accustomed to be baffled, the same men who that morning had carried the walls by escalade, had recoiled twice before it. In that lane alone eight officers and fifty men had fallen. There was nothing for it but to retire. The fallen hero was then carefully removed to his tent, and the men fell back on to the Kábul gate. Nicholson still lived, and the lungs being uninjured by the ball, the doctors had some hope of his life. He alone had the certain conviction that the triumph for which he had prepared would escape his grasp.

By the fall of Nicholson the command of the first and second columns, now established at or near the Kábul gate, devolved on Brigadier Jones, C.B.

Whilst the infantry were thus contending with alternate success and mishap to establish themselves in the imperial city, the cavalry were not less actively employed outside the walls. It had

never been absolutely certain that all the four columns would succeed in their attack, whilst it was tolerably clear that the failure of any one of them would entail a counter assault from the victorious enemy. It was necessary likewise that the flanks of the assaulting columns should be efficiently covered. With wise prevision, then, General Wilson had directed Brigadier Hope Grant to move with the greater part of his cavalry and a troop and a half of Horse Artillery at the time of the assault to the vicinity of No. 1 battery, to check any attempt to take our storming columns in flank by sortie from the Láhor and Ájmir gates, and to hold himself in readiness to act as circumstances might require.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

Hope Grant, taking with him two hundred men of the 9th Lancers, four hundred of the Sikh horsemen, and a troop and a half of Horse Artillery, under Major Tombs, moved to the point indicated. Handling his men skilfully, he effectually covered the assaulting columns. Moving onwards as the columns advanced, he took up a position under the walls of the city, covering the batteries. Here he remained, ready for further action, till the moment when the movement of the enemy on his right showed him that the fourth column had been repulsed. In fact the enemy following up that column had thrown themselves into the houses and gardens near Kishanganj, and now opened a heavy musketry fire on the cavalry. Hope Grant at once ordered the Horse Artillery to the front. Tombs galloped up, unlimbered, opened fire, and compelled the enemy to fall back.

Hope Grant  
and Tombs.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

Their presence produces a material effect on the enemy's movements.

The gallantry displayed the greater because of the compulsory inaction.

The reserve column.

But as they did so, the guns on the Burn bastion opened out on the cavalry. At a distance of five hundred yards, drawn up for action, though compelled to remain inactive, their presence on the spot constituted a material aid to the infantry then endeavouring to make good their position within the city. For two hours they stood to receive. General Wilson, alive to their danger, promptly despatched Captain Bouchier's battery to aid them. But the round shot from the Burn bastion continued to empty saddle after saddle, or to dismount officer after officer. Nine officers of the Lancers had their horses shot under them. Conspicuous on either side of this gallant regiment were the scarlet-clad horse of Dighton Probyn, and the Panjabis of John Watson in their slate-coloured garments. Gallantly they stood, conscious that thus exposing their lives without the power of retaliating they were serving the common cause. At the end of about two hours the cavalry were further reinforced by about two hundred of the Guides and Gúrkahs. Then shortly afterwards came the intelligence that the infantry had established their positions within the town. Then, and then only, did Hope Grant withdraw leisurely to Ludlow Castle, satisfied that he had not only prevented the enemy from following up their victory over the fourth column, but had occupied their attention with a very considerable result on the main operations.

We have now to consider the operations of the reserve column.

The commander of this column, Brigadier Long-



field, having previously detached the wing of the Bilúch battalion, three hundred strong, to the right of No. 2 battery, followed No. 3 column through the Káshmir gate, and cleared the College gardens. One portion of the column, consisting of the 4th Panjáb Rifles and some of the 61st Regiment, occupied these gardens; whilst another, composed of the Jhind Auxiliary Force and some of the 60th Rifles, held the Water bastion, the Káshmir gate, Colonel Skinner's house, and the house of Ahmad Áli Khán, a large, commanding building.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 14.

The position of four out of the five columns of the attacking force as the evening set in may thus briefly be described. The entire space inside the city from the Water bastion to the Kábul gate was held by the first, second, and fifth columns. The fourth column, repulsed in its attack on Kishanganj, was holding the batteries behind Hindú Rao's house. We have still to account for the third column. I left that column, gallantly led by Colonel Campbell, holding a large enclosure parallel, with the Chándni Chók, called the Bégam Bágh, anxiously expecting assistance from the other columns, and exposed to a heavy fire of musketry, grape, and canister.

Results of  
the day's  
work.

The failure of the first column in its attempt to master the lane leading to the Chándni Chók, and the repulse of the fourth column, account for the unsupported position in which Colonel Campbell was left. In advance of, and without communication with, the other columns; in the vicinity of a position strongly occupied by the

Reason for  
the want of  
support ac-  
cording to the  
third column.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

enemy; liable to be cut off from the main body; the position was eminently dangerous. But Colonel Campbell knew himself, and he knew the men he commanded. They were eager to dare, anxious to press on. But the Jamma Masjid had been made impregnable to an attack from infantry, and the Brigadier had neither artillery to beat down, nor powder-bags to blow up, the obstacles in the way of his men. Under these circumstances, taking a soldierly view of the situation, he had occupied the Bégam Bágh, resolved to hold it till he could communicate with head-quarters. Whilst occupying this position he was rejoined by the Kamáon Battalion, belonging to his column, but which had in the advance diverged to the right, and had occupied the Kót-wáli. An hour and a half elapsed, however, before he was able to communicate with head-quarters. Then, for the first time, he learned that the first and second columns had not been able to advance beyond the Kábul gate, and that he could not be supported.

Campbell, towards evening, falls back on the church.

A glance at the plan of Delhí will make it evident, even to non-military readers, that with the main body unable to penetrate beyond the Kábul gate, it would be injudicious for the third column to attempt to hold the Bégam Bágh during the night. Colonel Campbell, then, leisurely fell back on the church, the nearest point at which he touched the reserve column. Placing the 52nd in the church, he occupied Skinner's house with the Kamáon Battalion, and posted the 1st Panjáb Infantry in the houses at the end of the two streets

that lead from the interior of the city into the open space around the church.\* At the head of these streets guns had previously been posted.

A review of the work of the 14th September 1857, will show that though the British loss had been heavy, though all had not been accomplished which it had been hoped to accomplish, yet not only had great obstacles been overcome, but a solid base had been obtained whence to continue and complete the work. In less than six hours the army had lost sixty-six officers, and eleven hundred and four men in killed and wounded. Four out of five of the assaulting columns were within the walls, but the position which they held was extensive, and owing to the failure of the fourth column, their right flank was threatened. The enemy were still strong in numbers, strong in guns, strong in position. They, too, had had success as well as reverses, and they had not yet abandoned all hope of ultimate victory.

The first care of the assailants was to secure as best they could the posts that had so dearly gained. That night the engineers who were still fit for duty—they were but few, for out of seventeen ten had been struck down during the assault—were sent to fortify the advanced positions. Here they threw up barricades, and loop-holed and fortified the houses commanding the approaches. To maintain the flank communications between the heads of the several columns,

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 14.

Notwithstanding heavy losses a solid base for further operations had been gained.

The positions gained are secured during the night.

\* Major Norman's *Narrative* in the Blue Book, No. 6, 1858.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 14.

Review of the  
losses of the  
day.

in the shape of strong pickets, throwing out vedettes, were established.\*

Such was the result of the assault of the 14th September. At the cost of a very heavy loss of life a firm lodgment had been gained. The five assaulting columns numbered, exclusive of the Káshmir Contingent, five thousand one hundred and sixty men. Of these, one thousand one hundred and four men and sixty-six officers, or about two men in every nine, had been killed or wounded. Amongst the brave men who were killed or died of their wounds, were Nicholson, of whom I shall write further on; Jacob of the 1st Fusiliers; Speke, 65th Regiment Native Infantry; Salkeld, Engineers; Roper, 34th Foot; Tandy, Engineers; Fitzgerald, 75th Foot; Bradshaw, 52nd Light Infantry; Webb, 8th Foot; Rempay, 4th Panjáb Infantry; Pogson, 8th Regiment; MacBarnett, Davidson, and Murray, doing duty respectively with the 1st Fusiliers, the 2nd Panjáb Infantry, and the Guides. The number of wounded officers amounted to fifty-two, of whom eight were Engineers. All these officers were but a type of the unreformed British army. They were men in whom their soldiers had confidence, whose physical energies had not been neutralised by a premature absorption of the powers of the brain, who had learned their duties in the practical life of camps, who were ever to the fore in manly exercises in cantonment, ever as eager as able to lead their men

\* Medley.



on the battle-field. Honour to their memory! However limited their acquirements might have been regarded by examiners, they at least knew how to lead their men to victory!

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

The determination not only to hold the ground already won, but to continue further operations, was not arrived at by General Wilson without considerable hesitation. The success achieved, important as it was, had not corresponded—I will not say to his anticipations, for he had never been very confident—but to his hopes. The repulse of the first and fourth columns, the mortal wound of Nicholson, the tremendous loss in killed and wounded, the conviction he personally acquired that evening that the city had yet to be taken,—all these considerations combined to work on a nature never very sanguine or self-reliant, and now enfeebled by anxiety and ill-health. The General's first thought had been to withdraw the assaulting columns to the positions they had so long held on the ridge.

General Wilson is inclined to withdraw from the position he had gained.

From this fatal determination General Wilson was saved by the splendid obstinacy of Baird Smith, aided by the soldierly-like instincts of Neville Chamberlain. What sort of a man Baird Smith was, I have recorded in a previous page. Neville Chamberlain had been cast in a mould not less noble. A soldier almost from the hour of his birth, Neville Chamberlain united to the most complete forgetfulness of self, a courage, a resolution, a coolness equal to all occasions. The only fault that the most critical could find with his action was that he was too eager to press forward. If

But is deterred by the remonstrances of Baird Smith and Neville Chamberlain.

Neville Chamberlain.



Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

a fault, it was a noble fault—a fault which the critics carefully avoided. But, warring against Asiatics, to go forward is never a fault, and I have been assured, not by one but by many, that Chamberlain's personal daring had contributed greatly to inspire with confidence the soldiers he commanded.

Chamberlain was Adjutant-General of the Army. He had been a consistent counsellor of bold and daring measures, and he had more than once, after repulsing a sally of the enemy, led the counter-attack which had driven him headlong within the city. In one of these daring pursuits he had been severely wounded, and it was this severe wound which had prevented him from taking an active part in the actual assault. But from the summit of Hindú Rao's house he had witnessed all the events of that memorable day. The repulse of the fourth column, and the demonstration made by the enemy to pursue that column, seemed for a moment indeed to imperil his position, and he had summoned the native guard to the roof to defend the threatened magazine. This danger was averted by the action, already recorded, of Hope Grant and the cavalry. But this episode in no degree diverted the attention of the Adjutant-General from the other events. He noticed the first successes of the other columns; then the check—the apparently insurmountable check—evidently a bar to further progress on that day. To Chamberlain its significance was clear and unmistakeable. There was but one course to pursue. To hold, at any

cost, the positions taken, to fortify them, and to make them the base of a fresh attack at the earliest moment. Unable to move himself, he sent to the General a record of his convictions, accompanied by an earnest request that he would hold the ground for the night.

Would the written request of the Adjutant-General, not actually on the spot, have alone sufficed to turn the General from the course which a personal inspection had at once suggested to him? It is doubtful. The General undoubtedly believed that the safety of the army would be compromised by the retention of the positions they had gained. Fortunately, Baird Smith was at his elbow. Appealed to by General Wilson as to whether he thought it possible for the army to retain the ground they had won, his answer was short and decisive, "*We must* do so." That was all. But the uncompromising tone, the resolute manner, the authority of the speaker, combined to make it a decision against which there was no appeal. General Wilson accepted it.\*

The following day, the 15th, was devoted to the securing of the positions gained, to the esta-

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

Baird Smith's  
resolute  
answer to  
Wilson.

Sept. 15.

\* Many other officers gave the General the same advice. Amongst others, prominently, his Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery, Captain Edwin Johnson, who shared his tent. This officer not only constantly urged General Wilson to see the matter through to its bitter end, but sustained him in his hours of

depression, and by his tact, judgment, and practical ability, contributed to bring his mind into a state willing to accept the advice of Chamberlain and Baird Smith. All the foremost officers of the army, Nicholson, Jones, Reid, and others, had been all along in favour of decisive action.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 15.

Proceedings  
on the 15th.

blishing and making use of mortar batteries to shell the city, the palace, and the Sélimgarh, to the restoring of order, and to the arranging of means for putting a stop to indiscriminate plundering. That our troops were permitted to carry out this programme with but slight disturbance from the enemy, shows how truly Baird Smith and Chamberlain had judged the position. It is not too much to affirm that a retrograde movement on the 15th would, for the time, have lost India. As it was, whilst a mortar battery, established by our engineers in the College gardens, effected considerable damage in the enemy's defences, and our men, under the cover of that fire, were able to occupy and fortify some houses in front of the position taken the previous evening, the enemy's fire from Sélimgarh and the magazine was comparatively ineffective. Already the depression of failure, which our retirement would have changed into the joy of triumph, was beginning to weight their efforts very heavily.

Temptations  
placed in the  
way of the  
Europeans.

I have said that measures were taken on the 15th to restore order and to put a stop to indiscriminate plundering. The fact is, that the part of Delhí which our troops had occupied was the part which abounded in stores containing intoxicating liquors. What a temptation this would be to men faint from work of the severest character, and subjected for months to deprivations on the ridge, may easily be conceived. The indulgence in half an hour's unchecked impulse might paralyse the force. The danger was imminent, the advanced guards fell victims to the



But it was met promptly and with energy. The General ordered that the whole of the liquor should be destroyed, and the order was, to a very great extent, carried out.

Book X.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 15.

The morning of the 16th dawned hopefully. During the night and in the early morning the enemy evacuated the suburb of Kishanganj, whence they had, on the 14th, repulsed the fourth column. Our men at once occupied the position, and captured five heavy guns which had been left there by the enemy. They were immensely impressed with the great strength of the place. The fire from our batteries, also, having effected a breach in the magazine, a party, consisting of H.M.'s 61st Regiment, a part of the 4th Panjáb Rifles, and the wing of the Bilúch Battalion, was detached, personally directed by the General, to storm it. The position was carried with but slight loss to the stormers—three men only being wounded—another proof of the growing depression of the enemy. The capture was of the highest importance, the magazine containing one hundred and seventy-one guns and howitzers, most of them of the largest calibre, besides ammunition of every kind.

Sept. 16.  
  
Kishanganj is  
evacuated by  
the rebels,

and the ma-  
gazine is  
stormed.

On the afternoon of the same day, the enemy made an attempt to recapture the magazine, as well as the workshops adjoining it. They advanced under cover of the fire of some guns in front of the palace gate, carried the workshops, but were driven back from the magazine, and ultimately from the workshops also. On this occasion, Lieutenant Renny of the Artillery dis-

Gallantry of  
Renny.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 16.

Continued  
despondency  
of Wilson.

played great coolness and contempt of death. For, mounting on the roof of the magazine, he pelted the enemy with shells which were handed to him with their fuses burning!

It would be natural to imagine that the fact that the army could not only hold its own, but make an impression upon the enemy so formidable as that implied by the abandonment of Kishanganj, and the feeble defence of the magazine, would have inspired the General with a confident hope as to the ultimate issue. But he was still desponding, and with Nicholson dying and Chamberlain unable to take an active part in his operations, it needed all the exertions of the engineers, than whom it would have been impossible to have collected a more daring and energetic set of men,\* to carry out the necessary forward movement.

\* Pre-eminent "amongst these were Alexander Taylor, of whom Baird Smith thus wrote: "He was, throughout, my most able and trusted subordinate;" George Chesney, at a later period author of the *Battle of Dorking*; Fred Maunsell and Henry Brownlow, both shot down in the assault; Julius Medley, who to ability and daring added a genius for organization of no common order.

The tone of General Wilson's mind, at this particular period, may be gathered from his correspondence. "We took possession," he wrote at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 16th, "of the magazine this morning with the loss of

only three men wounded. This advances us a little, but it is dreadfully slow work. Our force is too weak for this street fighting, when we have to gain our way inch by inch; and of the force we have, unfortunately there is a large portion, besides the Jummoo troops, in whom I place no confidence. . . I find myself getting weaker and weaker every day, mind and body quite worn out. The least exertion knocks me down. I walk with difficulty, and fully expect in a day or two to be laid altogether on my bed. . . We have a long and hard struggle still before us; I hope I may be able to see it out."

On the 17th and 18th the advance was pushed still further. The brain-task fell to the engineers, it having been decided to avoid the line of the streets and to sap through the houses. In this way the bank, Major Abbott's house, and the house of Khán Muhammad Khán were taken, and our posts brought close up to the palace and the Chándni Chók. During these days, too, the positions on the right and left, indicated by the Kábul gate and the magazine, were brought into direct communication by a line of posts.

Nor were the artillery silent. Whilst the steady progress of sapping was going on, the heavy mortars and guns in the magazine, and the recovered and re-armed batteries of the enceinte bastions and gates, were at work, pouring a continuous flight of shells into the city and palace. Of the enemy's resistance it may be said that, though continuous, it was not characterised by the determination which had marked their conduct on the 14th. They had read their doom, and though they still fought, their hearts were elevated neither by the hope of victory nor by the energy of despair. Many had abandoned the city. The courage of those who remained was still undaunted, but hopelessness of success had weakened their powers. Owing partly to this, and in a great measure to the skill of the attack, the British losses on those days were small.

The position of the attacking force on the evening of the 18th has thus been described :  
 " The line of the canal may be said to have been our front ; on its bank some light mortars were

BOOK X.  
 Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 17-18.

The advance pushed on on the 17th and 18th by the engineers

and by the artillery.

The resistance slackens.

Sept. 18.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 18.

Greathed's  
attack on the  
Láhor gate  
fails.

posted, to clear the neighbourhood of the Láhor gate; while light guns were posted at the main junction of the streets, and sand-bag batteries erected to prevent the possibility of a surprise.”\* The establishment of communications between the extreme right and left has been already mentioned. In the rear everything was our own.

Still all was not *couleur de rose*. On the morning of that day an attack on the Láhor gate had been directed, and failed. Greathed, who directed that attack at the head of a column composed of detachments from the 8th, the 75th, and a Sikh Regiment, and supported by fifty men of the 1st Fusiliers, had to advance up a narrow lane leading into the Chándni Chók through a gate at the end of it. This gate had been closed, and behind it dwelt the unknown. Greathed had led his men up the narrow lane, but as he approached the end leading into the Chándni Chók the gate was suddenly thrown open and displayed to his astonished gaze a 24-pounder turned on the assailants. This gun opened suddenly with grape on the column, whilst simultaneously from the houses on either flank poured a smart and continuous fire of musketry. No wonder that the men recoiled. They were enormously outnumbered, and occupied a cramped position, which gave no play for manœuvring. Greathed drew them back, and, bringing a 6-pounder to the front, ordered a charge under cover of the smoke. But all was in vain. For a moment indeed the hostile gun

\* *Eight Months' Campaign against the Bengal Sepoys*, Bouchier.



appeared to be in the possession of our men ;\* but the odds were too great, the position too confined; the enemy being thoroughly on the alert, surprise had become impossible. No one saw more clearly than Greathed that the attack on the Chók had failed. He therefore gave the order to retire. The retreat was effected in good order and without loss, the enemy not venturing to enter the lane.

The repulse of Greathed's column had filled the mind of General Wilson with despair. "We are still," he wrote, that same day, "in the same position in which we were yesterday. An attempt was made this morning to take the Láhor gate, but failed from the refusal of the European soldiers to follow their officers. One rush, and it would have been done easily; but they would not make it. The fact is, our men have a great dislike to street fighting; they do not see their enemy, and find their comrades falling from shots of the enemy who are on the tops of houses and behind cover, and get a panic, and will not advance. This is very sad and, to me, very disheartening. We can, I think, hold our present position, but I cannot see my way out at all. I have now only three thousand one hundred men (infantry) in the city, with no chance or possibility of any reinforcements. If I were to attempt to push on into the city, they would be lost in such innumerable streets and masses of houses,

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 18.

Its lowering  
effect on  
General  
Wilson.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, the article is known to the January 1858. The writer of author.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 18.

and would be annihilated or driven back." The reader will remark that, desponding as are these words, they mark a step in advance of those uttered on the evening of the 14th. Then, General Wilson was inclined to retire to the ridge to save his army. On the 18th, though he still doubted of ultimate success, he felt he could hold his own.

Sept. 19.

The Burn  
bastion.

On the 19th action of a different character was taken. A glance at the plan will show the position, previously described, attained on the evening of the 18th. Immediately in front of our right was the Burn bastion, no longer supported by the presence of a strong hostile force in Kishanganj and Táliwári. Now the Burn bastion commanded the Láhor gate, and with it the Chándni Chók; and, though from our advanced post in the Bank that important street could be occupied, it would be difficult to maintain it and to push on operations against the palace and the Jamma Masjid until the remaining strongholds on the enemy's left should be occupied.

Alexander  
Taylor is  
authorised to  
work through  
to the Burn  
bastion.

To the clear minds of the Chief Engineer and of his principal coadjutor, Captain Alexander Taylor, the requirements of the position were apparent. With the concurrence, then, of the former, Captain Taylor obtained from the General an order to the Brigadier commanding at the Kábul gate to place at his disposal, for operations on the following morning, a body of men to work through the intermediate houses, and thus to gain the Burn bastion. Whilst this gradual and necessarily somewhat slow process was being

adopted, a column of about five hundred men, taken from the 8th and 75th and the Sikh regiment, proceeded, under Brigadier William Jones, to attack the Láhor gate.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 19.

The sapping party, directed by Captain Taylor, gradually made their way through the detached houses situated between the Kábul gate and the Burn bastion, annoyed only by a constant musketry fire maintained by the enemy upon such of their number as were forced to show themselves. Making their way, as it were, step by step, they succeeded, as night fell, in occupying a house which completely overlooked the Burn bastion. From this place they were able to pour a commanding fire upon the occupants of the latter, and they did this with so much effect that the enemy, convinced of the impossibility of holding it, evacuated it during the night. Brigadier Jones then pushed forward his men, and found it deserted. But his men were in a very unruly condition. Much brandy had fallen into their hands, and it was difficult to keep them steady.\*

Its capture  
by Brigadier  
Jones.

The news brought to the General that night (19th) by Captain Taylor of the capture of the Burn bastion, could not fail to revive his spirits.

The immense  
gain of the  
capture.

\* The men were in a very unruly state . . . Much brandy, beer, and other intoxicating liquors were left so exposed by the enemy, that it would seem they had almost been left about purposely; and though the officers endeavoured to persuade their men that the liquor was

poisoned they did not succeed. . . One old soldier, a thirsty soul, taking up a bottle of brandy, and looking at it, said: "Oh no, Sir, the capsule is all right—Exshaw and Co.—no poison that."—*Blackwood's Magazine*, January 1858.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 19.

It was an immense gain; for the possession of that bastion was the certain key to the capture of the Láhor gate. So impressed was General Wilson with the importance of the conquest that he sent some officers of his staff to spend the night in the bastion, and to take measures for its retention. The precaution, wise though it was, was not needed. The enemy by this time were thoroughly cowed, and, far from thinking of recovering the place, were hurrying out of the city as fast as their legs could carry them.

Sept. 20.

Jones carries  
the Láhor  
gate,

The capture of the Burn bastion was the beginning of the end. Early the following morning (the 20th) Brigadier Jones's column, pursuing the advantage of the previous evening, carried the Láhor gate with a rush; the Garstin bastion fell also to their prowess. The Brigadier then received instructions to divide his force, and whilst detaching one portion up the Chándn Chók to occupy the Jamma Masjid, to proceed with the remainder towards the Ájmir gate. The opportune arrival of Major Brind and his artillery caused the Brigadier to confide to him the command of the first portion. Brind, having under his orders, in addition to his own men, the 8th Regiment and the 1st Fusiliers, marched at once to the Jamma Masjid, and carried it without difficulty. He had no sooner occupied it than he perceived that the one thing wanting to assure the complete capture of the city was to assault the palace, promptly and without delay. He, therefore, on the spot, wrote a pencil note to the General reporting his success, and urging

and Brind  
the Jamma  
Masjid:

he then in-  
vites Wilson  
to attack the  
palace.



him to an immediate attack on the royal residence.

Meanwhile Jones had penetrated to the Ajmir gate. Almost simultaneously the main body of the cavalry, going round by the Idgar, found the camp of the mutineers outside Dehlí evacuated, and secured the clothing, ammunition, and plunder left by the rebels in the precipitation of their flight.

General Wilson responded to Brind's note by ordering the advance of the column at the magazine to attack the palace. The decreasing fire from the battlements of the residence, famous in history, famous in romance, of the descendants of Bábar, had made it abundantly clear that the last representative of the family which had for so long ruled in Hindustan had, with his family and attendants, sought refuge in flight. When the British troops (the 60th Rifles), pressing forward, reached the walls, a few fanatics alone remained behind, not to line them, for their numbers were too few, but, careless of life, to show to the very last their hatred of the foe they had so long defied. Powder-bags were promptly brought up, the gates were blown in, and our troops entered, and hoisted the British flag. The Sélingarh fort had been occupied even a little earlier. Its capture was effected in a manner which demands a separate notice.

Some short time before the assault on the palace gate, Lieutenant Aikman, with a small party of Wilde's Sikhs, had been directed to feel his way to the left. Aikman, the most daring and intrepid of men, knew the ground thoroughly; and having

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 20.

Completion of  
the occupa-  
tion of the  
gate.

Wilson sends  
a force  
against the  
palace,

which is cap-  
tured.

Aikman cap-  
tures the  
Sélingarh.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 20.

received, as he imagined, permission to act on his own judgment, he resolved to effect an entrance into the Sélingarh from the rear, and hold the enemy as in a trap. Accordingly he doubled round to the Calcutta gate, forced it open, and pushed on to the Sélingarh. The few men in that fort fled on his appearance, and escaped across the river. Aikman's attention was then turned to the gateway at the narrow passage from the Sélingarh into the rear of the palace. This passage connected the rear gate of the palace with an arched gate over the fort, over which was a parapet. Were he able to gain possession of this he could stop the escape of multitudes till the storming party should reach them from the front. Thus thinking, he acted without hesitation, shot the sentry at the gate opening on to the drawbridge leading into the rear of the palace, and placed his men in the best position to defend it. He then, with the assistance of the Sergeant-Major of Renny's troop or battery, set to work to spike the heavy guns directed against the Water bastion. He was in possession of the gate and drawbridge when the gates of the palace were blown in. The rush of the fugitives was not so great as had been anticipated, so extensive had been the flight on the two preceding days. But some at least were kept back. A more gallant or well-thought-out act was not performed even during that long siege.\*

\* Official report of Major Wilde, commanding 4th Sikh Infantry.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 20.

In the afternoon of the same day General Wilson, having given directions for the establishment of posts at the various gateways and bastions, took up his quarters in the imperial palace.

The appearance of Dehlí after the capture of the palace, the Sélimgarh, and the Jamma Masjid had placed it in the hands of the British, has thus been graphically described by a gallant officer who took part in the assault and in the subsequent operations.\*

“The demon of destruction,” writes Colonel Bouchier, “seemed to have enjoyed a perfect revel. The houses in the neighbourhood of the Mori and Káshmir bastions were a mass of ruins, the walls near the breaches were cracked in every direction, while the church was completely riddled by shot and shell. . . . In the Water bastion the destruction was still more striking. Huge siege-guns, with their carriages, lay about seemingly like playthings in a child’s nursery. The palace had evidently been hastily abandoned. The tents of Captain de Teissier’s battery, stationed at Dehlí when the mutiny broke out, were left standing, and contained plunder of all sorts. The apartments inhabited by the royal family combined a most incongruous array of tawdry splendour with the most abject poverty and filth. The apartments over the palace gate, formerly inhabited by Captain Douglas, who commanded the palace guards, and Mr. Jennings the clergy-

\* *Eight Months’ Campaign against the Bengal Sepoys*, by Colonel George Bouchier, C.B., R.A.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 20.

man, were denuded of every trace of the unfortunate party which had inhabited its walls, and with whom, not many months before, I had spent a happy week. It was with a sad and heavy heart that I paced its now empty rooms, which could tell such terrible tales of the scenes there enacted."

Dehlí was now virtually our own. But though the strong places had been occupied by our troops thousands of the mutineers were still in the vicinity, armed, and ready to take advantage of any slackness of discipline. The very relief of guards and batteries was still a matter of danger and difficulty, nor did the event of the following day, which deprived the rebels of their nominal leader, lessen in any material degree the magnitude of the risk.

The King of  
Dehlí.

Sept. 14.

The King of Dehlí, his family, and his personal adherents had shown themselves as easily depressed by adversity as they had been cruel and remorseless when Fortune had seemed, in the early days of the revolt, to smile upon them. The result of the events of the 14th September had produced upon the mind of the King effects precisely similar to those which had, for the moment, mastered the cooler judgment of the British commander. We have seen that General Wilson, surveying his position on the evening of the 14th, declared that a prompt retreat to his original position could alone save the army. Baird Smith and Neville Chamberlain forced him, so to speak, to remain. On the other side, the King and his advisers, deeply impressed by the

successful storm of the assailants, and not considering that success outweighed, or even balanced, by the repulse of the first and fourth columns, rapidly arrived at the conclusion that, unless the British should retire, the game was up. There was no Baird Smith at the right hand of the King to point out to him how many chances yet remained in his favour if he would but profitably employ the small hours of the night; no Neville Chamberlain to urge him, above all things, to dare. When the morning of the 15th dawned, and the British were seen to have retained their positions, to be making preparations for a further advance, the hearts of the King and his advisers fell, and they began even then to discount the future.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 14.

Sept. 15.

The persistence of the British depresses the adherents of the King.

Still, as long as the Sélingarh, the palace, the Jamma Masjid, and the Láhor gate were held, no active measures for retreat were taken. But when, on the night of the 19th, the Burn bastion, virtually commanding the Láhor gate and the Chándni Chók, was captured, the thought that had been uppermost in every heart found expression. That thought was flight.

Sept. 19.

Their success completes the despondency.

The commander-in-chief of the rebel army, the Bakht Khán, whom we have seen exercising so strong an influence at Baréli,\* evacuated the city that night, taking with him all the fighting men upon whom he could depend. Ways of egress, that by the bridge of boats, and those by the Khairáti and Dehlí gates were still open to

Bakht Khán urges the King to accompany the army in its flight.

\* Vol. i., page 303, note.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 19.

them; and of these they availed themselves. Bakht Khán exerted all his eloquence to induce the King to accompany him. He represented to him that all was not lost, that though the English had gained their stronghold the open country was before them, and that, under the shadow of his name and presence, it would be still possible to continue the war, always with a chance of success.

The King  
vacillates.

Had Bahádur Khán possessed a spark of the persistent nature or the vigorous energy of his ancestors, of Bábar, of Humáyun, or of Ákbar, that appeal had not been made in vain. But he was an old man—one of that class of old men who have exhausted youth in their teens, and who become, with increasing years, more and more nerveless and irresolute. It is probable that throughout the mutiny the King had been a mere puppet in the hands of others. Whilst the siege lasted the chiefs of the army had sustained their power over him by promises of ultimate victory. But with impending defeat their influence vanished; and the old King, acted upon by events, was in the humour to fall under any spell which might seem to promise him immunity for his misdeeds.

The secret  
thoughts of  
Mirza Iláhi  
Bakhsh.

Such a spell was at hand. Of all the nobles about him the wiliest was Mirza Iláhi Bakhsh, whose daughter was the widow of the eldest son of the King. It is probable that in the early days of the mutiny the counsels of Iláhi Bakhsh had been strongly in favour of vigorous action. But he had a keen eye for probabilities. The

events of the 14th and 15th September had read to him no doubtful lesson. He foresaw the triumph of the English—a triumph fraught with ruin to himself and his family unless he could turn to account the few days that must still intervene.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 19.

He did turn them to account. Having made all his plans, he listened, without speaking, to the eloquent pleadings made to the King by the commander-in-chief, Bakht Khán. When all was over, and when Bakht had departed with a promise from the King that he would meet him the following day at the tomb of Humáyun, Iláhi Bakhsh persuaded the Moghol sovereign to accompany him to his house for the night. Having brought him there, he moulded him to his purpose. He pointed out to him the hardships which would follow his accompanying the army, assured him of its certain defeat, and then, showing the other side of the shield, indicated that a prompt severance of his cause from the cause of the Sepoys would induce the victorious English to believe that, up to that moment, he had acted under compulsion, and that he had seized the first opportunity to sever himself from traitors.

He moulds  
the King to  
his purpose.

These arguments, urged with great force upon one whose brain power, never very strong, was waning, had their effect. When, next day, the King of Dehlí, his zenana, his sons, and his nobles, met the rebel commander-in-chief at the tomb of Humáyun, he and they declined to accompany them. Rather than undergo the fatigues, the

Sept. 20.

The King  
refuses to  
accompany  
the army.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 20.

The rebel  
army leaves  
Dehli.

The intrigues  
of Mirza Iláhi  
Bakhsh.

Their nature  
communi-  
cated to Cap-  
tain Hodson.

perils, the uncertainties attendant on the prolongation of a contest which they had encouraged, they deliberately preferred to trust to the tender mercies of the conqueror. What those tender mercies were likely to be did not seem to trouble much the degenerate Moghols. They promised, at all events, a quick decision—a decision preferable to the agony of suspense.

Bakht Khán and the rebel army, then, went their way, leaving behind the royal family and a numerous crowd of emasculated followers, the scum of the palace, men born never to rise above the calling of a flatterer or a scullion. So far had the plans of Mirza Iláhi Bakhsh succeeded. The next step was more difficult. It involved the betrayal of his master.

Difficult, it was not insurmountable. Chief of the native agents maintained by the English to obtain correct information regarding the movements of the enemy during the siege, was Múnshí Rajab Áli, a man possessing wonderful tact, cleverness, assurance, courage—all the qualities which go to make up a spy of the highest order. He possessed to the full the confidence of the English administrators, and he was true to his employers. With this man Iláhi Bakhsh opened communications. Rajab Áli requested him simply to detain the royal family for twenty-four hours after the departure of the rebel army, at the tomb of Humáyun, and to leave the rest to him.

Rajab Áli communicated the information he had received to Hodson of Hodson's Horse; Hodson at once rode down to the General's head-

quarters, communicated the news, and requested permission to take with him a party of his men to bring in the King. With some reluctance—for he knew Hodson's nature—General Wilson accorded the permission, but solely on the condition that the King should be exposed to neither injury nor insult. Hodson, taking fifty of his troopers with him, galloped down towards the tomb.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 20.

Who was Hodson? Some men are born in advance of their age, others too late for it. Of the latter class was Hodson. Daring, courting danger, reckless and unscrupulous, he was a *condottiere* of the hills, a free-lance of the Middle Ages. He joyed in the life of camps, and revelled in the clang of arms. His music was the call of the trumpet, the battle-field his ball-room. He would have been at home in the camp of Wallenstein, in the sack of Magdeburg. In him human suffering awoke no feeling, the shedding of blood caused him no pang, the taking of life brought him no remorse. The *certaminis gaudia* did not entirely satisfy his longings. Those joys were but preludes to the inevitable consequences—the slaughter of the fugitives, the spoils of the vanquished.

Hodson rode off, full of excitement, towards the tomb of Humáyun. As he approached that time-honoured structure he slackened his pace, and making way cautiously to some ruined buildings near the gateway, posted his men under their shade. Having taken every precaution, he then sent to announce to the King his arrival, and to invite him to surrender.

Hodson rides  
to capture  
the King.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 20.

The scene  
within the  
tomb of  
Humáyun.

Within the tomb despair was combating with resignation. The favourite wife of the last of the Moghols, anxious above all for the safety of her son, a lad not old enough to be implicated in the revolt, and yet not too young to escape massacre, was imploring the old man to yield on the condition of a promise of life; the mind of the old man, agitated by a dim recollection of the position he had inherited and forfeited, by despair of the present, by doubts of the future, was still wavering. Why had not he acted as Ákbar would have acted, and accompanied the troops to die, if he must die, as a king? What to him were the few years of dishonour which the haughty conqueror might vouchsafe to him? Better life in the free plains of India, hunted though he might be, than life in durance for him, a king! But then rushed in the fatal conviction that it was too late. He had decided when he dismissed Bakht Khán! The Frank and his myrmidons were at his door!

The King  
surrenders on  
condition  
that his life  
be spared.

Yet still the difficulty with him was to act on that decision. His mind was in the chaotic condition when everything was possible but action. For two hours, then, he hesitated, clutching at every vague idea only to reject it; his wife, his traitorous adviser, his surroundings, all urging upon him one and the same counsel. At last a consent was wrung from him to send a message to Hodson that he would surrender provided he should receive from that officer an assurance that his life should be spared.

Hodson re-  
ceives the

On receiving this message, Hodson gave the

promise. Then, issuing from his cover, he took post in the open space in front of the gate of the tomb, standing there alone to receive the royal prisoner. Preceded by the Queen and her son in palanquins, the King issued from the portico, carried in a similar conveyance. Hodson spurred his horse to the side of the palanquin and demanded of the King his arms. The King asked if his captor were Hodson Bahádur. Receiving an affirmative reply, the King asked for a promise from the Englishman's own lips of his life and of the lives of his wife and her son. The promise given, the arms were surrendered and the cortége moved towards the city. The progress was slow, and for a great part of the journey the palanquins were followed by a considerable number of the King's retinue—men never dangerous and now thoroughly cowed. These gradually dropped off as the Láhor gate was approached. By that gate Hodson entered, and traversing the Chándni Chók, made over his captives to Mr. Saunders, the principal civil officer in the city. He then went to report his successful achievement to the General, carrying with him the arms of the last sovereign of the imperial house of Bábar.

So far Hodson had acted as a chivalrous officer of the nineteenth century. But the spirit of the *condottiere* now came into play. The same active agents who had informed him of the whereabouts of the King, now came to tell him that two of the King's sons and a grandson, men who were reported to have taken part in the massacre of May,

BOOK X  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 20.

King as a  
captive

and makes  
him over to  
the civil  
authorities.

Hodson learns  
that the  
King's sons  
and a grand-  
son could be  
captured.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 20.

Sept. 21.

He starts  
with a hun-  
dred troopers  
to capture  
them.

Refuses to  
promise to  
spare their  
lives.

had not accompanied the rebel army but were concealed in the tomb of Humáyun or in its vicinity. The information excited all the savage instincts of Hodson. These men could not stipulate for mercy. He might himself "rid the earth of those ruffians." He rejoiced in the opportunity.\* The following morning, then, having obtained permission from the General to hunt down the princes, he started, accompanied by his second in command, Lieutenant McDowell, one hundred troopers, and his two spy-informers, Múnshí Rajab Áli and Mirza Iláhi Bakhsh, and rode for Humáyun's tomb. The three princes, Mirza Kházar Sultán, Mirza Moghol, and Mirza Abú Bakht, were in the tomb attended by a considerable number of the scum of the people—the same who, the previous day, had seen, without resistance their kifig carried off, and who were not more prepared to resist now. It is true that the more daring among them, seeing the approach of Hodson, implored the princes to resist, offering to defend them to the last. Better for the princes, ten thousand times better for Hodson's reputation, if the offer had been accepted. At least, then, the Englishman would have been able to aver that he killed his enemies in fair fight. But with the example of their father before them, the princes hoped to gain the promise of their lives by

\* "In twenty-four hours I disposed of the principal members of the House of Timour the Tartar. I am not cruel, but I confess that I did rejoice in the opportunity of ridding the earth of these ruffians."—Letter from Hodson, 23rd September 1857.



negotiation. For two hours they implored that promise. Hodson steadily refused it. Their spirits weakened by the useless effort, the three princes then surrendered to the mercy and generosity of the conqueror.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 21.

They surren-  
der to his  
mercy and  
generosity.

They came out from their retreat in a covered cart. Similar carts conveyed the arms of which Hodson, in the meanwhile, had deprived the crowd. Hodson placed troopers on either side of the cart which bore the princes, and directed it towards the Láhor gate. The people, the same miserable population who had previously followed the King, followed this cortége also. Between them and the cart containing the princes were a hundred of Hodson's far-famed horsemen. There was no real danger to be apprehended from them. They were too cowed to act. Hodson would have rejoiced had they displayed the smallest intention to resist. He wanted blood. His senses were blinded by his brutal instincts. Five-sixths of the journey from the place of capture to Dehlí had been completed without the display of the smallest hostility on the part of the crowd. Despairing, then, of any other mode of gratifying his longings, he made the pressure of the mob upon his horsemen a pretext for riding up to the cart, stopping it, and ordering the princes to dismount, and strip to their under garments. Then, addressing the troopers, he told them in a loud voice, so as to be heard by the multitude, that the prisoners were butchers who had murdered our women and our children, and that it was the will of the Government that they should die.

He shoots  
them when  
within a mile  
of Dehlí.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 21.

Comments on  
Hodson's act.

Then, taking a carbine from the hands of a trooper, he shot dead his three unresisting captives !

A more brutal or a more unnecessary outrage was never committed. It was a blunder as well as a crime. It is true that the gossip of the camp had accused the princes of the imperial house of having instigated the massacre of our countrymen and countrywomen in the month of May, but not a single item of evidence had been adduced to substantiate the charge. It is quite possible that a fair trial might have cleared them ; or, had it convicted them, the British public would have enjoyed the satisfaction of knowing that they deserved the fate which would then have befallen them. The princes surrendered, prisoners of war. It is idle to say that unless they had been shot they would have been rescued. No attempt was made by the crowd to wag a finger on their behalf. Its undisciplined and unarmed component parts had lost the only fair chance of resistance when they assented to the surrender of the princes. They made no sign when Hodson ordered his intended victims to descend from the cart and to strip. It is possible, indeed, that a man deficient in nerve might have been so far daunted by the sight of the number of men following his troopers as to lose his presence of mind, and, in sheer desperation, end the matter by murdering his captives. But Hodson had nerves of iron. He had all his wits about him. He had regretted that his instructions forbade him to kill the King. His savage instincts re-

quired to be satisfied, and he satisfied them by this cowardly murder.

It is to be regretted on every ground that he gave way to the promptings of his nature. On the grounds of justice, because it was a base and unnecessary act; on the grounds of public interest, because the trials of the princes would probably have elicited much curious information regarding the revolt; on the grounds of his own reputation, for though whilst men's blood was still hot the deed might have been overlooked, their better feelings would have asserted themselves in the end, and Hodson would have been a marked man for ever. In the history of the mutiny there is no more painful episode than that connected with his name on this occasion.

It is now time to return to the city. I left it on the evening of the 20th, its strong places fully occupied by our troops. On the following morning began the work of securing the city. To Major James Brind—known in the camp, for his gallantry, for his untiring energy, for the earnest and persistent manner in which he had pounded the enemy, as Brind of the batteries—was allotted the task, in conjunction with the Chief Engineer, of ensuring the safety of the gateways and posts.

A more high-minded, a more gallant, or a more merciful officer than Major James Brind never lived. Every soldier knew, and every soldier loved him. He brought to his task all the characteristics which had gained for him respect and affection. But that task was no light one. The

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 21.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 21.

Brind clears  
the city of  
murderers  
and incen-  
diaries.

scum of the rebel army still lurked in the place, hiding in mosques or burying themselves in underground receptacles. As Major Brind went about it he was again and again startled by reports of cold-blooded murder of our soldiers, of their being enticed by a promise of drink into the dark corners of the city and there basely murdered. He found that numerous gangs of men were hanging about, prepared to interfere with the reliefs of the batteries and posts, and that it was even possible they might attempt to surprise the garrison. The time was critical. It was necessary to show the rebels that we were prepared for them. Major Brind, therefore, determined to make an example of the first gang of murderers who might be caught. Just at the moment a murder of an atrocious character was reported to him. Collecting a few artillerymen, Brind hastened to the spot, stormed the mosques and houses where the murderers and their associates were assembled, ordered the perpetrators to be executed, and made over the remainder to the authorities. This act of vigour, combined with acts of the same nature carried out by other commanding officers, had a wonderful effect. The remainder of the rowdy element quitted the city, and from that day forth there was neither murder nor disturbance. Major Brind was then able to continue, in comparative freedom from alarm, his task of making the gate-ways and other military posts as secure as possible from attack. Colonel Burn, an officer not attached to the force, but who, being on leave at the time, had joined it, was.



on the 21st, nominated military governor of the city.

Book X.  
Chapter 1.

1857.  
Sept. 21.

One sad event remains yet to be chronicled—the death of the heroic man who, sweeping across the Panjáb, had come down to reinforce the besieging army, to inflict a deadly blow on the enemy at Najaigarh, and to command the storming party on the 14th. After lingering for eight days, John Nicholson died. As fortunate as Wolfe, he lived long enough to see the full success of the attack he had led with so much daring. At the age of thirty-seven he had achieved the highest rank alike as an administrator and as a soldier. There never lived a man who more thoroughly exemplified the truth of the maxim that great talents are capable of universal application. Whatever the work to which he had applied himself, he had succeeded. His mastery over men was wonderful. His penetrating glance never failed in effect. It was impossible to converse with him without admitting the spell. With all that, and though he must have been conscious of his power, he was essentially humble-minded. “You must not compare me with Herbert Edwardes,” he said to the writer in 1851. In appearance, especially in the eye and the contour of the face, he bore a striking resemblance to Lord Beaconsfield, as Lord Beaconsfield was when, as Mr. Disraeli, he first became leader of the opposition. The resemblance had been remarked by many when he visited England in 1850. What he might have become it is difficult to guess. It is difficult because it would be hard to put a limit to his career. Look-

Sept. 22.

John Nicholson dies.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 22.

ing at the point whence he started, at the reputation he had acquired at the age of thirty-seven—the reputation of being the most successful administrator, the greatest soldier, the most perfect master of men—in India, it is impossible to believe that he would have fallen short of the most famous illustrations of Anglo-Indian history, for to all the military talents of Clive he united a scrupulous conscience, and to the administrative capacity of Warren Hastings he joined a love of equal justice for the rights of all.

Remarks on  
the siege.

The stronghold had fallen, “the first great blow struck at the rebel’s cause.”\* The total loss of the army, from the 30th May to the final capture on the 20th September, had amounted to nine hundred and ninety-two killed, two thousand seven hundred and ninety-five wounded, and thirty missing, out of a force never numbering ten thousand effective men. But in addition to these, many died from disease and exposure.

“In the history of sieges,” wrote at the time an officer, in words the truth of which the lapse of twenty years has confirmed,† “that of Dehlí will ever take a prominent place. Its strength, its resources, and the prestige attached to it in the native mind, combined to render formidable that citadel of Hindustan. Reasonably might the ‘Northern Bee’ or the ‘Invalide Russe’ question our ability to suppress this rebellion if they drew their conclusions from the numerical

\* Medley.

† *The Red Pamphlet.*

strength of the little band that first sat down before Dehlí. But the spirit that animated that handful of soldiers was not simply the emulative bravery of the military proletarian. The cries of helpless women and children, ruthlessly butchered, had gone home to the heart of every individual soldier and made this cause his own. There was not an Englishman in those ranks, from first to last, who would have consented to turn his back on Dehlí without having assisted in meting out to those bloody rebels the retributive justice awarded them by his own conscience, his country, and his God. It was this spirit that buoyed them up through all the hardships of the siege, that enabled them for four long months of dreary rain and deadly heat, to face disease, privation, and death, without a murmur."

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 22.

It was indeed an occasion to bring out the rare qualities of the British soldier, to show how, under the untoward circumstances of climate, of wet, of privation, he can be staunch, resolute and patient whilst waiting for his opportunity, daring when that opportunity comes. With him, too, can claim equal laurels the splendid Gúrkah regiment of Charles Reid, the magnificent frontier warriors of the Guide Corps, the cavalry regiments of Probyn, Watson, and Hodson, the levies from the various parts of the Panjáb. These men were worthy to vie with the British soldier. Their names, unfortunately, do not survive for the advantage of posterity; but their commanders live to speak for them. They, in their turn, will leave the scene of this world. But when the tale

The British  
soldier.

His native  
comrades.

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 22.

The heroes of  
the siege.

is told to our children's children, the names of Nicholson, of Chamberlain, of Charles Reid, of Baird Smith, of Hope Grant, of John Jones, of Edwin Johnson, of Alec Taylor, of Tait, of James Brind, of Seaton, of Daly, of Tombs, of Jacob, of Probyn, of Watson, of Medley, of James Hills, of Quintin Battye,\* of Speke, of Greville, of Aikman, of Salkeld, of Home, and of many others—for the list is too long—will be inquired after with sympathy, and will inspire an interest not inferior to that with which the present generation regard the achievements of their forefathers in Spain and in Flanders.

## BOOK X.

---

### CHAPTER II.

DEEPLY sensible of the fact that a victory not followed up is a victory thrown away, General Wilson prepared, as soon as he felt his hold upon Dehlí secure, to detach a force in the direction of Balandshahr and Aligarh to intercept, and, if possible, cut off the rebels.

Wilson  
follows up the  
capture of  
Dehlí

Had Nicholson lived, it had been the General's intention to bestow upon him the command of this force. On his death it was thought that it would be offered to the commandant of the cavalry brigade, Brigadier Hope Grant. The presence of this gallant and able officer was, however, still thought necessary at Dehlí. The officer selected was Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Greathed, commanding the 8th Foot.

by sending  
a force  
towards  
A'gra.

The force consisted of two thousand seven hundred and ninety men, composed as follows:—



		Europeans.	Natives.
Book X. Chapter II. — 1857. Sept. 21.	Captain Remmington's Troop of Horse Artillery, five guns .	60	—
	Captain Blunt's Troop of Horse Artillery, five guns . . .	60	—
	Major Bouchier's Battery, six guns . . . . .	60	60
	Sappers . . . . .	—	200
	H.M.'s 9th Lancers . . . .	300	—
	Detachments, 1st, 4th, and 5th Panjáb Cavalry, and Hodson's Horse . . . . .	—	400
	H.M.'s 8th and 75th Regiments	450	—
	1st and 4th Regiments Panjáb Infantry . . . . .	—	1,200
		<hr/>	<hr/>
		930	1,860

Glad sensations of officers and men on leaving Dehli.

"Never," wrote a distinguished member of the force,\* "never did boys escape from the clutches of a schoolmaster with greater glee than we experienced on the 21st September, when we received our orders to proceed on the following morning to the plain in front of the Ajmír gate, where a column was to be formed under the command of Colonel Greathed, H.M.'s 8th Foot, destined to scour the Gangetic Doab." With the exhilarating feelings sufficiently indicated in the above extract, the force I have detailed marched on the morning of the 24th by way of the Hindan in the direction of Balandshahr.

Sept. 24.

\* *Eight Months' Campaign against the Bengal Sepoy Army during the Mutiny of 1857,* by Colonel George Bouchier, C.B.

Crossing the Hindan, and passing through Ghazi-ú-dín Nagr, the force reached Dádri on the 26th. The Gújar inhabitants of this place having been convicted of having sacked the loyal town of Sikandarábád, their town was destroyed. Pushing on, Greathed reached Sikandarábád on the 27th. Here he found himself upon the track of the enemy, a body of their cavalry having evacuated the place only on the day preceding. The distance from Sikandarábád to Balandshahr is about eight miles. Five miles from the latter is the fort of Málagarh, a place which had been held for upwards of three months by Walidád Khán, a partisan of the royal family of Dehlí, and connected with it, it was said, by ties of blood. To expel Walidád Khán from Málagarh was then the first object of Greathed's mission.

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Sept. 26-27.

Greaded de-  
stroys Dádri  
and comes on  
the track of  
the rebels.

Starting in the early hours of the 28th, the column reached at daylight four cross roads within a mile and a half of Balandshahr. One of these cross roads led to Málagarh. Balandshahr was immediately in front of the column.

Sept. 28.

Moves on  
Balandshahr

A picket of the enemy's cavalry, stationed at the cross roads, falling back before the advanced cavalry of the British force on Balandshahr, made it clear to Greathed that that station was the true point of attack. He at once prepared to avail himself of his knowledge. Strengthening the advanced guard with two Horse Artillery guns, and forming a reserve under Major Turner for the protection of his baggage, he advanced, his troops well in hand, towards the town.

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Sept. 28.

Position of  
the rebels.

Greathed's  
order of  
attack.

The rebels had occupied a position in front of the town, at a point where two roads leading to it converged. The position was well-wooded, abounding in high crops, and in gardens, the walls of which were lined with infantry. Their guns were in the centre, concealed by the crops.

On this position Greathed marched, four guns of Remmington's troop moving on by the main road; Bouchier's battery, supported by a squadron of the 9th Lancers and the squadron of the 5th Panjáb cavalry, advancing on the right, the remainder of the cavalry with the other two guns of Remmington's troop under Lieutenant Cracklow, on the left; the 8th and 75th Foot and the 2nd Panjáb Infantry being at the same time pushed forward through the gardens and houses of the civil station. Remmington's guns pounded the enemy in front, while Bouchier advanced till he could gain a position to open a cross fire on the enemy's flank. The moment this position was gained, the enemy gave in, and the British centre and left advancing, drove them headlong into the town.

The cavalry  
turn the  
enemy's  
right.

Meanwhile the cavalry under Major Ouvry and Cracklow's guns had circled round to the left, and though exposed in their progress to a severe fire, from a serai\* which the enemy had fortified and from the jail, which momentarily checked them, they carried all before them. Their loss was heavy,—not, however, out of proportion to the results obtained by their dash. The advan-

\* A traveller's resting-place.

tage they had gained was followed up by the infantry and the remainder of the cavalry, who penetrated into or turned the place. The rout then became general. Four hours after the halt at the cross roads, the town, three guns, a quantity of baggage and ammunition, were in the hands of our troops. The enemy lost about three hundred men, the victors forty-seven in killed and wounded.

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Sept. 28.

The infantry  
come up and

complete the  
defeat of the  
enemy.

The wisdom of forming a reserve to cover the baggage was justified by the results. For no sooner had the main column advanced to attack the town than a flying party of the enemy made a dash at the baggage. Major Turner, however, beat them off, and Lieutenant Probyn with the squadron of the 2nd Cavalry following them up killed several of them.

An attack on  
the baggage  
repulsed with  
loss.

Lieutenant Watson, 1st Panjáb Cavalry, and Lieutenant Blair, 9th Lancers, greatly distinguished themselves in this action. Of Lieutenant Roberts, Assistant Quartermaster-General, so distinguished during the present year as General Roberts for his conduct in Áfghánistán, and who, a few months later, gained a Victoria Cross, Captain Bouchier writes that he "seemed ubiquitous."

Málagarh was, however, the main object of Greathed's hopes, and he at once reconnoitred with a view to attack it. But the blow inflicted at Balandshahr had penetrated to Málagarh. The rebels evacuated it in a panic, leaving behind them all the plunder they had collected there.

Sept. 28-  
Oct. 2.

Greaded  
pushes on to  
Málagarh.

Málagarh was occupied, and orders were given to destroy its fortifications. In carrying out this



BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Sept. 28-

Oct. 2.

Accidental  
death of Lieu-  
tenant Home.

operation an accident happened, by which the engineer, Lieutenant Home, was unhappily killed on the spot. Home was an officer of great distinction and greater promise. He was the sole surviving officer of the gallant band who had blown up the Káshmir gate on the morning of the 14th September. For that act, one of many deeds of skill and daring, he had been promised the Victoria Cross. To die by accident after having survived the storming of the Káshmir gate was a hard dispensation, but though Home did not live to reap the fulness of his reward, he had at least known how his former splendid service was appreciated by his comrades.

Oct. 3-9.  
Kúrjah and  
its skeleton.

From Balandshahr the column marched, 3rd October, to Kúrjah. On entering this town the soldiers were greeted by a sight calculated above all others to excite their feelings of resentment to boiling pitch. "As we entered Kúrjah," writes Colonel Bouchier, "a skeleton was stuck up on the road-side, exposed to public gaze, against a wall. The head had been severed from the body, and cuts in the shin-bones were apparent, inflicted by some sharp instrument; and, in the opinion of a medical committee, this skeleton was that of a European female."

Kúrjah was on the high road to Aligarh. It was a place of some importance, for it paid a considerable revenue. The civil officer attached to the column was, therefore, strongly opposed to the prosecution of any measures of retaliation against the townspeople. To the indignation, then, of the soldiers, Kúrjah was spared, and

Greathed pushed on for Āligārḥ, two marches in advance, where he believed he should meet a considerable force of the rebels.

Āligārḥ, however, was found substantially undefended, the enemy having evacuated it and taken to the open. Pursued and overtaken in headlong flight, about two hundred and fifty of them fell to the British troopers, whose loss amounted only to three men wounded. Leaving here a garrison, Greathed pushed on to Akbarábád, and was fortunate enough to surprise it with two notorious rebel chiefs within its walls. The two chiefs, Mangal Singh and Maitáb Singh, were tried and summarily executed.

Greathed now pushed forward in the direction of Ágra, from which place "epistles, imploring aid, in every language, both dead and living, and in cypher, came pouring into camp."\* On the 9th October he was at Bijégarḥ, forty-eight miles distant. Near this place, a contrast to the general destruction of European property by the mutineers, was found a house belonging to an indigo factory, containing all its furniture uninjured, and having servants in attendance. The owner, a European, had fled to Ágra. From Bijégarḥ, in consequence of the urgent entreaties he received from Ágra, Greathed sent forward at midnight the cavalry and horse artillery by forced marches. Four hours later he followed with his infantry, using the utmost speed, mounting his men on elephants, carts, and

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Oct. 3-9.

The column gains A'ligarh and pushes on to Akbarábád.

Oct. 9.

An instance of the forbearance of the rebels.

\* Bouchier's *Eight Months' Campaign*.

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 9-10.

Greathed  
receives  
urgent  
prayers for  
assistance  
from A'gra.

camels. The despatches he received on the way were more and more urgent. "His credit was at stake," he was told, "if Agra were attacked and he so near." Thus implored, he pressed on with the utmost expedition, overtook his artillery and cavalry, and with them crossed the Jamná at the bridge of boats under the walls of the fort of Ágra on the morning of the 10th.

To account for the urgent requisitions of the Ágra garrison it is necessary to give a brief narrative of the occurrences at that place from the time we left it.

Sept. 9.  
The condition  
of A'gra

We left Ágra on the 9th September. The death of Mr. Colvin had left Mr. E. A. Reade the senior civil officer in the North-west Provinces. To great capacity for work, a clear brain, and a large understanding, Mr. Reade added the rare virtue of absolute disinterestedness. Conscious that *inter arma silent leges*, Mr. Reade at once wrote to the Supreme Government, recommending that until order were restored the administration should be vested in the hands of a military chief, and promising his hearty co-operation in any capacity. Pending the orders of Government, Mr. Reade, though the senior officer, retained only his office of Financial Commissioner.

Even before Mr. Colvin's death Ágra had been agitated by the rumour of another attack. The 23rd Native Infantry, which, it will be recollected, had mutinied at Máu on the night of the 1st July—joining itself to the mutinous contingents of Central India—those of Méhidpúr, of Málwa, and of Bhopál—and to the



rabble of the Native States, had reached Gwáliár. There, by the loyal exertions of Mahárájá Sindia, in active correspondence with the political agent, Major Charters Macpherson, residing in the fortress of Ágra, they had been detained the whole of the month of August. To detain them so long the Mahárájá had strained his authority, and was at times in imminent personal danger. To keep them longer was impossible. Early in September, then, this force of Central Indian mutineers, joined by a number of Gwáliár malcontents, though not, it is believed, by any of the regular army of that State, broke loose from the capital, and marched on Dholpúr. This place lies nearly midway between Gwáliár and Ágra, being distant but thirty-four miles from the latter. The presence, then, of a large force of the three arms at Dholpúr constituted an undoubted threat to the fortress of Ágra.

So much was known at the time of Mr. Colvin's death. It was impossible to attempt to disturb the intruders by detaching from the fortress of Ágra any portion of the small garrison upon whom the safety of so many thousand lives depended. Emboldened by the silent attitude of the English, the rebels began then to feel their way towards Ágra. Sending out detachments from Dholpúr about the 11th September, they spread over the districts of Khairagarh, Fathpúr-Sikri, Irádatnagar, and Fathábád, expelling from them the native officials in the pay of the British Government.

The storming of Dehli, instead of lessening, aggravated for the moment the difficulties of the

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Sept. 9.

threatened by  
the mutineers  
of Central  
India,

who are em-  
boldened by  
the compul-  
sory silent  
attitude of the  
garrison.

Sept. 11.

The difficul-  
ties of the  
A'gra garrison



BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Sept. 14-17.  
momentarily  
aggravated by  
the fall of  
Dehlí.

Sept. 26.

Measures  
taken in con-  
sequence by  
the Ágra  
authorities.

Sept. 19.

Sept. 30.

Colonel Hugh  
Fraser, C.B.,  
is appointed  
Chief Com-  
missioner.

British authorities in Ágra. For, although the result of the 14th September at Dehlí had been partial, yet the persistence of General Wilson on the 16th and 17th, had had the effect of inducing the more soft-hearted of the rebels to leave the town. A considerable body of these men, led by a Shahzádeh named Firozshah, bent their way from Dehlí towards Mathurá, reached that place on the 26th September, and joining there the rebel Sepoys of the regular army, mainly of the 72nd Native Infantry, led by one Híra Singh, a subadár of that regiment, effected a junction with the rebels from Central India.

To combat the facts and rumours surging about him, Mr. Reade, in conjunction with Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton, commanding the garrison, issued orders on the 19th September, to set to work at once to level some obstacles which interfered with the free play of the guns mounted on the fort, and to mine some of the more prominent buildings, including the great Mosque, which were in dangerous proximity to the walls.

On the 30th September an order from Calcutta was received at Ágra nominating Colonel Hugh Fraser, C.B., of the Engineers, to act as the Governor-General's Chief Commissioner for Ágra and its dependencies.

Three days prior to the installation of Colonel Fraser, official intelligence had been received in Ágra of the complete success of the British arms in Dehlí, of the capture of the king, and the slaughter of his two sons and grandson. It was then anticipated that a column of the Dehlí force,

released from its siege operations, would at once be despatched to Ágra by Gúrgáon and Mathurá on the right bank of the Jamná.

Great then was the consternation in the fortress when the news arrived that though a column under Colonel Greathed had been despatched southwards, it had crossed the Jamná and had taken the route of Kúrjah and Aligarh. To the minds of the British within the fortress there was present always the possibility that Greathed's force, regarding Ágra as secure in the strength of the fortifications, might push on towards Kánhpúr or Baréli, leaving the Ágra garrison threatened by the incongruous mass of rebels of whom I have spoken. Hence it was that the urgent applications I have referred to were sent to Colonel Greathed,—applications imploring him to make the best of his way to Ágra, to relieve the garrison there from their unpleasant predicament, and to re-establish the Government of the North-west Provinces.

That these urgent applications should have been misunderstood, and have been the cause of some merriment among the officers of Greathed's force, is scarcely surprising. The officers and men of that column had for more than three months occupied a position before Dehlí, exposed to the fire of the enemy, to rain, and heat, and privations of every sort. They were fresh from the storming of the imperial city, and worn by exposure, by fatigue, by watchings,\*

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Sept. 30—  
Oct. 10.

Reason for the  
urgent appli-  
cations sent  
to Greathed.

Reason why  
these applica-  
tions caused  
merriment in  
Greaded's  
force.

\* "We went," writes Mr. *Revolt*) "to the royal bastion  
C. Raikes (*Notes on the Ágra* this morning, to see Colonel

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Sept. 30—  
Oct. 10.

Greathed  
reaches A'gra  
and is in-  
formed that  
the enemy  
have  
retreated.

their minds were scarcely tuned to listen to entreaties for help from men who, however anxious and wearisome their position, seemed to have enjoyed comparative ease in the shelter of the fortress.

We have already seen how Colonel Greathed, responding to the entreaties pressed upon him with so much urgency, turned off the Grand Trunk Road and hurried by forced marches to the threatened capital. When at sunrise on the morning of the 10th he marched his force over the bridge of boats, cheered by the 3rd European Regiment on the bastions, to the gates of the fort, he was informed that the enemy, alarmed at his approach, had retired beyond the Kári Nadi, a stream about nine miles distant.\*

Greathed's movable column cross the bridge. Sikhs, Lancers, three batteries of Horse Artillery, and skeletons of two Queen's regiments. This column came in by long forced marches, owing to an express sent out by Colonel Fraser. From the bastion we went down to the Dehli gate. The Queen's 8th passed within three yards of us. 'Those dreadful-looking men must be Afgháns,' said a lady to me, as they slowly and wearily marched by. I did not discover they were Englishmen till I saw a short clay pipe in the mouth of nearly the last man. My heart bled to see these jaded, miserable objects, and to think of all they must have suffered since May last, to

reduce fine Englishmen to such worn, sun-dried skeletons."

\* An attempt has been made to deny this. In his official report, Mr. Phillips, Magistrate of Agra, quotes a memorandum by Mr.—now Sir William—Muir, that "there was no intimation given to Colonel Greathed, by any of the authorities, on the morning of the 10th, that the enemy were re-crossing." But the presence of the enemy was either unknown or misbelieved, for I find it stated in a manuscript journey of a very high official: "Major Hennessy, Commandant of the Agra Militia, had been on picket duty during the previous night (9th) with militia-men, mounted



The force halted on the public road in front of the fortress, whilst the Āgra authorities and Colonel Greathed were debating about an encampment ground. Two hours were spent in this discussion—a dreary two hours for men who had just completed a forced march of forty-eight miles. The “local executives,” touched doubtless by the sun-burnt appearance of the troops, were all for encamping them “in a series of gardens overgrown with brushwood, where the guns would not have had a range of fifty yards, and where the cavalry could not possibly act,” but Greathed was too much of a soldier to accede without urgent remonstrance, to such a proposition.

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 10.

Difference of  
opinion as to  
the encamp-  
ing ground.

In the end, however, Greathed’s proposal that

and foot, at the Metcalfe Testimonial and the cemetery beyond it. *His warning of the approach of the enemy, though some of his scouts had been fired upon, was disregarded. Such was the confidence that the arrival of Colonel Greathed’s force would deter any attempt, that his repeated remonstrances led to his being summarily remanded to the Fort. The same information, given by one of Mr. Muir’s spies, was scornfully rejected.* Rejected—by whom? Certainly by the Āgra authorities. Mr. Muir himself, writing the same day to Sir Hope Grant, says, “It was a most complete surprise in one sense to us, but a greater one to them

(the rebels).” Major Norman, now Lieutenant-General Sir H. Norman, K.C.B., wrote in 1858, “The head authorities at Āgra informed Colonel Greathed that the insurgent force from Dholpūr was beyond the Kari Naddi, ten miles from cantonments, across which they would find difficulty in passing . . . This information was given in positive terms.” It is clear, then, that convinced in their own minds that the enemy had crossed the Kāri Naddi and were ten miles distant, the Āgra officials conveyed their convictions on this point to Colonel Greathed. It was, perhaps, unwise in him to trust to this.

Greaded  
gains the  
point and  
encamps on  
the parade  
ground.



Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 10.

Greathed's  
camp.

The soldiers  
prepare to  
rest after  
their toil.

his men should encamp on the parade ground, a magnificent grassy plain, with not an obstacle within three or four hundred yards of it, and then only a few high crops, was allowed to prevail. The camp was marked out, the horses were picketed, and the men went to their breakfasts. Some of the officers hastened into the fort, others from the fort poured into the camp, followed or accompanied by men of all sorts, who seized the long wished for opportunity of communicating with their friends of the outside world.

The men in the camp, having swallowed a hasty meal, were variously occupied. Some, pending the arrival of the baggage, now slowly coming up, had thrown themselves on the ground and were fast asleep; some were talking to their friends; some were assisting to pitch the few tents that had reached the ground. The long march had caused the camp to be pervaded by an air of listlessness and languor, common to men who have but just completed an undertaking of more than ordinary labour. Not a sign betokened an enemy. As far as the eye could reach, the horizon was clear. The high crops and trees which shut in the view at no great distance were stirred only by the breeze. After their long fatigues it seemed as though the weary soldiers were to enjoy at last a day of repose.

This sense of security was scarcely justified by the certain proximity of the enemy, and by the absence of any effort being made to ascertain whether the conjectures of the Ágra officials were correct. It was soon disturbed in a very sudden

and remarkable manner. Four natives, apparently conjurors, and beating tom-toms, came strolling up to the advanced guard of the 9th Lancers. On the sergeant in charge ordering them off, one of them drew a sword from under his clothes and cut him down. Another sergeant moving up to the rescue was also wounded. These men were soon despatched by the troopers, but, before the alarm had reached the rear, round shot "from out the blue" came pouring into the camp. The familiar sound was sufficient for the soldiers of Dehlí. The assembly was sounded, though the call was scarcely needed. To start to their feet, seize their muskets, mount their horses, and man the guns, was the work of an instant. But while this was doing the cannonade spread terror among the camp-followers, and as great among the visitors.\*

The enemy's horse, taking advantage of the surprise, had charged our artillery and had sabred the gunners of one gun, when a dashing charge made upon them by a squadron of the 9th Lancers, drove them back in disorder. It cost the squadron dear, for Captain French, the squadron leader, was killed, and Lieutenant

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 10.

They are  
surprised by  
the enemy

but prompt  
form up.

Gallant  
charge of the  
9th Lancers.

\* "Such was the terrible panic among the latter," writes Colonel Bouchier, C.B., an eye-witness and actor in the drama, "that those officers who had gone into the fort and were eager to get back to their posts could not stem the torrent of affrighted beings; an officer

of the Dragoons in attempting it was fairly carried off his legs and borne back with the crowd. Not satisfied with legitimate means of escape, the gun horses in many cases were seized as they were being led to the guns, and were found next morning in the fort."

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Oct. 10.

Greathed  
deploys his  
line.

Pearson  
brings his  
battery to  
the ground,

and, checking  
the enemy,  
drives back  
his left.

Jones, his subaltern, was dangerously wounded and cut up when dismounted. Greathed, who was on the spot a few minutes after the attack had begun, lost not a moment in taking the necessary measures. He deployed his line and directed Watson to move off with a portion of his irregular cavalry to turn the enemy's left flank.

The line when advancing was joined by Pearson's 9-pounder battery, which had been despatched from the fort on the first arrival of the column. This gallant officer, whose distinguished conduct has already been mentioned,\* had brought this battery again into a state of efficiency by substituting for the native drivers, who had wholly deserted after the disastrous affair of the 5th July, volunteers from the Eurasian fugitives in the fort.† He now arrived at an opportune moment on the right of the line where there was no artillery, and where the infantry were giving ground under the fire of some heavy guns of the enemy which commanded the road along which their centre was advancing. Three of these having had their limbers blown up, and been captured in succession by Pearson's advance; and the cavalry under Ouvry, with all the guns on the left under Turner, having also made a forward

\* Note, vol. i. pages 272-276.

† It is but justice to these men to record that in consequence of their admirable behaviour on this and other occasions, Lord Canning

asked Captain Pearson if he would undertake to raise a battery of them. But there were several reasons why it was deemed inexpedient to repeat the experiment in a permanent form.



movement, the enemy were soon seen to be giving way on all sides. A well-timed charge by Watson and Probyn completed the disorder; nor though, with their usual tactics, their cavalry attempted to make a diversion by threatening the camp, were they successful. A second charge of the Lancers and two squadrons of Hodson's Horse sent them back more quickly than they came.

Colonel Cotton had by this time arrived from the fort with the 3rd Europeans, and, as senior officer, had assumed the command. Detaching two companies of this regiment to strengthen the Panjáb infantry on the right flank, where the enemy were still contesting the ground under shelter of some high crops, he urged the whole line forward in pursuit. The rebels fell back in hasty disorder by the Gwáliár road, nor did they make a halt even at their camp, which was found standing about midway between Ágra and the Kári Naddi. Here the infantry were done up and halted, but the pursuit was continued with great vigour and success by the artillery and cavalry. "Once only," says Colonel Bouchier, "did they make a stand. A few rounds of grape, however, scattered them in all directions, and the cavalry were soon among their flying ranks, doing great execution. For seven miles the road was one continued line of carts, guns, ammunition wag-gons, camels rushing about without their drivers, and baggage of every description—all of which fell into our hands. Not a gun or a cart recrossed the stream; all became prize owing to the rapidity with which the victory was followed

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 10.

The enemy's  
disorder is  
completed by  
the cavalry.

Colonel  
Cotton  
arrives with  
the 3rd Euro-  
peans and  
assumes  
command.

The enemy  
defeated and  
pursued.



BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 10.

Their guns  
and ammuni-  
tion taken.

Merit due to  
the troops  
who won it.

The surprise  
as great to  
the rebels as  
to the  
British.

up on the opposite bank. A few cavalry troopers made their appearance, but soon disappeared after a few rounds from the Horse Artillery. Thirteen pieces of ordnance, with an enormous quantity of ammunition, were brought into camp. Much that was useless was destroyed; and the enemy's camp, with the villages on which it abutted, was burnt."

No victory could have been more rapid or decisive. It was especially creditable to the troops who had that morning marched into Ágra, and whom neither fatigue nor hunger, nor want of sleep, could stop when an enemy was within their grasp. Bouchier's 9-pounder battery had marched thirty miles without a halt before the action began. From first to last Greathed's cavalry and artillery had marched at least over sixty-four miles, and the infantry fifty-four miles of road, in less than thirty-six hours, besides moving through the fields, and fighting a general action. It was a splendid performance—well marched, well fought, well followed up. The force did not return to their camp before 7 o'clock in the evening.

But it was a surprise! Yes—but a surprise also to the rebels. They were not aware, until the sleeping camp had been startled into activity by the fire of their guns, that it was Greathed's force which lay before them. They believed they had to do only with the garrison of Ágra. In adjusting the balance, then, of surprises, it must be admitted that the rebels had more reason than the British to regret the want of a careful look-out.

The column halted at Ágra the three days following the battle. A supply of ammunition was obtained from the fort, and the wounded were sent into the hospital which had been improvised in the Moti Masjid. Here they were attended not only by the medical officers but by the ladies, whose zealous and tender exertions have been recorded in a previous volume.\*

Whilst the column lay halted at Ágra a change in the command of it was inaugurated.

Brigadier Hope Grant was Lieutenant-Colonel of the 9th Lancers. Left behind at Dehlí in command of the cavalry, he had felt keenly his separation from his splendid regiment. He could not, however, devise, nor could General Penny—commanding at Dehlí, in the absence of General Wilson, who on the fall of the place had proceeded on sick certificate to the Himalayas—devise any plan by which he could serve with the column to which his regiment was attached. For he was senior to Greathed, and General Penny did not possess the power to supersede that officer. One morning, however, when ruminating over the sad fate which compelled him to be inactive, he received a letter from Mr. (now Sir William) Muir, the Secretary to the Government of the North-west Provinces—a letter dated the 10th October, and concluded while Greathed was beating the rebels—in which occurs the following passage: “You are to come on as sharp as you can. . . . You are to come on at

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Oct. 10-13.

The column  
halts three  
days to refit

Hope Grant

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 10-18.  
is directed to  
proceed to  
A'gra and  
assume com-  
mand of the  
column.

He assumes  
command,

Oct. 19-29.  
reaches  
Kánhpúr,

crosses the  
Ganges,

Oct. 30.

and encamps  
in the plain  
beyond the  
Banni bridge.

once in the mail-cart if possible." Grant, doubting the authority of Mr. Muir to confer upon him the command of a moveable column, showed the letter to General Penny, who, reading through the lines, directed Grant to proceed to Ágra, and gave him a written order to assume command of the column.

The column had left Ágra for Kánhpúr before Grant, hurrying night and day, reached that place. He overtook it, however, at Firozábád, the third march out of Ágra, and at once assumed command. Pushing onwards, he reached Mainpúri, evacuated by its rebel Rájá, on the 19th, and arrived at Kánhpúr on the 26th October—a skirmish of a squadron of the 9th Lancers and two of the Panjáb cavalry with some five hundred rebels, on the Káli rivulet, near Kánúj, on the 23rd, ending in their complete defeat, their pursuit by Lieutenant Probyn as far as the Ganges, and the capture of four guns and a large quantity of ammunition and two store carts, alone breaking the monotony of the march. At Kánhpúr arrangements were made whereby the strength of the column would be increased, by additions principally to its infantry, to about five thousand men. On the 30th, Grant crossed the Ganges for the Álambágh, but in consequence of orders from the Commander-in-Chief, he halted within a few miles of it, near the village of Bantúra, situated in a fine plain four miles on the Lakhaon side of the Banni bridge, there to await the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, on his way to commence operations



for the final relief of Lakhnao. To gain this position Grant had a skirmish with the rebels who had occupied the village of Banthíra. He drove them out of it, however, without loss, and captured the only gun they possessed—a 9-pounder, the property of the East India Company.

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 30.

Simultaneously with the advance of Greathed's column to relieve Ágra, a considerable body of native levies, raised and commanded by Van Cortlandt—an officer of foreign extraction who had served under Ranjit Singh, and had subsequently to the campaign of 1845–6 accepted civil office under the British Government—proceeded to restore order in the districts to the north-west of the imperial city. Van Cortlandt was well qualified for the task. He had had great experience of native soldiers, and he had shown on many an occasion, notably when he assisted Herbert Edwardes in that gallant officer's campaign of 1848, that he could make them fight. On this occasion his work was comparatively easy. The large villages all over the district submitted without a blow; many mutinous soldiers surrendered to him; the roads were opened; and on the 26th September he had so far reduced the large district of Rohtak to submission, that it was possible to re-establish the civil authorities, and even to collect revenue.

Van  
Cortlandt

reduces the  
districts to  
the north-  
west of  
Dehlí.

Another column, under Brigadier Showers, the commanding officer of the 2nd European Regiment, was despatched on the 2nd October to clear the districts to the west and south-

Brigadier  
Showers pro-  
ceeds to the  
west and  
south-west.



Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 2-17.

The Rájá of  
Balamgarh

submits.

Showers  
takes Riwári,  
Jajhar, and  
Kanáund.

Oct. 18.

west. This column consisted of portions of the Carabineers, of a portion of Hodson's Horse, and the Guide Cavalry, of a field battery and two or three heavy guns, and mortars, of the 2nd European Regiment, the 2nd Gúrkahs, and a regiment of Sikh infantry. The first destination of this column was the fort of Jajhar, on the way to which place it had to march within a few miles of Balamgarh.

The Rájá of this place had certainly admitted the authority of the King of Dehli. It is more than possible, it is probable, that he had to choose between such a course and destruction. Certain it is that when he heard that the British force was in the vicinity of his capital, he drove out in his carriage to meet it. The British officer with whom he came in contact was the notorious Hodson. Hodson has recorded his opinion that the Rájá and his followers deserved to be exterminated; but the orders not to interfere with the native chief of Balamgarh had been so positive that he was constrained to allow him to return, and the force, striking away from the road to Balamgarh, marched through the Riwári district in the direction of Jajhar. The fort overlooking the town of Riwári was taken without opposition. Jajhar was next reached and occupied, the Nawáb having made his submission, on the 18th. The still stronger fort of Kanáund in the same district, armed with fourteen guns, and containing five lakhs of rupees, surrendered the following morning to the Carabineers and Hodson's Horse, both having marched forty-one

miles in fifteen hours. Being then on the borders of the sandy desert, Showers returned to Dehli. In the course of his expedition he had occupied four forts, burnt many villages, and taken about seventy guns and £80,000, besides much ammunition and many horses. He had captured or forced to surrender, two princes, the Nawáb of Jajhar, and the Rájá of Balamgarh,\* and one notorious partisan, Hákim Abdúl Hak, chief of Gúrgaon. The last-named was hanged immediately after the return of the column to Dehlí.

Showers's column had scarcely returned to Dehlí when intelligence reached General Penny that the rebels, reinforced by the mutineers of the Jodhpúr legion, had beaten the troops of the loyal Rájá of Jodhpúr, and reappeared in great force in the districts which had but just been traversed, reoccupying Riwári. It became necessary, therefore, to organise and despatch a second force to restore order. A column composed of the 1st Fusiliers, under Captain Caulfield, the 7th Panjáb Infantry, under Godby, a troop of Horse Artillery—the 3rd Brigade—under Colin Cookworthy, a heavy battery of 8-inch howitzers and 18-pounders, under Gillespie, a portion of the Corps of Guides, under Kennedy and Sandford, and the Múltání horse under Lind, was ordered on this duty. The direction of it was bestowed upon Colonel Gerrard, an officer of merit and distinction, trained in the 1st Fusiliers, and who then commanded that regiment.

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Oct. 19.

Showers  
returns.

Results of his  
expedition.

The rebels,  
reinforced by  
the Jodhpúr  
legion, renew  
their ex-  
cesses.

A column is  
sent under  
Gerrard to  
repress them.

\* The unfortunate Rájá was subsequently tried and hanged at Dehlí.

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 10-13.

Gerrard  
joined by  
detachments  
under  
Stafford.

The rebels  
meanwhile  
had occupied  
Nárnúl.

Nov. 16.

Their  
splendid posi-  
tion—and the  
folly which  
prevented  
their keeping  
it.

Gerrard marched from Dehlí on the 10th of November, reached Riwári on the 13th, and re-occupied the fort without opposition. Here he was joined by two squadrons of the Carabineers. At Kanáund, which he reached two days later, he was met by a detachment of the Hariáná Field Force—of the three arms, including, in addition to the police and native levies, the 23rd Panjáb Infantry—under Captain Stafford. Thence he pushed on over a very sandy plain difficult to traverse to Nárnúl, where, it was understood, the enemy had mustered in force.

It was true that on the morning of that very day, the 16th November, the rebels had occupied the village of Nárnúl in considerable force. They occupied it, however, only to prove, for the fiftieth or sixtieth time in this memorable year, that neither strong positions, nor numbers, nor personal courage, are of any avail when there is no leader able to take full advantage of those positions, of those numbers, or of that valour. Never was there a stronger exemplification of the harmlessness of lions, when the lions are led by asses. Nárnúl was a very strong place. It lay under a hill about four hundred feet high, which formed part of a ridge extending some miles to the south-east. It was covered in front—the front facing the road by which the British force would have to advance—by low walls, forming admirable defensive cover. A large and well-filled tank with steep banks, standing much above the surrounding plain, distant only about two hundred yards from the village, and commanding the



road to it, afforded another strong position, which infantry might advantageously have occupied. The ground to the left was broken and uneven, but the plain in front was level and broad, admirably adapted to the movements of cavalry, in which arm the rebels were very strong.

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

Such was the position occupied early on the morning of the 16th November by the rebel army, flushed with recent victory over the Rájput levies of Jaipúr. It was clear that their leader, San-nand Khán, a near relative of the Nawáb of Jajhar, was well aware that a British force was moving against him, for he had specially selected the strong position of Nárnúl as one against which that force would spend its strength in vain. But with the country people well disposed towards him, he made no effort to procure information regarding his enemy's movements. He posted no vedettes, he sent out no scouts. Wielding a numerous cavalry, he trusted entirely to his own eye-sight to learn when and in what manner the British would advance.

The rebel leader learns that the English are marching against him.

Notwithstanding this information he posts neither vedettes nor scouts.

It would appear that he expected the British early on the morning of the 16th. But when the clock struck eight, then nine, and when then the hands began to point towards ten, and not a single speck of dust was visible on the horizon, he gave them up for the day, and retiring to his camp, near a dilapidated fort of the same name, about two miles in the rear, there gave orders to his men to dismount and eat. He thus deliberately abandoned, though for the short space of only

As up to 10 the English had not come in sight he vacates his splendid position.



BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

Causes which  
had for-  
tunately re-  
tarded the  
British.

one hour, a position which it would have required all the dash, all the energy, all the exertions of the small British force, numbering altogether about two thousand five hundred men, to carry. That hour was fatal to him.

The fact was, that the impediments in the road between Kanáund and Nárnúl had terribly—though owing to the incompetence of the rebel leader, fortunately—delayed Gerrard's advance. The distance to the fort of Nárnúl was but fourteen miles, and Gerrard had started at 1 o'clock in the morning. Yet, in the first instance, the enormous difficulty experienced by the artillery in traversing the narrow and sharp-angled streets of Kanáund, and, in the second, the depth of the sand in the road which followed, so hindered the advance, that in ten hours they were only able to accomplish twelve miles! At 11 o'clock Gerrard reached the village of Nárnúl, now guiltless of the presence of an enemy.

The delay  
smooths  
away great  
difficulties.

How he and his officers grumbled at the inevitable delay, may well be imagined. Not one of them could imagine that Fortune was working for them—that the blind goddess was really removing the difficulties in front and plotting to spare the lives of many—to give them in the plain the easy victory which, though still certain, would have been difficult and bloody in the village.

At Nárnúl, I have said, Gerrard saw no signs of the enemy. The difficulties of the march had greatly fatigued his men. He therefore halted while a dram was served out, and the men devoured the small store of food which each had

carried with him. They had hardly finished this frugal meal when "a slight cloud of dust was seen to rise over a gentle swell of the ground to the left in front."\* Another smile from Fortune! Sannand Khán had withdrawn his men for an hour that they might break their fast at the encampment near the ruined fort: he was now returning, hoping to reoccupy his strong position!

In a moment the British infantry stood to their arms, the cavalry were in the saddle. A trooper belonging to the Corps of Guides rode to the front to reconnoitre. As he nears the rising ground a bullet strikes the ground close to him. But prior even to that evidence of the presence of the enemy he had seen enough. He turned to report to his commanding officer, but before he could reach him the rebel horsemen showed themselves in numbers moving from left to right along the crest of the rising ground. Meanwhile Gerrard had ordered an advance, the Carabineers and the Guides on the right, linked to the centre by a wing of the 7th Panjáb Infantry, and six light guns. In the centre the 1st Fusiliers, the heavy 18-pounders, which it had cost so much trouble to drag across the sand, a company of the Guide Infantry, and the 23rd Panjáb Infantry. To connect the centre with the Irregular Cavalry and Múltáni Horse on the left, and protected by the Sikh Infantry, were four light Sikh guns. In front of all rode Gerrard, a handsome man, with wavy grey hair, his red coat covered with decorations,

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Nov. 16.

The enemy  
return to  
occupy their  
position.

A Guide  
trooper re-  
connoitres.

The enemy  
show them-  
selves in  
numbers.

Gerrard  
advances.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, the article was present at the June 1858. The writer of affair.

Book X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16

The cavalry  
of the rival  
hosts join.

The cavalry  
conflict.

conspicuous on his white Arab, surrounded by his staff. So steady were the movements, it might have been an ordinary field-day.

The trooper of whom I have spoken had scarcely rejoined his regiment when the enemy's guns opened with grape on our right. There reply to them first our light guns, next the big eighteens and an 8-inch howitzer. Many hostile saddles are emptied, so the rebels, thinking this poor work, mass their cavalry on their left, and come down with a shout. But the movement has been foreseen, and the Carabineers and Guides, moving up at the same moment, gallop to meet them. About midway between the two lines the rival hosts join.

It was a gallant conflict. Never did the enemy fight better. There was neither shirking nor flinching. Both sides went at it with a will. The Guides were commanded by Kennedy,\* "the worthy son of a worthy sire," and he led them with a skill and a daring which could not be surpassed. The Carabineers, splendidly led by Wardlaw, who commanded the entire cavalry, equalled, if they did not surpass, their former splendid achievements. Never was there a charge more gallant, and certainly, never were the British cavalry met so fairly or in so full a swing by the rebel horse. As the rival parties clashed in deadly shock, the artillery fire on both sides was suspended as it were by instinct, the gunners gazing with outstretched necks at the converging horsemen.

\* Now Colonel Kennedy, commanding a cavalry regiment in Afghánistán.



The result was not long doubtful. Though the enemy fought with the courage of despair, though they exposed their lives with a resolution which forbade the thought of yielding, they were fairly borne down. The Carabineers and the Guides forced them back, cleaving down the most stubborn foemen, till the remainder, overpowered, sought safety in flight. Then Wardlaw and Kennedy, mindful of the mistake of Prince Rupert, gathered up their men, and, instead of pursuing the routed horsemen of the enemy, wheeled suddenly round to the left, and came down with a swoop on the enemy's guns. The shock was irresistible; the gunners who stood were cut down. Leaving the guns, the cavalry then went on to prevent any rally on the part of the enemy's horse.

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

But that had long since been cared for. Meanwhile the enemy's infantry and gunners, recovering from their panic, had, after our horsemen had swept by, pushed forward, and recovering the guns, opened fire on our advancing infantry. Not for long did they continue this hazardous game. The 1st Fusiliers, coming up with a run, reached the guns after two rounds had been fired, and recaptured them.

The infantry  
conflict.

On our left the cavalry movement had not been so successful. The Múltáni Horse, new levies, had not displayed the alacrity to come to close quarters which their comrades on the right had so conspicuously manifested. In vain did their gallant commander, Lieutenant Lind, dash amongst the foe. But few followed him, until the Field Engineer, Lieutenant Humphrey, who that day

The conflict  
on the left.



BOOK X.  
Chapter II.  
—  
1857.  
Nov. 16.

acted as Aide-de-Camp to Gerrard, riding up to the still hesitating mass, called upon them to follow him, and charged single-handed the rebel horse. Then the Múltánis followed, not, however, before the gallant Humphrey had been unhorsed and cut down, receiving a severe wound in his right arm, another, slighter, on the left side of his body, "while a third entirely divided his leather helmet and thick turban which covered it, fortunately without injuring his head." He subsequently recovered.

The enemy  
completely  
defeated.

Cookworthy's  
gallant feat.

But the action was over. The right and the centre had won it, and the charge of the Múltánis tardy though it was, completed their good work. The enemy, beaten and in disorder, fell back through the gardens and broken ground on their left, in full retreat to their camp. The British followed them up with vigour, each arm vying with the other. It was on this occasion that the Horse Artillery performed a feat unsurpassed even in the annals of that splendid regiment. It is thus recorded by an eye-witness: \* "On turning up from the left, the Artillery got into a ploughed field, which was separated from the road by a mud wall fully three feet high. At this, Dawes's troop, this day commanded by Captain Cookworthy,† rode at full gallop. On they come—over go the leaders, nicely both together, next follow the centre pair, and lastly the wheelers take the leap; then, with a sort of kick and a bump, over goes the gun on to the hard road.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*,  
June 1858.

† Now Major-General Colin  
Cookworthy.

The Fusiliers were so delighted that they gave a willing cheer, while the Sikhs, who witnessed the feat, said nothing for some time, but looked on with open mouths and eyes; at last 'Truly that is wonderful!' burst from their lips spontaneously." Of such was the old Bengal Artillery, unsurpassed and unsurpassable!

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

The old  
Bengal  
Artillery!

Colonel Gerrard, the commander of the column, had ridden in front the whole time. He was the only man of the force—his orderly officer, Captain Osborn alone excepted—dressed in red, the infantry wearing the kháki, or dust-coloured uniform, then authorised for service in the field. As in the fight, so in the pursuit, Gerrard maintained his prominent position. He pushed forward, directing the men, till he reached a rivulet with partially wooded banks. On these banks he drew in his horse, whilst he directed the movements of the troops to the other side. To him, thus sitting on his white Arab and giving directions calmly, one of his staff officers, Lieutenant Hogg, suddenly pointed out a man on the opposite bank taking deliberate aim at him. Just then the man fired, but missed. Hogg entreated the Colonel to move back. Gerrard replied that he would move in a minute, but that he must see what was going on. But before he did move, the man had reloaded and fired. This time his aim was true. Gerrard fell mortally wounded, and died in two hours.

Gerrard,  
directing the  
pursuit,

is killed.

By the death of Gerrard the command devolved upon Captain Caulfield, then commanding the 1st Fusiliers. But before the intimation of his pro-

Caulfield  
takes com-  
mand.

BOOK X.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

The enemy  
make a  
sudden  
stroke for  
victory,

but are  
foiled.

Nov. 17-23.

Seaton is  
sent to  
replace  
Gerrard;  
he returns to  
Dehli pre-  
paratory to  
marching  
towards  
Kánhpúr.

motion reached him, the troops, carrying out Gerard's plan, had crossed the rivulet, and had stormed the enemy's camp. The action, however, was by no means over. The rebel horse, rallying on the right, made a sudden charge on Lind's Múltánis and recaptured two of their lost guns. Their success, however, was but momentary. Two companies of the Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Warner, charged and recovered the guns, whilst the main body of the regiment, under McFarlane, expelled the rebel infantry from the still remaining buildings in the fort of Nárnúl. The rebels then dispersed, leaving in the hands of the victors eight guns, their camp, and the fort.

The next day Caulfield gave the force a rest, only sending out parties of horse to ascertain the direction in which the enemy had fled. This direction proving to be to the south-east, towards the dominions of the Rájá of Alwar, Caulfield set off on the 19th to follow them. The rebels were, however, invisible. On the 23rd the force reached Paltaóli. Here it was joined by its new commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Seaton, C.B., sent for that purpose from Dehli. To that place Seaton marched the force to prepare it to escort to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief at Kánhpúr a large convoy of grain and stores—covering above eighteen miles of road. Here I must leave him, to return once more to Calcutta, there to note how the Commander-in-Chief selected by Lord Palmerston to crush the mutiny was preparing to carry out his rôle.

## BOOK XI.

---

### CHAPTER I.

SIR COLIN CAMPBELL had arrived in Calcutta on the 13th August. At that moment affairs were seemingly at their worst. The North-west Provinces, Dehlí, Rohilkhand, and Oudh were lost. The Panjáb was fermenting. Central India was in a state of veiled rebellion. The very existence of the English in India was depending upon the early capture of Dehlí, and Dehlí still held out.

State of  
affairs  
throughout  
India on the  
arrival of Sir  
Colin  
Campbell.

The latest accounts received from the districts occupied by the rebels were far from re-assuring. The British force before Dehlí was believed to be more besieged than besieging. The British garrison in Agra was known to be isolated and cut off from communication with the outer world. All that men knew of Lakhnao was that the small British force, having sustained a defeat in the field, was shut up in an enclosure, not, in a military point of view, defensible, charged with the care of a large number of women and children; that Havelock, after two heroic efforts to re-



BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Aug. 13—  
Oct. 26.

The British  
hold on the  
country de-  
creasing  
every day.

Sir Colin  
finds that  
though cer-  
tain centres  
are held,  
there has  
been a great  
dissemination  
of troops east  
of Allahábád.

lieve them, had been forced to fall back upon Kánhpúr.

But if these accounts were sufficient to dishearten, the private information received was scarcely calculated to console. Every day made the loyalty of the Sikhs more questionable. Every day increased the difficulty of Sindia to restrain his troops from a movement against Ágra, or, more to be dreaded still, upon Kánhpúr. Every day relaxed our hold upon the princes of Rajpútáná and of Bandalkhand, whilst from the Western Presidency there came unmistakable symptoms that order in the southern Maráthá country could be maintained only by a strong and vigorous hand.

What was Sir Colin Campbell's position? What were his means? Thanks to the skill, the energy, the daring of a few men who had come to the front in the heart of the crisis—to Neill, to Frederic Gubbins, to Vincent Eyre, and to William Tayler—the British held Allahábád, and the important cities between that fortress and Calcutta, of Banáras, of Gházipúr, and of Patná. The retention of these three salient points enabled them to hold four others of lesser though of great importance, and by their means to command the great river artery between Calcutta and Allahábád. But the holding of these posts involved the occupation of them by troops, whose services were urgently needed in the field. This, too, at a moment when the reinforcements from England were only beginning to arrive.

The distance by river between Calcutta and

Allahabad is eight hundred and nine miles. When Sir Colin Campbell arrived, no troops were available for active purposes. Two regiments indeed, the 5th and 90th, had been despatched to join Havelock's force at Kánhpúr. All the others were employed in keeping open the river communication between Calcutta and Allahabad.

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Aug. 13—  
Oct. 26.

He has no troops available for active purposes.

It is true there was the grand trunk road—Mr. Beadon's famous line of six hundred miles—though in point of fact the distance was somewhat less. But along this road the railway extended only to Rániganj, one hundred and twenty miles. Thence it was necessary to march, and the route was not only long, but as events proved, in spite of Mr. Beadon, it was liable to be traversed by the rebels. The troops marching upon it, therefore, might at any moment be diverted for other duties.

Mr. Beadon's line still, and always, in danger of being broken.

The refusal of Lord Canning's Government in the month of July to order the disarming of the native regiments at Dánápúr had added still further to the difficulties of the new Commander-in-Chief. Two regiments of foot and a battery of artillery were thus diverted from the general plan—the plan which had made Lakhnao the point at which the first great blow was to be dealt—in order to quell a rebellion which, had the members of the Government of India been unfettered by sophisms and theories, would never have occurred—the rebellion in western Bihár.

The results of Lord Canning's refusal to disarm the Dánápúr native regiments still felt.

But if Sir Colin Campbell had no men with whom to operate, it might be imagined that the Government had at least provided for him resources to be

BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Aug. 13-  
Oct. 26.

Want of fore-  
sight of the  
Supreme  
Government.

Sir Colin  
Campbell has  
"to organise  
victory."

made available for the troops expected from China and from England. There could not be a greater delusion. Dreaming of reorganisation, sanguine that the coming troops would at once settle the business, the members of the Government had opened wide their mouths in expectancy. They had done nothing, and nothing had fallen into their mouths. They had prepared no means of transport; they had no horses, either for cavalry or artillery; Enfield rifle ammunition was deficient; flour was even running out; guns, gun-carriages and harness for field batteries were either unfit for service or did not exist.\* Sir Colin Campbell's first care was to supply these deficiencies. He moved the Government to the purchase of horses on a large and necessarily an expensive scale; to indent on England for Enfield rifle ammunition whilst stimulating the manufacture of it on the spot; to procure flour from the Cape; to cast field guns at the Kásipúr foundry; to manufacture tents; to make up harness; to procure English-speaking servants for the expected European regiments from Madras. Before the end of August Sir Colin had quintupled the activity of the "departments," and had infused even into the Government a portion of his own untiring energy.

Nor was his attention confined to the preparations necessary for the troops before they could stir one foot from Calcutta. Those troops were

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858; also personal experience and observation.



to move forward—but how? I have given a description, in outline, of the two routes which were open to them—the river route and the land route. But useful, and in some respects superior, as the river route had been in the months of June, July, and August, Sir Colin could not but feel that with the cessation of the rainy season the river would fall, and the way by it would become tedious and uncertain. He therefore resolved to do all in his power to improve the land route and to quicken the means of transport. With this view, under his inspiring pressure, the Government established the bullock train. This train was composed of a number of covered waggon, in each of which a fixed number of European soldiers could sit at ease. To draw these, a proportionate number of bullocks were posted at stages all along the road. The starting-point of the bullock train was the railway terminus at Rániganj, one hundred and twenty miles from Calcutta. The soldiers, leaving the train, were supposed to enter the bullock-carriages and to travel in them all night and in the early hours of the morning and evening, resting for food during the heat of the day. This scheme was soon brought to perfection, and was made to work so as to land daily in Allahabad two hundred men fresh and fit for work, conveyed in the space of a fortnight from Calcutta.

But, I have said, Mr. Beadon's famous line of six hundred miles, once already rent in twain, was still far from safe. Constant revolts rendered it less and less so every day. The Rámgarh battalion, stationed at Ránchi, on the left of the road,

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Aug. 13–  
Oct. 26.

He moves  
the Govern-  
ment to or-  
ganise a  
bullock train  
to convey  
troops to  
Allahábád.

The scheme  
is soon  
brought to  
perfection.

Dangers  
which  
threatened  
the line to be  
traversed by  
the bullock  
train.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Aug. 13—  
Oct. 26.

Sir Colin  
orders patrol  
parties to  
secure it.

The tempta-  
tion thus af-  
forded to the  
civil authori-  
ties to use  
these troops  
for local pur-  
poses some-  
times ir-  
resistible.

breaking the bands of discipline, menaced all the salient points running within easy distance of that station; on the right the remnants of the Dáná-púr garrison, of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, and subsequently the mutinous portion of the 32nd Native Infantry, uniting themselves with the bands of Kúnwar Singh, threatened the districts in the neighbourhood, and spread consternation amongst the local authorities. These mutinous bands constituted the great difficulty of Sir Colin Campbell. Not that they were sufficiently formidable to check a British force. Could they have been found collected, a few companies of Europeans would have annihilated them. But spreading over a vast tract of country, they harassed every district and threatened every post. For the moment Sir Colin's one care was to ensure the safety of the small parties travelling along the Trunk Road in the bullock train. To secure this he formed moveable columns, of about six hundred men each, infantry and artillery, to patrol the road. This measure, successful in so far that it secured the passage of the troops, was less so in another. It afforded to the civil authorities the temptation of diverting some of the troops to small and comparatively unimportant local operations on the flanks, "So that," says a well-informed writer, "at one period, out of about two thousand four hundred men who were proceeding by the different routes to Allahábád, one thousand eight hundred were, on one pretence or other, laid hold of by the civil power, and employed for the time being in opera-

tions extraneous to the general plan of the campaign.”\*

The efforts made by the Government to produce resources and to ensure the safety of the road were beginning to bear good fruit when most of the troops diverted by Lord Elgin from the China Expedition arrived. These consisted of the 93rd Highlanders, the 23rd Fusiliers, three companies of the 82nd Foot, two companies Royal Artillery, and one company of Sappers. About the same time also, that is during September and in the first week of October, there arrived from the Cape of Good Hope a company of Royal Artillery with fifty-eight horses and about five hundred of the 13th Light Infantry. To hurry forward these troops had now become a matter of the greatest necessity. In the interval before their arrival Dehlí had, it is true, fallen, but Lakhnao had not been relieved; so far from it, the British force that had reached our garrison in the Residency, besieged itself by the rebels, had been thus withdrawn from active operations, and left a gap on which an enterprising enemy might act with fatal effect.

The rebel troops of Gwáliár were displaying unwonted activity, and it certainly was in their power at this particular period to cut the British line in two, and sever communications between Calcutta and Kánhpúr. To press on troops quickly to Allahábád, where equipments were being prepared, became then an imperative duty. To this end every exertion was made. Horses

BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Aug. 13–  
Oct. 26.

Troops of the  
China Expe-  
dition reach  
Calcutta.

The gap left  
by the reten-  
tion of Out-  
ram's troops  
in Lakhnao,

necessitates  
prompt and  
active mea-  
sures.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Aug. 13—  
Oct. 26.

The *Shannon*  
and *Pearl*.

were taken bodily from regiments which had mutinied, and were pressed into service. The Military Train Corps, composed to a great extent of old dragoons, was formed, by means of some of the horses so become available, into a cavalry regiment, and they, too, were sent on with the rest.

But before a single man of the China expeditionary Corps had left Calcutta, there had set out from that city in river steamers a gallant body of men, gallantly commanded, destined to cover themselves with glory in a series of actions for which they had no special training. In another part of this history I have alluded to the arrival in Calcutta of H.M.'s ships *Shannon* and *Pearl*, and of the offer made by Lord Elgin to place those vessels with their respective crews at the disposal of the Governor-General. The offer was accepted, and, on the 18th August, Captain William Peel had started for Allahábád in the river steamer *Chunar* with a flat in tow, conveying four hundred and fifty men, six 68-pounders, two 24-pound howitzers, and two field-pieces. Captain Peel took with him also a launch and cutter belonging to the *Shannon*.\*

Aug. 18.

\* The following officers accompanied Captain Peel: Lieutenants Young, Wilson, Hay, and Salmon, R.N.; Captain Gray and Lieutenant Stirling, R.M.; Lieutenant Lind, of the Swedish Navy; the Rev. G. L. Bowman; Dr. Flanagan; Mr. Comerford, Assistant Paymaster; Messrs. M. Daniel, Garvey, E. Daniel, Lord Walter Kerr, Lord Arthur Clinton, and Mr. Church, midshipmen; Messrs. Brown, Bone, and Henri, engineers; Mr. Thomson, gunner; Mr. Bryce, carpenter; Mr. Stanton, assistant-clerk; and Messrs. Watson and Lascelles, naval cadets.—*The Shannon's Brigade in India.*



Captain William Peel was a man who would have made his mark in any age and under any circumstances. To an energy that nothing could daunt, a power that seemed never to tire, he added a freshness of intellect, a fund of resource, which made him, in the expressive language of one of his officers, "the mainspring that worked the machinery." Bright and joyous in the field, with a kind word for every comrade, he caused the sternest duty, ordered by him, to be looked upon as a pleasant pastime. "The greatness of our loss we shall in all probability never know," wrote Dr. Russell, on learning of his untimely death from small-pox. And, in truth, that reflection of the genial correspondent represents the exact measure by which to gauge the value of Peel's services. Starting from Calcutta on an expedition unprecedented in Indian warfare, he conquered every obstacle, he succeeded to the very utmost extent of the power to succeed. He showed eminently all the qualities of an organiser and a leader of men. Not one single speck of failure marred the brightness of his ermine. His remarkable success in a novel undertaking, on an untried field—a success apparently without an effort—was in itself a proof that had he survived, his great powers might have been usefully employed in larger and more difficult undertakings. There must be something in the man who, not exercising supreme command, is able to stereotype his name in the history of his native land. Yet William Peel accomplished this. To the chaplets of fame placed by his father on the altar of his

BOOK XL.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Aug. 18.

Captain  
William Peel



BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 2-20.

The *Shannon*  
brigade  
reaches  
Allahábád.

country, he, still young, added another not less immortal.

Peel reached Allahábád on the 2nd September. There he was joined on the 20th of the following month by the second party from the *Shannon*.\* By this junction the number of his brigade was brought to five hundred and twenty men, exclusive of officers. The *Pearl* brigade, of a hundred and fifty-five men, under Captain Sotheby, R.N., was shortly after placed at the disposal of the authorities at Patná.

More troops  
reach  
Calcutta.

Sept.-Oct. 26.

We left Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta engaged in "organising victory." We have seen how in September and the first week of October he had been gladdened by the arrival of troops from China and the Cape, how he had at once sent them to the point of rendezvous in batches of two hundred daily. During the next fortnight there had arrived the remainder of the 82nd Foot, one hundred and ninety-eight men of the 38th, H.M.'s 34th, and one hundred and forty-four men of the 42nd Highlanders, and one hundred and two recruits for the local European regiments. These were quickly followed by six hundred and twelve men of the Royal Artillery, nine hundred and three of the Rifle Brigade, 2nd and 3rd battalions, two hundred and ninety of the 42nd Highlanders, three hundred and fifty-two of the 54th Foot, six hundred and twenty-seven of the 88th, and

\* The second detachment from the *Shannon* consisted of one hundred and twenty men, under Lieutenants Vaughan and Wratislaw; Mr. E. H. Verney, mate; Mr. Way, midshipman; and Mr. Richards, naval cadet.

eight hundred and eighty-three recruits. Having placed upon a thoroughly well organised basis the scheme for despatching these reinforcements as expeditiously as possible to the front, Sir Colin Campbell, with the Army Headquarters and Staff, set out, on the 27th October, by post, for Allah-ábád.

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Oct. 27.

The operations of Sir Colin Campbell demand an entire chapter to themselves. It will be advisable that, before entering upon them, I should clear the road behind him, and place before the reader a general view of the transactions in Bengal and Bihár since Vincent Eyre's splendid gallantry had redeemed the *laches* of the Government in those important provinces.

The narrative  
clears the  
road behind  
Sir Colin  
Campbell.

The large division of Bhágalpúr, comprising the districts of Bhágalpúr, Manghyr, Púrnía, Santhá-lia, and Rájmahal, was governed by Mr. George Yule as Commissioner. The division constituted the eastern moiety of the province of Bihár. The headquarters were at the station of Bhágalpúr, on the Ganges, two hundred and sixty-six miles westward of Calcutta.

Bhágalpúr.

Mr. George Yule\* was a good specimen of a manly, true-hearted gentleman. He was essentially a man of action. His even-handed justice had gained for him—what was rare in those days—the confidence alike of the native ryot and the European planter. Both classes alike trusted him, and both were prepared to obey his orders without hesitation or murmur.

Mr. George  
Yule.

\* Now Sir George Yule, K.C.S.I.

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
June.

The native  
troops in  
eastern  
Bihár.

Up to the time when the native garrison of Dánápúr broke out into revolt, there had been no signs of disaffection in the Bhágalpúr division. The troops quartered there—the 5th Irregular Cavalry, with their headquarters at Bhágalpúr, the 32nd stationed at Báosi, and the 63rd at Barhám-púr, had, with the exception noted in the preceding volume,\* displayed no inclination to follow the example of their mutinous brethren. The conduct of Major Macdonald on the occasion in question had greatly impressed the men of the 5th, and the strong will of that courageous man had repressed the smallest inclination on the part of his soldiers to manifest the sympathies which, subsequent experience proved, they held in secret. The men of the corps had, subsequently to the event of the 12th June, been detached to various stations in the division, as well to divide them as to overawe the turbulent classes.

Mr. Yule,  
at the outset,  
tries to main-  
tain order  
without  
European  
troops,

Although ruling over a native population numbering, besides the Santháls, about six millions, Mr. Yule had considered it unnecessary to ask for, or to accept, the services of a European detachment, however small. He believed that if the districts contiguous would but remain loyal, he would be able, with the assistance of his assistants and the planters, to maintain order in Bhágalpúr. He did so, successfully, till the third week of July. But when, during that week, the mutiny of the 12th Irregular Cavalry and the native regiments quartered at Dánápúr threatened the loss

of western Bihár, he deemed it prudent to detain at Bhágalpúr ninety men of the 5th Fusiliers, then being towed up the river, and to despatch fifty men of the same regiment to garrison the important fortress of Manghír.

The proceedings of the native soldiers of the Dánápúr garrison, almost invited to mutiny by the supine action of the Supreme Government, combined with the immediate rising of Kúnwar Singh to render the condition of eastern Bihár dangerous in the extreme. Not only was it impossible any longer to rely upon the native soldiers in that province, but it had become necessary, for the security of life and property, to prove to the disaffected that the hand wielding executive power was thoroughly aware of the danger, and thoroughly ready to meet it.

Mr. Yule, as a practical man, accustomed to command, was well aware that occasions may arise when an active demonstration is the best defence. Such an occasion had, in his opinion, arisen in eastern Bihár, and he prepared to act accordingly.

Fore-warned, it was necessary to be fore-armed. His first act, then, had been to press into his service the detachment of the European troops passing by, and secured Bhágalpúr and Manghír. The importance of this precautionary measure can scarcely be over-rated. The occupation of those two stations, both salient points on the Ganges, was absolutely essential to the free navigation of that river, and it must be remembered that in July, when Mr. Beadon's line of six hundred miles had been broken, the Ganges consti-

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
July.

but the threatening aspect of affairs forces him to detain a few.

Effect on eastern Bihár of the Dánápúr mutiny.

The securing of two salient points in his division assures the navigation of the Ganges,



Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
July.

and stops  
communica-  
tion between  
the dis-  
affected of  
eastern and  
western  
Bihár,

who now  
wait for the  
result of the  
siege of  
A'rah.

The natives  
not always  
inclined to  
trust the  
news they  
receive.

tuted the only safe highway between Calcutta and Allahábád.

Great as was the advantage thus gained, another, second only to it in importance, naturally followed. The native troops stationed at Barham-púr had not, up to that time, thanks to the timid policy of the Government, been disarmed. Had Bhágalpúr and Manghír not been occupied by Europeans, the armed mutinous soldiers scattered over western Bihár would have held uninterrupted communication with their brethren on either side of them, and a general insurrection would probably have ensued.

But the occupation of those stations cowed the disaffected for the time. They were content to wait. The fate of eastern Bihár now depended on the result of the siege of Árah. To that the eyes of the natives were turned with an excitement daily increasing.

One rather remarkable circumstance deserves to be noticed. Ill news generally, it is said, flies quickly. But it is a fact that throughout the troubled times of the mutiny, news betokening evil to the rebels did not fly surely to their friends. It was not that the rebels failed to transmit to them a true record of events. But that record came, not written on paper, but by word of mouth. The result was that when the news was bad, the men who received it, impatient of inaction, and confident of ultimate success, refused to believe it. Their sanguine natures induced them to imagine that the Europeans had invented the bad news and

had caused it to be conveyed to them by men whom they had suborned. They proceeded to act then, in very many cases, as though the bearing of the news were exactly contrary to the actual meaning of the words in which it was conveyed.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
August.

So it happened on this occasion. The 5th Irregular Cavalry in the districts round Bhágalpúr had, in common with the other native soldiers in the province, waited long for the result of the leaguer of Árah. Had they not waited, but broken out, the difficulties of the British position in Bihár would have been enormously increased. But they waited to hear of its fall. On the 14th August information reached the men of the 5th that Árah had been relieved by Eyre. They believed this story to be a weak invention of the enemy—that the contrary had happened. That night, therefore, they deserted, and pushed with all speed for Báosí, where the 32nd Native Infantry were stationed.

The 5th Irregular Cavalry in eastern Bihár mutiny.

They try to reduce the 32nd,

But before the mutineers of the 5th Irregulars reached the 32nd Native Infantry, the men of that regiment had received positive proof of the utter and absolute defeat of their brethren at Árah and at Jagdispúr. Mr. Yule, too, with an energy worthy of the occasion, had despatched to their commandant, Colonel Burney, a special messenger, warning him of the departure in his direction of the 5th. Burney was a capable man, a splendid linguist, and thoroughly conversant with the native character. He harangued his men, and made it palpably clear to them that whether they should march eastward or westward, they would march to destruction. He spoke

who, under the influence of Colonel Burney, repel them.

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
August.

Chutiá  
Nágpúr.

eloquently and with effect. When the 5th Irregulars then, on the 16th, presented themselves at Báosí, they were received by the 32nd with bullets and bayonets. The 5th, baffled in their hopes, continued their course *viâ* Rohni to Árah.

For the moment the active measures of Yule had conjured from eastern Bihár all danger. It was, however, otherwise in the neighbouring district of Chutiá Nágpúr. This mountainous district lies between southern Bihár, western Bengal, Orisá, and the Central Provinces. It is called Chutiá Nágpúr from Chutiá near Ránchi, the residence of the Rájás of Nágpúr. It is chiefly inhabited by aboriginal tribes, such as Kóls, Oráons, Mundás, Bhúmij, Korwás, and others. Its chief military stations were Hazáríbágh, Ránchi, Chaibásá and Parúliá.

July.

At Hazáríbágh there was quartered in July 1857 a detachment of the 8th Native Infantry; at Ránchi, the headquarters and artillery of the local Rámgarh battalion; and at Chaibásá and Parúliá, detachments of that battalion. The acting Commissioner of the district was Captain Dalton.

Effect in  
Chutiá Nágpúr of the  
mutiny at  
Dánápúr.

The news of the mutiny of the native garrison at Dánápúr and of the rising of Kúnwar Singh, reached Hazáríbágh on the 30th July. The detachment of the 8th Native Infantry at once mutinied, driving their officers and the civil authorities from the station.

Those were still the days of confidence. Almost every officer of the native army, whilst admitting and deploring the disaffection of other



regiments, believed implicitly in the loyalty of his own men. When, then, intelligence reached Dúrandá, the civil station adjoining Ránchi, that the troops at Hazáribágh, only sixty miles distant, were shaky, the officer commanding at that station despatched Lieutenant Graham with thirty horsemen of the Rámgarh Irregular Cavalry, two companies of the Rámgarh battalion, and two guns, to Hazáribágh, to disarm them. Graham marched, but he had not reached the second stage before Captain Oakes met him with the information that the detachment of the 8th Native Infantry had mutinied the previous day. That same night his own infantry mutinied, seized, in spite of his protestations, the guns and ammunition, as well as four elephants, the property of Captain Dalton, and marched back to Ránchi, breathing hostile imprecations against the Europeans there stationed. The cavalry remained staunch.

Captain Dalton and a few European officers were at Ránchi. They received timely information of the revolt. The defence of the place was impossible. They remained there, however, till the latest safe moment, and then proceeded to Hazáribágh, now abandoned by the rebels, and whither Lieutenant Graham with a few horsemen who had remained faithful had preceded them.

The stations of Ránchi and Dúrandá fell into the hands of the rebels, who plundered the treasury, fired cannon at the church, released the prisoners, and destroyed private property.

Meanwhile, Dalton, ably seconded by the offi-

BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
August.

The troops  
in the pro-  
vince gene-  
rally mutiny

Captain  
Dalton aban-  
dons Ránchi  
and proceeds  
to Hazáribágh.

The plunder  
of Ránchi  
and Dúrandá.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
August.

Efficient  
measures  
taken by  
Dalton to  
restore order.

cers of the Rámgarh battalion and the cavalry, by his own civil officers, Captains Davies and W. H. Oakes, was exerting himself to restore order in Hazáríbágh. In this he was loyally assisted by the Rájá of Rámgarh. This petty chief placed at the Commissioner's disposal some forty or fifty armed men. With the aid of these men, and of the few native horsemen and foot soldiers who had remained faithful, Dalton not only tranquillised Hazáríbágh, but he recovered a large quantity of the property seized by the rebels, and captured many of them. In a few days the courts were re-opened, and business proceeded as usual.

Parúliá and  
Chaibásá.

At Parúliá and at Chaibásá, the other posts in Chutiá Nágpúr occupied by native troops, scenes had taken place similar to those enacted at Ránchi and Hazáríbágh. On the 5th August, the sepoy of the Rámgarh battalion, stationed at those places, mutinied, plundered the treasury, released the prisoners, and sacked the private houses of the Europeans. These, few in number, fell back upon Rániganj.

Loyal conduct  
of the Rájá  
of Rámgarh.

The Rájá of Rámgarh, at the time that he afforded to the Commissioner of Chutiá Nágpúr the aid in armed men of which I have spoken, had expressed his strong conviction that it would be difficult to hold Hazáríbágh against the surging influences around it, unless European troops should be sent to occupy it. He had therefore pressed upon Captain Dalton the necessity of asking at once for a European regiment.

Captain Dalton asked for a European regiment.

It was but natural and proper that he should do so. But how was it possible for the Government to comply? Dehlí had not fallen. The districts below Kánhpúr were in the state which I have endeavoured to describe in the opening pages of this chapter. Sir Colin Campbell had just arrived, but Sir Colin Campbell had not a soldier to dispose of. When an army was urgently required at Kánhpúr, it was not in his power to do more than to organize transport for the troops which were to come, but which had not arrived.

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
August.

Dalton  
applies for  
European  
troops.

None are  
available.

It happened, however, that the Government had other resources at its disposal, and that it was possible to use these for the double purpose of tranquillising Chutiá Nágpúr *en route* and of then lending a hand to the force which was concentrating at Allahábád.

Other re-  
sources at  
the disposal  
of the Go-  
vernment.

The native soldiers of the army of the Madras Presidency—those of one regiment, the 8th Light Cavalry excepted—had not been tainted by the mutinous spirit which had disgraced their brethren in the Bengal army. Inheritors of the fame of the men who had fought the French soldiers of Lally, who had helped to wrest Southern India from the grasp of Haidar Ali, the Madras sepoy had come forward, on the first bursting of the storm, to offer their services, had begged—to use their own touching language—“to be granted an opportunity of proving their faithful attachment to the Government which had cherished them.” After some hesitation, the Government of India responded favourably to the request thus pressed upon them. On the 5th

The Madras  
army.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
August.

August, the 27th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, and a wing of the 17th Regiment Native Infantry, landed in Calcutta. They were speedily followed by the remaining wing of the 17th Regiment, some native artillerymen, a company of sappers, half of the E Troop Horse Artillery, and a little later by a Rifle battalion composed of the rifle companies of the 1st, 5th, 16th, 24th, 36th, 49th, and 34th Regiments of Native Infantry, the whole under the command of Brigadier M. Carthew.

Brigadier  
Carthew.

Of Brigadier Carthew I shall have to speak more in detail further on. It will suffice here to state that to a thorough knowledge of his profession he combined great quickness of military vision, the capacity and the nerve to strike at the right moment. All that he did, he did thoroughly and well. With larger opportunities it cannot be doubted that he would have achieved great things.

The Madras  
troops constitute the  
other resources at the  
disposal of the Govern-  
ment.

Besides the troops of the Madras Army already enumerated, there were others marching by land from Katak in eastern Bengal. Among these was the 18th Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer.

These Madras troops constituted the further resources at the disposal of the Government of India to which I have alluded, and which enabled them to reply with effect to Captain Dalton's requisition for European troops.

Reply of the  
Government  
to Dalton's  
requisitions.

They pointed out to him, in effect, that the moment the artillery, then daily expected from Madras, should arrive, a considerable force would



be sent to restore order; that one column would proceed along the grand trunk road to Barhí and Hazáribágh, the other direct to Parúliá and Ránchi. The Government expressed a hope that until these reinforcements should arrive Captain Dalton would be able to maintain himself at Hazáribágh.

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
August.

But this was just what Captain Dalton could not do. Matters became so threatening that he, accompanied by his few adherents, was forced, on the 13th, to fall back on Bagoda. Here he remained for a few days, when he was joined by one hundred and fifty of Rattray's Sikhs, under Lieutenant Earle. With these men, Dalton re-occupied Hazáribágh.

Difficulties of  
Dalton.

But the mutineers were still at large, and although the Government, grown wise by experience, had endeavoured to prevent any augmentation of their forces by the disarming, on the 2nd August, of the 63rd Native Infantry, the 11th Irregular Cavalry, and the troops of the Nawáb Názim at Barhampúr, yet the presence of a considerable body of revolted soldiers of all arms in the vicinity of the grand trunk road—the line of six hundred miles—constituted a danger which it was necessary to meet, and meet quickly. The danger was increased by the sudden mutiny, accompanied by the murder of their officers, of two companies of the 32nd Native Infantry at Déogarh in the Sánthál districts.

Difficulties of  
the Govern-  
ment

enhanced by  
further mu-  
tinies.

The Government therefore revised their plans. Countermanding their intention of working on two lines, they directed Colonel Fischer, command-

Fischer is  
ordered to  
march direct  
on Hazári-  
bágh.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
September.

Fischer des-  
patches a de-  
tachment,  
53rd, under  
English  
towards  
Dorandá.

Fischer is  
directed to  
protect the  
trunk road,

ing a detachment of Madras troops, to mass them, and march by way of Dorandá on Hazáribágh.

Fischer received this message at Barhí on the night of the 13th September. He had with him his own regiment, a few Sikhs, a detachment of the 53rd, and two guns.

Before the message arrived, he had ascertained that the mutineers had left Chutiá Nágpúr, probably for Rhotásgarh: he submitted that instead of marching on Hazáribágh, he should move to intercept them in their retreat. This was agreed to in principle, but other contradictory telegrams from headquarters disarranged Fischer's plans. When at length he received the orders to carry out his own ideas, he had already despatched Major English with one hundred and fifty men of the 53rd and one hundred and fifty Sikhs towards Dorandá.

Whilst English was marching on Dorandá, Rattray, with two hundred Sikhs, was intrenched at Dehri, and Fischer, with the main body, was moving towards Jalpa. No one knew where the enemy was. "It is incredible, but a fact," wrote Colonel Fischer, on the 24th September, to the Chief of the Staff at Calcutta, "that the Rámgarh mutineers, with their guns, are moving about in a small province, and not an official, civil or military, can tell where they are to be found." A careful consideration of probabilities induced Fischer, however, to think that Chattra would prove to be their place of refuge. He informed the Chief of the Staff of his opinion. But in reply, Fischer was relieved from the charge of

the operations against the insurgents, and directed to protect the trunk road. The small campaign in Chutiá Nágpúr was confided to Major English, under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

Major English marched then on Chattra, reached that place at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 2nd October, and encamped on the west side of the town. That officer's force now consisted of one hundred and eighty men of the 53rd Foot, one hundred and fifty Sikhs, and two guns, in all about three hundred and fifty men. The rebels amounted to three thousand. Nothing daunted, English attacked them, and after a resistance lasting over an hour, completely defeated them. The survivors fled in great disorder, hotly pursued for some distance, leaving in the hands of the victors four guns and waggons complete, forty carts laden with ammunition, ten elephants, twenty-nine pair of ordnance bullocks, and several boxes of treasure. The loss of the British amounted to forty-two killed and wounded: that of the enemy was never accurately known.

This action removed the greatest danger from the grand trunk road. Though English's detachment, in the pressing circumstances of the times, was not allowed to remain in the province, Rattray's Sikhs were left there, and these excellent soldiers, under the guidance of their active and energetic commander, proved themselves fully competent to make head against the insurgents in Chutiá Nágpúr and in the districts immediately to the north and east of it.

Book XI.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
October.

English to  
operate  
against the  
insurgents.

English  
attacks the  
enemy at  
Chattra,

and com-  
pletely de-  
feats them.

The province  
is then left  
to the protec-  
tion of  
Rattray.

## BOOK XI.

---

### CHAPTER II.

Sir Colin  
starts for the  
seat of war,

and runs a  
risk of being  
captured.

I RETURN to Sir Colin Campbell. That gallant officer left Calcutta for Allahábád on the 27th October. The insecurity of the road was almost illustrated by his capture. The two revolted companies of the 32nd Native Infantry had pushed northwards, travelling on the elephants they had purloined. Sir Colin and his staff travelled without an escort. They reached Shergháti in safety. Again setting out, they had proceeded ten or twelve miles, when a turn of the road revealed to the driver of the foremost carriage the fourteen elephants laden with native soldiers, and escorted by some twenty-five sowars. Fortunately, the bullock train with a British detachment was some short distance behind. On this train the carriages at once fell back. But for the good look-out and prompt action of the drivers, the Commander-in-Chief could not have escaped capture—and worse.

On the evening of the 1st November, Sir Colin arrived at Allahábád. The troops of the Line and the Naval Brigade, pushed to that station by the energy of the Commander-in-Chief, had, under his instructions, left it in strong columns or detachments for Kánhpúr. Some of these had reached that place without encountering an enemy on the road. The case was otherwise with the column of which a detachment of Peel's Naval Brigade, under Peel himself, formed a considerable portion.

One detachment of the Naval Brigade, consisting of a hundred men and four officers, escorting the siege-train, had left Allahábád for Kánhpúr on the 23rd October; the second detachment, under Peel himself, followed on the 28th. Accompanying this second detachment, were a wing of the 53rd Regiment, a company of the 93rd, drafts for different regiments, and a company of Royal Engineers, the whole under the command of Colonel Powell, C.B., of the 53rd. It is with this last detachment that I have at present to deal.

This column reached Fathpúr, about midway between Allahábád and Kánhpúr, at midnight of the 31st October. That afternoon, information had reached Powell that the revolted regiments of the Dánápúr garrison, the same whom Eyre had driven out of Bihár, their ranks swollen by other mutineers, were then occupying a strong position at the village of Kajwá, some twenty-four miles north-west of Fathpúr. Their numbers were estimated at, in round numbers, two thousand

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Nov. 1.

The troops as they reach Allahábád are sent on in strong detachments to Kánhpúr.

The Naval Brigade and 53rd detachment,

commanded by Colonel Powell.

Powell learns at Fathpúr that the rebels are close at hand.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 1.

Kajwá.

sepoys, and about the same number of untrained adherents.

Kajwá is rather a famous place in Indian history. Here it was, in January 1659, that Aurangzib gained the empire of Hindustán by a decisive victory over his brother Shúja. Close to the town is a spacious garden, walled and turreted, flanked by enclosures, capable, when held by good soldiers, of offering a solid resistance to an advancing foe. Moreover, troops occupying this place barred the road to any column marching from Fathpúr to Kánhpúr.

Colonel  
Powell, C.B.

Powell possessed the truest instincts of a soldier. He had been in Fort William in command of his regiment when the mutiny broke out. He had watched every turn it had taken, and throughout, when our fortunes seemed lowest, had proclaimed his certain confidence in the ultimate success of our arms. He had panted for action. Now, unexpectedly, the opportunity came to him. He marched on at once to Fathpúr and arrived there at midnight. That night he made all his preparations for a forced march and an attack on the following morning.

He marches  
against the  
rebels at  
Kajwá.

At half past 5 o'clock on the morning of the 1st November, Powell set out with a detachment, increased before coming into action to five hundred and thirty men. It consisted of a hundred and three officers and men of the Naval Brigade under Peel, one company of Royal Engineers, under Captain Clarke, two companies (one hundred and sixty-two men) of the 53rd, under Major Clarke, one company of the 93rd, under Captain

Cornwall, and a company made up of the men of different detachments, under Lieutenant Fanning. It had two 9-pounder guns, under Lieutenant Anderson. Captain William Peel was the second in command.

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 1.

It was not till 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the following day that Powell came in sight of the enemy. He saw at a glance that he had them. Instead of taking advantage of the walled garden and the buildings in Kajwá, they had placed their right on open ground, covered by some sand hillocks, forming a sort of embankment; their left on higher ground on the other side of the road. They had three guns posted in the road, two somewhat in advance, the third on a bridge near the village behind. A field of standing corn in front of their position concealed their skirmishers.

False position  
of the enemy.  
Nov. 2.

Powell attacked at once. Pushing the enemy's skirmishers out of the corn-fields, he made a dash at the two foremost guns, the fire of which had done great execution amongst his men. He had just secured these when he fell dead with a bullet through his forehead. The command then devolved on Peel.

Powell  
attacks them;

is killed just  
as he had  
captured two  
guns.

Whilst the 53rd, under Powell, had been marching on the guns, the Naval Brigade, on the right, had forced back the enemy's left. The position of the battle was then changed. The enemy, driven back on the left, now faced the road, and the British, whose right had been thrown forward, faced them. Peel gave them no time to rally. Posting a strong force to secure his new position, he carried his troops round the upper end of the

The Naval  
Brigade force  
back the  
enemy's left;

Peel then  
cuts their  
force in two,  
and defeats  
them.

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 2.

Result of the  
action.

Sir Colin  
reaches  
Allahábád,

and pushing  
on,

arrives at  
Kánhpúr.  
Nov. 3.

His resolve to  
march on  
Lakhnao  
justified.

embankment, cut the enemy's force in two and drove them from their positions, capturing their camp, two of their guns, and a tumbril.

Pursuit was impossible. The infantry had marched seventy-two miles in three days, and Peel had no cavalry. His losses, too, had been severe, amounting in killed and wounded to ninety-five. That of the enemy was estimated at three hundred. The captured guns and tumbril, as well as a third gun and three tumbrils, abandoned by the rebels in their flight, were brought into camp the same evening. Peel then regained the high road and pursued his march to Kánhpúr.

This successful action was fought the day Sir Colin Campbell arrived at Allahábád. It made the way clear for his further progress. Sir Colin stayed at Allahábád only one day. He did not leave, however, until he had perfected all the arrangements for the districts he had left, those especially by which a force under Colonel Longden, of the 10th Foot, was to clear of rebels the district of Ázamgarh and its neighbourhood. The movements of this force will be referred to hereafter.

The Commander-in-Chief reached Kánhpúr on the 3rd November. Rejecting the counsels which conceited men attempted to thrust upon him, he had resolved, before doing anything else, to relieve Lakhnao. Oudh was the ulcer which had up to this time swallowed up all the reinforcements which had been pushed up from Calcutta, which was attracting to it the hardened warriors released by the fall of Dehlí. At all costs the heart of Oudh must be pierced: Lakhnao must be



really conquered before a single step could be taken to subdue enemies still rising up on many sides.

I use the expression, "still rising up," advisedly. It had been very generally believed that the fall of Dehlí would terminate the revolt. It did nothing of the sort. It is true that it saved India: that is, occurring when it did, it prevented the insurrection of the Panjáb. On the other hand, it added greatly to the number of our enemies in the field. The rebellious sepoy, cooped up till its fall in Dehlí, spread in detachments over the country. But, perhaps, its most important result was the manner in which it affected the trained soldiers of the Mahárájá of Gwáliár.

In the preceding volume I have narrated how whilst the troops of Sindia had mutinied, Sindia himself had remained loyal to his British overlord. Sindia continued loyal to the end. When, on the 22nd September, he received certain tidings of the complete conquest of Dehlí, his joy could not contain itself. At last he was free from the tension that had almost killed him. He could breathe: he could talk: he could even laugh. It often happens that sudden transition from anxiety to its opposite can find relief only in exaggerated expressions of pleasure. It was so in this instance. Sindia's joy was so unmistakeable, that the trained soldiers, whom till then he had succeeded in detaining at Gwáliár under various pretences, broke loose from his grasp, and sought a chief who would lead them against the English. After brief negotiation they agreed to the terms offered by

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 3-8.

The immediate effect of the fall of Dehlí is to add to the enemies of the British.

Its effect on Sindia and on the Gwáliár contingent.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 3-8.

the Ráni of Jhánshi and her confederate, Tántia Topi, the Maráthá chief, who, under the orders of Náná Sáhib, had superintended the massacre of Kánhpúr. Tántia at once assumed command of them. A wary, capable, astute man, he alone of all the natives brought by the mutiny to the front—Kúnwar Singh and the Oudh Moulvi alone excepted—showed any great qualities of generalship. Tántia was a man to be feared. Fortunate was it for the British that the Gwáliár soldiers had not earlier placed themselves under his orders, for his first act on taking up his office was to march them southwards to occupy a position which should threaten Kánhpúr.

Reasons  
which  
prompted Sir  
Colin to  
march, in the  
first instance,  
on Lakhnao.

A weaker mind than that of Sir Colin Campbell might have been deterred, by the action of Tántia Topi, from leaving Kánhpúr with a small garrison and marching to a contest which must be desperate, and might be doubtful at Lakhnao. But, in war, something must always be risked. The information from Lakhnao was to the effect that the store of provisions could not well last to the end of the month. There we had our soldiers, our women, our prestige. That was the decisive point—and Sir Colin had a way of always striking at the decisive point.

Hope Grant's  
position  
beyond the  
Banni bridge.

Before he reached Kánhpúr, then, he had made all his arrangements for an advance on Lakhnao. I have already stated that Hope Grant's column had reached Kánhpúr on the 26th October, and had been there increased to an effective strength of five thousand five hundred; that he had crossed the Ganges on the 30th, and pushing forward,

had encamped on the plain between Banni and the Ālambágh, to await there the arrival of Sir Colin. In this position Grant formed the *point d'appui* upon which all the detachments and store carts, as they came up, were to mass themselves. Daily there arrived something in the way of provisions and carriage—for the certainty of having to carry back with him the women and children had not been lost sight of by the Commander-in-Chief.

Sir Colin Campbell joined Hope Grant on the 9th. The interval—from the 3rd to the 9th—had been spent by the Commander-in-Chief in arranging for the protection of his base—that base being Kánhpúr. He left behind him at that station about five hundred Europeans. These consisted of four companies of the 64th Regiment, strengthened by men belonging to other regiments to four hundred and fifty men; forty-seven men of the Naval Brigade; and some eighteen or twenty artillerymen. There were besides a few Sikhs, who, with the artillerymen, manned a field battery of four guns, which had been hastily improvised. This garrison was placed under the command of Major-General Charles A. Windham, C.B., of Redan celebrity. Windham was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to place his troops within the intrenchment which, on the reoccupation of Kánhpúr by Havelock in July, had been hastily constructed on the river; not to attack any enemy unless by so doing he could prevent the bombardment of the intrenchment; to send into Oudh, by wings of regiments, the detachments of European infantry which might arrive; on no

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 3-8.

Nov. 9.

The force left  
at Kánhpúr

commanded  
by Windham.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 9.

Instructions  
given to  
Windham.

Sir Colin  
joins Hope  
Grant.

pretext to detain them unless he should be seriously threatened, and, even in that case, to ask for instructions from the Commander-in-Chief. Windham was authorised, however, to keep back the brigade of Madras native troops, expected the following day, the 10th November, until the intentions of the Gwáliár contingent should become developed.

Having, by these instructions, secured, as he believed, his base, Sir Colin Campbell started on the 9th, accompanied by his staff, to join Hope Grant's camp in the sandy plain four miles beyond Banni. He reached it that afternoon, had a cordial meeting with Hope Grant and his old friends of the Dehlí force, and, after a short conversation, gave his orders for the following day. In pursuance of these orders, Colonel Adrian Hope was sent forward to the Álambágh, the following day, in charge of a large convoy of provisions. The provisions were to be left there, and the carts laden with sick and wounded to be sent back to Kánhpúr. That same day a portion of the siege-train, escorted by the Naval Brigade, arrived in camp. This had been expected. But it had been preceded by an arrival which was not altogether anticipated. Suddenly, in the early morning of the 10th, there presented himself to the astonished gaze of Sir Colin Campbell, an European gentleman, disguised as a native, and who, in that disguise, had managed to make his way through the beleaguering forces, carrying on his person important despatches. His name was Kavanagh. To understand thoroughly the nature of the information he brought, I must ask the reader to return with

Kavanagh  
joins Sir  
Colin from  
the Resi-  
dency.

Nov. 10.



me to Lakhnao, and to view the Residency on the morrow of the arrival of the relieving force under Outram and Havelock.

On the night of the 25th September, the advanced portion of Havelock's force had entered the Residency. They were followed the next morning by all but the rear-guard. Thanks to the splendid exertions of Colonel Napier, R.E., and the valour and skill of Crump, of Olpherts, of Fraser, of Private Duffy—of the artillery—of Lowe of the 32nd, who covered the movement, of Dodgson and of others, the wounded men and the guns were brought safely to the new ground occupied by the British, and to which reference will be presently made, on the 27th. It had been already discovered that the advent of Outram's force constituted not a relief but a reinforcement; that means of transport for the ladies and children, the sick and the wounded, were wanting; that an enormous addition had been made to the hospital list; and that even had the transport been available, the combined force was scarcely strong enough to escort it to Kánhpúr. But one course, then, remained open to Outram, and that was to hold the Residency until he should be effectively relieved by Sir Colin Campbell.

Outram's first care was to provide accommodation for the largely increased force. With this view, he at once caused the palaces extending along the line of the river, the Tára Koti, the Chatter Manzil, and the Faríd Baksh, to be occupied, the enemy's works and guns in the vicinity being at the same time destroyed.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.

September.

Outram and  
Havelock in  
the Resi-  
dency.

The manner  
in which  
Outram pro-  
vides accom-  
modation for  
the increased  
force.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
September.

The palaces  
extending  
along the  
river are  
taken

These posts were taken on the morning of the 26th September. One party, composed of one hundred and fifty men of the 32nd Regiment, under Captain Lowe, commanding that regiment, attacked the rebels in the Captain Bazaar, drove them into the Gúmti with loss, and captured three large and four small guns. Another, composed of the 13th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Aitken, assaulted the gateway leading to the Farid Baksh palace, and carried it with considerable loss to the enemy. It was mainly in consequence of these sorties that the palaces above mentioned fell into the hands of the British.

and occupied.

The Álam-  
bágh.

These new posts were held by the troops forming Havelock's command, and were under his personal orders. The old garrison, reinforced by the Madras Fusiliers, continued, under Brigadier Inglis, to occupy their posts in the Residency. There remains to be mentioned the Álambágh. The reader will remember that this place had been occupied by Havelock on the 23rd September, that he had stored there the baggage of the force, and left in it a guard of two hundred and fifty men. This small party had under its charge many of the wounded, several of whom speedily became convalescent and able to bear arms. Separated from the Residency as was the Álambágh by the city, which was still and was likely to remain in the hands of the rebels, it was very defensible. A fortified enclosure, the garrison brought to defend it two heavy guns and two 9-pounders, besides others taken from

the enemy. They had ammunition and water, every necessary of life except a large store of provisions. It was very desirable to maintain the position as a touching point for a relieving army. But the want of provisions constituted a difficulty. Outram therefore instructed Major McIntyre, 78th Highlanders, the senior officer at the post, to hold it as long as he could do so, and only in case of absolute necessity to fall back on Kánhpúr.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
September.

To rid himself entirely of his native cavalry, useless inside a fortified enclosure, Outram, at an early period after his arrival, directed Lieutenant Hardinge to endeavour to arrange so that they should all leave the enclosure in the dark of the night, and, if successful in this, should make at once for Kánhpúr. Hardinge got his men under arms and endeavoured to lead them out. But the sound of his horses' hoofs was the signal for a heavy and concentrated fire upon them from the loop-holed houses of the streets through which they had to pass—a fire so heavy and so concentrated that the attempt had to be abandoned. It was clear that the enemy were well on the alert. The result was that the horses, reduced in the absence of grass to feed on the bark and branches of the trees, died in great numbers, and those that survived to get out were utterly unfit for service.

He attempts  
to get rid of  
the native  
cavalry,

but the  
enemy  
baffle him.

The six weeks which followed the arrival of Outram's force have not been inaptly described as the blockade. That arrival had terminated the siege. The danger of being overwhelmed by the

Difference  
between the  
period prior,  
and that  
subsequent,  
to the relief.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
September.

Sortie of the  
27th September.

masses of the enemy had in a great measure passed away. But, in spite of this change in their condition, events were of frequent occurrence which served to keep up the soldierly excitement of the garrison. There was only this difference in the feeling. Before the reinforcements had reached it, it had generally been the excitement of defence; it had now become the more stirring excitement of attack.

On the 27th September, for instance, a party of the 1st Fusiliers, and some men of the 32nd Regiment, under the command of Major Stephenson, made a sortie for the purpose of taking some guns in the enemy's Kánhpúr battery. The British troops were met by a very heavy fire from the enemy, and although they succeeded in spiking three of the enemy's guns, they were unable to bring them back within the defences. On their return, they were exposed to so destructive a fire from the tops of houses and loopholes that they found it most difficult to carry in their killed and wounded. One sergeant, severely wounded, must have been left on the ground, had not a private of the 32nd, in the most gallant manner, and with the assistance of Captain Galway 1st Madras Fusiliers, carried him to a place of safety. Lieutenant Huxham, of the 48th Native Infantry, was wounded.\*

The 32nd  
Foot.

The unexampled losses which the 32nd Regiment had suffered, may be gathered from the

\* For his conduct on this occasion, following on previous acts of distinguished gallantry, Private William Dowling, of the 32nd Foot, received the Victoria Cross.



fact that, on this occasion, they were commanded by Lieutenant Warner, of the 7th Light Cavalry, solely because there were no regimental officers available. Tried as this gallant regiment had been during the siege, its men were yet detailed for every sortie and for every attack.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.  
—  
1857.  
September.

Thus on the 29th September, three sorties were made simultaneously. One of these proceeded from the left square of the Brigade Mess; the second from the Sikh Square; the third from the Redan. The last named, composed of two hundred men, with a reserve of one hundred and fifty, from the 32nd and 5th Fusiliers, drove the enemy from their guns, and advanced till they came to a lane commanded by an 18-pounder. In this advance they lost Captain McCabe of the 32nd, a most distinguished officer, who was then leading his fourth sortie. Major Simmons of the 5th Fusiliers was also shot dead; and, it being ascertained that no further advance could be made without considerable loss, the party was recalled. The second party, from the Sikh Square, commanded by Lieutenant Hardinge, was composed of men from the 32nd, 78th, and 1st Madras Fusiliers, two hundred in all, and supported by some men of the 13th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Aitken. They succeeded in demolishing several houses and batteries. The first-named party, commanded by Captain Shute, and composed of men from the 32nd, 64th, and 84th, succeeded in destroying a 24-pounder gun, and in spiking two mortars, and four native guns of small calibre. Their loss was very severe,

Subsequent  
sorties and  
their results.



Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
September.

The officers  
and men of  
the Indian  
army.

quite disproportionate to the service rendered. On the 2nd November Lieutenant Hardinge again led a party composed of the 32nd, 84th, 1st Madras Fusiliers, and seven artillerymen, to destroy some guns on the Kánhpúr road. This was done effectively and almost without opposition.

To write a detailed account of these operations would require a volume devoted wholly to the siege of Lakhnao. Dealing with a large subject I unwillingly confine myself to a simple statement of deeds in which every man was a hero. In these the officers of the Indian army were not one whit behindhand. Constantly recurring are the names of Wilson, Aitken, Ouseley, Apthorp, Forbes, Graham, and Cubitt; the Engineers, McLeod Innes, Anderson, and Hutchinson; there were, too, many others. Some, not less prominent, and whose names will be found mentioned further on, were killed. With them, too, Thornhill of the Civil Service, one of the most daring of men.\*

\* As a proof of the fidelity and gallantry of the native troops, I may mention that every native officer of the 13th Bengal Native Infantry was either killed, wounded, or died during the siege. The subadár-major of the regiment, Amar Singh, a gallant old Rájpút, received two wounds at Chínhat, but struggled back into the Residency with the beaten troops from that fatal field, and served throughout the siege and for many years afterwards as su-

badár-major of the Regiment of Lakhnao.

Débidín Misr, the drill havildár of the 13th, got through the siege without a wound, in spite of his conspicuous gallantry, and was for many years subsequently subadár-major of the Regiment of Lakhnao.

Hírá Lál Misr, a sepoy of the 48th, at the commencement and throughout the siege was the right-hand man of Captain James, the head of the Commissariat. He dis-

On the 2nd October, Outram, finding that the garrison were greatly annoyed by a fire from a very strong battery—known as Phillips' Garden battery, on the Kánhpúr road—ordered out a party formed of detachments from several regiments under Colonel Napier to storm it. Napier conducted the attack with his usual combination of science and daring, and took the battery—a very strong one—with the loss of two men killed and eleven wounded. He captured three guns—two 9-pounders and a 6-pounder. There was nothing strange in this: but it was remarkable that he should have rescued a private soldier of the Madras Fusiliers, who had been three days in the power of the enemy, without their knowing it. The man had fallen down a well, and had remained there, undiscovered by the rebels who were occupying the place.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.  
—  
1857.  
October.

Napier attacks Phillips' Garden battery,

and captures three guns.

Remarkable rescue of a soldier.

Outram had been very much impressed with the advantage which must accrue from adopting

Outram endeavours to open out the Kánhpúr road,

played the greatest gallantry and intelligence, and died a few years ago a subadár of the Regiment of Lakhnao. He, like many of the distinguished native officers, who served throughout the Defence, received a village in perpetuity.

the 13th when the siege commenced, and native officers when Sir Colin Campbell came to the relief of the Residency, are worthy of mention, as are Anúka Singh and Híra Singh, both Sikhs; Rámnarain Pándé, who greatly distinguished himself, under Lieutenant Aitken, in the sortie of the 26th September. All ranks of this gallant regiment, the 13th, as well as of the 48th and 71st Native Infantry, received the Order of Merit.

Many other gallant sepoy, especially of the 13th, may be mentioned. Séoráj Singh (severely wounded on the 20th June under Loughnan, defending Innes's post,) and Indra Singh, both sepoy of

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
October.

out is baffled.

the direct Kánhpúr road as the mode of communication with the Álambágh. To carry out this idea, he directed Major Haliburton, of the 78th Highlanders, to extend the position in that direction, working from house to house. This operation, which was full of danger, was begun on the 3rd. The next day Haliburton was mortally wounded. Stephenson of the Madras Fusiliers, who succeeded him, shared the same fate on the 5th. Still the work was persevered with. Several houses were pierced through. At last, on the 6th, a large mosque was reached. This place was of great strength in itself, and was occupied in considerable force. To reduce it would have required more extensive operations than, in the state of the garrison, would have been convenient. The operations, therefore, were relinquished, but the intermediate houses were blown up and the 78th were located in the garden, in which rested the battery captured on the 2nd. This became an important permanent outpost, and not only protected a considerable portion of the old intrenchment, but connected it with the palaces which had been occupied on the 26th and 27th.

Development  
of the work  
of mining and  
counter-  
mining.

The work of mining and countermining, so remarkable during the siege, was, during the blockade, still further developed under the superintendence of Colonel Napier. Ably seconded by the engineer officers, Crommelin, Anderson, McLeod Innes, Hutchinson, Russell, Limond, and by others, all the efforts of the enemy in this direction were frustrated. The post to which I have alluded as occupied by the 78th Highlanders,



and called Phillips' garden, from its situation outside the intrenchment, offered temptations to their miners which were irresistible. But Hutchinson successfully countermined them. The Sikhs of the Ferozpúr regiment (Brasyer's) became very skilful in this work, and always baffled the enemy. Some of the 32nd, trained during the siege, likewise made themselves remarkable for their dexterity. For general purposes, a company of miners was formed of volunteers from the several corps, and placed under the orders of Captain Crommelin. These "soon gave him the ascendancy over the enemy, who were foiled at all points, with the loss of their galleries and mines, and the destruction of their miners in repeated instances." \*

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
October.

The occupation of Phillips' garden by the 78th Highlanders formed a part of the plan conceived by Outram for relieving the old garrison from all molestation on its east, north-east, and south-east faces; that is from the Kánhpúr road to the commencement of the river front. The plan was completed by the occupation as outposts of three strong positions commanding the road to the

The limits of the British position are extended.

\* Sir James Outram's official report. "I am aware," wrote Outram in the same report, "of no parallel to our series of mines in modern war. Twenty-one shafts, aggregating two hundred feet in depth and three thousand two hundred and ninety-one feet of gallery, have been executed. The enemy ad-

vanced twenty mines against the palaces and outposts; of these they exploded three which caused us loss of life, and two which did no injury; seven have been blown in, and out of seven others the enemy have been driven and their galleries taken possession of by our miners."



Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
October.

Altered tactics of the rebels.

iron bridge. Whilst these posts and that held by the 78th received the brunt of the enemy's attacks, the defences of the original intrenchment were thoroughly repaired, and new batteries to mount thirteen guns were constructed.

The effect of the occupation of these outposts on the enemy was remarkable. During the siege they had occupied positions within a few yards of our intrenchments. From these they were now driven back to a distance so great, that their musketry fire had no chance of doing mischief inside the old position. They accordingly, with considerable skill, altered their tactics. They withdrew their guns to a point whence the balls would clear the outer defences and fall within the intrenchment. The plan was ingenious, and was so far well worked that the point of fire was constantly shifted. But for one defect it might have been very damaging. That defect consisted in want of confidence in the success of the plan, which produced, therefore, want of continuity in the working of it. It was fatal.

The garrison hear of the complete success at Dehlí and of Greathed's march.

On the 9th of October, the garrison were cheered by news that Dehlí was completely in our power; that the King was a prisoner; and that Greathed had set out to lead a brigade to Kánhpúr. This news was confirmed the following day by the further intelligence of the victory gained by Greathed at Balandshahr.

From this date the chief enemy to combat was impatience. Relief was a question of time, and if relief would but arrive before the 20th November, Outram felt that all would be well. He ought to

have known that his stock of provisions would last much longer. But on this point an utterly mistaken impression prevailed. Outram believed, from the information officially given him, that, even on the reduced scale of rations allowed, the supplies in the Residency would not feed the force longer than the 20th. In reality they would have lasted much longer. The error might have had evil consequences. For it was mainly the belief that Outram's supplies were nearly exhausted that induced Sir Colin Campbell to march to Lakhnao before disposing of Tántia Topí and the Gwáliár troops. And the non-disposal of them almost landed us in disaster.

Still, though the greatest enemy was impatience, the efforts of the enemy outside the walls never slackened; nor were they wholly without effect. Between the 25th September and the 10th November, Lieutenant Graydon of the 44th Native Infantry, an excellent officer, in command of Innes's post, was shot dead while superintending the works beyond that post. I have noticed the death of McCabe whilst gallantly leading his fourth sortie. Captain Hughes of the 57th Native Infantry, doing duty with the 32nd, was mortally wounded at the attack of a house which formed one of the enemy's outposts. Captain Lowe, commanding the 32nd, was severely wounded. Wounded also were Browne, Edmonstone, and Assistant-Surgeon Darby, of the same regiment. On the south side of the intrenchment, the fire continued to be specially galling, several bullets entering the loop-holes. Complete exposure on this

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
November.

Mistake regarding the quantity of provisions in stock.

Some casualties of the siege.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
November.

The garrison  
hears of the  
advance of  
Hope Grant.

Outram de-  
vises a plan  
of communi-  
cation with  
the Com-  
mander-in-  
Chief.

side was certain death. On the 4th November, Dashwood, of the Bengal army, lost both his legs by a round shot, whilst sketching in the Residency compound. He had been warned by a first shot passing near him, but he would not stir.

On the 6th November, news reached the garrison that Hope Grant had encamped on the ground on the Lakhnao side of the Banni bridge, and that he was to wait there for Sir Colin Campbell, whose arrival at Kánhpúr was also announced.

It now became a point with the generals to devise some plan of communicating with the Commander-in-Chief. Sir James Outram had previously forwarded to the Álambágh a despatch for Sir Colin, in which were contained plans of the city and its approaches, and his own ideas as to the best mode of effecting the junction of the relieved with the relieving forces. He had advised the Commander-in-Chief to make a *détour* from the Álambágh to the right of the Dilkúsha, and to advance thence by the Martinière and Sikandar Bágh. By a means of a preconcerted signal, he ascertained that his despatch had safely reached the Álambágh. The success of this mode of communication suggested the improvising of a semaphore telegraph, and the idea was no sooner conceived than it was carried out.\*

\* "All necessary particulars," writes Mr. Martin Gubbins, "being fortunately found under the head 'Telegraph,' in the *Penny Cyclopædia* in my library, the

General ordered the immediate erection of a semaphore on the top of the Residency, and copies of the necessary instructions were sent to the Álambágh."



But though written descriptions might be useful to the Commander-in-Chief, their value could in no respect equal that which might be conveyed by an intelligent member of the garrison, by one who had undergone the siege and withstood the blockade, and who could cast the light of personal experience on the insufficient description of a despatch. But where was a man to be found who would dare the risk—who would undertake to penetrate the serried lines of the enemy, knowing that death was synonymous with discovery? Disguise was necessary, an almost impossible disguise, for the fair skin of the European, the light hair, the northern accent, could scarcely escape detection. To ask a man to attempt this, was to ask him to encounter something worse than death in its ordinary aspect, to expose himself to the ignominious fate of the spy!

To ask a man to dare this risk was, everyone felt, impossible. But everyone felt, at the same time, that it was a risk which it was most desirable should be undertaken. Such was the common thought: such the whisper of the garrison. It has often been found, amongst Englishmen, that the occasion produces the man. It produced him, even on this, when the risks of death were enormous, and when the death would be an ignominious death. A clerk in one of the civil offices, by name Thomas Henry Kavanagh, caused General Outram to be informed, some time on the 9th November, that he was prepared to traverse in disguise the hostile lines, and to convey a letter to the Commander-in-Chief in his camp

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.

November.

Necessity felt  
in the garri-  
son for per-  
sonal com-  
munication  
with Sir Colin  
Campbell.

Thomas  
Henry  
Kavanagh,



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
November.

notwith-  
standing his  
thoroughly  
European  
character-  
istics,

volunteers to  
traverse the  
enemy's lines  
in disguise.

The garb he  
chose.

near Banni. Mr. Kavanagh's offer was the more heroic, inasmuch as, of all the garrison, he was perhaps the most difficult man to disguise. Tall, taller than the ordinary run of natives, he was very fair—fair of a freckly fairness—and his hair glittered as gold. But, perfectly cognisant of these drawbacks to disguise, Mr. Kavanagh offered himself. General Outram loved a gallant deed: but, brave as he was, and loving bravery in others, he yet shrunk from exposing a man blindly to the consequences of a deed such as that which Kavanagh proposed. He told him frankly the risks he ran, the almost certain fate that would befall him. But Kavanagh had made up his mind. Dangers there were, he knew. But, having in view the all-important consequences of his mission, he would brave them.

Having made up his mind, and received his commission, Kavanagh proceeded to disguise himself. He chose the garb of a Badmásh—a native “swashbuckler”—a soldier for plunder, of the sort which abounded in the ranks of the rebels. He put on a pair of tight silk trousers, fitting close to the skin, a tight-fitting muslin shirt, and over this a yellow silk short jacket. Round his waist he bound a white waistband, over his shoulders he threw a coloured chintz cloth, on his head he placed a cream-coloured turban, his feet he inducted into the slipper-like shoes affected by the natives of India. His face down to the shoulders and his hands down to the wrist, he caused to be stained with lamp-black dipped in oil. His hair he cut short. Thus disguised, and wearing the

shield and sword peculiar to the swashbuckler, Kavanagh, at 9 o'clock on the evening of the 9th November, accompanied by a faithful native spy, by name Kanáojí Lál, set out.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 9.

He sets out,

His journey, though not without its alarms,\* proved that Mr. Kavanagh had not counted vainly on his brave and resolute heart. He could not, indeed, reach the Álambágh, but, passing by it, he fell in, on the morning of the 10th, with a party of Panjáb Cavalry, by whom, after receiving their warm greeting and hearty congratulations, he was escorted to Sir Colin Campbell.

Nov. 10.

and  
succeeds.

The information thus received by that gallant commander supplied the one link which, till then, had been wanting to his complete mastery of the position. The following morning his engineer park arrived, and orders were issued for an advance the next day. But that afternoon Sir Colin devoted to an inspection of the men with whom he was to accomplish the relief of the long beleaguered garrison—to deal the first deadly blow at the revolvers of Oudh. Who and what were those men? They were composed mainly of the remnants of regiments which had already fought and bled against the mutineers. There were, of the Line, the 8th, a wing of the 53rd, the 75th and 93rd Regiments; of Sikhs, the 2nd and 4th Panjáb Infantry; of Cavalry, the 9th Lancers, and detachments of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Cavalry, and

Nov. 11.

Sir Colin  
Campbell's  
force.

\* Mr. Kavanagh has written an account of this journey, "*How I Won the Victoria Cross*," Ward and Lock.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 11.

Sir Colin in-  
spects them.

Their dif-  
ferent cos-  
tumes and  
appearance.

of Hodson's Horse; of Artillery, sixteen guns, all tried at Dehlí; a few Bengal sappers, and some Panjábi pioneers; and of the Naval Brigade, two hundred and fifty men, with eight heavy guns, and two rocket tubes, mounted on light carts. The total number of fighting men, European and Native, was estimated at three thousand four hundred men.

Such were the men whom Sir Colin Campbell inspected on the afternoon of the day prior to the advance. "The scene," writes one who was present on the occasion,\* "was striking. The small army was drawn up in quarter-distance columns in the centre of a vast plain, surrounded by woods. On the edge of these the pickets were posted. A mere handful it seemed. The guns of the troops and batteries who came down from Dehlí, looked blackened and service-worn, but the horses were in good condition, the harness in perfect repair, the men swarthy, and evidently in perfect fighting trim. The 9th Lancers, with their blue uniforms and white turbans twisted round their forage caps, their flagless lances, lean but hardy horses, and gallant bearing, looked the perfection of a cavalry regiment on active service. Wild and bold was the carriage of the Sikh cavalry, riding untamed-looking steeds, clad in loose fawn-coloured robes, with long boots, blue or red turbans and sashes, and armed with carbine and sabre. Next to them were the worn and wasted remains of the 8th and 75th, clad entirely

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.



in slate-coloured cloth. With a wearied air, they stood grouped round their standards — war, stripped of its display, in all its nakedness. Then the 2nd and 4th Panjáb Infantry, tall of stature, with eager eyes overhung by large twisted turbans, clad in short sand-coloured tunics—men swift to march and forward in the fight—ambitious both of glory and of loot. Last stood, many in numbers, in tall and serried ranks, the 93rd Highlanders. A waving sea of plumes and tartans they looked, as, with loud and rapturous cheers, which rolled over the field, they welcomed their veteran commander, the chief of their choice. It was curious to mark the difference between the old Indian troops and the Highlanders in their reception of Sir Colin. Anxious and fixed was the gaze of the former as he rode down their ranks—men evidently trying to measure the leader who had been sent to them from so far. Enthusiastic beyond expression was his reception by the latter. You saw at once that to him was accorded their entire confidence—that, under him, they would go anywhere and do anything.”

At sunrise the following morning, the troops advanced. The plan upon which Sir Colin Campbell, well-instructed by Sir James Outram and possessing the advantage of the presence by his side of Mr. Kavanagh, had determined, was to move on the Álambágh; to store within that enclosure all the tents, and having drawn to himself the detachments still in rear, to make, with a wide sweep, a flank march to the right, on the Dil-kúsha Park and the Martinière; starting afresh

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 11.

Reception  
of Sir Colin  
by the 93rd;

by the veterans  
of Dehlî.

Nov. 12.

Plan of  
operations.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 12.

from these points, to force the canal close to its junction with the Gúmti; then, covered by that river, to advance, up its right bank, on the Sikandar Bágh. This point once secured, a portion of the force would make a dash southwards on the barracks north of Hazratganj, and having seized them, would erect there batteries to play on the outworks of the Kaisarbágh. The main body, meanwhile, forcing the Shah Najíf and the Motí Mahal, would open out the way for a junction with Outram. To support this operation, Outram would co-operate by a heavy fire on the intermediate positions held by the enemy from all the guns in the Residency; having forced these, he would move out, with all his sick and wounded, women and children, and treasure, between the Gúmti and the Kaisarbágh, and effect a junction with the Commander-in-Chief. It was based upon the plan drawn up by Outram, and transmitted to Sir Colin by the hands of the gallant Kavanagh, on the 9th.\*

The army  
advances.

To carry out this plan, the little army set out at sunrise on the morning of the 12th November. It had marched barely three miles when the advanced guard, headed by a squadron of Hodson's Horse, commanded by Lieutenant Gough, striking the road leading to Jallálábád, came at once under the fire of some light guns, covered by a line of field-works. The moment the sound was heard,

\* *Vide* Appendix D. Sir Colin deviated from Outram's plan only in so far that, to avoid street fighting, he kept away from the suburb indicated by Outram, and took his course in the more open ground near the Gúmti.

Captain Bouchier brought up his field battery, and opened out a fire which soon silenced the hostile guns. The rebels then attempted to remove them, but Gough, dashing forward, was amongst them like lightning, and drove them from the field with the loss of two of their pieces.

No further opposition was offered to the progress of the force to the Álambágh. That same evening the camp was pitched close to that enclosure: but as it thus came under the fire constantly directed by the enemy on that place, its position had to be changed to another, which brought it under cover of the Álambágh. Here the force halted for the following day.

The Álambágh was, at this time, held by Major McIntyre of the 78th Highlanders, nine hundred and thirty Europeans, a few Sikhs, and eight guns. McIntyre's original garrison of two hundred and eighty men had been from time to time augmented by parties from Kánhpúr, escorting the provisions which had maintained his garrison. It is a proof of Major McIntyre's skill, energy, and good arrangement, that although from his first occupation of the post, on the 25th September, to the date of his relief—a period of forty-nine days—he had been incessantly annoyed by the fire of the batteries erected by the enemy about the place, he had only lost one European soldier, and that two only had been wounded. The native camp-followers and the cattle had, however, suffered severely.

On the evening of the 12th he was, I have shown, relieved. The following day was devoted

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 12.

Bouchier  
silences, and  
Gough pur-  
sues the  
rebels.

The force  
encamps near  
the A'lam-  
bágh.

The A'lam-  
bágh

and Major  
McIntyre.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 13.

Adrian Hope  
carries the  
fort of Jallál-  
ábád.

Preparations  
made on the  
13th for an  
advance the  
following day.

by Sir Colin Campbell to making arrangements for a decisive advance on the 14th. First he despatched a small brigade, under the command of Colonel the Hon. Adrian Hope of the 93rd Highlanders—an officer of great attainments and brilliant promise—to take possession of the fort of Jallálábád, in the right rear of the position at the Álambágh. Hope found that the fort, which might have been advantageously defended, being constructed of thick mud with good flanking defences, had been evacuated. He therefore rendered it useless by blowing in one of its faces, and returned.

Whilst one brigade was engaged in this operation, Sir Colin caused to be stacked within the enclosure all the camp equipage not required for the hard work in prospect. He directed, also, that whilst supplies for fourteen days for himself and the troops in Lakchnao should accompany him, every soldier should carry in his haversack provisions for three days' consumption. Then, too, he received his last reinforcements from Kánhpúr, distributed to their several regiments the men brought up by various detachments he found in the Álambágh, and made a fresh division of his force into brigades. By successive reinforcements, and the junction with the Álambágh garrison, the force had now been augmented to about five thousand men of all arms,\* with forty-

\* Naval Brigade and Artillery, four hundred and fifty; cavalry, nine hundred; infantry, three thousand five hundred and fifty; sappers, two hundred; heavy guns, twelve; mortars, ten; light field guns, twenty-seven.

nine guns. The force was thus re-arranged. The 75th Regiment, not three hundred strong, and which had suffered much from previous service, was directed to occupy the Álambágh, aided by fifty Sikhs of the regiment of Firozpur, and a detachment of artillery under Captain Moir. The detailing of these troops for the purpose indicated reduced the force effective for field operations to about four thousand seven hundred men.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Nov. 13.

Re-arrangement of the force;  
the A'lambágh detachment,

The naval brigade, commanded by Captain William Peel, consisted of two hundred and fifty men of the crew of the *Shannon*, seamen and marines, having with them eight heavy guns and howitzers, drawn by bullocks, and two rocket tubes mounted on light carts. Vying with these in zeal and ardour was the artillery brigade, composed of Travers's 18-pounder battery, Remington's and Blunt's troops of Horse Artillery, half a troop of Madras Horse Artillery under Captain Bridge, and Bouchier's battery. This brigade was commanded by Brigadier Crawford, R.A.

the naval brigade and artillery,

The cavalry brigade, commanded by Brigadier Little, was composed of two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, and one each of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Panjáb Cavalry, and of Hodson's Horse.

the cavalry,

The Engineers' Department, commanded by Lieutenant Lennox, R.E., was composed of a company of Royal Engineers, a company of Madras Sappers, a few Bengal Sappers who had served at Dehlí, and two companies of newly raised Panjáb Pioneers.

the engineers,

The infantry brigades were the third, the the infantry.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 13.

Hope Grant  
has general  
supervision of  
the force.

Nov. 14.

The order to  
advance is  
given;

fourth, and the fifth. The third, commanded by Brigadier Greathed, was composed of the remnant of the 8th Regiment; of a battalion of detachments of three regiments shut up in Lakhnao; and of the 2nd Panjáb Native Infantry. The fourth, led by Brigadier Adrian Hope, was the strongest of all. It was composed of the 93rd Highlanders, and a wing of the 53rd, the former fresh from England, the latter from Calcutta; of the 4th Panjáb Infantry, and a weak battalion of the regiments shut up in Lakhnao. The fifth brigade, commanded by Brigadier Russell, was composed of the 23rd Fusiliers and a detachment of the 82nd Regiment. Hope Grant, with the rank of Brigadier-General, had the general direction of the force under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief.\*

On the evening of the 13th Sir Colin rode out to reconnoitre. The following morning at 9 o'clock, the troops having first partaken of a good breakfast, he gave the order to march. The advance was made from the right, through the fields, crossing the several roads leading from the city at right angles. The enemy had not evidently anticipated this circuitous movement, as whilst their scouts watched the route of the British from the tops of trees, small bodies of them were seen hastily endeavouring to throw up cover at the several points by which it was likely that the head of the advanced column would turn towards the city.

\* Sir Hope Grant's *Sepoy War*, page 179.

The turning movement having been completed, the advance, bringing forward their right shoulders, moved directly on the wall of the Dilkúsha park. Up to this moment no opposition had been offered by the rebels, but as the advance neared the enclosure a heavy matchlock fire was opened upon it from the left. Reinforcements were at once sent to the front, and the British guns opened upon the group whence this fire proceeded and silenced it. A body of rebel skirmishers then showed themselves emerging from the park, but the British skirmishers, horse, foot, and artillery, advancing, drove them speedily back and pushed them through the grounds of the Dilkúsha park, over the crest of the plateau, to the Martinière, about a mile below it, on the banks of the Gúmti. The Dilkúsha was thus carried, almost without a blow.

This operation, described though it be in a few lines, had occupied two hours. The loss on both sides had been inconsiderable, as the enemy did not stand to receive, but retreated after discharging their pieces. The work had been easy for the assailants, and they were ready for more.

They did not halt then in the Dilkúsha, but, running and cantering across the park, pressed on to the Martinière. The rebels were in advance of them, and the sight of these men running in panic had inspired their comrades, entrusted with the defence of the Martinière, to do something to check the pursuit. They succeeded, by considerable exertions, in turning two guns on the advancing cavalry; but before they could

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 14.

and carries  
the Dilkú-  
sha.

The British  
skirmishers  
dash at the  
Martinière,

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 14.

which they  
carry.

Watson's  
hand to hand  
encounter.

Sir Colin  
Campbell  
makes ar-  
rangements  
for holding  
the ground up  
to the edge  
of the canal.

produce any perceptible effect, Bouchier and Remington opened upon them. Their fire was quickly followed by discharges from Travers's 18-pounders, and from a heavy howitzêr brought up by Captain Hardy, R.A. Many rounds had not been fired when the infantry, composed of a battalion made up of companies from the 5th Fusiliers, the 64th and 78th Foot, and the 8th Foot, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton of the 78th, came up, dashed down the slope, and carried the Martinière, the enemy not waiting to receive them, but retreating across the canal with all speed, followed by our cavalry. In the course of the pursuit, Lieutenant Watson\* of the Bombay army, commanding the squadron of the 1st Panjáb Cavalry, encountered and slew in a hand to hand encounter the leader of the enemy's party, a native officer of the 15th Irregular Cavalry. Watson had a narrow escape, his opponent having discharged his pistol at him within a few feet of his body.

Both these important places having been carried, and the ground up to the edge of the canal being held by our troops, it devolved upon the Commander-in-Chief to make arrangements for holding it. He accordingly brought up Adrian Hope's brigade (the 4th), and arranged it in position in the gardens of the Martinière. Remington's troop of horse artillery was located there likewise. Russell's brigade (the 5th) was posted on the left in front of the Dilkúsha; whilst

\* Now Colonel Watson, C.B. and V.C.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 14.

on the plain in front of the Martinière, occupying a line drawn from the canal on their right to the wall of the Dilkúsha park on their left, were Little's brigade of cavalry and Bouchier's battery. Somewhat later in the afternoon, in pursuance of orders issued by Sir Colin, with a view to guard his communications with the Álambágh from being cut off by a turning movement on his left, Brigadier Russell pushed forward several companies of his infantry to occupy two villages on the canal, covering the left of the British position.

These arrangements had not been made one moment too soon. They were hardly completed, The enemy prepare to attack him;

when it became evident from the massing of troops on their centre, that the enemy were contemplating an aggressive movement. To gain information as to its probable nature, Captain Grant of the 9th Lancers galloped forward to reconnoitre. He was received by a crashing musketry fire, which, however, left him unscathed. Little at once ordered Bouchier to the front, supporting him with his cavalry. It was then seen how wise had been the occupation of the two villages already referred to; for the enemy, creeping down to the bed of the canal, had opened upon them a heavy and continuous fire. But as soon as Bouchier's guns opened upon their supporting masses, they fell back very rapidly to the city. A few more discharges cleared the canal bed.

but the attack had been previously discounted.

Little, having accomplished his mission, withdrew to the Martinière compound, and orders were at once issued for a night bivouac. But They make a second attempt;



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 14.

scarcely had the horses been untraced, than the enemy, regathering courage, made a second and more desperate attempt to turn the British position. About four hundred yards to the proper right of the wall of the Dilkúsha park, as one faces the canal, is the bridge connecting the Martinière plain with the Hazratganj main street. It was on this bridge that the rebels now came down in great numbers and with several guns.

but are baffled  
by Adrian  
Hope,

It was now nearly 5 P.M., and our men were ready for them. Adrian Hope brought up his brigade with an alacrity not to be surpassed. The 93rd he placed lining a mud-wall opposite the bridge. On either side of them were the 53rd and the 4th Panjábis. Remmington's troop galloped at once to the front, closely followed by the remainder of the artillery, and opened fire on the enemy. The cavalry were handy. As each successive regiment came up it lined the banks of the canal.

aided by  
William Peel  
and Bour-  
chier.

Bourchier's battery and Peel's 24-pounders occupied a position on some high ground on the left of the bridge, whence they were able to direct a concentric fire on the angle formed by the canal near the bridge, and where the enemy were massed in large numbers. Their fire speedily "crushed"\* the enemy out of this position. Then Adrian Hope, forming up his brigade, pushed across the bridge, drove back the enemy with heavy loss, and secured a lodgment on

the other side. The attack of the rebels had failed.\*

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

Then did the British troops bivouac for the night, Adrian Hope's brigade, flanked by Bouchier's battery, two guns of the naval brigade, and a troop of cavalry, on the canal; Russell's brigade on their right; Greathed's in the rear; the bulk of the artillery on the high ground to the left, and the cavalry on the summit of the plateau round the Dilkúsha house behind the centre. The men slept with their arms by their side, ready for prompt action.

1857.  
Nov. 14.

The bivouac  
for the night

The following day, the 15th, was spent in making preparations for the grand advance. The Dilkúsha palace was to be made a second depôt for the stores and baggage which would have needlessly encumbered an army which had to fight in the streets. The heavy baggage, consisting of everything pertaining to the officers and soldiers, had been placed in charge of a strong rear-guard, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, H.M.'s 93rd Highlanders. This officer, whose splendid gallantry was soon to be displayed in a position more advanced and still more dangerous, had had no easy time of it. Although his men had been under arms on the 14th at the same time as the rest of the army, his progress, charged with a large

Nov. 15.

Ewart, 93rd  
Highlanders,  
commands  
the rear-  
guard.

\* In this action our force lost two very promising officers, Captain Mayne, of the Bengal Artillery, and Captain Wheatley, of the Carabineers, doing duty with the 9th Lancers. A few hours before,

Wheatley, talking with some comrades of the approaching Christmas, had remarked, "I wonder how many of us will then be alive." He was a very gallant officer.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 15.

Aided by  
Blunt and  
Crawford, he  
repulses  
every attack.

Arrange-  
ments made  
at the Dilkú-  
sha.

The afternoon  
and night  
prior to the  
advance.

convoy, had necessarily been slow. The enemy, hovering about the main force, but afraid to attack it, had singled out the rear-guard as their prey. The attacks which they made upon it were incessant. But, well aided by Blunt of the Bengal, and Crawford of the Royal, Artillery, Ewart beat back every assault. But the attacks had necessarily delayed him, and he was unable to bring his convoy into camp before the 15th. But he brought it then, having accomplished, skilfully, a difficult and harassing task.

Then did Sir Colin make his final arrangements. The whole of his heavy baggage, his supplies for fourteen days, he stored in the Dilkúsha. Into the palace all the sick and wounded were conveyed. Defences were thrown up round that building, and a force was detailed to guard it. This force consisted of five field guns, half the 9th Lancers, the Military Train, a squadron of Panjáb Cavalry, and the remnant of the gallant 8th, about three hundred strong—the whole under the command of Brigadier Little of the 9th Lancers.

But though the 15th was a day of preparation, the enemy did not leave the fighting qualities of our soldiers untested. About mid-day, huge masses of infantry, supporting two horse artillery guns, made a strong demonstration against the extreme right of the British position. Their pickets, however, were on the alert, and the guns (two guns of the Madras Native Horse Artillery) speedily opening fire, the enemy fell back. As the point thus threatened was that from which it was intended to make the advance the following

morning, Sir Colin deemed it advisable to draw the enemy's attention to another quarter. He accordingly a little later in the day made a strong reconnaissance in front of our extreme left, and subsequently massed all our artillery on that point. He further directed that, during the night, a fire of mortars should be directed on the point opposite our left, so as to keep the enemy's attention fixed there, whilst silence should be preserved at the other end of the line.

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 15.

Having made all the arrangements which skill and foresight could suggest, Sir Colin signalled to Sir James Outram, by a code previously arranged, that he would advance on the morrow.

Sir Colin  
signals to  
Outram his  
intention to  
advance.

Early on the morning of the 16th the heavy guns were withdrawn from the advanced pickets on the canal, and the detachments of Adrian Hope's brigade which had been sent to the front, rejoined their regiments. The men first breakfasted. Then, a strong body of cavalry, with Blunt's troop of horse artillery and a company of the 53rd, forming the advance guard, moved forward from the extreme right. The way crossed the canal, then dry; followed then for about a mile the bank of the Gúmti, led then through a narrow line, through thickly wooded enclosures, and then made a sharp turn to the left on to a road which, turning again, runs between low mud houses, for about one hundred and twenty yards parallel to the Sikandarbagh. Following the advance guard marched Adrian Hope's brigade; then Russell's; then the ammunition and engineers' park. Greathed's brigade, now reduced

Nov. 16.

The advance  
on the 16th.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

by the retention of the 8th at the Dilkúsha, remained till mid-day occupying the position on the canal, so as to protect the left rear of the main body. It then followed the remainder of the force as its rear-guard.

The British  
advance  
comes in con-  
tact with the  
enemy.

Danger of its  
position.

The precautions taken by Sir Colin the preceding afternoon and evening had been successful, for the enemy's attention had been completely diverted from the line of advance he had contemplated. His advanced guard, then, marched along the bank of the Gúmti, through the lane and enclosures, without meeting an enemy. Suddenly it made the sharp turn to the left already described. Then the enemy for the first time took the alarm. First from men occupying huts and enclosures in advance of the building, then from the mass of men in the Sikandarbágh\* itself, poured an overwhelming fire on the troops forming the advance. Their position was, in a military point of view, desperate, for they were exposing their flank to the enemy. For a distance of a hundred and twenty yards to the walled enclosure of Sikandarbágh, they were broadside on to the enemy's fire. Our officers saw the position clearly. Before a shot had been fired a staff officer remarked to his right-hand comrade, "If these fellows allow one of us to get out of this *cul de sac* alive, they deserve every one of them to be hanged."†

\* The Sikandarbágh is a high-walled enclosure about one hundred and fifty yards square, with towers at the angles.

October 1858. The writer of the article quoted either made or heard the remark. He was himself a distinguished actor in the campaign.

† *Blackwood's Magazine*,

The situation was indeed critical. The gallant 53rd (one company only), in skirmishing order, lined indeed the enclosures bordering on the lane ; but their numbers were few, and the fire of the enemy was concentrated ; the cavalry were jammed together, unable to advance, and the high banks on either side seemed to offer an impassable barrier to artillery.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

But only “seemed.” Up the steep bank the daring Blunt led his gallant troop, and “conquering the impossible,” brought them, guns and all, into an open space between the Sikandarbagh and another large loop-holed building, exposed as he galloped on to a terrific cross-fire. Here unlimbering, with remarkable coolness and self-possession, he opened with his six guns on the Sikandarbagh. Never was anything done better.

The splendid  
gallantry of

Whilst Blunt was engaged on this gallant deed, Adrian Hope's brigade, disengaging itself, had come up with a rush and driven the enemy first from the enclosures bordering the lane, and then from the large building of which I have spoken opposite the Sikandarbagh. This gave it access to the open space on which Blunt had unlimbered. Travers followed with his heavy battery, and the sappers and miners having demolished a portion of the high bank, he too was able, by the aid of the infantry, to bring two of his 18-pounders into position and to open fire against the angle of the enclosure. In less than an hour their fire opened a hole in the wall which might be practicable for stormers.

Adrian  
Hope's bri-  
gade.

Travers and  
his heavy  
battery.

Meanwhile the infantry of Adrian Hope's bri-

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

The assault  
of the Sikan-  
darbágh.

gade, after the achievement already related, had been ordered to lie down, covered by a small bank and some trees. But the moment the breach was considered practicable the bugle-sound gave the signal for assault. It was made by the 93rd Highlanders and the 4th Panjáb Rifles, supported by the 53rd and a battalion of detachments. Springing to their feet the Highlanders under Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, and the Sikhs under Lieutenant Paul, dashed forward. "It was," writes an eye-witness,\* "a glorious rush. On went, in generous rivalry, the turban of the Sikh and the dark plume of the Highlander. A native officer of the Sikhs"—Subadár Gokal Singh, specially mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief in his despatch—"waving his tulwar above his head, dashed on full five yards in front of his men. The Highlanders, determined not to be left behind, strained nerve and limb in the race. Their officers led like gallant gentlemen, shaking their broad swords in the air. Two young ensigns springing over a low mud wall gave the colours of the regiment to the breeze. Paul with voice and accent urged on his wild followers." All ran towards the hole—a small hole in a bricked-up doorway, about three feet square and about the same distance from the ground. A Sikh of the 4th Rifles reached it first, but he was shot dead as he jumped through. A similar fate befell a Highlander in his track. A young officer of the 93rd, Richard Cooper by name, outstrip-

Richard  
Cooper,

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

ping the majority of his comrades, was more fortunate. Flying, so to speak, through the hole, he landed unscathed. "His jump into it," wrote the gallant Blunt, who witnessed it, "reminded me of the headlong leap which Harlequin in a pantomime makes through a shop window, and I thought at the time that if he was not rushing to certain death life would be very uncertain to those first making entrance by that ugly blind hole." Cooper was almost immediately followed by Colonel Ewart of the 93rd, Ewart by three privates of his regiment, they again by eight or nine men, Sikhs of the 4th Panjáb Rifles and Highlanders. Altogether, besides the two officers, about a dozen men, Sikhs and Highlanders, had jumped within the enclosure, when, from some reason yet undiscovered, the supply from outside suddenly stopped. The enclosure in which these fourteen men found themselves was one hundred and fifty yards square, with towers at the angles, and in the centre of the eastern face a building, consisting of a room opening out into a courtyard behind it. The grass growing all over the ground of the enclosure sufficiently high to conceal the enemy from view. There were, however, two pathways—the one to the left leading to the gate; the other, to the right, to the building in the centre of the eastern face.

Losing not a moment after he had daringly jumped in, Cooper dashed along the path to the right, closely followed by Ewart and about a dozen soldiers. No other officer accompanied them. Following the path, they reached an angle

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

Ewart,

and twelve  
Sikhs and  
Highlanders

jump into the  
enemy's  
walled en-  
closure.

Cooper,  
Ewart, and  
their follow-  
ers



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

come face to  
face with the  
enemy's  
masses.

Cooper is  
slashed across  
the head.

Notwith-  
standing the  
splendid  
achievement  
of Ewart, the  
contest is  
doubtful,

of the enclosure, turned it, and in three seconds more found themselves in front of the square building I have already described. There were rebels in front of it, rebels within it, rebels in the courtyard behind it. But on this occasion, as on so many others, boldness was prudence. The rebels outside, astonished by the sudden appearance of the two British officers and their following, ignorant of their numbers, and believing, it may be presumed, that the main entrance had been forced, ran hurriedly into the building, and attempted to make their way through a small door into the courtyard behind. The two officers and their men dashed after them, and a hand-to-hand encounter ensued. Cooper, after greatly distinguishing himself and laying many low with a sword wielded by an arm of more than ordinary strength, was singled out by a native officer of the regiment of Lúdhianá, and received from him a slash across the forehead at the same moment that he laid his antagonist dead at his feet. Ewart, forcing his way into the courtyard, pushed forward with his following against the men at the other end of it. Some of these men had muskets, some swords and shields. They allowed Ewart to approach within ten yards of them, when those who had muskets fired a volley. Fortunately they fired high. One ball pierced Ewart's bonnet. Our men then rushed at them, and a desperate hand-to-hand encounter ensued. One tall rebel, armed with sword and shield, singled Ewart out for destruction, but that gallant officer was beforehand with him, and shot him, and five others who

followed him, dead with his revolver. Still in the end numbers might have prevailed when at the critical moment the Highlanders, the Sikhs, and the 53rd poured in to the rescue.

How these had forced their way remains now to be told. Impatient of the delay which would be caused by jumping singly through a narrow hole, the bulk of the storming party had turned to the left to force a way by the gate of the enclosure. This gate was locked and barred; and although the men used all their efforts, firing their pieces at the lock, some time elapsed before it gave way. But at last it yielded, and the 93rd and Sikhs dashed through it. Almost simultaneously the 53rd forced a barred window to the right of it and joined in the rush to the rescue of Ewart, of Cooper, still fighting in spite of his wound, and their comrades.

I have been particular in describing in full detail the services of these two gallant officers, both belonging to the 93rd Highlanders, not only because they and the ten or twelve men who followed them were the first to penetrate within the enclosure of the Sikandarbagh, nor because their action had a direct effect on the ultimate issue, holding, as they did, the rebels in check while the main body of the storming party were engaged in endeavouring to force an entrance by the main gate, but because whilst many officers were mentioned in the despatch,\* the splendid services of

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

when the remainder of the storming party arrive.

How they had been delayed.

The splendid gallantry of Ewart and Cooper unnoticed and unrewarded.

\* "The attack on the Sikandarbagh had now been proceeding for about an hour and a half when it was determined to take the place by storm through a small open-

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

The stormers  
drive back  
the rebels.

these two gallant men did not receive even a bare notice. It is fit that, even after the lapse of twenty years, history should atone, as far as atonement is possible, for official neglect.

To return. I have already stated that whilst Ewart and Cooper and their small following were making fierce head against the mass of rebels opposed to them, a considerable body of the 93rd and the 4th Panjáb Rifles, outside the enclosure, had, by strenuous exertions, succeeded in forcing the main doorway, whilst the 53rd had driven in the window on its right. Through these, and through Cooper's hole, which the

ing which had been made. This was done in the most brilliant manner by the remainder of the Highlanders, the 53rd and 4th Panjáb Infantry, supported by a battalion of detachments under Major Barnston."—*Official Despatch of Sir Colin Campbell*, dated 18th November 1857. It will be observed that neither Ewart nor Cooper is mentioned. Yet Cooper's splendid deed was well known in camp. I have seen letters from distinguished officers stating that he was pointed out to them as the man "who had leapt into the breach." When, a little later, the officers of the 93rd were called upon to elect from among themselves one member whom they considered entitled to receive the Victoria Cross for distinguished conduct and bravery under fire in the field, al-

though the majority of the officers voted for Captain W. D. Stewart, many voted for Ewart and Cooper. No other officer was voted for. "On that occasion" wrote three years later one, not the least distinguished amongst them, "I, for one, gave my vote in Cooper's favour, conscientiously considering that he had justly earned the distinction. . . . I know that this was the opinion of others besides myself. . . . Cooper and Ewart both deserved to receive the Victoria Cross." Yet their gallant deeds were not even mentioned. It is true that Colonel Ewart was subsequently made a Companion of the Bath and Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, but Cooper was left out in the cold—where he still remains.



sappers had succeeded in enlarging, the stormers poured as fast as they could make their way. As they entered, the rebels fell back into the towers at the angle of the enclosure, and opened a heavy and continuous musketry fire on our men, occasionally diversifying this mode of fighting by descending to a hand to hand encounter. In one of these, Colonel Ewart succeeded in cutting down two native officers who guarded a colour, and in capturing the colour,\* which he presented with his own hand to Sir Colin Campbell.

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

Ewart captures a colour, cutting down its defenders.

The contest for the possession of the enclosure was bloody and desperate, the rebels fighting with all the energy of despair. Nor did the struggle end when our men forced their way inside. Every room, every staircase, every corner of the towers was contested. Quarter was neither given nor asked for, and when at last our men were masters of the place more than two thousand rebel corpses lay heaped upon each other. It is said that of all who garrisoned it only four men escaped, but even the escape of four is doubtful.

After a desperate slaughter, the Sikandarbagh is gained.

Meanwhile, whilst a portion of the 93rd, of the 53rd and the 4th Panjáb Rifles were gra-

The "Barracks" captured.

\* This was another splendid deed buried till now in silence. Ewart had observed the colour in question in one of the rooms into which the rebels had retreated. He determined to get possession of it, and made a dash, quite un-

assisted, at the room. He found the entrance to it defended by two native officers armed with tulwars, each on either side of the doorway. He fought them both and killed them, receiving himself two sabre cuts.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

Captain  
Stewart, 93rd.

dually overcoming resistance in the enclosure, some companies of the 93rd and 53rd, supported by two guns of Blunt's battery, had pushed forward through the opening, and following the plain, nearly southwards, for almost half a mile, had attacked and effected a lodgment in a large building called "The Barracks," and which formed at about half the distance the angle of the rectangular road, used in contradistinction to the direct road which connected the Sikandarbagh with the Kaisarbagh. In this attack Captain Stewart of the right wing of the 93rd greatly distinguished himself by capturing two guns which commanded the approaches to the Barracks.

But the shorter road from Sikandarbagh to the Residency ran directly westward between the large loop-holed building, stormed in the first instance by Adrian Hope's brigade and the Sikandarbagh itself, across an open plain about twelve hundred yards broad. "About three hundred yards along this road there is a small village, with garden enclosures round it; while about two hundred and fifty yards further on, and one hundred yards to the right of the road stood the Shah Najif, a large mosque, situated in a garden enclosed by a high loop-holed wall. This wall is nearly square and very strong. Between it and the plain is a thick fringe of jungle and enclosures, with trees, and scattered mud cottages, which make it impossible to get a distinct view of the place until you come close on it. Between it and the Sikandarbagh, amidst jungles and enclosures, to the right of the little plain,

The Shah  
Najif.

was a building on a high mound called the Kaddam Rasúl.”\*

The afternoon was now waning, and Sir Colin Campbell deemed it essential to carry the Shah Najíf. The operation was dangerous and most difficult. Success, to most men, would have seemed uncertain. Failure was ruin. Of all the actions in the campaign this was the most critical. How it was done has been described by an actor in the scene, with a vigour of touch and with a life-like freshness which it is impossible to surpass. I have read nothing which conveys the scene more vividly to the mind. I am sure, then, I shall be pardoned, if, instead of using my own language, I borrow the account of the daring action from one who saw it, and who wrote what he saw.†

“Hope,” says the writer, taking up the story from the point where I left it, “having now drawn off his brigade from the Sikandarbágh, led it against the village, which he cleared and occupied without much difficulty; while Peel brought up his 24-pounders, mortars, and rocket frames, and placed them in battery against the Shah Najíf in an oblique line, with their left resting on the village. The musketry fire which streamed unceasingly from that building and the surrounding enclosures, was most biting and severe; and after nearly three hours battering it was still unsubdued. An attempt, made with great gallantry by Major Barnston with his battalion of detachments, to drive the

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

Sir Colin determines to carry the Shah Najíf.

Preliminaries  
to the attack.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

† *Ibid.*

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

The confusion  
in the lane  
communi-  
cating with  
the rear.

enemy from the fringe of jungle and enclosures in front, by setting fire to the houses, proved unsuccessful; but on the right the Kaddam Rasúl was assaulted and carried by a party of Sikhs.

“In the narrow lane leading up from the rear, meanwhile, the utmost confusion prevailed. The animals carrying the ordnance and the engineer supplies, unable to advance from the enemy’s fire in front—unable to get out on either side, and pressed forward by those in rear—got completely jammed, insomuch that an officer, sent to bring up ammunition and all Greathed’s disposable infantry to the now hard-pressed front, had the utmost difficulty to get the men on in single file; whilst some houses having been wantonly set on fire by the camp-followers, the passage was for a time entirely blocked up; and it was only when the flames were abating that a string of camels, laden with small-arm ammunition, which was urgently required by the troops engaged, could with great risk and toil be forced through the narrow and scorching pass. Even then, however, the confusion near the Sikandarbágh had got to such a pitch, that all passage had become impossible; and had it not been that a staff officer discovered a by-path leading into a broad road, which abutted on the Sikandarbágh, neither men nor ammunition could have been brought up.

The battle  
makes no  
way against  
the Shah  
Najíf.

“In front of the Shah Najíf the battle made no way. The enemy, about 4 o’clock, got a heavy gun to bear upon us from the opposite bank of the river, and their very first shot blew up one of Peel’s tumbrils, whilst their deadly musketry had

obliged him to withdraw the men from one of his pieces and diminished the fire of the others. The men were falling fast. Even Peel's usually bright face became grave and anxious. Sir Colin sat on his white horse, exposed to the whole storm of shot, looking intently on the Shah Najíf, which was wreathed in volumes of smoke from the burning buildings in its front, but sparkled all over with the bright flash of small arms. It was now apparent that the crisis of the battle had come. Our heavy artillery could not subdue the fire of the Shah Najíf; we could not even hold permanently our present advanced position under it. But retreat to us there was none. By that fatal lane our reflux force could never be withdrawn. Outram and Havelock and Inglis, with our women and children, were in the front, and England's honour was pledged to bring them scatheless out of the fiery furnace. What shot and shell could not do the bayonets of the infantry must accomplish. But the crisis was terrible. Even as the fate of the French empire hung at Wagram on the footsteps of Macdonald's column, so did the fate of our Indian dominions depend that day on the result of the desperate assault now about to be undertaken.

“Collecting the 93rd about him, the Commander-in-Chief addressed a few words to them. Not concealing the extent of the danger, he told them that he had not intended that day to employ them again, but that the Shah Najíf *must be taken*; that the artillery could not bring its fire under, so they must win it with the bayonet. Giving

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

Sir Colin  
harangues  
the 93rd,



Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

and deter-  
mines to win  
it with the  
bayonet.

Middleton.

William Peel.

Sir Colin.

Adrian Hope.

them a few plain directions, he told them he would go on with them himself.

“To execute this design Middleton’s battery of the Royal Artillery was ordered to pass Peel’s guns on the right, and getting as close as possible to the Shah Najif, to open a quick and well sustained fire of grape. Peel was to redouble his, and the 93rd to form in column in the open plain, close to the village, ready to rush on.

“Middleton’s battery came up magnificently. With loud cheers, the drivers waving their whips, the gunners their caps, they galloped forward through that deadly fire to within pistol-shot of the wall, unlimbered, and poured in round after round of grape. Peel, manning all his guns, worked his pieces with redoubled energy, and, under cover of this iron storm, the 93rd, excited to the highest degree, with flashing eyes and nervous tread, rolled on in one vast wave. The grey-haired veteran of many fights rode, with his sword drawn, at their head. Keen was his eye, as when in the pride of youth he led the stormers of St. Sebastian. His staff crowded round him. Hope, too, with his towering form and gentle smile, was there, leading, as ever was his wont, the men by whom he was loved so well. As they approached the nearest angle of the enclosure the soldiers began to drop fast; but, without a check, they reached its foot. There, however, they were brought to a stand. The wall, perfectly entire, was nearly twenty feet high, and well loop-holed; there was no breach, and there were no scaling-ladders. Unable to advance,

unwilling to retire, they halted and commenced a musketry battle with the garrison. But all the advantage was with the latter, who shot with security from behind their loops, and the Highlanders went down fast before them. At this time nearly all the mounted officers were either wounded or dismounted. Hope and his aide-de-camp were both rolling on the ground at the same moment, with their horses shot under them: his major of brigade had just met with the same fate: two of Sir Colin's staff had been stricken to the earth: a party, which had pushed on round the angle to the gate, had found it so well covered by a new work in masonry, as to be perfectly unassailable. Two of Peel's guns were now brought up to within a few yards of the wall. Covered by the fusilade of the infantry, the sailors shot fast and strong; but, though the masonry soon fell off in flakes, it came down so as to leave the mass behind perpendicular, and as inaccessible as ever.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

The Shah  
Najif baffles  
them all.

“Success seemed now impossible. Even Hope and Peel, these two men, iron of will and ready of resource, could see no way. Anxious and careworn grew Sir Colin's brow. The dead and wounded were ordered to be collected and carried to the rear. Some rocket frames were brought up, and threw in a volley of these fiery projectiles, with such admirable precision, that, just skimming over the top of the rampart, they plunged hissing into the interior of the building, and searched it out with a destroying force. Under cover of this, the guns were drawn off. The shades of evening were falling fast—the

Success  
seems im-  
possible.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

As a last resource Adrian Hope attempts a flank movement,

which succeeds.

assault could not much longer be continued. Then, as a last resource—the last throw of a desperate game—Adrian Hope,\* collecting some fifty men, stole silently and cautiously through the jungle and brushwood away to the right, to a portion of the wall on which he had, before the assault, thought he perceived some injury to have been inflicted. Reaching it unperceived, a narrow fissure was found. Up this, a single man was, with some difficulty, pushed. He saw no one near the spot, and so helped up Hope, Ogilvy (attached to the Madras Sappers), Allgood, the Assistant Quartermaster-General, and some others. The numbers inside soon increased, and as they did so they advanced, gradually extending their front. A body of sappers, sent for in haste, arrived at the double: the opening was enlarged, the supports rushed in. Meanwhile, Hope's small party, pushing on, to their great astonishment, found themselves almost unopposed. Gaining the gate, they threw it open for their comrades. The white dresses of the last of the garrison were just seen gliding away amidst the rolling smoke into the dark shadows of the night. Panic-stricken apparently by the destruction caused by the rockets, and the sudden appearance of some of the assailants within the walls, they fled from the place and gave up the struggle just when victory was secure.

\* I believe that, in point of fact, Adrian Hope's attention was drawn to this portion of the wall by Sergeant

Paton, 93rd, who was the first to discover its weakness. For this act Paton received the Victoria Cross.



“Never had there been a harder-fought day,\* but never was a result gained more satisfactory.”

Book XL  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

A lodgment had been gained for the night. Every man felt now that the work was virtually accomplished. It is true that between their position and that occupied by Outram there were still buildings which the rebels would fight to maintain. But those buildings taken all together did not equal one Shah Najíf. The men who had, under the circumstances narrated, stormed that mosque, might justly feel confident that the difficulties of the morrow could not be insuperable. No wonder that “there was joy now in every heart—there was light in every eye.”

The order then was given to bivouac for the night. The main body of the 93rd garrisoned the Shah Najíf: another portion of that regiment, under Colonel Ewart, occupied the barracks, already adverted to. The troops not occupying these two posts lined the roads, maintaining the communications between the three points—the Barracks, Sikandar Bágh, and the Shah Najíf. The field hospital for the wounded was established in some huts opposite the Sikandar Bágh, which might be regarded as the central point of the position taken up for the night. The men lay down in line with their arms in their hands.

Whilst they are sleeping I may advert, I fear  
oo briefly, to some of the deeds of gallantry

How justice  
is not done to  
deserving  
officers in  
despatches.

\* “It was an action almost unexampled in war.”—*Sir Colin Campbell's Despatch*, 18th November, 1857.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

accomplished during that eventful day. Not all the brave actions performed on the battle-field can come under the notice of a commander; nor, coming under his notice, are they always mentioned. The stereotyped form of despatch writing prevailing in, if not peculiar to, the British army, necessitates the mention of all officers on the staff of the commander, of the divisional and brigade commanders and their staffs, of the officers commanding regiments and batteries, of all heads of departments. Not to mention any one of these officers is to disgrace him. It follows that such stereotyped mention is without real value. This hard and fast rule is unjust. It may sometimes happen that a particular staff officer or a particular regimental commander fails to distinguish himself, that he makes serious blunders. Such matters are at once known in the camp. But when the despatch appears, the capable finds himself bracketed in one chorus of praise with the incapable, the clear-headed with the dullard, and the general public knows no difference between them. Hence, I repeat, the stereotyped praise of despatches is really without value.

But there is some praise which is not stereotyped. Such is the praise, for instance, awarded for special deeds of daring. Applause of this sort is real and genuine. Yet whilst its genuineness when applied cannot be questioned, it is undeniable that many greatly distinguish themselves whose names are never brought forward. No stranger can be sure, when addressing an officer

How justice  
might be  
done.

of the British army, that he is not speaking to an undecorated hero.\*

I have mentioned, in the proper place, the splendid achievements, in the early part of the day, of Ewart and of Richard Cooper. Those "undecorated heroes" were undoubtedly the men who made the first entrance into the Sikandar Bágh. But on a day when so many distinguished themselves they were not the only heroes. One non-commissioned officer and two privates of the 93rd, Dunley, Mackay, and Grant, effected their entrance into the Sikandar Bágh by the hole through which Cooper had leapt, though after him, and gallantly supported their officers. More fortunate than these they received the Cross for their daring. Sergeant Munro of the same regiment received the Cross for distinguished conduct in the same enclosure. In the 53rd Regiment, Lieutenant Ffrench, and Privates Kenny and Irwin, and in the 84th, Captain the Hon. H. A. Anson,† deservedly received the Cross for conspicuous daring in the capture of the Sikandar Bágh. Later in the same day, Captain Stewart of the 93rd secured the Cross for the capture of two of the enemy's guns at the Barracks. I have already mentioned Sergeant Paton of the 93rd.‡ The Cross was given to this daring non-commissioned officer "for distinguished personal gallantry in proceeding alone round the Sháh Najíf under an

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

The heroes  
of the day.

\* Vide Appendix B.

† Captain Anson's gallant conduct at Balandshahr, already mentioned, had pre-

viously entitled him to the Cross.

‡ Page 194, note.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

extremely heavy fire, discovering a breach on the opposite side, to which he afterwards conducted the regiment, by which means that important position was taken." There were many others, not less deserving even than this man. What could exceed the gallantry of Blunt of the Bengal Horse Artillery, taking his guns over an "impossible" wall, and calmly unlimbering on the plain between a heavy fire on either side of him; the imperturbable coolness of William Peel, the daring of Travers, of Middleton, of Bouchier, of Longden, of Walker, of Hardy—killed fighting with his guns,—of Ford, of Brown, and of Bridge—all gunners, Royal and Bengal? "It is impossible," wrote Sir Colin Campbell, "to draw any distinction between any of these officers. They all distinguished themselves under very arduous circumstances." Of Adrian Hope I have already spoken. The bare statement of his action is sufficient. Not less deserve to be mentioned the two Alisons, sons of the historian, Paul, MacQueen, Biddulph, Oldfield, Barnston, Wood, Keen, Welsh, McNamara, Lumsden—killed at the Sikandar Bágh,—all of whom were spoken of in the camp. But the list is too long, for there are many others.

Outram,  
during this  
day, is en-  
deavouring to  
effect a  
diversion.

Whilst the men are still sleeping on their arms, it is fit, too, that I should state that, during the hours employed by the troops under Sir Colin Campbell in attacking the Shah Najíf, the Residency garrison, under Sir James Outram, were using all their efforts to effect a diversion. They captured some of the positions to the east of the Residency, and from these maintained a conti-



nuous fire of guns and mortars on the rebels. I shall give a more detailed account of their proceedings in the proper place.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Nov. 16.

Nor must I omit to record the fact that whilst our men had been struggling onwards, winning with difficulty those important posts, the enemy had threatened their flanks and their communications. They had attacked, fortunately without result, the Martinière and the Dilkúsha, and had even shown themselves in force on the road to the Álambágh. They were seen, too, in numbers on the opposite bank of the Gúmti. What would have been the position of the army, with the enemy all about it, and the lane by which it had advanced completely blocked up, had the attack on the Sháh Najíf failed, the reader may imagine. Happily, it did not fail.

The action of the rebels during the day.

indicates a resolve to wait for the failure of the direct attack.

The British and Sikh troops, lying in unbroken order, their arms by their sides, slept the sleep of men who had earned their rest that sixteenth night of November. They were awakened early in the morning of the 17th, not by their own bugles, but by the bells of the city and the beating of the enemy's drums. It seemed as though an attack were imminent. The British soldiers sprang up with alacrity, each man in his place, ready for action. But the enemy did not come on. Sir Colin Campbell was, therefore, able to carry out his own plan and to choose his own time.

The night of the 16th,

and morning of the 17th.

Nov. 17.

His plan was, first, to carry the Mess-house, a large masonry building, defended by a ditch twelve feet broad, surmounted by a loop-holed wall behind, about midway between the Shah

Sir Colin's plans for the 17th.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 17.

The diffi-  
culties before  
him.

Sir Colin  
secures his  
left flank;

determines  
to attack  
Banks's  
house and the  
bungalows.

Najíf and the Kaisarbágh. The Mess-house carried, the Moti Mahal, lying due north of the former, and on the direct road from the Shah Najíf to the Residency, would be the next point of attraction. Could the Moti Mahal be carried, a junction with Outram would be the certain consequence. That alone would be a good day's work. Much would still remain to be accomplished. The strong positions of the Kaisarbágh—covered by the Tára Koti—and of the Bégam's palace, covering the vast city behind them, would still remain in the occupation of some 30,000 unsubdued foes, and it was in the face of these that Sir Colin would have to withdraw the women and the children, the sick and the wounded.

Knowing all this—that absolute success on the 17th would be the prelude to difficulties of a new kind on the 18th and the days following the 18th—Sir Colin marked the commencement of his operations on the first-named day with great caution. First, he deemed it advisable to secure his left flank. It was true that he had a force at the Barracks, connected with the Sikandar Bágh, but as the enemy commanded all the massive buildings south of the Barracks, and even to the eastward of them, it would not be difficult for them to make a détour, avoiding the Barracks, and to act on our left rear. To prevent this, Sir Colin detached the 5th Brigade under Brigadier Russell to carry the house called Banks's house and four bungalows close to the Barracks, to convert them into military posts. To make the plan clear to the reader, I may state that Banks's house occu-

pied a position on the edge of the city, on the city side of the canal, directly south of the Barracks, and somewhat south of an imaginary straight line, from west to east, drawn from the Kaisarbágh to the canal. The four bungalows were to the north of it, close to the Barracks. A direct road led from Banks's house across the canal to the Dilkúsha. It will thus be seen that, possessing now the Barracks and the Dilkúsha, the occupation of Banks's house and the bungalows would sever the communication between the Kaisarbágh and the Dilkúsha, and would cover the left rear of the attacking force.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 17.

Having thus made arrangements to secure his communications, Sir Colin directed William Peel to open fire with his heavy guns on the Mess-house—formerly the Mess-house of the 32nd Foot. He “was determined to use his guns as much as possible in taking it.” \* The fire continued from the early morning till 3 o'clock in the afternoon. At that hour, the musketry fire of the enemy having been almost completely silenced, it appeared to Sir Colin that the Mess-house might be stormed without much risk. He ordered on this duty a company of the 90th Foot, under Captain Wolseley,† and a picket of the 53rd, under Captain Hopkins, supported by Major Barnston's battalion of detachments under Captain Guise of the 90th,‡ and some of the 4th

William Peel  
cannonades  
the Mess-  
house.

Garnet Wol-  
seley ordered  
to storm it.

\* Sir Colin Campbell's Despatch, dated 18th November.

† Now Sir Garnet Wolseley, K.C.B.

‡ Major Barnston had been severely wounded the previous day in the attack on the Shah Najíf.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 17.

Panjáb Rifles, under Captain Powlett. The actual leader of the storming party was Captain Wolseley.

The feat of arms Wolseley was about to attempt was no light one. The Mess-house, a building of considerable size, was surrounded by a loop-holed mud wall, covering a ditch about twelve feet broad, scarp'd with masonry. The ditch was traversed by drawbridges, but whether these were down or up, was unknown to the storming party.

He storms it,

Never was a daring feat of arms better performed. Leading his men at the double across the intervening space, exposed to a hot fire from the neighbouring buildings, Wolseley reached the mud wall of which I have spoken. Here he halted for a moment to recover breath, then clambered through the breach into the garden. Pushing forward, despite the fire of the enemy's matchlockmen, he reached the ditch. Fortunately, the enemy, with the carelessness that had so often characterised their proceedings, had left the drawbridges down. Wolseley and his men crossed them, entered the house, which the enemy had abandoned at their approach, and climbing to the roof, planted on its summit the British flag. Twice was the flag struck down by the enemy's bullets, and twice was it replaced. At length, however, the severity of the fire forced the stormers to seek cover. Just then came up a company of supports, commanded by Captain Irby. Wolseley sent him to clear the houses to the left, whilst he himself attacked those on the right. Both attacks were



successful, and the rebels, driven out, fled in panic to the Moti Mahal.

The victorious stormers followed the fleeing enemy, and Wolseley; far from checking them, determined to push his advantage to the utmost. He had, it is true, no orders to attack the Moti Mahal, but the inborn instinct of the soldier had taught him that nothing tended so much to bloodless victory as immediate pressure upon a defeated foe. He pressed on therefore to the wall of the Moti Mahal, but the opposition offered was great, and the wall was solid, and the gateway had been blocked up. He had, therefore, to send back for the sappers. These promptly came up, and succeeded after a time in making narrow openings in the wall. Through these Wolseley and his men eagerly rushed, and attacked the network of buildings within. The resistance they encountered was, however, stout and even desperate, every room being contested. At length the enemy were expelled, and the Moti Mahal, the last building held by the rebels on the line communicating with Outram and Havelock, came completely into British possession.\*

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 17.

and follows  
the enemy to  
the Moti  
Mahal,

which, after  
a keen resist-  
ance, he  
storms.

\* "It will be allowed that Wolseley had good reason to anticipate the congratulations and thanks of the Commander-in-Chief for his conduct, but what was his astonishment on learning from his Brigadier, the Hon. Adrian Hope, that Sir Colin was furious with him for having exceeded the

letter of instructions in that, when he was only ordered to take the Mess-house, he actually of his own motion had driven the enemy out of the Moti Mahal! The Brigadier advised him to keep out of the way, as the Chief was asking for him, and he never saw a man more enraged



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 17.

An open space, nearly half a mile in width, still intervened between the assailants and the advanced positions of Outram and Havelock. This space was exposed to a heavy musketry fire from the Kaisarbágh and could not be crossed without imminent risk. But the risk did not prevent the two gallant generals and their staff from crossing the space to meet the Commander-in-Chief. They started—eight officers and one civilian. They were Outram, Havelock, Napier (now Lord Napier of Magdála), Vincent Eyre, young Havelock (now Sir Henry Havelock), Dodgson, the Deputy Adjutant-General, the aide-de-camp Sitwell, the engineer Russell, and the gallant Kavanagh. They had not gone many paces before they were seen by the enemy, and the musketry fire from the Kaisarbágh redoubled. Napier was struck down, young Havelock was struck down, Sitwell and Russell were struck down. Outram, Havelock, Eyre, Dodgson, and Kavanagh, alone reached the Moti Mahal uninjured. Then, to borrow once again the appropriate language of Sir Colin Campbell, “the relief of the garrison had been accomplished.”

Outram,  
Havelock,  
Dodgson, and  
Kavanagh  
return.

The conversation between the Commander-in-Chief and his four visitors, though animated and joyful, was not long. The visitors had to return across the terrible space. They set out at a run.

in his life.”—Low’s *Life of Sir Garnet Wolseley*.

It is due, however, to Sir Colin, to add, that although when he met Wolseley the following morning he wigged

him severely, he almost immediately cooled down, congratulated him on his courage and ability, and promised to recommend him for promotion.

Outram and Kavanagh were able to keep it up. But Havelock, weak and ill, soon tired. Turning to Dodgson, he exclaimed, "I can do no more, Dodgson, I can do no more." Dodgson, than whom no braver, no more modest, and no more deserving soldier ever lived, at once supported the gallant veteran. Resting on Dodgson, then, the illustrious soldier traversed, at a slow and measured pace—the only pace of which his strength was capable—the ground still remaining to be gone over, the enemy's balls striking all around them, at their feet, just short of them, just before them, just behind them, but all missing their mark.

I propose now to devote a few moments to explain in detail the manner in which Outram and Havelock had accomplished their portion of the allotted task. I left Outram on the 9th November, sending off the devoted Kavanagh, disguised as a native, to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief. From that date Outram was made aware, by means of preconcerted signals, of each move of Sir Colin Campbell's force; of his successive arrivals at the Álambágh and the Dilkúsha, and of his movement against the Sikandar Bágh and the Shah Najíf on the morning of the 16th.

The time, so long and eagerly looked for, had now arrived when it would be possible for the troops pent up in the Residency and the adjoining buildings to co-operate actively with the relieving force. With his usual self-denial, Outram once again assigned to the illustrious Havelock the honour of conducting this critical operation.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Nov. 17.

Havelock and  
Dodgson.

The proceed-  
ings of Out-  
ram and  
Havelock.

Havelock  
assumes com-  
mand of the  
advance.  
Nov. 16.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

Composition  
of the ad-  
vance.

In pursuance of his instructions, Havelock selected from his division a body of about one thousand two hundred men, and held them in readiness on the first signs of the successful storming of the Sikandar Bágh, to drive the enemy from the strong positions which would still intervene between him and the advancing columns of the Commander-in-Chief.

The force selected by Havelock consisted of one hundred and sixty men of the 5th Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Mara; of forty-eight of the 64th Regiment, under Captain Shute; of one hundred and sixty of the 84th, under Captain Wills; of one hundred and forty-two of the 78th Highlanders under Captain Lockhart; of one hundred and eighty-one of the 90th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Purnell; of one hundred of the Regiment of Firozpur, under Lieutenant Cross. Of artillery, he had three batteries of heavy guns, howitzers, and mortars, commanded respectively by Vincent Eyre (with the rank of Brigadier), Olpherts, and Maude, R.A. Each column was likewise accompanied by a party of miners, with tools and powder-bags, under the command of an engineer officer. The engineer officers were Russell, Hutchinson, and Limond. To these also was attached Captain Oakes. The reserve was composed of two hundred men from the 5th Fusiliers, 78th Highlanders, and Regiment of Firozpur.

Havelock's  
plan.

Havelock had occupied the Farid Baksh palace. It was his intention, as soon as the attack on the Sikandar Bágh should be pronounced, to blow

up, by means of mines previously prepared, the outer wall of the Faríd Baksh palace, and open a heavy fire upon the enemy from the heavy batteries which had been constructed behind it. As soon as that fire should produce a certain effect, the infantry would rush forward and storm two buildings between Faríd Baksh palace and the Moti Mahal, known as the Harn-khána and the steam-engine house. Under these, mines had been constructed. It may be convenient to state that, on the two batteries constructed behind the outer wall of the the Faríd Baksh were mounted four 18-pounder guns, one 8-inch iron howitzer, four 9-pounder field guns, and two 24-pounder field howitzers. In position behind these were six 8-inch mortars, under Captain Maude, R.A.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

At about 11 o'clock Havelock learned that the advancing force was operating against Sikandar Bágh. He at once gave orders for the explosion of the mines under the outer wall of the Faríd Baksh. It happened, unfortunately, that the result of the explosion was not nearly so effective as he had hoped, and it devolved upon the batteries to complete the work which the mines had only very partially accomplished. Vincent Eyre and the officers serving under him were, however, in no way discouraged. A continuous fire lasting over three hours, not only demolished the remaining obstacles of the wall, but produced a very considerable effect on the buildings beyond it. So great was it, indeed, that at 3 o'clock Havelock formed his columns of assault in the square of the

He gives  
orders for  
action,



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 16.

and carries  
the enemy's  
position as  
far as the  
engine-house.

Chattar Manzil—outside the battered wall of the Faríd Baksh—and ordered his engineers to fire the mines laid under the two buildings beyond.

At a quarter past 3, two of the mines of the Harn-khána exploded with good effect. A quarter of an hour later the signal for assault was given. "It is impossible," wrote Havelock in his despatch, "to describe the enthusiasm with which this signal was received by the troops. Pent up in inaction for upwards of six weeks, and subjected to constant attacks, they felt that the hour of retribution and glorious exertion had returned." Their action corresponded to the feelings which swayed it. Dashing forward with a cheer, they carried the Harnkhána, then the engine-house, and were thus in a position to extend their hands to their friends of the advancing force as soon as these should have captured the Moti Mahal. I have already shown how this was done.

The diffi-  
culties that  
yet remained.

"The relief of the garrison was accomplished." Yes—but to quote once again from the gallant writer whose account of Lord Clyde's campaign is a masterpiece of description of military movements,\* "a most difficult and dangerous task still remained. The garrison, with women and children, sick and wounded, guns and stores, had to be withdrawn; and to effect this in the face of the vast force of the enemy was no easy task. One narrow winding lane alone led to the rear, and through it the whole force had to be filed.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

To protect the march of the convoy, the whole of the immense line, extending from the ruined walls of the Residency to the wooded park of the Dil-kúsha, required to be held, and this gave a most hazardous extension to our forces—far too weak for the maintenance of so extended a position. To keep any considerable reserve in hand was impossible.”

Book XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 17.

The circumstances were indeed such as to merit the earnest care and consideration which the Commander-in-Chief devoted to them. Fortunately, Sir Colin Campbell was a man of iron nerves, of splendid resolution. He could act promptly and steadfastly even when confronted by so great a difficulty as that which now presented itself. His plans were quickly formed. The enemy still occupied the Kaisarbágh in great force. From the Kaisarbágh they threatened the flank and the left rear of the British army. To permit an enemy so numerous to occupy a position so strong and so threatening whilst carrying out the delicate operation which it had now devolved upon Sir Colin Campbell to attempt, was more than any prudent commander could permit. Sir Colin's first object, then, was to silence the fire from the Kaisarbágh. This silenced, two lines of retirement might be open to him.

Sir Colin  
Campbell is  
equal to cope  
with them.

I have already stated\* that on the 17th November Sir Colin had detached the 5th Brigade, under Brigadier Russell, with some artillery and rockets, to carry the house called Banks's house

His plans.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

Nov. 17,  
Brigadier  
Russell carries Banks's  
house and the  
bungalows.

and four bungalows, adjacent to the Barracks, with the view of converting them into military posts covering his left rear. Russell found the positions well fortified, and strongly garrisoned. But he was equal to the occasion. The four bungalows were first stormed. A detachment of the 2nd Panjáb Infantry, led by a gallant subaltern, Lieutenant Keen, was then pushed forward to Banks's house. This officer occupied that house without difficulty and remained there with fifty Sikhs, during the remainder of the operations for the relief of Lakhnao. His position was extremely dangerous, for the enemy were in great numbers, and in his comparatively isolated position, he might at any moment have been overwhelmed before assistance could reach him. But he showed a bold front which daunted the enemy.

Russell's  
position

The chain of posts covering the British left rear was now complete. The proper right of this chain was the Barracks occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart and three hundred of the 93rd, its proper left Banks's house; the right centre was formed of the four bungalows referred to, the left centre by gardens. But precisely at the moment when Russell's brigade had succeeded in occupying the right centre and left of the position, there rose in the minds of the rebels the conviction that such occupation barred to them the road by which they had intended to operate, and that they must at any cost expel the British. Throughout the night of the 17th and during the whole of the 18th, then, they kept upon the right and right centre of the position, a vigorous

is fired upon  
by the rebels.



and unceasing fire from muskets and from an 18-pounder. Had it been Sir Colin Campbell's intention simply to occupy these posts whilst his large convoy was being withdrawn by the line he had advanced, this incessant fire, however annoying, would have had no important result. But Sir Colin Campbell having resolved, as I have shown, to dominate in the first instance the fire of the Kaisar Bágh, and thus to secure properly a second line of retirement by the Barracks and Banks's house, the line of posts had become a base from which to attack and occupy certain buildings between them and the Kaisar Bágh. In this view the heavy fire kept up by the enemy during the 18th possessed a far greater importance.

The first building Russell had decided to attack was the hospital, the nearest important post to the four bungalows and the Barracks. • But before he could move, it was necessary to silence the enemy's fire. This could only be done by means of artillery. Early on the morning of the 18th, then, Sir Colin directed Colonel Biddulph of the Bengal Army, head of the Intelligence Department, to proceed in company with Major Bouchier, to reconnoitre the roads leading to the Barracks and the canal, with the view of discovering whether guns could not be taken down to co-operate with Russell.

To no nobler and more zealous men could this dangerous task have been entrusted. Bouchier, to whose splendid services I have already referred, was one of the most daring officers of his unsurpassed regiment—the Bengal Artillery.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 18.

Reasons why  
the retention  
of the post  
was impor-  
tant.

Russell recon-  
noitres the  
roads.

Bouchier  
and Biddulph.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 18.

Biddulph was cool, intelligent, and a thorough soldier. They quickly found a road, and then with the utmost speed brought down a 9-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer, and four 5½-inch mortars. The gun and the howitzer were placed in position in front of the bungalow, on the extreme right, the mortars behind the bungalow.

Russell is  
wounded.

The fire then opened. Brigadier Russell was almost immediately placed *hors de combat* by a contusion.\* Colonel Biddulph then assumed the command. The fire continued with great effect, and the rebels withdrew their 18-pounder. Biddulph then organised a column for an attack on the hospital. But as he was explaining his plans to the officer next to him in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Hale of the 82nd, a bullet, which had previously traversed the cap of the latter, penetrated his brain. •

Biddulph is  
killed.

Hale assumes  
command,

Hale then assumed command. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, he led his column to the assault, covering it with a quick fire from the 24-pound howitzer. Traversing some intermediate gardens, he attacked the hospital. The resistance, how-

\* The story is thus told by Colonel Bouchier (*Eight Months' Campaign against the Bengál Sepoys*): "The 18-pounder (rebels') was not above one hundred and twenty yards distant, and to avoid giving notice to the enemy of our intentions by opening an embrasure, the muzzle of the 9-pounder was crammed through a hole that

a shot had just made. The riflemen declared they had not been able to load again. As we fired, so did they. A cloud of dust is all I remember. Brigadier Russell, Captain Ogilvy, and I were on our backs. Poor Russell had just been grazed on the back of the neck: the clods broken from the wall had knocked us over."

ever, was obstinate, nor did he drive out the enemy until they had inflicted a severe loss on his column. Nor, unfortunately, was he able to maintain himself in the hospital after it had been stormed. Its thatched roof was kindled by the enemy, and the heat of the flames alone forced him to retire. He withdrew, then, in perfect order, to his original position.\*

Whilst the struggle, followed by the retirement, had been going on at the hospital, the rebels, thinking that the central position, that between the Barracks and Sikandar Bāgh, must have been thereby weakened, attacked the pickets in considerable force. But Sir Colin Campbell, attentive to every detail, was no sooner cognisant of the situation, than he himself brought up Remmington's troop of Horse Artillery, a company of the 53rd, and a company of the 23rd, to meet the attack. These were absolutely the only troops of which he could dispose, but they were sufficient. The conduct of Remmington's troop elicited the admiration of the whole army.

BOOK XL.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Nov. 18.

but can make  
no progress.

The enemy  
attack the  
centre  
pickets.

Splendid  
conduct of  
Remming-  
ton's troop.

\* Colonel Bouchier thus mentions a gallant deed, performed on this occasion, which deserves a permanent record in history. "Lieutenant Harrington, Bengal Artillery, and another officer (whose name I regret I never knew) belonging to H. M.'s service, with a gunner of artillery and a drummer of infantry, did most gallant service. A man of the storming column had been wounded

and left in the garden for an hour and a half. The drummer stuck by him, and dashed into the picket to report the fact. The little party above mentioned, under a very hot fire, rushed out and brought in the wounded man. As they left the picket a round shot struck the ground under their feet." Lieutenant Harrington received the Victoria Cross.

BOOK XI.  
CHAPTER II.  
—  
1857.  
Nov. 18.

“Captain Remmington’s troop of Horse Artillery,” wrote Sir Colin, “was brought up, and dashed right into the jungle with the leading skirmishers, and opened fire with extraordinary rapidity and precision. Captain Remmington distinguished himself very much. I superintended this affair myself, and I have particular pleasure in drawing your Lordships’ attention to the conduct of this troop on this occasion as an instance of the never-failing readiness and quickness of the horse artillery of the Bengal Service.” The attack was repulsed.

The roads on  
the left again  
reconnoitred,

Thus ended the 18th. The British had maintained the position covering their left rear, but had made no substantial progress towards gaining a second line of retirement. The difficulties experienced in gaining the posts which would command such a line rendered it advisable once more to reconnoitre the ground between the positions actually held and the canal, to ascertain whether it was possible, abandoning the projected line of retirement by the direct road from Sikandar Bágh to Banks’s house, to withdraw the guns and the troops by one of the unmetalled roads behind the bungalows already occupied. The reconnaissance showed that the roads in that locality, though heavy, were practicable for artillery. On receiving a report to this effect, Sir Colin determined to withdraw his force by the road by which he had advanced. He therefore directed Colonels Ewart of the 93rd, Hale of the 82nd, and Wells of the 23rd, commanding the posts covering the left rear, simply

and are found  
practicable  
for guns.



to maintain their positions, whilst he would himself personally superintend the delicate operation of the withdrawal by the road already traversed of the sick and the wounded, the women and the children. The order was simple, comprehensible to the meanest capacity, and was carried out to the letter.

On the morning of the 20th, whilst Captain Ogilvy, already mentioned in these pages, was, under the direction of Colonel Hale, engaged in entrenching the positions covering the left rear, Sir Colin Campbell began to carry out the withdrawal. As a preliminary measure, William Peel, on the morning of that day, opened on the Kaiser Bágh a tremendous fire from his heavy guns. This fire continued during that day, the day following, and the 23rd, increasing every hour in intensity. It gradually assumed the character of a bombardment. The enemy suffered enormous losses, and on the evening of the 22nd three breaches in the walls of the Kaiser Bágh invited assault. They expected it. Such, however, was not the intention of Sir Colin. The bombardment had in fact been used to cover the withdrawal of the women and children, sick and wounded. Long before it concluded, these had reached the Dilkúsha in safety. The effecting of the three breaches on the evening of the 22nd was used to carry out the retreat of the glorious garrison of Lakhnao. Whilst the rebels passed that night in devising measures to meet the assault which they expected on the morrow, the garrison which had so long held them at bay, the veterans of

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Nov. 19-22.

Sir Colin's  
plan of retire-  
ment.

The retire-  
ment.

William Peel  
opens fire on  
the Kaiser  
Bágh with  
signal effect.

The rebels  
expect an  
assault, under  
cover of  
which expect-  
ation Sir  
Colin with-  
draws,



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 22-23.

without being  
molested.

How Hale  
covered the  
left rear.

Inglis's force, the victors in many fights of Havelock's and Outram's, began, at midnight, their retirement. The guns which they could not carry away they rendered useless. Then, "behind the screen of Campbell's outposts, Inglis's and Havelock's toilworn bands withdrew. Then these began also to retire; the pickets fell back through the supports, the supports glided away between the intervals of the reserve—the reserve, when all had passed, silently defiled into the lane—thick darkness shrouded the movement from the gaze of the enemy—and, hours after the position had been quitted, they were firing into the abandoned posts. Hope's brigade, which had so nobly headed the advance, had also covered the retreat. Before daylight on the 23rd, the last straggler had quitted the camp at Dilkúsha." \*

Whilst the Commander-in-Chief was thus effecting the well-planned retirement, in the security gained by his skilful operations against the Kaisar Bágh, his lieutenants, Hale, Ewart, and Wells, covering his left rear, had remained occupying the positions they had gained and intrenched. During the three days of the bombardment of the Kaisar Bágh, the rebels had never relaxed their musketry fire against those positions. But they had attempted no assault. The fact that they made no attempt at all is another remarkable proof, added to the many already cited, of the scarcity of military ability amongst their leaders. For Banks's house was not only entirely sepa-

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

rated from the other posts, but it was garrisoned only by fifty Sikhs, who might have been overwhelmed ere succour could have reached them.

But no such attempt was made, and Hale and his lieutenants, as soon as he had ascertained that the Commander-in-Chief had advanced far enough on his line of retreat, evacuated the Barracks and bungalows, and fell back on the Dilkúsha by the road which had been selected after the reconnaissance of the 19th. They rejoined the main force at this place early on the morning of the 23rd.

The re-united force remained at the Dilkúsha during that day and the ensuing night. But there was no rest for officer or private. The detachment parties who had come up with the relieving force had to be distributed to their several regiments; carriages had to be allotted; arrangements for the formation of the convoy of the women and children under responsible officers, had to be made. In a word, there was made on this day a reorganisation of the whole force to remain in operation as far as the Álambágh.

Looking back from this place—the first halt—after the successful relief, I find a sincere pleasure in paying the tribute of the historian to the splendid exertions of one arm of the service, whose place on the field of action has not yet been specifically mentioned. The storming of the Sikandar Bágh, of the Shah Najíf, of the Moti Mahal, of the bungalows adjacent to the Barracks, was the united work of the artillery and the infantry; the bombardment of the Kaisar Bágh, of the artillery and the sailors. During

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.

Nov. 23.

Hale rejoins  
Sir Colin at  
the Dilkúsha,

where the  
army halts,  
but does not  
rest.

The cavalry.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 23.

this time, the cavalry, ever ready, always on the alert, prompt to take advantage of every opening, had been engaged in covering advanced movements, in keeping up the long line of communications, and in repelling the counter attacks of the enemy on the extreme right.

Their leaders.

Such services were necessary to the safety of the force, and, though they might be less prominent, they were not inferior in value to those of the other arms. The names of Little, and of Ouvry, of Probyn, of Watson, of Younghusband, and of Gough, still live in the memory of those who served under them.

Havelock  
dies.

Nor, when writing of the halt at the Dilkúsha, dare I omit to chronicle the one mournful event which tinged the joy of the relief. That day, Havelock, who had been long ailing, passed away to his last home. He had lived long enough to hear that his Queen and his countrymen had appreciated his noble qualities, that his name had become a household word among the homes and the hearths of England.

Havelock.

The life of Havelock had been a life devoted to his profession. He had made the strict performance of duty his polar-star. Gifted with military abilities of a very high order, and conscious that he possessed those abilities, he had borne without repining the sapping torment of slow promotion and its inevitable results—employment in positions below his capacity. But every trial of Fortune had found Havelock cheerful, resolute, and devoted. To the smallest office he gave his best abilities. And, whilst thus labouring, he had



striven also to prepare himself for the eventualities which were to follow.

A story is told of the famous Scot-Austrian Marshal, Loudon, that when he was a major on frontier duties in Croatia, he used to spend his leisure in studying an enormous map of the Austrian dominions. This map he had placed on the floor of one of his rooms. His wife, jealous of this devotion, burst open one day the door of his study, and seeing Loudon on his knees tracing a particular route on the map, exclaimed, in a pet, "I wonder what pleasure you can find in eternally studying that map?" Loudon, turning to her, replied, "Leave me alone, my dear, the knowledge I am now acquiring will be useful to me when I become a Marshal of the Empire." Not only did Loudon become a Marshal of the Empire, but he came also to be recognised as the one Austrian general whom the great Frederic respected.\*

Similar was the course pursued by Havelock. He studied all his life for the future. Similar, too, was the result. When the opportunity did come, he used it in a manner which electrified his contemporaries, which gained for him the confidence and devotion of his soldiers. His daring march from Allahábád to Kánhpúr against enemies

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 23.

\* On one occasion after the seven years' war, when Joseph II. entertained Frederic at Neustadt, in Moravia, Loudon had modestly taken a seat towards the end of the table on the side opposite to that on which Frederic was seated. "Come up here and sit near me," called to him the latter. "I would rather see you by me than opposite to me."



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 23.

excited by the slaughter of our countrymen; the splendid defiance of rule which he showed by, to effect a great end, fighting the battle of Kánhpúr with a river in his rear; the skill with which he gained it; the inspired audacity which characterised his marches into Oudh; the confidence with which he resolved at all risks to hold on to the position he had taken up at Kánhpúr—a position in a military sense false, inasmuch as his communications were liable to be severed: all these deeds stamp him as a general of the very first order. He was bold and daring in conception, prompt and sudden in execution, persistent and unshaken in his resolves. The jealousy of men in whose hands the opportunities granted to Havelock would have shattered, has attempted, since his death, to diminish his glory. But the poisoned darts have rebounded, blunted, from the iron cuirass of the warrior. His deeds speak for themselves. The incidents of that Kánhpúr campaign will live, an imperishable record of his glorious qualities. The statue which adorns Trafalgar Square, whilst it will show his outward form to the generations which shall have known him not, will whet their curiosity to inquire regarding the early training and later deeds of one who, in a short and glorious campaign, illustrated all the qualities which combine to form a commander of the first rank.

Havelock  
buried at the  
Álambágh.

Havelock died on the 24th. On the morning of the 26th, his remains were consigned to a humble grave in the Álambágh. His gallant son, the leaders who had been associated with him,

Campbell, Grant, Outram, Inglis, and others, and a crowd of officers, followed him to his last resting place. He had fought a good fight: he had died, as he had lived, in the performance of duty.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 24.

Sir Colin and  
his convoy  
reach the  
A'lambágh.

To return. On the afternoon of the 24th, Sir Colin, having made all his arrangements, marched with his men and the train of women and children whom they guarded, leaving Outram's division, in front of the Dilkúsha, to cover his retirement. That evening Sir Colin, with his long convoy, reached the Álambágh. The rebels had made no demonstration against Outram, and that officer, having received a supply of carriage from Sir Colin, fell back and rejoined his chief on the 25th. As Outram was preparing to fall back, the rebels showed themselves for a moment—only, however, to disappear. They had not forgotten the rough lessons of the preceding days.

Nov. 25.

With the junction of the divisions of the army at the Álambágh came the necessity for making a new distribution of it. Three matters pressed themselves particularly on Sir Colin's attention, viz. the safe transport of the ladies and children to Kánhpúr, the necessity of dealing with the Gwáliár mutineers, and the occupation by a sufficient force of the Álambágh. The second of these matters was a cause of considerable anxiety, inasmuch as Sir Colin had for many days received no communication from General Windham, commanding at Kánhpúr, and it was impossible to say how circumstances had gone with him subsequently to the 9th November.

Fresh distribution of the  
force at the  
A'lambágh.

The third matter was, naturally, that first settled.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 26.

Outram  
ordered to  
remain at the  
A'lambágh.

Sir Colin decided on the 26th that Sir James Outram should remain at Álambágh with a force augmented to about four thousand men of all arms, twenty-five guns and howitzers, and ten mortars. Outram would thus occupy a position threatening Lakhnao, and would retain it till the Commander-in-Chief, having placed his convoy in safety and disposed of the Gwáliár mutineers, should return, to act offensively against the city of Lakhnao. To maintain the communication with Kánhpúr, a post at the Banni bridge, up to that time occupied by the wing of a Madras native regiment and two guns, was strengthened by a detachment of European troops.

Sir Colin and  
the remain-  
der of the  
force start  
for Kánhpúr;

Nov. 27.

reaches  
Banni,

but can hear  
nothing of  
Windham.

His position  
should Wind-  
ham have

Having made this disposition on the 26th, Sir Colin set out for Kánhpúr at 11 A.M. on the 27th. He had with him about three thousand men, including the wasted remnant of the 32nd Regiment, and the few survivors of the native pensioners who had responded to the call of Sir Henry Lawrence. Under the convoy of the troops, were the ladies, the children, the sick, and the wounded, numbering altogether about two thousand, and the treasure which had been rescued from Lakhnao. That same evening Sir Colin encamped at the Banni bridge. In reply to an inquiry as to whether any communication had been received from Kánhpúr, the officer there commanding reported that not only had he heard a cannonade during that day, but during the day previous also.

This information was of an alarming nature. If Windham had been overwhelmed, the rebels



would certainly have destroyed the bridge of boats, and the British army would be cut off from its own provinces, which for the moment would be in the power of the rebels. There was nothing for it but to press on with the utmost expedition. Early on the following morning, the force pressed onward. "At every step the sound of a heavy and distant cannonade became more distinct; but mile after mile was passed over, and no news could be obtained."\* Just before noon, however, a native who had been concealed behind a hedge, ran forward, and delivered a missive to the Staff at the head of the advance guard. "He had a small rolled-up letter in the Greek character, addressed 'Most urgent, to General Sir Colin Campbell, or any officer commanding troops on the Lakhnao road.' The letter was dated two days previously, and said that unless affairs shortly took a favourable turn, the troops would have to retire into the intrenchment; that the fighting had been most severe; and that the enemy were very powerful, especially in artillery. It concluded by expressing a hope that the Commander-in-Chief would therefore see the necessity of pushing to their assistance with the utmost speed."†

The information contained in this note converted into certainty the impressions which the sound of the cannonade had produced. It deepened

Book XI.  
Chapter II

1857.  
Nov. 28.

been over-  
whelmed.

A cannonade  
is heard in  
the distance

Receives  
news of an  
impending  
disaster to  
Windham,  
unless he  
were speedily  
relieved.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine.*

† *A Lecture on the Relief of Lucknow*, by Colonel H. W. Norman, C.B. Sir Colin

stated that he received three notes in succession, *vide* Bouchier's *Eight Months' Campaign.*



BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 28.

The scene  
that followed  
described by  
an eye-  
witness.

The tension  
too great for  
Sir Colin;

he announces  
his approach  
by salvoes;

then gallops  
on with his  
staff;

the anxiety of the leaders, the impatience of the troops. The scene that followed has thus been painted by an eye-witness :—\* “The impatience and anxiety of all became extreme. Louder and louder grew the roar—faster and faster became the march—long and weary was the way—tired and footsore grew the infantry—death fell on the exhausted wounded with terrible rapidity—the travel-worn bearers could hardly stagger along under their loads—the sick men groaned and died—but still on, on, on, was the cry.”

After progressing in the usual order for a short time, the tension became too great for Sir Colin. Leaving the infantry to march on with the convoy, he pressed forward with the cavalry and horse artillery. On reaching Mangalwár, about five miles on the Lakhnao side of the Ganges, he halted his troops, directed the artillery to fire salvoes to announce the approach of assistance, and galloped forward with his staff, in mingled hope and fear regarding the condition in which he might find the bridge of boats. As he approached the river, a glance dissipated every doubt on this head. Through the glimmering light, for evening had set in, the bridge was seen to be intact. Flames rising in every direction, mingling with the light of the setting sun, showed that the enemy must have taken the city and a large part of the cantonments; that the tents intended for the ladies and children, the sick and wounded from Lakhnao, and the stores of clothing intended for the de-

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

fenders of the Residency, must have been destroyed; whilst the artillery fire occasionally directed at the bridge, and the musketry fire near the river bank, proved that a sharp crisis was impending. In a word, to use the language of an officer on Sir Colin's staff, "the veil which had so long shrouded us from Windham was rent asunder, and the disaster stood before us in all its calamity." \*

What that disaster was, and how it came about, will form the theme of the next chapter. I leave Sir Colin and his staff galloping, on the dusky evening of the 28th November, across the bridge, the preservation of which might yet enable him to repair the evil that had been accomplished.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Nov. 28.

has a glimpse  
of the disaster

as he gallops  
across the  
bridge into  
Kánhpúr.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

## BOOK I.

---

### CHAPTER III.

IN the preceding chapter I mentioned that when, on the 9th November, Sir Colin left Kánhpúr to join his army in the plain beyond Banni, he had left at that station about five hundred Europeans and a few Sikhs under the command of Major-General C. A. Windham. On the 6th November, in a memorandum addressed to that officer, he had directed him to occupy and improve the intrenchment which had been constructed on the river; to keep a careful watch over the movements of the Gwáliár force; to send into Oudh, unless he should be seriously threatened, by detachments of wings, any European infantry that might arrive; but to detain, if he should think fit, the brigade of Madras native troops, expected the following day, until the intentions of the Gwáliár contingent expected to arrive at Kálpi on the 9th, should become developed. In case of any pronounced movement towards Kánhpúr on the part of that force General Windham was directed to make as great a show as possible of

Kánhpúr.

Detailed  
instructions  
given to  
General  
Windham,

the troops at his disposal by encamping them conspicuously and in extended order in advance of the intrenchment, which, however, was to be sufficiently guarded. On no account was he to move out to attack, unless compelled to do so by force of circumstances, in order to save the intrenchment from being bombarded.

It is a proof alike of the careful supervision which Sir Colin Campbell exercised over the generals subordinate to him, but placed in independent command, and of the anxious attention which he devoted to that particular position, that, two days later, he sent to General Windham a second memorandum, in which he entered in full detail into the possibilities before that officer. Every movement of the Gwáliár troops was provided for; the corresponding action of General Windham was defined; and the retention of certain troops and the despatch into Oudh of others were again insisted on.

General Windham prepared at once to carry out the directions of the Commander-in-Chief in their most essential point. The rendering the intrenchment secure against any attack was that point. The intrenchment guarded, though it did not absolutely protect, the passage of the river, the commissariat stores, and two of the hospitals. Windham, then, at once took measures to clear the glacis and the country beyond it, to extend and strengthen the works, and to train men to work the guns. For the intrenchment he had nine guns worked by a detachment of the Naval Brigade. Six field guns were to arrive with

Book XI.  
Chapter III.  
—  
1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

supple-  
mented by a  
second memo-  
randum still  
more in  
detail.

Windham  
takes steps  
to carry out  
Sir Colin's  
orders.

Artillery at  
his disposal.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Tántia Topi  
arrives at  
Kálpi.

The country  
between  
Kálpi and  
Kánhpúr.

the Madras force on the 10th. He had, besides, two 9-pounders and one 24-pounder howitzer, with ammunition in their waggons. But there being no gunners attached to these guns, Windham set to work to train some Sikh soldiers for that purpose.

Meanwhile, Tántia Topi was preparing to establish his claim to generalship. Well served by his agents, Tántia had received very minute and very timely information regarding the movements of Sir Colin Campbell. He arrived with the revolted Gwáliár contingent at Kálpi on the 9th November. Kálpi lies on the right bank of the river Jamná, forty-six miles south-west from Kánhpúr. The direct road between the two places ran through the villages of Bhognipúr and Suchandi. From Suchandi to Kánhpúr the distance is fourteen miles, the road being intersected at the fourth milestone by the Pándu rivulet, at the eighth by the Ganges canal. Another line, which led to positions a little to the north-east of Kánhpúr, must now be referred to. Leaving Kálpi, and passing through Bhognipúr, this road, just about midway from the latter to Suchandi, branches off to Akbarpúr. Thence, running nearly north, it touches the Pandú rivulet at Sheoli, and then, taking a turn to the north-west, crosses at a distance of four miles the Ganges canal, and prolonging itself for two miles, reaches the village of Sheorájpúr on the grand trunk road about three miles from Serai Ghát on the Ganges, and twenty-one miles north-west of Kánhpúr.

To march on Kánhpúr, Tántia had first to cross

the Jamná. There was no one to oppose the passage. He had left at Jaláon his treasure and *impedimenta*. Kálpi he garrisoned with three thousand men and twenty guns. Then, on the 10th, he crossed the Jamná. The passage effected, Tántia, determined not to make too decided a demonstration until Sir Colin Campbell should have absolutely committed himself to the relief of Lakhnao, and hoping that the rebel troops there would find means to detain him at least the time necessary for the perfect carrying out of his own scheme, moved slowly forward with about six thousand men and eighteen guns to Bhognipúr. Leaving here one thousand two hundred men and four guns, he advanced by Akbarpúr to Sheoli and Sheorájpúr, occupying the first-named place with two thousand men and six guns, Sheoli with the same number and four guns, and Sheorájpúr with one thousand men and four guns.

These operations, beginning about the 10th November, were completed about the 19th. Their effect was completely to sever the communications between Kánhpúr with the west and north-west—the country on which it had been mainly dependent for its supplies.

Windham had been neither blind nor indifferent to the movements of the enemy. He was duly informed of the passage of the Jamná and the occupation of positions reaching to the Ganges, some twenty miles to the north-west of his position. What did this movement forebode? Some thought that the march on the Ganges at a prudent distance from Kánhpúr indicated an intention

Book XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.

Nov. 9-28.

Plans and  
hopes of the  
rebel com-  
mander.

He occupies  
the salient  
points be-  
tween Kánh-  
púr and the  
Jamná;

thus severing  
the com-  
munications  
between  
Kánhpúr and  
its supply-  
country.

Effect of  
Tántia Topi's  
movements  
on Windham.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

He divines  
the reasons  
which actuate  
the rebel  
leader.

Communi-  
cates to Sir  
Colin the  
enemy's  
movements.

Receives per-  
mission to  
detain Euro-  
pean troops.

Brigadier  
Carthew  
arrives;

to cross unmolested into Oudh to act there on the rear of Sir Colin Campbell. Windham was not of this opinion. Crediting Tántia Topi with merely natural acuteness, he could not believe that he had any other intention but that of taking advantage of Sir Colin's absence to crush him at Kánhpúr. He believed, in fact, that Tántia would act as a general in his position ought to act.

Yet, believing this, convinced of it, he had still those positive and reiterated orders of the Commander-in-Chief which required him to forward into Oudh by detachments of wings of regiments the European troops as they should arrive. General Windham, whilst obeying these instructions, made an urgent representation to Sir Colin Campbell, informing him of the disquieting reports he was daily receiving regarding the movements of the Gwáliár contingent, and requesting permission to retain such troops as he might consider absolutely necessary for the defence of the place. Pending a reply, he continued to forward the arriving detachments towards Lakhnao.

On the evening of the 14th November the required permission arrived. On the morning of that day the Madras brigade, commanded by Brigadier Carthew, had marched into Kánhpúr. It was but a shadow of its former self. One of the regiments of which it had been composed, the 17th Native Infantry, had been left, by superior orders, at Fathpúr, to maintain the communication between Allahábád and Kánhpúr. Carthew



brought with him, then, only the wing of one native regiment, the 27th, four 9-pounders, manned by natives, and two manned by Europeans. Between this date and the 26th the force was increased by successive companies or drafts of the 34th, 82nd, 88th Regiments, of the Rifle Brigade, and by the remaining wing of the 27th Madras Native Infantry. But the course of the narrative will show that not all of these were retained.

Windham was now more at ease. On the 17th, following the instructions he had received, he took up a position beyond and to the west of the town, near the junction of the Dehlí and Kálpi roads, and encamped there. This camp, composed of detachments from the 34th, 82nd, 88th, and Rifle Brigade, and of the right wing of the Madras Native Regiment, the 27th, with six guns, was placed under the command of Brigadier Carthew. Windham thus entirely followed out his orders, making a show of his troops, encamping them conspicuously, at the same time that he covered the town and with it the buildings between the town and the intrenchment, some of which had been prepared for the reception of the Lakhnáo ladies, and in others of which supplies had been stored.

Matters so continued till the 20th. On that date Windham had become aware of the movement of the Gwáliár contingent I have already described, and of their occupation of strong positions stretching from Kálpi to Sheorájpúr. Nor was this all. Up to the 19th he had received in-

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.

Nov. 9-28.

is followed by  
detachments  
of European  
regiments.

Windham  
takes up a  
position west  
of the town,

and displays  
his troops.

Communica-  
tion with the



BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Commander-in-Chief ceases.

Windham learns that the Banni bridge has been surprised.

He despatches troops to re-occupy that bridge.

Windham is thoroughly aware of the difficulties and danger of his position.

telligence of the successful attacks made by the Commander-in-Chief on the Sikandarbagh and the Shah Najif. But from that date all communications from Lakhnao, even from the Alambagh, ceased; while, to add to his perplexity, he received, on the 22nd, information that the enemy had surprised and defeated the police force stationed to guard the Banni bridge, on the high road to Lakhnao!

The occupation of the Banni bridge by the rebels might, if permitted to continue, lead to fatal consequences; for Windham could not know how, since the 19th, it had fared with Sir Colin Campbell. It was quite possible, with thirty thousand still unconquered rebels in Lakhnao, that he might yet have to fight hard for it. Under these circumstances the conduct of Windham was marked by great judgment and great self-denial. Not caring to consider, in the presence of this possibly great danger, that Tantia Topi and his trained soldiers were pressing upon him, he deliberately diminished his force to re-open the communications with Lakhnao. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd the right wing of the 27th Madras Native Infantry, with two 9-pounder guns manned by Europeans, marched, by his orders, to re-occupy the Banni bridge.

Notwithstanding the permission he had received, and on which he had acted, to detain at Kanhpur the European troops who might arrive, Windham had felt from the first that the showy position he had, in obedience to orders, taken up beyond the city, would in no way defend Kanhpur in case of

a serious attack. Under no circumstances could he prevent the enemy from bombarding the bridge with their heavy guns. The extent of the position, too, would prevent its proper defence with even the larger number of troops at his disposal, while, in the event, almost certain were he attacked seriously, of having to fall back on the intrenchment, the city and the houses I have spoken of would fall into the enemy's hands. With respect to the intrenchment, it should be borne in mind, that though Windham had done much to strengthen it, it was not, in a military sense, defensible.

Windham was a brave and adventurous soldier. His position not being, in point of fact, defensible, he asked himself whether an aggressive defence might not present better chances of success. Thinking the matter over, he devised a scheme which he was prepared to carry out, and, on the very day on which he had taken up the position at the junction of the Dehlí and Kálpi roads—the 17th November—he transmitted this scheme to Lakhnao to obtain for its execution the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief.

This scheme was based on the honoured principle of taking advantage of the separation from each other of the enemy's posts and of destroying them in detail. The enemy had taken up positions, as already stated, at Bhognipúr, Akbarpúr, Sheoli, and Sheorájpúr. Between the two last-named villages at the distances of three miles and two miles flowed the Ganges canal. Windham conceived the idea of transporting one thousand

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

He transmits  
to Sir Colin a  
plan of ag-  
gressive  
defence.

Nature of the  
scheme.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Receiving no  
reply from  
Sir Colin,

he takes up a  
position on  
the Kálpi  
road.

The rebels  
accept his  
challenge,

two hundred men in the night by this canal, taking his guns along the towing-path, and falling upon one or other of the positions (Sheoli or Sheoráj-púr), overwhelming it, always able to fall back on Kánhpúr before the enemy from Akbarpúr could reach it.

To the request containing this plan Windham received no answer. The roads were closed. Meanwhile he had simply maintained his position and had sent off troops, as already mentioned, to regain the Banni bridge. But he had every day fresh causes for disquietude. The very day that he had heard of the defeat of the police force at the Banni bridge information reached him that rebels were crossing over from Oudh to swell the ranks of Tántia Topi's force. It was necessary to take some decisive step. He hesitated to attempt a plan so opposed to his instructions as the canal-plan without special sanction. But something must be done. Windham knew, from his reading, from his instincts, from conversation with officers experienced in Indian warfare, that the most certain mode of defeating an Asiatic enemy is to march straight against him. At half past 8 o'clock on the morning of the 24th, then, he broke up his camp, and marching six miles south-westward, took up a position close to the bridge by which the road to Kálpi crosses the canal. The position was comparatively strong, for his entire front was covered by the canal, and he was still nearer to the intrenchment than the enemy.

The Gwáliár troops, noting Windham's forward movement, regarded it as a challenge. They ac-



cepted it. That very day the detachment at Akbarpúr set out for Suchandi. Between this village and the canal, about midway, runs the Pándu rivulet. The rebels reached Suchandi on the 24th; the banks of the Pándu on the 25th. As soon as information of this movement reached Brigadier Carthew he despatched a special messenger with it to the General. Windham at once galloped to the camp, and reached Carthew's tent a little after midnight—during the first hour of the 26th.

Book XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

and march to  
the Pándu.

Windham at once made his plans. Dividing his force into two brigades, he placed Carthew at the head of the first, composed of the 88th Connaught Rangers, four companies of the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, and four 6-pounder guns, manned by natives. The second brigade, consisting of the 34th Regiment, four companies of the 82nd, and four 9-pounder guns, drawn by bullocks and manned by Europeans and Sikhs, he gave to Colonel Kelly of the 34th. Windham had also at his disposal one hundred native troopers and ten men of the 9th Lancers. With this force he determined to take the initiative the following morning. His plan was to deal the most advanced division of the enemy a heavy blow; then, returning to his base, repeat, should occasion offer, the same tactics on another portion of their force.

Windham  
prepares to  
attack them.

Before daylight of the 26th, Windham, having taken precautions to guard his baggage, to protect the canal bridge, and to observe the enemy on the side of Sheorájpúr, rode forward to reconnoitre. He found the rebels posted beyond the

He recon-  
noitres,



BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.

Nov. 9-28.

and advances  
to the attack.

Carthew  
silences the  
enemy's fire,

and Kelly,  
pushing on  
the 34th,  
captures  
their guns.

Windham  
marches back  
to the city,  
but threat-  
ened by the  
enemy's  
cavalry,

Pándu rivulet, then nearly dry. They numbered about two thousand five hundred infantry, five hundred cavalry, and they had six guns of large calibre. Windham at once sent back orders for his troops to advance. The order was at once obeyed.

Carthew led forward his brigade from the right, the men of the Rifle Brigade leading in skirmishing order. The enemy were seen in masses in front of a large tope of trees, but as the skirmishers approached they moved to their right. This movement completed, their guns in the tope opened a very heavy fire. The balls passed over the skirmishers and fell right into the 88th, who were following them, knocking over many officers and men. Carthew brought his guns into position as quickly as possible, and opening upon the enemy, silenced their fire, whereupon Kelly, from the position on the left, led the 34th at the guns, and captured three of them (two 8-inch iron howitzers and one 6-pounder gun). Such, in brief, was the story of the main fight. I may add, that prior to Colonel Kelly's attack, a portion of his regiment had repulsed a charge of the enemy's cavalry. These did not appear again until later in the day, but it will be seen that they then made their presence felt.

The capture of the guns was followed by the flight of the enemy, who were pursued for some distance. Windham then drew off his troops and marched back towards the city. This retrograde movement inspired the enemy with courage, and their cavalry, coming to the front, became so insolent that Windham halted and deployed his

troops. It was no part of their game, however, to attack our men in the open, so they again drew off. Windham then marched his force to a new position near the town across the Kálpi road, immediately in front of some brick-kilns. A letter from the Commander-in-Chief's camp had reached him to the effect that all was well, and that the army was marching towards Kánhpúr. Windham hoped, then, that the blow he had inflicted that day might serve as a deterrent to the enemy at least till the Commander-in-Chief should arrive. Their loss had been severe; his own amounted to ninety-two killed and wounded.

But the leader of the rebel army was no fool. The blow dealt by Windham, far from frightening him, had disclosed to his astute mind the weakness of the British leader. A force, completely victorious, does not as a rule fall back beyond even the position it had occupied before the action had commenced; nor, in falling back, does it allow itself to be threatened with impunity by the troops it had defeated. But these things had happened to the little army of Windham. It had been victorious on the field—a fact proved by the capture of three of the enemy's guns. But the necessities of his position had forced Windham, after his victory, to fall back, threatened by the enemy's horse, to a position nearer to the city than that he had occupied before the battle. Tántia Topi read the necessities of Windham's position as he would have read an open book, and, with the instincts of a real general, he resolved to take advantage of them.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

takes up a  
new position  
across the  
Kálpi road.

Tántia Topi,  
perceiving  
Windham's  
weakness,  
resolves to  
attack him,

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.  
in front and  
in flank.

Windham,  
standing on  
the defensive,

is attacked at  
noon.

Far, then, from allowing Windham the respite of twenty-four hours which would, that general hoped, bring the Commander-in-Chief to his aid, Tántia Topi directed that portion of his force which had engaged at Suchandi the previous day to stand at their arms at daybreak, ready for a forward movement, but to withhold that movement until the detachments at Sheoli and Sheorájpúr, which would march in the night, should open fire on the right flank of the British. That fire was to be the signal for a general attack.

Meanwhile, Windham, hoping much from the blow he had delivered the previous day, had not the less prepared for possible eventualities. His troops stood to their arms at daybreak. But, as there were neither signs of an enemy, nor any certain information as to his movements, they were dismissed, at 9 o'clock, to their breakfasts. The General, after partaking of his morning meal, ordered up two 24-pounder guns, drawn by bullocks, and manned by seamen of the *Shannon*, and then went to reconnoitre. The aspect of affairs evidently did not satisfy him, for at 11 o'clock he sent down to the camp an order for the whole force to stand to their arms. An hour later, just as the British gun in the intrenchment fired the mid-day signal, he rode into camp. He had scarcely arrived when a heavy cannonade was opened on the right flank of the British. Almost simultaneously a shell exploded over the trees in their front. It was evident that an attack in force had begun on all points.

Cool and prompt in action, Windham at once



directed Brigadier Carthew, with the 34th, two companies of the 82nd, and four 6-pounder guns, to take up and hold a position on the right, defending the approaches to the town by the Bithor road. Carthew at once moved off, detaching the 34th to occupy some gardens on the left of his position, throwing some fifty men of the 82nd into some ruined huts on its right, and covering the guns in the centre with the remainder of the two companies of that regiment. As his brigade, so to call it, was marching to the points indicated, the enemy opened fire upon it at a long range. But so effective was the reply from the 6-pounders and Enfields, so steady and continuous their fire, that the rebels ceased their attack on that side.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

He detaches Carthew to repulse the enemy on his right.

Carthew succeeds.

In the front, forming the extreme left of his position, Windham had not been so fortunate. He had there five companies of the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, the 88th Regiment, two 9-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder howitzers, and two 24-pounder guns manned by seamen of the *Shannon*. To the right of this position, in a wood midway between it and that occupied by Carthew, was posted the main body of the 82nd.

Windham's front, or left, position.

Windham placed the guns in the centre of his position, supporting them by the Rifle Brigade and the 88th on either flank. Before the first gun had been fired, he proceeded himself to the right to watch the attack in that quarter, leaving the left brigade in charge of Colonel Walpole of the Rifle Brigade. The 24-pounder guns were then



BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

The great  
superiority of  
the rebels in  
artillery  
makes itself  
felt.

Finding his  
position un-  
tenable,  
Windham  
falls back on  
the brick-  
kilns,

pushed to the front to within sight of the enemy.\* The enemy on sighting them, fired the first shot from a gun they had placed on the road. The British guns at once replied, but they had not fired two rounds when the rebels opened fire with grape and canister from batteries in front and on the right flank of Windham's position. So superior, from their immense superiority in the number of guns, was their fire, that Windham, on his return, an hour later, from the right brigade, found that his men were getting all the worst of it. The rebel leader, with great judgment, kept back his infantry, and fought Windham with his artillery alone. The advantage he derived from his greatly superior numbers was enormous, for they enabled him to form a semicircle round the British position. Any attempt on the part of Windham to break through this semicircle at any point would have placed it in the power of the rebel leader to lap over and overwhelm his far inferior force.

Windham used all the means in his power to make head against the enemy. Their flanking fire he attempted to silence by turning upon it one of the 24-pounders worked by the men of the *Shannon*. But all would not do. The position was not tenable against an enemy superior in number and who fought only with their guns. To add to his misfortunes, the bullock-drivers, not liking the prospect, deserted as fast as they could, and, as a final blow, ammunition began to run short. Orders were accordingly given to fall back

\* *The Shannon's Brigade in India*, page 33.

on the brick-kilns, a little to the left of the position Windham had taken up on the night of the 26th. Windham at the same time sent for the 34th to reinforce him, and directed Carthew, by an order twice repeated, to fall back also on the brick-kilns.\*

Carthew, meanwhile, had held the position on the right, and with the force at his disposal he probably could have held it. But, at this moment, Windham, to protect his retiring movement, sent for the bulk of the 34th. This regiment, which had covered itself with glory by its repulse of the enemy, was accordingly sent to reinforce the left brigade. It found that brigade in considerable disorder. The two big guns had been for the moment abandoned, and the men were falling back disheartened. The 34th came up in time to take the initiative in dashing at the big guns, and, with the aid of the sailors, in bringing them on with the retreating column.

But the retiring movement had served as a signal for the enemy to advance. They crowded on in numbers, firing their guns. The English fell back, confused and in disorder, on the brick-kilns. Here it was hoped a stand might be made. It was now 5 o'clock, and Windham, thinking the position now reached might be held, and anxious for the condition of the right brigade, weakened by the withdrawal of the 34th, left General Dupuis,

Book XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.

Nov. 9-28.

and orders  
Carthew to do  
the same.

Before this,  
Windham had  
reinforced his  
left with the  
34th, taken  
from Car-  
thew.

Windham  
falls back.

The enemy  
follow.

Windham  
gallops to the  
right.

\* Windham stated subsequently that he afterwards countermanded that order, but the countermand never reached Carthew.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Fatal effect of  
Windham's  
reiterated  
order to Car-  
thew to fall  
back.

Great confu-  
sion at the  
brick-kilns.

R.A., in command, with orders to hold the brick-kilns, if possible, and galloped to the right.

But before he could reach the right brigade, the order to retire, which he had sent to it, had had its fatal effect. It is true that, weakened by the withdrawal of the 34th, the brigade could with difficulty hold its ground against the enemy pressing on it. But, coping bravely with the difficulty, Carthew did hold it. So convinced was he of the value of the position, that he did not act on the first order which he received. The second order was imperative. He was forced to obey his general, and he fell back.\*

When Carthew reached the brick-kilns, confusion seemed worse confounded. The carriage cattle had been driven off, whilst the tents of the encampment had been struck, and, with most of the heavy baggage, were lying in disorder on the earth. Just then, an order reached Dupuis to fall back on the intrenchment. Windham, as he was riding to look after his right brigade, had received intelligence that the rebels, turning the extreme right of his extended position had occupied the lower part of the city,

\* Captain Drury, who was Brigadier Carthew's brigade-major on this occasion, thus described the situation in a letter to a friend at Madras: "The other position" (Windham's) "of the force had not fared so well, and the General sent for the 34th to strengthen the encampment. Shortly afterwards we were ordered

to return to the encampment and occupy some brick-kilns immediately in its rear. This order was repeated, and it was not until the second time that we commenced falling back to the place directed. This order was a grave error. General Windham says he sent a countermand afterwards. *That never came.*"



and were then attacking his last stronghold. Fortunately, at the moment a detachment of the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade arrived opportunely from Fathpúr. Windham, placing himself at their head, drove the enemy from the lower part of the town, at the same time that he sent the order to Dupuis to fall back on the intrenchment. This movement had been just begun when Windham, riding towards the force after the exploit just recorded, personally directed Carthew to take two companies of the 88th and his four 6-pounders, to return to the position he had vacated on the right, and on reaching the Bithor road, to fall back on and occupy the theatre. This building lay about a quarter of a mile south of the intrenchment, and was filled with stores and clothing for the troops.

Whilst the main body, abandoning tents and the soldiers' kits, fell back on the intrenchment, "pursued by the enemy and harassed by musketry," \* Carthew moved to the right to execute Windham's latest order. Between the suburb through which he had to pass and the Bithor road were the abandoned lines of a native regiment. On debouching from the suburb, he saw the enemy's skirmishers feeling their way down the road toward the intrenchment. They were exposing their right flank to Carthew, but the moment they saw him they fell back in soldier-like

Book XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.

Nov. 9-28.

The rebels  
attack the  
intrench-  
ment,  
but are driven  
back.

Windham  
orders a re-  
treat on the  
intrenchment,

but directs  
Carthew to  
defend his  
right.

Carthew  
moves to the  
right,

\* *The Shannon's Brigade in India*, page 36. A private letter from a soldier of the 34th says: "They took all our kit and encampment, which we saw burning during the night."



Book XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.

Nov. 9-28.

and drives  
back the  
enemy

style and occupied the abandoned lines I have spoken of. But Carthew, sending his men at them with the bayonet, drove them out in fine style, and as far as the Bithor road. Here he came upon their guns, which at once unlimbered and opened fire. But Chamier's four 6-pounders were at hand. They had had to make a short detour to avoid the narrow streets, but they came up with all possible haste, and, worked magnificently by the swarthy gunners of the Madras army, they silenced and drove back the guns of the enemy. Had Carthew had four companies instead of two, he would have captured the enemy's guns. But it was growing dark, and his few men were dispersed in skirmishing order. He could not rally in time a sufficient number for a rush.

and occupies  
the theatre.

Carthew had, however, completely fulfilled his instructions. He had gained the Bithor road. Here he halted, alike to collect his men and show a front to the enemy. But the enemy had had enough of it. He then fell back, unmolested, on the theatre—the one officer in high command who had been victorious in every encounter on that eventful day!

He halts here  
for the night,  
barricading a  
bridge over a  
deep nullah  
in his front.

The theatre constituted now the centre of a chain of outposts, forming a semi-circle about a quarter of a mile in front of the intrenchment. The left of this semi-circle rested on the canal, the right in an outwork on the river Ganges. This outwork was occupied by the 64th. Carthew's small force, having just barricaded a bridge in their front over a narrow but deep nullah,

bivouacked on the road near the theatre. The 88th occupied the road leading from the canal to the town. The remainder of the force and the guns were withdrawn within the intrenchment.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

The laurels of the day rested certainly with the rebels. They had driven back the British force, had compelled it to renounce the defence of the town. With a little more enterprise they might probably have cut it off altogether. The fact is, Windham occupied with one thousand seven hundred men a very extended position, and he attempted to defend this position against an enemy computed, erroneously, I think, at twenty-five thousand trained soldiers, but who probably numbered at least fourteen thousand. It is possible, however, that if he had been content with holding the position he had taken up on the night of the 26th, near the brick-kilns, he could have maintained it. For the right flank of that position was covered by Carthew's brigade and by the linking detachments of the 82nd and 34th. But, by pushing his own brigade forward on the Kálpi road to a position in which its whole front and right flank were exposed to the enemy's fire, he virtually invited defeat. When he at last ordered Dupuis to fall back on the brick-kilns it was too late. His ill-judged order to Carthew, resisted as long as possible by that officer, to abandon the position he had successfully defended, gave an opening to the enemy to penetrate on his right. When, after the evil had so far worked its effect as to necessitate the order to Dupuis to fall back, Windham attempted to repair it by

Remarks on  
the events of  
the day.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

— —  
1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

The night  
that followed.

Windham  
issues in-  
structions for  
the morrow.

Line of de-  
fence en-  
trusted to  
Walpole,

sending back Carthew to his old position, Carthew did, indeed, by a display of skill and daring, prevent the mischief from becoming irremediable. But the position at the brick-kilns, which might have been maintained, had to be abandoned and the town to be sacrificed.

The night passed quietly. The British, that is to say, were not assailed. But the glare of the flames, and the tumult outside their position, proclaimed the triumph of the rebels. A great anxiety reigned within the British lines. Windham passed the night in consultation with the officers he most trusted. At one time he hoped to be able to redeem the past by a night attack on the rebels, but he could obtain no trustworthy information as to the locality of the enemy's guns. Nothing remained to him, then, but to make the best preparations to repel the renewed attack to be expected on the morrow.

That night Windham issued to the senior officers of his force the instructions for carrying out the plan upon which, after mature consideration, he had decided. To Colonel Walpole—commanding five companies of the Rifle Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Woodford, two companies of the 82nd Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, and four guns—two 9-pounders manned by Madras gunners, and two 24-pounder howitzers manned by Sikhs, under Lieutenant Green, R.A.—he confided the defence of the advanced portion of the town on the left bank of the canal, that is, the portion in the left rear of the brick-kilns separated from them and from the rest of the

town by the canal ; to Brigadier Carthew—having under him the 34th commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, the flank companies of the 82nd, and the four Madras 6-pounders under Lieutenant Chamier—the defence of the Bithor road, in a position more advanced than, and a little to the right of, that occupied the previous day. The intrenchment was entrusted to the care of the 64th under Brigadier N. Wilson, who was also to guard against a turning movement on the right by establishing a post at the Baptist Chapel; whilst Windham himself, having under him the 88th Regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, should defend the portion of the town nearest the Ganges, on the left bank of the canal.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

to Carthew,

to Wilson,

to Windham  
himself.

Before the action has begun, the impartial reader cannot but be struck by the disproportionate force allotted to Brigadier Carthew. That officer had to defend the key of the position. He had proved his capacity the day before ; and yet to him, occupying the post which was certain to draw upon him the weight of the enemy's attack, a force was assigned not larger than that given to Walpole, whose position was far more defensible.

Disproportionate force allotted to guard the key of the position.

At daylight on the 28th the several movements indicated took effect. Carthew pushed across the bridge he had barricaded the previous evening with the 34th and guns, covering his flanks with the two companies of the 82nd. He had just reached the point at which the road turned off to the position he was to occupy a little to the right, when the Assistant Quartermaster-General,

Carthew, after advancing, is ordered to fall back and defend the bridge.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Captain  
Stewart.

Successful  
defence  
offered by  
Carthew.

Captain M'Crea, brought him an order from the General to fall back on to the bridge. This position, then, Carthew took up, covering his left with two companies, occupying with three the ruined houses in the front and on the flanks of the bridge, and keeping the remainder at the bridge. The detached party on the right consisted of one company of the 34th commanded by Captain Stewart. The house it occupied was a lofty building with a flat roof, and from this roof Stewart noticed the advance of the enemy's artillery to a position whence their guns could bear with decisive effect on the bridge. A zealous, intrepid officer, beloved by the regiment, Stewart posted his men in positions whence they could pick off the enemy's gunners. They succeeded in this task beyond their hopes, in spite of the grape and round shot which came pouring upon them. This state of things continued for more than two hours, from half-past 9 o'clock till noon, the enemy pouring in shot and shell, the 34th and 82nd replying with musketry, and Chamier's two small guns\* doing all the mischief of which they were capable. The enemy made no way, but their artillery fire did considerable execution, and though they, too, suffered severely from the British fire, their immense superiority in numbers enabled them to fill up vacancies as they occurred.

This was the state of affairs on the right at 12 o'clock. On the left Walpole had received the

\* The other two had been sarily, to defend the Allah-withdrawn, most unneces-ábád road.

attack of the enemy. But the enemy's attack on the left bank of the canal, though made in force and with great resolution, was but the adjunct to his main attack on the right. The left advanced position was not the decisive point of the scene of action, yet on this point the British were posted in numbers sufficient to beat back the enemy; and though Windham from his post to the rear of them sent and brought up supports, those supports were not required to ensure the repulse of the enemy, for Walpole had achieved that result without them.\* A real general, having under his command in reserve a fine British regiment such as was the 88th, seeing that Walpole was able to hold his own, would at once have hurried to the scene of action, which the lay of the ground and the importance of the position to be gained there must have shown him to be the decisive scene. The stores, clothing, and impedimenta of all sorts were on the side which Carthew was defending—not where Walpole was successfully fighting.

But Windham did not possess the *coup d'œil* of a general. Instead of hurrying to the support of Carthew, he despatched to him, at 12 o'clock, his Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain M'Crea, to direct him to advance once again up

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Success of  
Walpole on  
the left.

Criticisms on  
Windham's  
conduct at  
this conjunc-  
ture.

He sends an  
order to  
Carthew to  
advance.

\* "On the left advance, Colonel Walpole, with the Rifles, supported by Captain Greene's battery, and part of the 82nd Regiment, achieved a complete victory over the enemy, and captured two 18-

pounder guns. *The glory of this well-contested fight belongs entirely to the above-named companies and artillery.*"—General Windham's Despatch, 30th November 1857. The italics are mine.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-18.  
and to Wilson.

The ground  
on which they  
were to act.

Carthew ad-  
vances.

Impossibility  
of further  
progress  
without  
cavalry.

the road, and promising him that the 64th Regiment under Brigadier N. Wilson would make a parallel advance on his right. To cover this movement of the 64th, M'Crea took with him to strengthen that regiment, forty men of a company of the 82nd, till then under Carthew's orders.

That the reader may more clearly comprehend the movements which followed, I may here state that after crossing the bridge the road runs up the centre of a parade-ground about six hundred yards long and two hundred yards wide, traversed by a watercourse, and having houses on both sides of it. On the advance being sounded, the three companies which till then had occupied the ruined buildings in front and on the flanks of the bridge pushed across the plain in skirmishing order, in spite of a continual shower of grape from three guns posted at the further end of it. When within about one hundred yards of these, Captain Stewart, who was leading his men in splendid style, was shot through the thigh. The adjutant of the 34th, Leeson, at once supplied his place, but the fire from the front and from the buildings on either side was so hot that it was impossible to reach the guns.

To gain breath the men lay down in the watercourse of which I have spoken, whilst Carthew, mounted, in the middle of the parade-ground, endeavoured to collect a sufficient number of men to make a rush at the enemy. But, crippled by the paucity of his numbers—a paucity caused by the necessity of guarding his left flank—his efforts in this respect were fruitless. He was



more successful, however, in causing Chamier's two guns to be brought to the front. These, unlimbering, replied to the enemy's fire; and, splendidly served by the Madras gunners, in the course of twenty minutes not only silenced it, but compelled the enemy to withdraw their pieces. Then was the chance if Carthew had but had one squadron of horse at his disposal. He had not a single trooper; and just at the moment he discovered that Wilson's attack on his right had failed and that his right rear was threatened by the rebels.

Book XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Captain M'Crea, taking with him forty men of the 82nd, had directed Brigadier Wilson to move to the front parallel with Carthew. The two companies covered the advance, harassed by a fire from six guns in position in their immediate front.\* When within about a hundred yards of these guns the skirmishers charged them and for a few minutes had them in possession. Unfortunately the main body were too far behind, and the rebels, recovering from their first panic, came on in overwhelming numbers, and cut to pieces many of the heroic band of skirmishers. There fell here Brigadier Wilson, Captain M'Crea, Captain Morphy, Major Sterling, Lieutenant McKenna,

Wilson, being  
repulsed,

exposes Car-  
thew's right.

\* General Windham writes thus in his despatch: "Brigadier Wilson thought proper, prompted by his zeal for the service, to lead his regiment against four guns placed in front of Brigadier Carthew." Brigadier Wilson did nothing of the sort. The guns upon

which he advanced were nearly half a mile from the guns in front of Carthew's troops. They were, as stated in the text, covering the line upon which Windham himself had, by the mouth of M'Crea, ordered Wilson to advance.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Criticisms on  
Windham's  
conduct at  
this conjunc-  
ture.

Lieutenant Gibbins, all nobly fighting. The supports came up only in time to cover the retreat of the few survivors.

Windham had thus engaged, without supports, his entire right wing on the decisive point of the scene of action. The available supports were in his own hand on a side part of action, never intended by the enemy to be the decisive scene. The advance in parallel lines on the right, ordered by himself, had, owing to one of those accidents always likely to occur in war, failed. Carthew had indeed repulsed the enemy, but he had no men to follow him up. The 64th had been repulsed, and their repulse endangered Carthew's right. Now was the moment when supports would have been invaluable. They might even have changed the face of the day.

Carthew falls  
back to his  
old position,

His right rear threatened—for the 64th had been gradually forced back on the intrenchment—Carthew very gradually, and showing a bold front to the ever-increasing enemy, fell back on the bridge. But how different was his position here to what it had been in the morning! Then, the bridge was the centre of a chain of posts, both flanks being guarded, and his front covered. Now the flanking parties had fallen back and he was isolated.

now scarcely  
defensible,

but which he  
still bravely  
defends.

Still, Carthew knew the importance of the position, and he resolved to hold it as long as he could. But the enemy's attacks became more and more furious, the number of his guns increased and their fire became more concentrated. Still

Carthew did not move. He had but two guns with which to reply, but the gallant Chamier and the sturdy Madr  sis worked them with a will.

Book XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

But every moment was pregnant with some new danger for him. The rebels, climbing to the roofs of the houses which the retirement of the 64th and of the detachment which connected him with that regiment had left empty, poured upon the gallant soldiers of the 34th a stream of fire. But the unconquered soldiers of that splendid regiment still held on. Twice did they clear the streets in their front, twice the Church compound on their right. But the continuous stream of fire of which I have spoken would not allow them to hold the positions they had gained at the point of the bayonet. More than that, the enemy shifted their position so that Chamier's guns could no longer bear on any vital point, whilst the fire from the roofs caused the defenders to drop fast.

Gallantry of  
the 34th;

and increas-  
ing numbers  
of the enemy.

A strong reinforcement might still have saved the position. Carthew sent for it. Pending its arrival this gallant leader went amongst the men, cheering them, and keeping them to their work. Even when the position had become practically untenable, when the enemy had all but turned his flanks, and when the party he had sent under Colonel Simpson of the 34th to keep open his communications was forced back, he still held on. Still the reinforcements did not come. At last, when it was absolutely certain that unless he were to retire he would be cut off, Carthew reluctantly gave the order—to give which when he could no longer hold out he had

In spite of  
Carthew's  
splendid  
tenacity,

he is at last  
compelled to  
fall back.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Carthew and  
Windham.

the authority of Windham—to fall back on the intrenchment.\*

All this time where was Windham? Windham was with the victorious left wing, where his presence was not needed. What he was precisely doing, or why he did not hasten to strengthen the key of his position, may never be known. He never attempted to explain his action. In his despatch he endeavoured, in the most ungenerous manner, to cast, by implication, the blame of the defeat on Carthew. "Brigadier Carthew," he wrote, "of the Madras Native Infantry, had a most severe and strong contest with the enemy from morning till night; but I regret to add that he felt himself obliged to retire at dark." This passage conveyed to the mind of Sir Colin Campbell the impression that Brigadier Carthew had, at a critical period, retired from his post without orders; and, on the 9th December, he animad-

\* "I have not the slightest hesitation," wrote, on the 11th December 1857, Lieutenant-Colonel Simpson of the 34th to Brigadier Carthew, "in giving my opinion about the brigade retiring from the position we held on the bridge on the evening of the 28th November. It is my firm conviction that you had no other alternative—that if you had not retired the brigade would have been cut off, as the enemy were completely outflanking us on our left. By your orders I sent round two companies of this regiment to check them, which

they did for the moment, but could not make a stand, as they in turn were quite outflanked on their left. When the two officers commanding those companies (officers in whom I have the greatest confidence) came back and told me what was going on, and from what I saw myself, I spoke to Colonel Kelly, Colonel Gwilt, and one or two more of the regiment, and I myself, and I think others, told you that if we did not retire we should be cut off. You then, *reluctantly*, gave the order to retire."



verted very severely in an official memorandum on such conduct. When Carthew received the memorandum he took it at once to Windham, who—it will scarcely be credited—advised him not to reply to it. But Carthew had too nice a sense of his own honour to act upon such advice. He not only replied to it, but forced from Windham an acknowledgment that he himself had given the Brigadier authority to retire when he could no longer maintain his position. Upon this, Sir Colin Campbell not only withdrew his censure, but expressed his regret that under an “erroneous impression” he should have given pain to a meritorious officer.

Book XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9–28.

But,—to return to the question,—where was Windham? I have already stated that Carthew had sent for reinforcements. He received them in the shape of two companies of the Rifle Brigade, as he was falling back, just in time to cover his retreat. Had Carthew not begun his retreat the reinforcement was too small to be of much avail. Windham states that he himself took down this reinforcement, and, returning, ordered up two companies of the 82nd. But it was too late—the mischief had been done; a strong reinforcement an hour earlier might have saved the position. It was not to be saved by sending on small supports in piecemeal. Under cover of the riflemen Carthew fell back in good order within the intrenchment. It was then quite dark.

As he is falling back Carthew receives reinforcements,

too few in number,

too late in time.

He and his officers and men had been for thirty-six hours almost without food and sleep. He had

Carthew, the 34th, and the rest of his brigade.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Windham's  
aggressive  
defence pro-  
bably saved  
Kánhpúr.

exposed himself to the hottest fire throughout the day. His cool and calm courage had been the admiration of everyone. His efforts had been splendidly supported by all under his command. In the 34th alone three officers had been killed and eight wounded. The total number of killed and wounded in Windham's operations up to the night of the 28th amounted to three hundred and fifteen. Carthew brought back with him all his guns.

The plain account I have given of the day's proceedings requires little comment. That Windham was justified in deciding to make an aggressive defence cannot, I think, be questioned. It is the opinion of those best qualified to form an opinion that, regard being had to the enormous superiority of the rebels in artillery, a purely defensive system would have ensured the destruction of his force, and the occupation of Kánhpúr by the rebels, with consequences—Sir Colin and the women and children of the Lakhnao garrison being on the other side of the river—the evil extent of which it would be difficult to exaggerate. Windham, by his military instincts, saved the country from this disaster, and he is entitled to all the credit due to a daring initiative. That the action might have been more skilfully fought is certain; but the aphorism of Napoleon, that in war victory is to the general who makes the fewest mistakes, must never be forgotten. Mistakes will be made; and it should be remembered that this was the first time that Windham had held an independent command in the field.

Both wings fell back that evening into the intrenchment. The town of Kánhpúr, the theatre and the houses, full of clothing and stores, or prepared for the reception of the Lakhnao ladies, fell into the hands of the rebels.

But before the right wing had reached the intrenchment, whilst Carthew, nobly daring, was still holding on to the Baptist Chapel, an event full of importance had occurred. Sir Colin Campbell had arrived, the precursor by a few hours of his army.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter III.

1857.  
Nov. 9-28.

Destruction  
consequent on  
the British  
defeat.

## BOOK XL.

---

### CHAPTER IV.

THE second chapter of this book left Sir Colin Campbell, followed by his staff, crossing the bridge of boats into Kánhpúr. The shades of evening were falling, and the light was the short twilight following the setting of the sun. Ascending at a gallop the road leading to the gate, some men of the Rifle Brigade, posted on the rampart, recognised their general, and repeated cheers at once announced his arrival alike to Windham's soldiers and their enemy. Windham was within the intrenchment, and Sir Colin had hardly reached him when a demand for reinforcements arrived from the Baptist Chapel—a proof that even then Carthew was still, with the small means at his disposal, attempting the impossible. The reinforcements were sent, but they arrived too late, and Carthew fell back in the manner already related. With

Sir Colin  
reaches the  
intrench-  
ment.

his arrival within the intrenchment the fighting for the night ceased.

Sir Colin remained some time with Windham, listening to his report and asking questions. He then communicated to him his plans. He would recross the river to his camp; as soon as possible the next morning drive the enemy with his guns from the positions he had taken up near the bridge, and then send over his infantry. Sir Colin then rode back to his camp, "into which, all night, the guns, stores, women, and sick, continued to stream."\*

Early the following morning Sir Colin proceeded to execute his plans. Peel's heavy guns had reached the ground, from their march of thirty miles, only an hour before sunrise. The astute leader of the rebel army had noticed with the early light of the morning the mass of soldiers filling the plain on the Oudh bank of the river, and that sight had told him that unless he could break the bridge his chances of ultimate victory would melt away. But there was yet time to break the bridge. He had therefore brought down his heaviest guns to the positions on the banks of the river whence he had the previous day driven the 64th, and had opened upon it a heavy, but fortunately an ill-directed fire. Sir Colin Campbell had foreseen that the rebels would try this last chance. Allowing, then, the men of the Naval Brigade but one hour for rest and food, he despatched them at sunrise to a point above the bridge of

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Nov. 29.

After conversation with Windham, returns to his camp.

The rebels attempt to break the bridge of boats.

Sir Colin, foreseeing the attempt, baffles them.

\* Norman's *Relief of Lucknow*.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Nov. 29.

The enemy  
fire the cap-  
tured stores.

Sir Colin  
takes mea-  
sures to meet  
every eventu-  
ality and  
every attack.

The passage  
of the troops  
continues  
without a  
break till the  
evening of the  
30th.

boats whence they could play on the enemy's guns. The artillery fire from the intrenchment was directed to the same point. For some time the artillery combat appeared not unequal, but gradually the guns of the British asserted their superiority. Then commenced the passage of the cavalry, the horse artillery, and of Adrian Hope's brigade. As they crossed, dark masses of smoke mingled with sheets of flame, arising from the store-laden buildings so well defended by Carthew the previous day, proved that the enemy had given up the contest for the bridge, and that they had set fire to the stores to cover his change of position. But it was yet possible that they might attempt a counterstroke on the weakened camp, crowded with non-combatants, on the Oudh bank of the river. The upper course of the river was in their possession; they had numberless boats at their command. What could be easier than to take advantage of the divided state of the British force and overwhelm the weaker portion? But the contingency had entered into the calculations of Sir Colin. By 9 o'clock he had crossed the troops I have already mentioned. On reaching the Kánhpúr bank these were instructed to take up a position facing the city, their right resting on a point near the intrenchment, their left stretching towards the grand trunk road. Their passage effected, Sir Colin crossed and established his headquarters on the Kánhpúr side, leaving Brigadier Inglis to protect the convoy until all the troops should have crossed. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the passage of the convoy commenced.

During that afternoon, during the ensuing night, and till 6 o'clock on the evening of the 30th, the passage of the convoy and of the troops forming the rear-guard continued. Practically it was not interrupted by the rebels, and by the hour I have mentioned it was accomplished. The ladies and children, sick, and wounded were taken across the canal to a camp on the plain near "the mouldering remains and riddled walls of the position Wheeler had held so long."

Book XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Nov. 30.

The rebels still continued to hold the town and the line of the canal passing through it to the westward. They were in considerable numbers, had a strong force of artillery, were flushed with victory, and they had as their leader a man of very great natural ability. They were evidently resolved to try conclusions with Sir Colin, and they had perhaps some reason for believing that even Sir Colin might find it a very difficult, perhaps an impossible, task to drive them from the position they had occupied.

Confidence of  
the rebels.

That position was, indeed, extremely strong. "Their left," to quote from the actor in the scene whose graphic journal I have so largely used,\* "was posted among the wooded high grounds, intersected with nullahs, and thickly sprinkled with ruined bungalows and public buildings, which lie between the town of Kánhpúr and the Ganges. Their centre occupied the town itself, which was of great extent, and traversed only by narrow winding streets, singularly sus-

Great  
strength of  
their position.

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Nov. 30.

Their  
numbers.

As a prelimi-  
nary to  
attacking  
them,

ceptible of defence. The portion of it facing the intrenchment was uncovered; but from the camp of our army it was separated by the Ganges canal. . . . Their right stretched out behind this canal into the plain, and they held a bridge over it, and some lime-kilns and mounds of brick in its front. The camp of the Gwáliár contingent was situated in this plain, about two miles in rear of the right, at the point where the Kálpi road comes in." The reader will be able the better to picture to himself the position if he will bear in mind that the right of the enemy was in the position whence they had dislodged Windham on the 27th; the left, that whence they had driven Carthew and Wilson on the 28th; and that the town, between the two, and up to the Ganges canal, formed the centre. This position was held by an enemy whose numbers were computed at twenty-five thousand men, with forty guns. It is probable that, even granting the correctness of this computation, the number of trained soldiers did not exceed fourteen thousand.

To attack a position so strong, and so numerously guarded, Sir Colin felt that he would require the services of every man of whom he could dispose. It was then, obviously, a main condition to despatch to Allahábád the ladies and children, the sick and wounded, before engaging in an action. Victorious though he felt he would be, the presence of the convoy near the battlefield, whilst constituting a danger to its members, would deprive him of the troops necessary to protect it against contingencies. His first care,



then, was to arrange for the despatch of the convoy.

I have already stated that by 6 o'clock on the evening of the 30th November, every man, woman, and child had crossed into Kánhpúr. The days of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd December were devoted to the perfecting of arrangements for the despatch of the convoy to Allahábád. The rebels did not fail occasionally to remind the Commander-in-Chief of their presence. On the 1st they attacked the British outposts. Although they were not in great force, and were easily repulsed, they managed nevertheless to effect some damage. Ewart, of the 93rd, whose gallantry at the storming of the Sikandar Bágh will be remembered, had his left arm carried away by a round shot, his regiment being at the time under cover of the unfinished barracks. On the 2nd they opened a very brisk cannonade, apparently pointed at the tents occupied by Sir Colin Campbell and the head-quarter staff. The cannonade became so pronounced, that the Commander-in-Chief detached a body of riflemen to occupy some houses near the canal, commanding the position occupied by the battery which was annoying him. This movement compelled the enemy to withdraw.

At length the arrangements for the transport of the convoy were completed. The communications between Kánhpur and Allahábád, interrupted during Sir Colin's absence, had been restored, and, on the night of the 3rd December, the convoy, composed of the women and children who

Book XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 1-3.

Sir Colin  
arranges to  
despatch the  
ladies and  
children to  
Allahábád.

The enemy  
try to inter-  
rupt him.

The convoy  
starts on the  
night of the  
3rd Decem-  
ber.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 3.

had survived the dangers and trials of the siege of Lakhnao, of the wounded who had shared those dangers and trials, or who had bled to relieve them, started for Allahábád. If for them war ceased thenceforth to be an affair of personal concern, inasmuch as they were no longer exposed to the fire of the enemy, the memory of its dread effects could not fail to accompany them. The sufferings of more than a lifetime had for many of that gentle cohort been crowded into the brief period of three months. There were few amongst them who had not experienced the loss of someone near and dear to them, of a husband, a child, a relation; and, rescued though they were, many were still leaving behind to the chances of death from a ruthless enemy the one dear companion, without whom the burden of life would be indeed hard to bear.

The attack delayed till the convoy should be out of distance.

Relieved from the anxiety which the presence of such a convoy within his lines could not fail to produce, Sir Colin Campbell prepared to attack the enemy. One strong reason moved him to delay still for a few days. For, whilst the convoy was near, it was always possible for the rebels, though beaten in action, to double round and destroy it. He wished, too, to arrange for the disposition of those slightly wounded men whom it had not been considered necessary to despatch to Allahábád. These were brought within the intrenchment.

The rebels still endeavour to harass Sir Colin.

In spite of the check given to them on the 2nd, the rebels still continued their attacks on the British position. On the 4th, they floated a number

of fire-boats, which, carried by the current against the bridge of boats, should set it on fire. This attempt was detected in sufficient time to cause it to be frustrated. On the afternoon of the 5th, they opened a heavy fire of artillery on the left pickets, whilst they threatened, or seemed to threaten, to turn that flank with infantry. The enemy's artillery fire gradually extended along their whole front. It needed a considerable display of troops and a continuous fire from the British guns to force them to cease their attack. Sir Colin Campbell determined it should be their last. He would himself take the initiative the next day.

I have already described the position held by the rebels. The reader will not have failed to perceive that whilst it was strong, and, in a military sense, unassailable in the centre and on the left—as whilst that left rested on the Ganges, both it and the centre and part of the right were enormously strengthened by the possession of buildings, bridges, narrow streets, and winding lanes—the extreme right was comparatively weak. It was weak because it rested almost without cover on a broad plain, intersected only by the canal. This canal, whilst it covered the centre and right, could be crossed in front of the latter only by two bridges. Whilst assailable with difficulty in front, the right was thus liable to be turned and driven in on its centre. This turning movement promised, moreover, another advantage. The troops executing that movement would naturally seize the Kálpi road—which

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 4-5.

The one weak  
point of the  
position of the  
rebels

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 5.

is detected by  
Sir Colin.

formed, so to speak, a prolongation of the ground occupied by the enemy's right wing; and the seizure of that road, by depriving the Gwáliár troops of their natural line of retreat, would drive them, were the execution to correspond with the design, into the British net. This idea decided Sir Colin's plans. He resolved to mass the largest number of troops on his left—the decisive point—to attack and defeat the enemy's right before it could receive assistance from the centre; then, taking possession of the Gwáliár camp, establish himself on the Kálpi road, and striking at the enemy's communications, compel him to renounce the strong positions occupied by his centre and left.

Reasons for  
limiting the  
number of the  
trained  
soldiers of the  
enemy.

One word as to the number and composition of the enemy's force. I have already said that it has been computed at twenty-five thousand men with forty guns. But, I repeat, it is difficult to believe that more than one half of these, or, at the outside, fourteen thousand, were trained soldiers. The Gwáliár contingent was composed of four companies of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and seven regiments of infantry, a total of about seven thousand men. There may have been in addition an equal number of trained sepoy regiments, some of which had attached themselves to Náná Sáhib—who commanded on the left—in the earlier period of the mutiny, others which had come in from Bandalkhand and Central India. The remainder of the force consisted of the adherents of the Ráni of Jhánshi, attached to the Gwáliár troops on the right; and of the undisciplined and irregular



followers of Náná Sáhib and of other discontented landowners on the left.

Sir Colin Campbell's force consisted of about five thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and thirty-five guns. His infantry were divided into four brigades. That called the 3rd, commanded by Brigadier Greathed, consisted of the wasted remnant of the 8th, of the 64th, and of the 2nd Panjáb Infantry; the 4th, under Adrian Hope, was composed of the 53rd Foot, the 42nd and 93rd Highlanders, and the 4th Panjáb Rifles; the 5th, commanded by Inglis, counted the 23rd Fusiliers, the 32nd Regiment, and the 82nd; the 6th, led by Walpole, was formed of the 2nd and 3rd battalions Rifle Brigade, and a detachment of the 38th Regiment. The cavalry was the same as that which we have already seen doing such good service at the relief of Lakhnao—the 9th Lancers, and detachments of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Panjáb Cavalry, and Hodson's Horse, commanded by the same gallant leader, Brigadier Little. The artillery consisted of the guns of the Naval Brigade, led by William Peel, of the troops of Blunt and Remmington, of the batteries of Bouchier, Middleton, Smith, Longden, and Bridge, commanded in chief by Dupuis. The engineer brigade, the same as that which had served in Oudh, was commanded by Colonel Harness. To Windham was consigned the command of the intrenchment—a command, it will be seen, of considerable importance. Hope Grant acted, nominally, in command of the whole force, but his real position was that of second to Sir Colin Campbell.

Book XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 5.

Number and  
composition  
of the British  
force.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 5.

Position occu-  
pied by the  
British force.

Sir Colin's  
plan of  
attack.

The advanced positions of the British force occupied the suburb called Generalganj, an old bazaar of very considerable extent along the canal, facing the centre of the enemy. This post had been held since the 30th by Greathed, and upon him and his brigade had fallen the brunt of the skirmishing of the subsequent days. Sir Colin's plan of attack was simple. Whilst Greathed should continue to occupy his position facing the enemy, Windham was to open on the enemy's left from the intrenchment a very heavy fire, so as to draw the attention of the rebel leaders to that point. The rest of the infantry, meanwhile, were to be massed in contiguous columns behind, and covered from view by, the old cavalry lines, buildings to the left rear of Greathed's position, and communicating by a cross road running immediately in their rear, at a distance of rather less than half a mile, with the grand trunk road. As soon as Windham's fire should produce the intended effect, the turning movement would be attempted. To facilitate this, certain orders were given to Greathed and to the other brigadiers, the purport of which the narrative of the action will disclose.

Sir Colin  
begins the  
action at 9  
o'clock on the  
6th December  
with a fire of  
artillery.

Early on the morning of the 6th December, Sir Colin Campbell struck his camp, and, to avoid the slightest risk of accident, despatched it to the river side under a guard. This having been accomplished, and the men having breakfasted, Windham, at 9 o'clock, opened fire. The enemy promptly replied, and in a few moments the earth shook with the noise of a terrific artillery com-

bat. Under cover of this fire, the infantry were massed in the position I have indicated, whilst the cavalry and horse artillery were held in readiness, at the same time, to cover the turning movement and to make a detour to the left, and crossing the canal by an unguarded bridge about a mile and a half further up, to threaten the enemy's rear, and to cut him off or intercept him when defeated.

Book XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 6.

The artillery duel continued about two hours. It then gradually slackened, and Greathed, in pursuance of his instructions, moved forward on to the canal, occupying the houses near it and from them opening a severe musketry fire on the enemy's centre. At the same time, the main body proceeded to carry out the plan confided to them.

Greathed  
makes a false  
attack on the  
centre,

The position assigned to each brigade may thus be stated. Walpole, with the sixth, immediately on Greathed's left, was to cross the canal above the town, and advancing along its face, was to mask every gate, and prevent the enemy from affording assistance to their right wing. Meanwhile, on his left, which was the extreme left, Adrian Hope would debouch with the fourth brigade, supported by Inglis with the fifth, and carry out the turning movement.

whilst Wal-  
pole, Hope,  
and Inglis  
prepare to  
turn the right.

When, then, the fire of the artillery slackened, and the rattle of Greathed's musketry was heard, Walpole, assisted by Smith's battery, dashed with his riflemen at the bridge, crossed the canal, and moved along the outskirts of the western face of the town. As he did this, a strong fire opened

Walpole  
crosses the  
canal.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 6.

Adrian Hope  
turns the  
right of the  
rebels.

from the heavy guns of the Naval Brigade, and from Bouchier's and Longden's batteries massed on the left.

The fire had scarcely opened when Adrian Hope brought his brigade into the open, supported by that of Inglis, and covered by the cavalry and horse artillery. The dust raised by the progress of the latter effectually concealed from the enemy the movements of the infantry. They marched to the left, in the direction given by the cross road already indicated. Suddenly, when they reached a point rather beyond a line parallel with the brick-kilns which played so prominent a part in Windham's fight of the 27th, the infantry brigades brought forward their left shoulders—the cavalry and horse artillery still continuing their forward movement parallel with the canal. Hope had covered his advance with the Sikhs of the 4th Panjáb Rifles in skirmishing order, supported by the 53rd. As these gallant men pushed forward, there opened upon them a very heavy fire of shot and shell from the enemy's guns posted behind the canal. At the same time masses of the rebel infantry, protected by the brick-kilns and by mounds formed by the operation of brick-making, poured in a rattling fire of musketry. But our men were not to be baulked. The Sikhs, splendidly supported by the 53rd, rushed on at the double, and driving the enemy from the mounds, gained for themselves a momentary shelter. Only momentary, however. Obeying an order conveyed to them, they rushed at the bridge over which the rebels had fallen back. But the bridge

Splendid conduct of the  
4th Panjáb  
Sikhs and the  
53rd.



had been well cared for by the enemy. Upon it guns were pointed, whilst the rallying infantry of the enemy, recovering heart, again poured upon the skirmishers incessant volleys. For a moment the struggle seemed doubtful, when a rumbling sound was heard, and William Peel and his sailors, dragging with them a heavy 24-pounder, came up with a run, dashed through the skirmishers, planted the gun on the bridge, and opened fire. The effect of this splendid deed was electric. Whilst it roused our men to the wildest enthusiasm, it completely cowed the enemy. Highlanders, Sikhs, and 53rd, dashing by the gun, or fording the canal, rushed on the enemy, and capturing their guns, drove them back in the wildest disorder. The Gwáliár camp was now almost within their grasp. But, before the infantry could reach it, the battery of the gallant Bouchier, always in the front, passed them at a gallop, and, unlimbering, opened fire. In a few minutes the infantry had repassed them, and the Gwáliár camp was their own.\*

Sir Colin Campbell joined his two left brigades at the enemy's camp. His measures had been completely successful. Windham's bombardment of the rebels' left had concentrated their attention

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 6.

Firm resistance of the enemy at the canal.

William Peel brings up a 24-pounder and opens fire

The canal is forced,

and the enemy are beaten.

General view of the action.

\* "So complete was the surprise, so unexpected the onslaught, that the chuppathes were found heating upon the fires, the bullocks stood behind the hackeries, the sick and wounded were lying in the hospitals; the

smith left his forge, and the surgeon his ward, to fly from the avenging bayonets. Every tent was found exactly as its late occupants had sprung from it."—*Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 6.

The enemy are  
pursued along  
the Kálpi  
road.

Completeness  
of the victory  
over the  
Gwáliár  
troops.

on that quarter; then Greathed's threatened attack on their centre so far imposed upon them, that they made no attempt, as a really capable general assuredly would have done, to pierce that—the weakest point of our line; Walpole had successfully prevented the centre from debouching by the western faces of the town to support their right. Adrian Hope and Inglis, Peel, Bouchier, and the gallant officers with their brigades and batteries, had done the rest. There was but one drawback to his complete satisfaction. The guide sent with the cavalry and horse artillery had misled them, and they were not on the spot when the camp fell into our hands. They came up shortly afterwards, however, in time to join in the pursuit which Sir Colin at once directed along the Kálpi road, and which was continued by Sir Colin in person to the fourteenth milestone.\*

It was a great victory. The most formidable portion of the enemy's army, the Gwáliár contin-

\* "For two miles without a check the pursuit was carried on by the battery alone" (Bouchier's), "accompanied by Sir Hope Grant and his staff. Four times in that distance did we come into action, to clear our front and flanks, until General Grant, thinking wisely we were too far from our supports, determined to wait until the cavalry arrived. A halt was called; not until it was required, for the horses, though in the condition of racers, had felt the pace. A small cloud coming nearer and nearer is seen on the left. The head of the cavalry column debouches from a grove. The order for a further pursuit is given. The cavalry spread like lightning over the plain in skirmishing order. Sir Colin takes the lead. The pursuit is continued to the fourteenth milestone, assuming all the character of a fox-hunt."—Bouchier's *Eight Months' Campaign against the Bengal Sepoys*.

gent, had been completely defeated; their camp, with all their stores, magazines, and a part of their *matériel*, had been captured. In a word, the right wing of the rebel army, its head, its brain, had been severed from the body.

The centre and left of the enemy were thus cut off, shut up in Kánhpúr. They had but one line of possible retreat, that by the Bithor road.

On the Bithor road, due north of the city, and immediately in rear of the enemy's left, was a large tank, known as the Subadár's Tank. As the Commander-in-Chief had cut them off on the right, and Greathed and Windham had imposed upon them in front, the occupation of this position would, Sir Colin Campbell felt, force the surrender of the entire force of the enemy. Before, then, he had started to pursue the beaten right wing, he ordered a force to occupy it at once. Whether he felt his presence more necessary with the pursuers, or whether, in the generosity of his heart, he desired to give a chance to one of his generals, I know not. But, considering the regard, almost amounting to affection, he felt for the officer whom he did select for this duty, it is, I think, probable that he was anxious to give him an opportunity of distinguishing himself as a commander. This officer was the Chief of the Staff, Major-General William Mansfield.

General Mansfield was, in many respects, a remarkable man. Tall, and soldierly in appearance, it was impossible for anyone to look at his face without feeling certain that the man before whom he stood possessed more than ordinary

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 6.

The centre and left still shut up in Kánhpúr.

Their line of retreat.

Sir Colin, before pursuing the Gwáliár troops, sends Mansfield to occupy that line of retreat.

General Mansfield.

BOOK XI.  
CHAPTER IV.

1857.  
Dec. 6.

ability. Conversation with him always confirmed this impression. Mansfield was a man of more than ordinary ability. He could write well, he could speak well, he was quick in mastering details, he possessed the advocate's ability of making a bad cause appear a good one. He had that within him to procure him eminence in any profession, excepting one. He was not, and could never have become, a great soldier. Possessing undoubted personal courage, he was yet not a general, at all, except in name. The fault was not altogether his own. Nature, kind to him in many other respects, had denied him the penetrating glance which enables a man to take in, on the instant, the exact lay of affairs in the field. His vision, indeed, was so defective that he was forced to depend for information regarding the most trivial movements upon the report of others. This was in itself a great misfortune. It was, in the case of Mansfield, made irreparable by a haughtiness and innate reserve which shrank from reliance upon anyone but himself. He disliked advice, and though swayed, perhaps too easily, by those whom he loved and trusted, he was impatient of even the semblance of control from men who were brought in contact with him only officially and in a subordinate position. Hence it was that, when in independent command, unable to take a clear view himself, he failed to carry out the action, which, to so clever a man, would undoubtedly have recommended itself, had he had the leisure to study it over a map, in the solitude of his closet.



General Mansfield took with him the whole of the infantry with which Sir Colin had turned the enemy's right wing, with the exception of the 23rd and a wing of the 38th, which he left to guard the captured camp.

It was about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Mansfield advanced, the Rifles skirmishing in front, the heavy guns following, then the main body, the 93rd Highlanders in reserve. The position on which Mansfield was ordered to march—and which, if properly occupied, would completely cut off the enemy—was one to the north of and close to the Subadár's Tank. Driving the enemy before him, he marched to this point, and there halted.

He then ordered the infantry to lie down. He could not see, and would not believe that he had placed them in a position where they could not act, and in which, if the enemy had had any audacity, they might easily have been cut off from the rest of the force. But the enemy had but one idea, that of escaping. The troops were held back, apparently to facilitate their escape. Their indignation was unbounded. More than one senior officer pointed out to Mansfield the golden opportunity he was losing. But he could be persuaded to do no more than to withdraw his infantry from the false position in which he had placed them. He still insisted on keeping back his men, whilst the horse and the foot and the artillery of the rebels filed down the road to Bithor.

This passive action not only rendered the movement to the Subadár's Tank useless, but, in

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 6.

The troops  
with Mans-  
field.

He advances  
towards the  
Subadár's  
Tank.

Consequence  
of his defec-  
tive vision.

Indignation of  
the troops.

The enemy  
are em-  
boldened,



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 6-7.  
and carry off  
their guns to  
Bithor.

accordance with the invariable rule of warfare of India, it emboldened the enemy to venture an artillery attack upon the stationary British. This, indeed, was repelled, but Mansfield still allowed the enemy to carry off all their guns without let or hindrance.\*

The left wing and centre of the enemy thus succeeded in making good their retreat on Bithor. The victory, though great, was not absolutely decisive, for Mansfield's inaction had made it necessary to follow it up with another blow.

Dec. 8.  
Sir Colin  
rests his  
troops,

Giving his men one clear day's rest, Sir Colin detailed a body of troops for this duty on the 8th. The officer he selected this time to command was Hope Grant—a tried, daring, noble-hearted soldier.

then detaches  
Hope Grant to  
follow up the  
escaped  
rebels.

At 1 o'clock in the afternoon of the 8th, Hope Grant set out on his mission. He had with him Adrian Hope's brigade, composed of the 42nd and 93rd Highlanders and 4th Panjáb Rifles; five hundred and fifty-one cavalry; Middleton's field battery, Remmington's troop of horse artillery, and one hundred sappers, or about two thousand seven

\* "Their guns might have been taken," wrote Mansfield, in his despatch, "but I refrained from giving the necessary order, being aware that it was contrary to your Excellency's wish to involve the troops among the enclosures and houses of the new cantonments," &c. Whether Sir Colin Campbell was satisfied with this explanation may be doubted. Let the reader con-

trast the notice in his despatch, without comment, of Mansfield's inaction, with his laudatory remarks in the same despatch on Hope Grant's operations two days later. With respect to the absolute correctness of the account in the text of Mansfield's operations, I appeal with confidence to the surviving officers of the 93rd and of the other regiments present on the occasion.

hundred men of all arms. It was known that the rebels had retreated by the Bithor road, but as it was considered far from improbable that they might attempt to cross into Oudh by the Serai ferry, about three miles from Sheorájpúr, Grant had received discretionary power to change his route in that direction.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 9.

In the course of his march Grant, careful to examine the traces of the retreat, satisfied himself that the rebels had taken the road leading to the ferry. He therefore continued his march, halting only at sunset for a light meal, direct to Sheorájpúr. He reached that place a little before daylight. Leaving here, under a small guard, the impedimenta not absolutely necessary for combat, Grant dashed across country with the bulk of his force for the ferry. When within about a mile of it he galloped to the front to reconnoitre. Whilst thus engaged, the men of his escort were fortunate enough to capture alive a trooper of the rebel force. From this man Grant learned that he had arrived in time; that the rebel guns were on the banks of the river, and that the crossing was to take place that day. Having satisfied himself that the man had told the truth, Grant sent back orders for the cavalry, guns, and infantry to come on with all speed. The remainder of the story is best told in the words of the noble and gallant soldier who commanded.\* “The narrow road ran sometimes parallel to, and sometimes through, a sort of quicksand. Under a

He traces the route they had taken.

He finds them,

\* *Incidents in the Sepoy War*, compiled from the private journals of General Sir Hope Grant, G.C.B.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 9.

and defeats  
them,

high bank, and close to the river, we found the long-sought-for 24-pounder \* embedded up to its axle-trees. We had great difficulty in getting our guns over this bad ground; but at last we reached sounder soil, and then we advanced rapidly. As soon as we came within one thousand yards of the enemy, a tremendous fire opened upon us; but Lieutenant Warren, a fine young fellow, who commanded the leading guns, never stopped until within five hundred or six hundred yards of the rebels, when he opened fire on them. In a few minutes Captain Middleton joined him with the remainder of the battery. Captain Remmington now galloped up with his troop, and came into action in an excellent position behind a bank, at a range of two hundred yards or less. This concentrated artillery-fire told with such terrible effect upon the enemy, crowded into a mass, with their guns, bullocks, baggage, that they gave way and retreated as fast as possible along the river bank, where it would have been difficult to pursue them in force, owing to the marshy state of the ground. However, the irregular cavalry managed to overtake and to cut up some of them. My gallant regiment, the 9th Lancers, was in support of our batteries. We captured fifteen of the enemy's guns, with the finest bullocks I ever saw, belonging to the Gwáliár contingent. We were only just in time; for as we came up to the ferry, we

capturing  
their guns.

\* This was one of the two 24-pounders captured in the Kálpi road on the 6th, but which mysteriously disappeared whilst our troops were continuing the pursuit.

found the rebels preparing to embark the guns in some boats which they had collected for the purpose." A gallant and effective deed of arms, told in the modest language eminently characteristic of the chief actor in the scene! But Hope Grant was as modest as he was daring, as careless of self as he was prodigal of his zeal. His forced march of twenty-five miles, and the prompt movement which followed it, enabled him to repair the mismanagement at the Subadár's Tank on the 6th.

Book XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.

Dec. 9.

Character of  
Hope Grant.

The rebel army was now utterly crushed. In the two days' fight, the 6th and the 9th, it had lost thirty-two guns, a strong position, and a vast number of killed. The two parts of which its army was composed had been for ever separated; the one driven headlong to Kálpi; the other, prevented from crossing into Oudh, had fled without its guns to Bithor, there still within our reach. These great results had been accomplished by the British with a loss to them of only ninety-nine killed and wounded! \*

Results of the  
fighting on the  
6th and 9th.

The battle established the right of Sir Colin Campbell to be regarded as a great commander. In attacking with five thousand men an army of fourteen thousand regular troops, in addition to some odd thousands of irregulars, occupying a very strong position, it was necessary to run some risk; and there can be no doubt that in leaving

Sir Colin  
Campbell as  
a general.

\* The official return was: four subalterns, one staff-sergeant, five sergeants, ten rank and file, killed; two seventy-one rank and file, field officers, three captains, wounded.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 9.

Greathed's weak brigade, not exceeding one thousand men, to guard his centre whilst he massed the rest of his army against the extreme right of the enemy, Sir Colin did leave an opening of which a Napoleon or a Frederic would have taken advantage. But the great thing for a general is to know when to dare. Sir Colin knew that the opponents' general was neither a Napoleon nor a Frederic, and that the soldiers he commanded were neither Frenchmen nor Prussians. He felt that with his actual opponents he could take liberties which they would not resent. It is true that he risked his centre, but the false attack which it made reduced all danger in that quarter to a *minimum*. Knowing his enemy, as he did, it was a sound and daring policy, a policy certain to obtain the end he was aiming at—that of preventing an attack—to order Greathed to feign an onslaught on the enemy's position at the moment he was about to hurl the bulk of his forces against their right wing. This movement would appear to the enemy the necessary corollary of the heavy artillery fire to which they had been subjected from the intrenchment. The plan succeeded, as it eminently deserved to succeed. Completely imposed upon, the enemy's centre and left remained quiet whilst their right was being destroyed. They allowed the centre to be hemmed in in front by Greathed's weak brigade, and on the right by Walpole—and why? Simply because Greathed and Walpole played offensive and not defensive parts. Sir Colin understood Indian warfare well, and he knew that attack supplied inferiority in numbers.

•

The theoretical weakness in his plan of attack was, then, under the circumstances of the case, no weakness at all. The plan was admirably adapted to the occasion, and the execution was worthy of the general. It was no barren victory. One section of the rebel army did indeed escape, though with heavy loss, to Kálpi, but the other, forced to evacuate the town, was pursued to the Ganges, and deprived of its power for mischief on the banks of that river.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 9-11.

Nor did Bithor itself escape. Sir Colin Campbell, on receiving from Hope Grant a report of his success, directed that officer to march at once on the residence of Náná Sáhib and destroy it. Grant set out on the 11th. He found the place evacuated. He carried out his orders by blowing up the temple and burning the palace. Amongst the booty discovered in a large well contiguous to the palace were "some curious pots, lamps which seemed of Jewish manufacture, and spoons of a barbaric weight. All were of the purest metal, and all bore an appearance of antique magnificence."

Bithor is  
destroyed.

Of the large programme Sir Colin Campbell had sketched out for his operations in the North-west Provinces and Oudh, the two first had now been accomplished. He had relieved Lakhnao, and he had utterly defeated the rebel army threatening Kánhpúr. His way was now clear for the performance of the third act of the drama—the opening communications between Kánhpúr and the Panjáb. This accomplished, he would be free to take vengeance on Lakhnao, and to reconquer Rohilkhand.

Two parts of  
Sir Colin's  
plans have  
been accom-  
plished.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IV.

1857.  
Dec. 9-11.

Minor parts of  
the great  
scheme to be  
considered.

It is necessary that the reader should bear in mind that whilst the main action of the campaign rested with the army led by the Commander-in-Chief, there were other actors who contributed effectively, though on a smaller scale, to bring to a perfect conclusion the general scheme which had been sketched out. In a previous chapter\* I have referred to the order given to Colonel Seaton to escort a convoy from Áligarh to the south-west. His movements, which would also serve to reopen completely communication with the north-west, will be noticed in the next chapter. I shall then have to transport the reader to the east and north-east, to witness the other operations, conducted by columns under Brigadiers Franks and Rowcroft, and by the Nipalese force under Jang Bahádur, having for their object to co-operate with the fourth great movement contemplated by Sir Colin Campbell—the reconquest of Lakhnao.

\* Page 118.

## BOOK XI.

---

### CHAPTER V.

AFTER the decisive actions of the 6th and 9th December, Sir Colin Campbell was naturally desirous to push onwards whilst the memory of the defeat of the rebels should be yet fresh in the minds of the combatants and their sympathisers. But there was one material difficulty in the way of his progress. His means of transport were restricted. It had taxed his energies to the utmost to procure carriage in sufficient abundance to serve for the transit of the ladies and children, sick, and wounded he had rescued from the Residency. These, to the number of at least two thousand, had been sent to Allahábád. In leaving Outram with four thousand men at the Álambágh, he had supplied him with the means of moving his troops in case of necessity. For his own entire army, forced to march rapidly a distance of fifty miles, he had not retained the wherewithal to enter upon a harassing campaign. He could

Sir Colin's  
movements  
hampered by  
want of  
carriage.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

The carriage  
arrives,

equip a column, but not an army. The supply of camels from northern and central India was cut off. He was forced, then, to remain inactive until the carriage conveying the convoy of ladies should return from Allahábád.

This carriage did not reach Kánhpúr till the 23rd December. Meanwhile Sir Colin had been maturing his plans. Fathgarh—the Fathgarh whose Nawáb had cast in his lot with the rebels, and had aided the mutinous sepoys in the destruction of our countrymen \*—Fathgarh was the first point to be attacked. The occupation of this place, about midway between Allahábád and Dehlí, would complete the command over the Doáb, which had been secured only partially by the reconquest of Dehlí and the maintenance of Ágra and Allahábád. That point regained, Rohilkhand would still remain to be conquered and Lakhnao to be regained. To quench the embers of the insurrection in the minor places on the left bank of the Jamná, and to the east of Allahábád, flying columns would, it was hoped, prove sufficient.

and Sir Colin  
detaches  
Walpole to  
Mainpuri.

Sir Colin Campbell's movements against Fathgarh were planned with his usual caution. Availing himself of Seaton's march from Aligarh, he directed Walpole to make a semicircular sweep by the Kálpi road *viá* Ákbarpúr to Itáwa and Mainpuri, at once threatening the Kálpi force and clearing of rebels the districts dependent upon Ágra. At Mainpuri Walpole would effect a junc-

\* *Vide* volume i. pp. 335 to 346.

tion with Seaton, who was to wait for him there. These, uniting their forces, were then to march on Fathgarh, upon which place the Commander-in-Chief would move by the direct road from Kánhpúr. In recounting these separate movements, I propose to follow first Walpole, then Seaton; then, leaving the two combined, to proceed to the leader, who had the shortest distance to traverse, and upon whom it devolved to fight the decisive battle.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

Walpole, taking with him the 2nd and 3rd battalions Rifle Brigade, a detachment 38th Foot, Bouchier's battery, Blunt's troop of horse artillery, and one company of sappers, set out on the morning of the 18th December. The column marched by Ákbarpúr to Itáwa without adventure of any kind. Itáwa had been plundered in the early days of the mutiny.\* It was now a wreck; the church, the court-house, the private residences were in ruins; but it was now held by the rebels.

Walpole  
marches on  
Itáwa.

On learning of Walpole's approach the majority of these men evacuated the place. A few fanatics, however, occupying a covered, square, loop-holed enclosure, determined to hold out to the last. Few in number, armed only with muskets, they were animated by a spirit fiercer even than the spirit of despair—by a determination to die martyrs to their cause. Walpole reconnoitred the place. It was, for a place to stop an army, insignificant. It could easily be stormed. Yet to

A few fanatic  
rebels bar his  
way.

\* Volume i. pp. 160 to 163.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

The place they  
occupy is  
blown up.

storm it in the face of its occupants would cost valuable life, and it seemed that easier and less costly means were available.

These easy means were at first tried. Hand grenades were thrown in; an attempt was made to smoke them out with burning straw. But all in vain. Through their loop-holes the rebels poured in a constant and effective fire on the assailants, and for three hours kept them at bay. At last it was resolved to blow up the whole place. For this purpose Bouchier, aided by Scratchley of the Engineers, made a mine, with a number of his gun cartridges, in the roof. The explosion conferred on the defenders the martyrs' honours they coveted. It buried them in the ruins.

Walpole  
reaches  
Mainpuri.

This happened on the 29th December. The column marched without further adventure to Mainpuri, and the following day, the 3rd February, joined Brigadier Seaton's force at Béwar, fifteen miles distant, on the road to Fathgarh.

Composition  
of Seaton's  
force.

Meanwhile Seaton, appointed to the command of the force ordered to escort to Kánhpúr a large convoy of grain and stores,\* had set out on the 9th December for Áligarh. He had under him, of artillery, two hundred and thirty-three men, manning six 9-pounder guns, two 6-pounders, two 18-pounders, one 8-inch howitzer, and two 5½-inch mortars; of cavalry, a squadron of the Carabineers, and a few of the 9th Lancers, one hundred and forty in all, and Hodson's Horse, five hundred and fifty strong, led by Hodson; of

infantry, the 1st Fusiliers, three hundred and seventy-six strong; the 7th Panjáb Infantry, five hundred and forty strong; of sappers, one hundred and twenty. He was joined on the march by Wales's Horse and some Sikhs.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

The night before Seaton left Dehlí he was informed that a considerable body of rebels had assembled in the Áligarh district, and that they were threatening to attack the small force with which Colonel Farquhar held it. With characteristic vigour, Seaton, in spite of his convoy, proceeded to Áligarh by forced marches. Arriving there, he placed his convoy under the guns of the Áligarh fort, made arrangements for a field hospital, rid himself of every ounce of extra baggage, and taking with him a small portion of the fort garrison (one hundred men of the 3rd Europeans) under Major Eld, set out to join Farquhar. He found him encamped at a place called Gangarí, close to the suspension bridge over the Káli river. The enemy were believed to be some thirteen miles distant. Seaton at once, then, crossed the river, marched a mile and a half, encamped in some fields, and sent Hodson to the front to reconnoitre.

Seaton, learning that the rebels are in the Áligarh district,

marches against them,

and sends Hodson to reconnoitre.

Whilst Hodson, accompanied by Major Light of the Bengal Artillery, a very gallant and skilful soldier, were galloping to the front to reconnoitre, Seaton and the other officers sat down to their breakfasts, whilst the men, hungry after their march, watched the cook-boys as they prepared for them the same stimulating meal. The officers had breakfasted, the men were about to sit down

Seaton and his soldiers are breakfasting, or about to breakfast,



BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

when the  
alarm is  
sounded.

The troops  
turn out, fast-  
ing.

Seaton ad-  
vances against  
the rebels.

to their breakfasts, already placed, smoking hot, before them, when the alarm called them, fasting, to their posts. Half a minute before, Light, galloping at full speed, had brought the information that the enemy was advancing on both flanks. At once all was bustle and animation. The infantry, without waiting to put on their coats, turned out, as in the Dehlí days, with their muskets and side-arms. The cavalry were in their saddles in less than three minutes. The gunners, always on the alert, were not a whit behindhand. In less time than it has taken to describe it, all arms of the force, thus suddenly alarmed, were in their places. On the extreme right were the Carabineers and Lancers; on the extreme left Hodson's Horse; the 1st Fusiliers and one hundred men of the 3rd Europeans were in the centre behind the guns; on the left of the 1st Fusiliers were the Sikhs and Rifles.

Seaton moved forward to meet the enemy. He had scarcely set his troops in motion when Hodson rode up and reported to the Brigadier that he had seen the enemy some miles in front filing through a village with guns; that having watched their further proceedings, he had sent on Light to make his report. Hardly had he finished speaking when the heads of the enemy's columns appeared in sight—two large bodies, one on each flank. Their infantry soon followed, filling up the gap between the two. Seaton at once ordered the guns to the front. These at once opened on the enemy. The hostile guns replied, and though the reply was feeble, yet from the position they

had taken up they were able to rake the British line. Seeing this, Wardlaw of the Carabineers, who had received discretionary orders, charged the enemy's battery. The guns turned at once upon the gallant soldiers led most gallantly. But nothing stopped them. Out of the five officers with the Carabineers three, Wardlaw, Hudson, and Vyse, fell dead; the lieutenant of the handful of Lancers charging with them, Head, was dangerously wounded, whilst of the men six were killed and eleven wounded; but the guns were captured! The cavalry were then led by the only surviving officer, Lieutenant Russell, along the fields, and his men, making good use of their carbines, cleared out the enemy without further loss.

Book XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

Gallant  
charge of the  
Carabineers,  
who, in spite  
of losses, cap-  
ture the guns.

Whilst this was happening on the left, Hodson on the right had dashed with his regiment against the enemy's horse, and had overthrown them.

Hodson over-  
throws the  
enemy on the  
right.

The infantry did not pause to receive. Throwing away their arms, they ran to hide themselves in the fields and ravines, or to continue their flight over the country. They had lost all their guns, one 9-pounder and two 6-pounders, and—what was of greater importance—had received “great discouragement.” It appeared that they had no idea that Seaton had come up; they hoped to have to do only with Farquhar's small force of Bilúchis. The discovery that a considerable European force was marching through the districts was a warning to them that from that time forth their occupation was gone!

The enemy  
completely  
defeated.

Their mis-  
take!

This fight received from the name of the town

BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

Seaton occu-  
pies Khás-  
ganj,

and pushes on  
to Pattiáli,

where, hear-  
ing of the  
rebels, he  
sends Hodson  
to recon-  
noitre.

Hodson re-  
ports the  
position occu-  
pied by the  
enemy.

Seaton forms  
his plan.

near which it was fought the title of combat of Khásganj. That town was occupied the following morning. It was a strong place, filled with brick houses, and surrounded by old gardens, encompassed with strong mud walls, and, if well-defended, would have been hard to take. Seaton then pushed on to Saháwar, and the next day, the 17th, to Pattiáli. When, however, passing through a village about two miles of this place, a few shots were heard, and Hodson, who was with the advanced guard, sent word that the enemy's outposts had fired their muskets, and galloped off. On receiving this report, Seaton brought all his men through the village, then halted, and served out bread and grog to the men, whilst Hodson and the engineers went to the front to reconnoitre.

In about twenty minutes Hodson returned to report that the enemy had formed across the road, barring the entrance to Pattiáli; that their right and right centre were resting on some large ravines, on the right face and front of which earth-works had been thrown up; that their left centre and left were posted in front of gardens and enclosures, covered on the extreme left by their cavalry, posted in an open country. In front of the centre of their position, and about half a mile from it, was a small village, through which, they had calculated, the British force would advance. They had laid their plans accordingly.

On hearing this report Seaton disposed his force for action. On the right he massed Hodson's Horse, the Carabineers and Lancers, and



some light guns; in the centre the Europeans; on the left the native infantry, and the heavy guns. His plan was to turn their left flank.

Occupying, then, the small village of which I have spoken with a few men, and thus constituting that village the left of his position, he brought four guns to the front on the extreme right, and sent four more to take up a position almost enfilading the enemy's position from left to right. But before these could unlimber, the enemy opened fire from a battery of twelve guns. In a few minutes, however, the British guns replied, and the duel commenced in earnest. The artillery contest lasted about thirty minutes, the cavalry and infantry meanwhile being halted. But as the fire from the British guns had, during those thirty minutes, been gradually gaining on the enemy, when that time had elapsed, Seaton could contain himself no longer. Giving the order to the infantry to advance, he charged himself at the head of the cavalry. The enemy did not await that charge. They broke and fled, and when the infantry, which had advanced on receiving the order, reached the spot, they found that their efforts were not required: they had been forestalled by their gallant Brigadier.\*

Book XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.

December.

Begins the  
battle with  
an artillery  
duel;

then, charging, gains it with his cavalry.

\* "On we move, and, to our surprise, without receiving a shot from the enemy, whose guns, we found, on reaching their position, had been captured by Colonel Seaton, who had led the Staff and horse artillery, with some few of Hodson's Horse. In fact, seeing the enemy wavering, this bold charge, led by Seaton, decided matters, so far as the guns were concerned." — The 1st



BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

The rebels  
are pursued  
and slaugh-  
tered;

among them  
their heredi-  
tary com-  
mander-in-  
chief.

Great effect  
on the coun-  
try of this  
victory.

The gallant charge of Seaton decided the day ; but it did not stop the slaughter. The Carabineers, the Lancers, Hodson's Horse, and the artillery "got in" among the fleeing enemy, and pursued them for seven miles, taking blood for blood. It is computed that not less than six hundred of the rebels succumbed in this pursuit. On the side of the British the loss was singularly small, one man only having been killed and three wounded. The number of guns taken amounted to thirteen. Amongst the trophies captured on this occasion were the elephant, the silver howdah, and the sword of the Hakím, hereditary commander-in-chief of the Nawáb of Farrakhábád. The Hakím himself had been killed by Hodson. In the choice of an open position in front of one very defensible, he had clearly demonstrated that the qualities which go to form an efficient commander-in-chief are not hereditary.

Seaton halted three days at Pattiáli, chiefly to give time to the administrative officers to reorganise their establishments and settle the country. This halt showed him the marvellous effect which his triumphant march had produced. On all sides the rebels were falling back, terrified, on Fathgarh, or endeavouring to cross the Ganges into Oudh. Some bodies of them, of whose movements he heard, and against whom he despatched a small force, fled on the appearance even

Bengal Fusiliers after the fall of Delhi (*Blackwood's Magazine*). The writer of the article was at the time attached to the 1st Fusiliers.

of a reconnoitring party! \* Seaton thought, then, that he might fairly return for his convoy.

Accordingly on the 21st he retraced his steps. On the 22nd, when within a few miles of Khásganj, he was met by Mr. Cocks, the Civil Commissioner of the division, with the information that a notorious rebel, named Jawáhir Singh, who had fought against him at Pattiáli, had doubled round, and had returned with one son, wounded in that engagement, to Khásganj. Hodson was at once sent to the front to dispose of the question. He disposed of it in his own manner. He killed the son; the father, taken prisoner, was tried by a military commission and blown from a gun that evening. He deserved his fate, for not only was he in receipt of a pension from the British Government as a native officer, but he was receiving also the emoluments attaching to the Order of British India, of which he was a member.

From Khásganj Seaton sent Major Eld to escort the captured guns to Áligarh and to despatch the convoy thence under charge of the escort with which he furnished him. He then resumed his march to Íta. There he received information that the Rájá of Mainpúri, a debauchee, named

BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.

December.

Hodson disposes of two noted rebels.

Seaton arranges for the convoy,

and marches on Mainpúri.

\* "On the appearance in the distance of the reconnoitring party they had fled precipitately. The officer went over the ground on which they had been encamped, and found their food

still cooking on the fire, their pots and pans, and all their baggage standing apart. The fear of us had fallen on all the district round about."—  
*From Cadet to Colonel*, by Sir Thomas Seaton, K.C.B.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

Learns on his  
march that  
the rebel  
Rájá is in his  
path, to  
oppose his  
progress.

Seaton out-  
manœuvres,

and defeats  
him.

Seaton halts  
at Mainpúri.  
Hodson pro-  
poses to open  
communica-  
tion with the  
Commander-  
in-Chief.

Téj Singh, had raised a force with the intention of barring the road to him. Upon Mainpúri, then, Seaton marched, *viâ* Karáli.

At Karáli, fourteen miles from Mainpúri, Seaton learned from his scouts that the young Rájá had drawn up his little force in position across the road from Karáli just above the junction with the grand trunk road leading to Ágra, and that he had occupied walled gardens on either side of the road, and had covered the road itself with field-works.

Seaton's plan was instantly made. When within a mile of the enemy's position, he turned off from the main road by a path to the right, hiding his movement, as far as possible, by the dust made by the cavalry, until he had gained a position whence he could rake the enemy's line from left to right. In vain did the enemy bring their guns to bear on him. Seaton continued his movement until he had reached the point he was aiming at. The British guns then opened. Two rounds were sufficient. The enemy fled in disorder, abandoning on the field and in the fort, which they did not attempt to defend, eight guns. Their loss cannot be properly estimated; it did not probably exceed one hundred. Seaton's amounted to two wounded!

The action near Mainpúri was fought on the 27th December. Seaton halted in the vicinity of that place till the 31st, whilst Hodson of Hodson's Horse made a daring and most successful effort to open communications with the Commander-in-Chief. Many gallant deeds were performed during



the mutiny, but not one exceeded this in cool and deliberate courage.

My opinion of Hodson has been already recorded. He was a free-lance of the Middle Ages. But if his action towards the unarmed and captive princes of the House of Taimúr proved that the instincts of the natural savage reigned strong within him, his fearlessness, his contempt of danger, his joy in the battle, his ever cool brain, made him invaluable as a partisan leader. When a risk for the general good was to be undertaken, Hodson always came forward to undertake it. In matters affecting, or likely to affect, him physically, he never counted the cost. He was invaluable to a commander. Was information regarding the enemy's movements required, Hodson would get it. Was a delicate movement at a particular period of a battle considered essential, the execution of it was entrusted to Hodson. Always in the position where his presence was needed, always the first to detect a false movement, always with his life in his hand ready to risk it, Hodson could not fail to be the right-hand man of his general. "He is indefatigable," said Seaton, to General Penny, when asking for his services—"a soldier of the highest class; I have unbounded confidence in him, and would rather have him than five hundred more men."

The undertaking to which he now devoted himself was one requiring nerve, intelligence, and activity of the highest order. Seaton's camp was at Mainpúri. The Commander-in-Chief was reported to be at Gúrsahaiganj, about forty miles

BOOK XI.  
Chapter V

1857.

December.

Hodson invaluable as a partisan leader.

Danger of the undertaking he proposed to accomplish.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

Hodson and  
M'Dowell  
start on their  
dangerous  
errand.

from Mainpúri, marching for Fathgarh. But the country between the two places was the country into which the rebels, so often beaten, had been driven, and though some, doubtless, had reached Fathgarh, others had lingered on the road. The rebels beaten at Mainpúri must of necessity be there.

Still, it was very advisable to attempt to open out communications with the Commander-in-Chief, and, the task being difficult and dangerous, Hodson naturally volunteered to execute it. His offer was accepted, and on the morning of the 30th he set out, taking with him his second in command, M'Dowell, a very gallant officer, and seventy-five of his own men. He carried on his person Colonel Seaton's despatches.

Hodson rode straight to Béwar, fourteen miles distant. There he left all his escort except twenty-five men. With these and with M'Dowell he continued his course to Chibramáo, another fourteen miles, where he made another halt.

Leaving their  
escort behind,  
they reach  
their destina-  
tion to find  
the Chief still  
distant from  
it.

From this point he determined to push on to Gúrsahaiganj accompanied only by M'Dowell. The distance was about twelve miles. Leaving, then, the twenty-five native troopers in Chibramáo, the two officers rode on alone. They reached Gúrsahaiganj in safety, only to find, however, that the Commander-in-Chief's camp was at Míran-ká-serai, some fifteen miles further off.

Alarming  
nature of the  
situation ;

The situation was alarming. The villagers reported that the rebels, seven hundred strong with four guns, were within two miles of the place. But hesitation never entered into the calculations

of Hodson. He and his comrade continued their journey, and reached the headquarter camp, without adventure, at 4 o'clock in the morning. They had ridden fifty-five miles in ten hours, without change of horse.

It happened that on the road between Chibramáo and Gúrsahaiganj, Hodson had bestowed alms upon a native. A very short time after he had left the former place, it had been entered by a party of two thousand rebels on their way to Fathgarh. These men overpowered and killed the troopers, and having gathered from the villagers that Hodson and his companion would return, they resolved to lay wait for them. Meanwhile, Hodson had been splendidly received by Sir Colin Campbell, had been closeted with him the greater part of the day, and had dined with him. At 8 o'clock in the evening, he and M'Dowell set out on their return journey. They proceeded without adventure till within five or six miles of Chibramáo. Here they were stopped by the native whom Hodson had befriended in the morning, with the information that Chibramáo was occupied by the rebels, who were on the look-out for them. It was near midnight, the moon was bright, and the wind cold. It was neither the time nor place for deliberation, nor did Hodson require it. He determined to push on. Dismounting, then, from their horses, he and his companion led them to the soft unmacadamised strip which forms the border to an Indian road, and followed by the native, walked on. They gradually approached Chibramáo, they entered it,

Book XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

but they  
push on, and  
gain the  
Chief's camp  
in safety.

While he is  
there the  
road he tra-  
versed is  
occupied by  
the rebels.

Hodson and  
M'Dowell  
start to  
return;  
they are  
warned of  
the danger  
threatening  
them.

By prudent  
boldness they  
escape the  
danger,

BOOK XI.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
December.

and return.

they saw the camp of the enemy, they heard the hum of voices; but they reached unseen the further end of the village. On emerging from it, they dismissed their guide, with a promise from him to join them in their camp, remounted, and rode on. At Béwar they were met by a party which Seaton, hearing of the surprise at Chibramáo, had sent out to look for them.

Seaton effects  
a junction  
with Walpole.

Seaton, indeed, alarmed at the reports brought in by the troopers left at Béwar, had moved on to that place on the 31st. Here he remained with his convoy till the 3rd January, when, as already related, Brigadier Walpole marched into Béwar. Seaton's force came at once under his orders.

## BOOK XI.

---

### CHAPTER VI.

It is time now to return to the Commander-in-Chief.

The carriage necessary for his movements returned from Allahábád on the 23rd December. Sir Colin marched from Kánhpúr on the 24th. Clearing the country lying between the main road and the road by which he had despatched Walpole with his left brigade, and stripping the Ganges of boats with a brigade on his right, Sir Colin reached Míran-ká-serai on the 30th. It was at this place that he met Hodson in the manner I have related in the preceding chapter. The following day he reached Gúrsahaiganj. Here a road branches off from the main road, and leads the traveller over the Káli Naddi, traversed by a suspension bridge at a distance of five miles from the junction of the roads to Fathgarh.

Sir Colin  
Campbell  
sets out for  
Fathgarh.

The advance of the Commander-in-Chief had been acting on the various detachments of rebels

The rebels  
driven from  
all sides to.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1857.  
Dec. 30-31.  
wards Fath-  
garh.

They deter-  
mine, too  
late, to de-  
stroy the  
bridge over  
the Káli  
Naddi.

They begin  
their work of  
destruction.

But are  
checked by  
Adrian Hope.

in the manner of a loaded net sunk in a stream and drawn upwards by men on both banks. Walpole and Seaton prevented escape on one side, Sir Colin drove his victims up on the other. There was one outlet, however, which neither commanded, and for this the harassed tribe was now making. The outlet was Fathgarh.

The Káli Naddi barred the entrance of a hostile force into Fathgarh. But I have said that it was spanned by a suspension bridge. The rebels, jammed into the place from all sides, some fleeing from Seaton, some from Walpole, some from the Commander-in-Chief, began, recovering from their panic, to reflect that their last chance of safety lay in the removal of the suspension bridge. Like so many of their reflections, it came too late.

However, on the 31st they sent down a party to destroy the bridge. Had they worked with a will they might have succeeded. But though they effected some damage that night, they left the piers and the main chains intact, hoping, it may be supposed, to deal with them on the morrow.

But for the destruction of the bridge there was to be no morrow. Early on the morning of the 1st January, Sir Colin detached Adrian Hope's brigade, reinforced with two 24-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, under Lieutenant Vaughan of the Naval Brigade, and some engineers, sappers, and cavalry, to the Káli Naddi, with orders to drive away the enemy and to repair the bridge in case it should be found damaged.

On the approach of Adrian Hope the rebels fled, and the engineers and sappers at once set to work to repair it, covered by a strong infantry picket. They laboured with so much earnestness that day and through the night, that by half-past 7 o'clock the next morning the bridge was in a fit state to be traversed.

The labours of the British troops had but just been completed, and the sailors, who had helped in the work, were on the river-bank washing their garments, when the Commander-in-Chief and his staff arrived to examine the position. Halting, he noticed a large village, facing the bridge, at a distance of about three hundred yards, flanked on its right by some tall trees. In front of the village was a small square building, which proved afterwards to be a toll-house. The road from the river-bank gradually ascended to a point beyond the village, which it intersected.

Sir Colin had had barely time to make these observations when the rebels, who till then had kept out of sight, poured into the village, and opened a heavy musketry fire upon the group of which the Commander-in-Chief was the centre. Under cover of this fire, they brought up two guns, and opened out on the pickets sent across to guard the bridge-head, and on the bridge itself. Sir Colin at once sent orders to the main body of his troops, then about four miles in rear, to push on. Till they could come up, he directed Adrian Hope to hold the bridge, but on no account to attack the enemy.

Adrian Hope at once detached the 53rd across

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1857.  
Jan. 1-2.

Sir Colin comes up and reconnoitres the ground beyond the bridge.

The rebels open fire upon him.

Adrian Hope keeps them in check.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1857.  
Jan. 2.

The 53rd lie  
down beyond  
the bridge  
and open fire.

Vaughan dis-  
mounts one  
of the ene-  
my's pieces.

the bridge to reinforce the pickets, directing them to extend under cover of the bank, and to keep up a brisk musketry fire on the enemy. One wing of the 93rd he kept in hand, ready, if necessary, to support the skirmishers, the other wing being posted three miles lower down guarding a ford.

The 53rd, crossing the bridge, found a partial though inadequate cover from the mounds and ridges of earth and the tall grass covering the bank. Lying down here, they opened on the enemy a very effective fire. Meanwhile, Vaughan's three guns crossed the bridge, and taking up a position close to a yellow bungalow near its northern end, opened fire on the village.

Still the rebels continued their fire, and their leader, noting that a gun placed under cover of the toll-house would sweep the bridge, brought up one of his pieces to that position between 2 and 3 o'clock, and opened from it. The effect was most damaging to our men, one shot alone killing or wounding eight of them. This practice continued for some time, when the guns of the Naval Brigade, splendidly directed by Vaughan, succeeded in dismounting the piece and blowing up the tumbril.\*

\* The manner in which this work was done reflects so much credit on all who were concerned in it, that it merits a notice more detailed than that which I have given in the text. "Lieutenant Vaughan now pointed and fired one of our guns at the small gun of the enemy,

which was concealed behind the corner of a house, and annoying us much. His first shot struck the roof of the house; his second struck the angle of the wall about half-way down; and a third dismounted the gun and destroyed the carriage. Captain Peel, who was standing



The gun which had caused so much destruction had scarcely been dismounted when the 53rd, disregarding their orders to remain where they were, made a simultaneous rush to the front on the toll-house, clearing out the enemy. Sir Colin was furious at this disobedience, but he vainly tried to check it.\* The men of the 53rd had heard that they were to be relieved, and they were determined to be in the front. There was nothing for it but to support them. Fortunately, the heads of the main column were now at hand. The 93rd crossed the bridge in support of the 53rd, whilst Greathed's brigade, following, advanced up the slope to the left, flanked on the extreme left by the cavalry led by Hope Grant. As the infantry advanced on the village, the enemy abandoned it. Upon this, Hope Grant, taking on his men round at a trot, caught the enemy as they were emerging from the other end, and, charging in echelon of squadrons, completely broke them. "Then despair seized upon the rebel mass; breaking their ranks, throwing aside their

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1857.  
Jan. 2.

The 53rd  
rush to the  
front.

Complete  
defeat of the  
rebels.

by, said: 'Thank you, Mr. Vaughan; perhaps you will now be so good as to blow up the tumbril.' Lieutenant Vaughan fired a fourth shot, which passed near it; and a fifth, which blew it up and killed several of the enemy. 'Thank you,' said Captain Peel, in his blandest and most courteous tones; 'I will now go and report to Sir Colin.'"—*The Shannon's Brigade in India*. E. H. Verney.

\* "The Commander-in-Chief was terribly annoyed, and, riding up to the regiment, pitched into it well. But these wild Irishmen were incorrigible. Whenever he began to speak, a lot of them exclaimed, as loud as they could, 'Three cheers for the Commander-in-Chief, boys!' until at length he himself was obliged to go away, laughing."—Hope Grant's *Incidents*.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1857.  
Jan. 2.

arms, they fled in wild confusion; but the horsemen were upon them and amongst them, and the slaughter was terrible; for several miles they rode along spearing and cutting down at every step; and the progress of their swift advance might be marked by the smoke of exploded tumbrils curling up amidst the dark-green trees." \*

They flee into  
Rohilkhand.

The rout of the enemy was complete. Eight guns, several colours, palanquins, and ammunition waggons fell into the hands of the victors. The rebels did not cease their flight even when they reached the fort of Fathgarh, but, hastily seizing on all that was portable in their camp outside that fort, hurried in panic and dismay across the same river which many of them had crossed but six short months before, arrogant with the pride of revolt, thirsting for the blood of the officers whom whilom they had sworn to obey! They fled into Rohilkhand.

Ovation given  
by the sol-  
diers to Sir  
Colin.

The ovation the Commander-in-Chief received from his soldiers that evening is thus described by an eye-witness, one of the gallant actors in that stirring scene. "Their return from this" (the return of the cavalry from the pursuit) "was a stirring sight of war. In front came the 9th Lancers, with three captured standards at their head; the wild-looking Sikh horsemen rode in the rear. As they passed the Commander-in-Chief he took off his hat to them, with some words of praise and thanks. The Lancers shook their lances in the air and cheered; the Sikhs

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

took up the cry, waving their sabres above their heads. The men carrying the standards gave them to the wind; the Highland brigade, who were encamping close by, ran down and cheered both the victorious cavalry and the veteran Chief, waving their bonnets in the air. It was a fair sight, and reminded one of the old days of chivalry. When Sir Colin rode back through the camp of the Highlanders, the enthusiasm of the men exceeded description." \*

Sir Colin's losses amounted to four men killed, two officers and eight men wounded. Those of the enemy were naturally much greater.

I have mentioned the skilful conduct of Vaughan of the Naval Brigade at this action, but I cannot quit the subject without referring to the gallantry of Roberts, the same Roberts who so distinguished himself recently in Afghánistán. In pursuing the rebels, this officer, then a lieutenant, came suddenly upon and engaged two sepoy with a standard, cut one of them down, and captured the standard. He subsequently cut down another sepoy who was keeping a trooper at bay. For these acts Roberts received the Victoria Cross.

Sir Colin halted for the night some twelve miles from Fathgarh. Early the next morning he marched for that place, blew open the gate of the fort, and entered without opposition. So great had been the previous confidence, and so complete the present panic of the rebels, that they had left in it uninjured a valuable stock of timber, stored for the purpose of making gun-carriages, steam

Book XI.  
Chapter VI.  
—  
1858.  
Jan. 2.

Gallantry of  
Roberts.

Sir Colin  
re-occupies  
Fathgarh,

\* *Blackwood's Magazine*, October 1858.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1858.  
January.

and there  
concentrates  
his flying  
columns.

Jan. 4.

The third  
portion of his  
programme  
accom-  
plished.

Sir Colin  
Campbell is  
in favour of  
dealing with  
Rohilkhand  
before recon-  
quering  
Oudh.

engines, guns of all sorts, and a large quantity of soldiers' clothing. They had even neglected to cut the bridge of boats communicating across the Ganges with the opposite bank. This was at once secured.

The next day Walpole's column, strengthened by Seaton's, and escorting the convoy, marched into Fathgarh. The army thus concentrated amounted to more than ten thousand men, well supplied with camp equipage and means of transport.

Thus was accomplished successfully the third portion of the original programme of the Commander-in-Chief. Communication with the north-west had been re-established: the Doáb had been cleared of rebels. Those rebels had escaped into Rohilkhand. That province and the province of Oudh still remained in open revolt. The dealing with them was to constitute the fourth scene of the drama.

It was the opinion of Sir Colin Campbell that the three months of cold weather which yet remained to him might be most profitably employed by following the enemy into Rohilkhand. Stamping out the rebellion in that province the submission of the whole of the north-west would be assured. The separate forces then operating, as will be hereafter described, in western and central India, in Rájputáná and in Bandalkhand, would at the same time restore order and tranquillity throughout those parts of India. Oudh alone would remain; and Sir Colin was of opinion that Oudh, hemmed in by the Gúrkahs



in one extremity, and by troops whom he would dispose in summer quarters from that extremity to the further border, might wait his pleasure—might remain, that is to say, for some months longer in the hands of the rebels, until the ensuing cold season would permit his troops to operate more effectually in that country. His European troops he regarded as the mainstay, the backbone of his army, and he was unwilling, if it could be avoided, to expose them to the exhaustion and loss inseparable from a hot-weather campaign—a campaign carried on under circumstances which would often require the employment of small detachments, hurried and forced marches, exposure to the mid-day sun, and possibly to the heavy autumnal rains.

But, in the opinion of the Aulic Council of the Government of India, the political exigencies of the time were so pressing, that they overbore considerations which, if prompted partly by sound rules of military science, were dictated in the main by regard for the health and preservation of the European soldier. Lord Canning and the members of his Council were guided in the views they propounded by two great principles: the one, that no rest should be given to the rebels—that they must be attacked and pursued until they should submit; the other, that the main object of the next movement should be the recapture of Lakhnao. These were cardinal points with the Government. They were supported, too, by another, which, if a minor, was yet not an unimportant consideration. I allude to the co-operation of the

Book XI.  
Chapter VI.

1858.  
January.

Lord Canning  
prefers that  
the recon-  
quest of  
Lakhnao  
should first  
be attempted.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1858.  
January.

Arguments  
in favour of  
the course  
adopted by  
Lord Can-  
ning.

Gurkahs, led by the Prime Minister of Nipál, Jang Bahádur. These troops, ten thousand in number, were occupying a position from which they could co-operate effectively with the British in Oudh. Were Sir Colin to deal immediately with Oudh, they would join in the action. But it could not be expected, if the Oudh campaign were adjourned, that these men, natives of the Himalayas, would remain during the hot and rainy seasons in the plains exposed to a climate with which they were naturally unfitted to cope.

There are few, I think, who would be disposed now to question the wisdom of the course recommended by the Government of India. It seems to me that every consideration favoured its adoption. Alike in war and in politics, it is always advisable to strike a decisive blow at the most important point of the enemy opposed to you. In this case Lakhnao was that point. Lakhnao taken, the heart of the rebels would be broken. No other great rallying-place would remain to them. So long, on the other hand, as that regal city should remain in their possession, their adherents would continue to nourish hope, and it would require more than ordinary tact and care to prevent the outbreak of rebellion in parts which had been already over-run.

Again, of the two provinces, Rohilkhand and Oudh, the latter was by far the most formidable, the most important. The pacification of Rohilkhand would produce little or no effect on the men of Oudh. On the contrary, the re-conquest of Lakhnao would be felt in every village and in

every corner of Rohilkhand. To this must be added the important consideration that whilst Outram was, with some difficulty, holding the Álambágh with nearly four thousand men, rebels from all parts of India were daily crowding into Lakhnao. This fact alone would show that the case of Lakhnao was the more pressing.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1858.  
January.

The necessity of dealing in the first instance a deadly blow at Lakhnao was insisted upon with so much force by Lord Canning that it became a law to the Commander-in-Chief. It devolved, then, upon him to make his preparations to carry into effect the settled plan.

The Commander-in-Chief adheres to Lord Canning's views.

At Fathgarh, situated on the Ganges, at the south-western extremity of the border-line between Oudh and Rohilkhand, Sir Colin was occupying a position of no small advantage. It effectually barred the entrance into the reconquered districts of mutineers from the capital of Rohilkhand—Barélí—seventy-seven miles distant; from the north-western division of Oudh; and from Lakhnao. The river-line between Fathgarh and Kánhpúr was strongly held, there being intermediate posts at Bithor and Miran-ka-Serai. It was impossible for Sir Colin Campbell to undertake the contemplated measures against Lakhnao without the aid of a siege-train. Now, the siege-train was at Ágra. The distance between Ágra and Kánhpúr, the point whence the advance on Lakhnao must be made, is one hundred and seventy-nine miles. The road passed through Itáwa, whence Walpole had but recently expelled the rebels, and in the vicinity of districts cleared by Seaton. The

Advantageous position occupied by Sir Colin at Fathgarh.

The road between Kánhpúr and Ágra protected on the left flank,

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1858.

January.

and on the  
right.

victory near Fathgarh and the occupation of that place by Sir Colin protected it against attacks from the left during its progress.

It was scarcely less secure on its right. For, although the broken remnant of the Gwáliár contingent was supposed to be at Kálpi or in its vicinity, the men forming it could scarcely have recovered from the heavy blow and sore discouragement inflicted upon them on the 6th December. It seemed almost certain, too, that they would feel in their rear the effects of the superhuman efforts which it was known were being made by the British troops in Central India and in Bandalkhand to get at them; whilst the fact that Kánhpúr was guarded by a brigade under Inglis, that the communications with Allahábád were preserved by a Madras brigade under Carthew, and that those between that place and Banáras were protected by another brigade under Franks, left them, in reality, but one line upon which they could act against the siege-train—the line by Akbarpúr, and that was the line which Walpole had but very recently cleared, and along which no force could march from Kálpi without exposing its right to Kánhpúr and Bithor.

Sir Colin  
makes pre-  
parations for  
Lakhnao.

The siege-train was then ordered from Ágra. Whilst it was on its way, Sir Colin had time to organise the measures he considered necessary to secure his conquests and to facilitate his movements. To guard the position at Fathgarh and the districts to the west and south-west of it, including Itáwa, Mainpúri, and Miran-ka-Serai, he required an officer of more than ordinary intelli-



gence and decision, well-acquainted with the natives, and capable of arriving at and acting on a decision. For this command he selected Colonel Seaton. What Seaton was may be gathered from the account I have given of his march from Dehlí to Béwar. A gallant soldier, shrinking from no responsibility, always ready to give his life for his country, he was just the man to hold a position full of difficulty and danger. The post that was offered him came emphatically within that category. For, to hold Fathgarh and the districts which Fathgarh covered, Sir Colin proposed to leave him only two weak English regiments,—one of which only, the 82nd, was at Fathgarh—the 7th Panjáb Infantry, a 9-pounder field battery, and three hundred and fifty newly raised native horsemen; this, too, when fifteen thousand rebels were within seven miles of Fathgarh! But, difficult as was the occasion, Seaton was equal to it.

Meanwhile, Sir Colin had endeavoured to amuse the Rohilkhand rebels. His great object was to mislead them—to impress them with the idea that Baréli was the object of his attack. Immediately after occupying Fathgarh, he had sent Adrian Hope's brigade to scour the country in the vicinity. On Hope's return, learning that a force of fifteen thousand men had assembled at the town of Allahganj on the banks of the Rámghanga river, some seven or eight miles distant, Sir Colin sent Walpole's brigade, with guns, cavalry, and sappers, to make a demonstration against them. Walpole's orders were to make as much display as possible, but not to commit himself to an en-

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1858.  
January.

Sir Colin  
manœuvres  
so as to in-  
duce a belief  
that Rohil-  
khand is his  
object.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1858.  
January.

gagement across the river. He carried out these orders to the letter; he made as though he would repair the bridge, which the rebels had broken down, across the Rámghanga; and to add to the delusion, Sir Colin rode out himself and made a careful reconnaissance of the spot. The ruse succeeded admirably, for the rebels were completely deceived, and, for a time, became rooted to the left bank of the river.

Whether suspicion gradually dawned upon them, or whether they were well served by their spies, I do not know. But it is certain that after remaining in this position ten or twelve days, they detached a body of five thousand men to attempt an incursion into the reconquered districts. These men, crossing the Rámghanga at a point above that watched by Walpole, marched to a ferry on the Ganges, called Surájghát, about twelve miles above Fathgarh, crossed that river, and occupied the village of Shamsábád. At ten o'clock on the evening of the 26th January, Adrian Hope's brigade, consisting of the 42nd, the 93rd, the 4th Panjáb Rifles, Remington's and Blunt's troops of Bengal Horse Artillery, two squadron's of the 9th Lancers, and half of Hodson's Horse, was sent to attack them. Marching all night, Adrian Hope found the enemy at 8 o'clock in the morning posted at the village of Sútia, half a mile from Shamsábád. As soon as the rebels saw the English their guns opened fire. Hope did not reply till well within distance; but when he did reply, it was with considerable effect. At the fifth discharge the rebels broke and fled.

Adrian Hope  
defeats the  
rebels at  
Sútia.

Hodson and the 9th Lancer squadrons were amongst them at once, and though the rebel cavalry fought well, the slaughter of them was great. The British loss did not exceed five or six killed and about twenty wounded. Amongst those wounded mortally was M'Dowell, the gallant second in command of Hodson's Horse, the companion of Hodson in many a daring enterprise. Hodson himself was wounded in two places. The enemy were pursued eight or nine miles. Those who escaped recrossed the Ganges into Rohilkhand, leaving four guns in the hands of the victors.

Meanwhile, in order the better to relieve pressure on Seaton's small brigade, Sir Colin Campbell had arranged with the Chief Commissioner of the Panjáb, Sir John Lawrence, that a force should be organised at Rúrki for the purpose of entering Rohilkhand from the north-west. This column, he had reason to believe, would be ready to set out on this expedition on the 1st February. It was now approaching that date; Hope's victory at Sútia had been severe enough to impose prudence on the rebels for a few days; the siege-train was well on its way to Kánhpúr; Seaton had had a week to examine the lay of the districts committed to his care and prudence; there was no reason for further delay. Sir Colin was anxious to return to the place which was to be his base in the new campaign, to see how the works he had ordered to cover the bridges were progressing, to be present there to receive the siege-train, and to despatch it across the Ganges

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.

1858.  
January.

Final pre-  
parations  
before  
marching on  
Lakhnao.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VI.  
—  
1858.  
January.

to the first advanced position on the Lakhnao road—the station of Onáo. He left Fathgarh, then, on the 1st February, followed by the cavalry and the horse artillery, and making forced marches, reached Kánhpúr on the 4th. Hope's brigade and the artillery park started the same day by regular marches, whilst Walpole's brigade, strengthened by a portion of that which Seaton had brought down, stayed a few days longer, to cover to the last the communications with Ágra. But by the 23rd February all had crossed the Ganges into Oudh. On the sandy plains between Oonao and Banni were massed engineers, artillery, horse, foot, commissariat waggons, camp-followers, the most efficient European army ever ranged in the plains of India. It counted seventeen battalions of infantry, fifteen of which were British; twenty-eight squadrons of cavalry, including four English regiments; fifty-four light and eighty heavy guns and mortars. They are there on the eve of their departure. The morrow will see them start for the rebellious city, the capture of which will be so fatal to many among them. I must leave them for the moment; for before I describe their deeds it is fitting that I should narrate the manner in which Jang Bahádur and Franks had been co-operating from the south-east, and how Outram and his gallant companions were bearing up in the A'lambágh.

---

## BOOK XI.

---

### CHAPTER VII.

AMONG the offers of assistance which, in the early days of the revolt, had been made to the Governor-General was one of peculiar significance. Jang Bahádur, the virtual ruler of the independent Hill State which, touching the British territory at Kamáon, extends all along the north-east border of Oudh, then rejoining British territory at a point in the Gorákhpúr district due north of the station of the same name, continues the touch to within a few miles of Dárjiling—Jang Bahádur had, in the month of May, placed the whole military resources of Nipál at the disposal of the Governor-General. The independent position occupied by Nipál, the known ability of the man, who, though only Prime Minister, wielded all real authority in the country, the certainty that the overthrow of the British could scarcely fail to offer great opportunities to an able general commanding a compact and well-disciplined army,

Jang Bahádur offers at an early date to aid to suppress the revolt.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1857.  
May-July.

gave to Jang Bahádur's proposal the appearance of being inspired by a pure and generous friendship. Few untravelled independent rulers would have acted in a similar manner. But Jang Bahádur had but a few years previously visited Europe. This visit had enlightened him on many points, and on one point in particular. It had convinced him that, under all circumstances, England would be able to maintain her hold on India. It became therefore with him a matter of interest to support the stronger combatant.

The offer,  
after some  
delay, is  
accepted;

Lord Canning thanked Jang Bahádur for his offer, but it was not till some time in the month of June that he accepted it. In pursuance of the agreement between the contracting parties, Jang Bahádur in July despatched three thousand Gúrkahs from Khátmánu. These, entering the British territory at a point north of Gorákhpúr, marched on that place, and reached it at the end of the month. Their arrival was the signal for the disarming of the sepoy's stationed there (1st August). The neighbouring stations of Ázamgarh and Jánpúr were then in the throes of anarchy. Vainly had the heroic Venables, the indigo-planter, who had been steadfast among the faint-hearted, struggled and fought for order. It is true that on the 16th July, after a gallant fight of the few against many, he had repulsed them in an attack on Ázamgarh. But, after the victory, his own followers had shown symptoms of mutiny, and he and the few Europeans who followed him had been forced, on the 30th July, to retreat on Gházipúr. To restore order, then,

and a few  
Gúrkah  
troops are  
sent to the  
A'zamgarh  
district.

in Ázamgarh and its vicinity, the arrival of the Nipálese troops was opportune. They occupied Ázamgarh on the 13th August, and Jánpúr on the 15th. Meanwhile, on their evacuating it, Gorákh-púr was taken possession of by rebels from Oudh, commanded by one Muhammad Husén.

BOOK XI.  
CHAPTER VII.  
—  
1857.  
Aug.—Sept.

The Government of India, to ensure concert between these allies and its own troops, had transmitted orders to the military authorities at Banáras to appoint certain officers, left unemployed by the mutiny of their regiments, to join and act with the Nipálese. In obedience to these orders, Captain Boileau and Lieutenants Miles, Hall, and Campbell, came to Jánpúr and took up the duties assigned to them. Two or three weeks elapsed before an opportunity offered of testing the quality of the allied troops, but in the third week of September the approach to Ázamgarh of a large body of rebels gave an occasion of which they eagerly availed themselves.

British officers sent to represent the Government with the Nipál troops.

Ázamgarh was the point threatened. Lieutenant-Colonel Wroughton, commanding at Jánpúr, deemed it advisable then to detach the Shér regiment of Nipálese, one thousand two hundred strong, and two guns, to reinforce that station.

A'zamgarh is again threatened.

The Nipálese left Jánpúr at 10 A.M. on the 18th September, marched forty miles that day, and reached Ázamgarh at 6 o'clock in the evening. It was known when they arrived that the rebels were encamped at or near a village called Mandori, ten miles distant; and as they would probably be ignorant of the arrival of the Nipál reinforcement it was determined to surprise them.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1857.  
September

The Nipál  
troops and  
Mr. Venables  
surprise and  
defeat the  
rebels.

Accordingly, at half past 1 o'clock the next morning, the Shér regiment again set out, accompanied by Captain Boileau as English officer in charge of the force, by Mr. Wynyard the judge, by Mr. Venables, the gallant planter whose recent services I have just referred to, and by three other officers. Mandori was reached a little after sunrise. The rebels were found strongly posted, their centre covered by the village, and their flanks protected by fields of sugar-cane, then at their full height. Nothing daunted, the Nipál colonel, Shamshér Singh, formed his men up in five columns, and dashed at the enemy's position. Their onslaught was so fierce, that in ten minutes the rebels were in full flight, leaving on the field three brass guns. They lost about two hundred men killed and wounded. On the side of the Nipálese two were killed and twenty-six wounded. Mr. Wynyard, in his report of the action to his civil superiors, alluded in the highest terms to the conduct of the Nipál troops. Regarding Mr. Venables, who commanded the cavalry, he wrote: "He was always where fighting was hardest; he was first up at the first gun taken, and killed three men with his own hand."\*

The victory  
is followed  
up.

This victory had an excellent effect on the conquerors. Up to that time some hesitation had been shown in employing our allies against the rebels, but with the victory of Mandori all uncertainty vanished. To march fifty miles in two

\* So sensible were the rebels of the immense service rendered by Mr. Venables to his country that they offered a reward of five hundred rupees for his head.



days and then to win a battle in an unknown country would have reflected credit on veteran soldiers. Their success on this occasion filled the English officers with confidence, and caused the step already taken to be followed up by others. On the 27th September, another party of Nipál troops from Jánpúr, commanded by Colonel Wroughton, and accompanied by the civil officers, marched against and occupied Mubárákpúr—the stronghold of a rebel Rájá, Irádat Khán. He was captured and hanged. Proceeding onwards, the Nipál troops pacified the entire district. On the 29th, a similar demonstration was made from Ázamgarh, and with similar success. Atráolia, the stronghold of the rebel leader Béni Mádhó, was occupied, its fortifications were destroyed; and although Béni Madho escaped, he quitted the district, and up to the borders of Oudh order was for the time restored.

To support the Nipál troops, the Government had, in September, directed the despatch from Banáras of a small force, consisting of three hundred and twenty men of the 10th Foot, two 9-pounder guns, a small detachment European artillery, and one hundred and seventy of the 17th Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Longdon of the 10th Foot. But before this small force could reach the scene of action, the Oudh rebels had again crossed the frontier, and had encountered and been beaten by the Nipálese at Kúdúa on the 19th October, and at Chánda on the 30th of the same month. The last-named action was severe enough to

Book XI.  
Chapter VII.

1857.  
Sept.—Oct.

A detachment  
of British  
troops sent  
from Banáras  
under  
Longden.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.  
—  
1857.  
Oct.—Nov.

merit a separate record. The rebels, numbering from four to five thousand men, were strongly posted and had seven guns. The Nipál troops counted only one thousand one hundred with two guns. The battle, obstinately contested, terminated in the complete defeat of the rebels, with a loss on their side of three hundred killed. Four of their guns were taken. But the victory was dearly purchased. Lieutenant-Colonel Maddan Mán Singh, and eleven men were killed, and fifty-nine were wounded. But the gallantry of the Nipál troops had been conspicuous. Of one of them, Lieutenant Gambhír Singh, it is related in the official account of the action that “single-handed, he took a gun, cutting down five of the artillerymen, and wounding and driving away two others.” This gallant ally was covered with wounds but eventually recovered.

Longden  
captures  
Atráolia.

Longden reached Jánpúr just after the action of Chánda. Three days after his arrival (4th November) the Oudh rebels, to the number of one thousand, with two guns, again crossed the Oudh frontier, and seized the fort of Atráolia. The attention of Longden was at once called to the fact. Uniting his force to that of the Nipálese, he marched out at once, and, on the 9th, cannonaded the place so vigorously, that the enemy evacuated it during the night.

The Govern-  
ment con-  
cludes an  
arrangement  
with Jang  
Bahádúr

But the fact that the British territory was still liable to invasion, and that the British troops, though strong enough to repel an isolated attack, were not strong enough to defend the whole frontier, and might be forced, under certain circum-

stances, to fall back on Banáras, induced the Government of India to conclude with the Nipál Government a new arrangement. In virtue of this, it was arranged that Jang Bahádur should proceed himself to the scene of action with a force of nine thousand picked troops, and that to this force Colonel MacGregor should be attached with the rank of Brigadier-General. At the same time measures were taken greatly to increase the British force on the eastern frontier of Oudh. Large reinforcements were likewise sent to the Jánpúr force, and that force so strengthened was placed under the command of one of the ablest officers in the British army, Brigadier-General Franks, C.B. Similarly, another mixed force was organised by Colonel Rowcroft to move from Tirhút along the Gandak towards Gorákhpúr. These three separate *corps d'armée* had but one primary object, to clear the British districts to the north of Banáras and east of Oudh; these once cleared, whilst one corps would remain in observation, the other two would march to co-operate with Sir Colin Campbell in his attack on Lakhnao. It will be necessary to deal with them separately.

Rowcroft's force was composed of thirty men of the Royal Marines, one hundred and thirty of the *Pearl* Naval Brigade under Sotheby, three hundred and fifty Nipál troops, fifty men of the Bengal Police Battalion, and four 12-pounder howitzers, two of which were mountain-train guns. It occupied an intrenched camp at Mirwá, about forty-nine miles from Chaprá. Seven miles distant at Sobanpúr on the west bank of the little

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1857.

Nov.—Dec.

for assistance  
led by him-  
self.

The British  
force is  
likewise  
strengthened.

Colonel  
Rowcroft's  
force

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1857.  
December.

beats the  
rebels at  
Sobanpúr,

Gandak, lay a small rebel army, computed to consist of twelve hundred regular sepoy, and four thousand armed adventurers, of whom one hundred were mounted, with four guns. On the morning of the 26th December, Rowcroft, who had waited for the arrival of the Gorákhnath Nipál regiment from Sigáoli, marched to attack them. The enemy's position was strong. They occupied a village, covered in front by a tank with high banks, and on the right by a tope of trees. Rowcroft halted within half a mile of the place and rode forward to reconnoitre. He resolved to render useless the enemy's strong positions in the centre and on the right by turning his left. He did this with great coolness and success. The Nipál troops behaved splendidly under fire. Sotheby of the Naval Brigade managed the artillery with great skill. The Minié rifles of the Royal Marines, directed by Lieutenant Pym, produced a striking effect. The result was that the enemy, attacked a little after 10 o'clock, were completely beaten by half past 1, forced back from Sobanpúr, and followed six miles further to Majáoli, and thence driven across the Gandak, with the loss of one large iron gun. Rowcroft followed up his victory the next day by crossing the river and destroying the homesteads of the leading rebels. Then, in pursuance of instructions he had received from Brigadier-General MacGregor, under whose orders he had been placed, he marched to Burhat Ghát on the river Ghághrá, there to await further instructions.

and halts on  
the Ghághrá  
for orders.

Jung Bahá-  
dur enters

Jang Bahádur's little army, meanwhile, setting



out from Nipál, had crossed the British frontier. On the 23rd December, it reached Bhetiá, eighty-two miles east of Gorákhpúr. Here it was joined by MacGregor. Continuing its march, it crossed the river Gandak on the 30th, and arrived in the vicinity of Gorákhpúr on the 5th January. Gorákhpúr was occupied by the rebels, but by rebels disheartened, divided in purpose, and hopeless of success. When attacked, then, the following morning by the Nipál army, they made but a feeble resistance, but fled across the Ráptí, leaving seven guns in the possession of the conquerors. These lost but two men killed. Seven were wounded. The loss of the rebels amounted to about two hundred.

The civil administration was at once re-established in Gorákhpúr. The British districts were cleared of rebels. At the same time, awaiting the time when the Nipál force at Ázamgarh should cross the Oudh frontier in co-operation with that under General Franks, MacGregor transmitted orders, to Rowcroft to embark his little force in boats and ascend the river.

Before Rowcroft came up, the moment referred to had arrived, and Jang Bahádur, starting from Gorákhpúr on the 14th February, reached Barári, on the left bank of the Ghághrá, on the 19th. On the evening of that day, Rowcroft's force anchored within four miles of that place, and landed on the right bank. There, on the morning of the 20th, he was joined by a brigade of the Nipál force, with six guns. Rowcroft's boats were ordered to be brought up to allow the rest of the

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1857-8.  
Dec.-Jan.

British territory,

and beats the  
rebels at  
Gorákhpúr.

Civil administration re-  
stored in  
Gorákhpúr.

Rowcroft  
approaches  
the Nipál  
force,



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
Feb.—March.  
and defeats  
the rebels at  
Phúlpúr.

Jang Bahá-  
dur enters  
Oudh,

and storms a  
strong fort.

Nipál force to cross over at Phúlpúr. But meanwhile, Rowcroft, discovering that place to be in the occupation of the rebels, marched on it, attacked, and dispersed them, capturing three guns. A bridge was then formed of the boats, and the entire Nipál force crossed. It was arranged that Rowcroft, with the *Pearl* Brigade, the Yeomanry Cavalry, which had joined him, and two Nipál regiments, should occupy Gorákhpúr, to keep open the communications, whilst Jang Bahádur should march *viâ* Súltánpúr on Lakhnao.

Crossing the Ghághrá, Jang Bahádur marched to Ambarpúr on the 25th February. The road to that place was commanded by a small fort, having a triple line of defence within a bamboo jungle, and defended by thirty-four men. It was necessary to storm this post, for though it might be turned, yet its occupation by the rebels would enable them to act on the communications of the advancing force. The Nipál troops, then, were sent against it. It was defended with so much vigour and resolution, that the assailants lost seven men killed and forty-three wounded before they gained possession of it. The defenders died, all, at their posts.

The effect of this capture was great, for two days later the rebels evacuated a larger fort occupied by two hundred men, towards which the Nipálese were advancing. Neither their passage across the Gúmti near Súltánpúr, nor their further progress to Lakhnao, was disturbed by the enemy. They reached the vicinity of that city on the 10th March, and moved into line with the British army

on the 11th, in full time to take an efficient part in the capture of that city.

I propose now to turn to General Franks. On the 29th November that officer had been appointed to command the troops in the A'zamgarh and Ján-púr districts. The force at his disposal consisted of about five thousand five hundred men—of whom three thousand two hundred were Nipálese—and twenty guns. His own brigade was composed of the 10th, 20th, and 97th Foot, the 6th company 13th battalion, and 8th company 2nd battalion Royal Artillery; detachments of the 3rd battalion Madras, and of the 5th battalion Bengal, Artillery, and a detail of native artillery. The Assistant Adjutant-General of the force was Captain H. Havelock, son of the famous general, and who had served under Franks, as adjutant of the 10th Regiment, for six years. This gallant officer, on learning the nomination of his old colonel to the command of the force, had at once applied to serve with it; and on the application being granted, though still suffering from severe wounds, had hastened to join. Franks was officially informed that his main duties would consist in protecting Banáras against attack, in preventing the rebels from crossing the Ganges into Bihár, in recovering British districts occupied by them. It was at the same time impressed upon him, in a memorandum, that the safety of Banáras was the prime, the main consideration, to which every other was to be subordinated.\*

Book XI.  
Chapter VII.

1857.  
November.

General  
Franks:

his force;

his Assistant  
Adjutant-  
General;

his instruc-  
tions.

\* Lord Canning's Memorandum, dated 29th November 1857, addressed to Colonel Franks.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1857.  
December.  
Supplement-  
ary instruc-  
tions given to  
him by Mr.  
Grant.

He shows a  
bold front to  
the invader.

Nevertheless, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Central Provinces, Mr. J. P. Grant, in communicating this memorandum to Colonel Franks, wisely supplemented it with a description of the state of the frontier, of the rebel chiefs, of their following, of the positions they had taken up, as well as of the probable means of offence and defence at their disposal. This memorandum, written clearly and with accurate knowledge, proved of inestimable value.

By end of December, Franks had organised his force, and had placed it in strong defensive positions, showing a bold front to the invader. His right column was near Ázamgarh, his centre some miles in front of Jánpúr, and his left at Badlapúr. Though the attitude taken up imposed on the rebels so far as to prevent them from hazarding an attack, it did not hinder them from pillaging and plundering the districts about one hundred and twenty miles to the west of Jánpúr.

The rebel  
leader

and his army.

The leader of the rebels was called Mehndi Husén. He called himself Názim of Súltánpúr. Like many men who rise to the surface in a period of riot and disorder, he was an adventurer, whose main object in life was to secure for himself something tangible out of the general wreck. He had under him about fifteen thousand men, mostly matchlock-men, of whom not more than a third could be depended upon to fight. The rebel leader had his headquarters at Chánda, a town thirty-six miles from Jánpúr, on the direct road from that station to Súltánpúr; but his lieutenant, Fazal A'zím, occupied a strong position at Saráon, just



fourteen miles north of Allahábád. His outposts were within four miles of that place.

Franks had no regular cavalry. He had, indeed, thirty-eight mounted policemen, known as the Banáras Horse, commanded by Captain Matheson. To compensate as far as possible for the deficiency, he had mounted twenty-five men of the 10th Foot, and placed them under the command of Lieutenant Tucker, of the Bengal Cavalry. The services rendered by these men can scarcely be exaggerated, but their numbers were insufficient to effectively follow up a victory. It would have been easy for him, with the force at his disposal, to beat the pseudo-Názim or his lieutenant; but a barren victory—a victory which could not be efficiently followed up—would be useless. The Government and the Commander-in-Chief were equally alive to the necessity that Franks should be supplied with this arm in sufficient numbers, and they did all that seemed to them possible under the circumstances. But the supply could only proceed by detachments. The first of these, composed of two squadrons of the Bays, and four horse artillery guns, was despatched from Allahábád on the 20th of January to reinforce him.

As soon as he heard that cavalry were on their way to join him, Franks (21st January) moved forward with his left column, numbering fourteen hundred men, of whom eight hundred were Nipálese, and six guns, to Sikandra, seven miles from Saráon. He found that Fazal Ázím, with eight thousand men and fourteen guns, was still at that place. Fazal Ázím heard at the same time

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.

January.

How Franks's  
want of  
cavalry

was  
attempted to  
be supplied.

Franks moves  
forward.



Book XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.

January.

The enemy  
advance to  
a strong  
position.

Franks waits  
for his  
cavalry,

which  
arrives.

Franks  
attacks and  
beats the  
rebels.

of the arrival at Sikandra of General Franks. The country all about Saráon being open, he broke up his camp that night and advanced to Nasratpúr, a very strong position, held then by an ally, an influential talúkdár, Béni Bahádúr Singh. In this position, extremely strong by nature, and the approach to which had been rendered more difficult by art, the two friends hoped to be able to give a good account of any assailant, even though that assailant should be British.

Franks learned next morning of the retreat of the rebels. He could not attack them at once, for his cavalry had not come up, and he had directed them to join him at Sikandra. The day of the 22nd, then, was devoted to preparing for the move, which he thought would scarcely be delayed beyond the morrow. Franks gathered all the information possible regarding the enemy's position, and whilst receiving this, he erected a kind of stockade, or fortified enclosure, there to leave his baggage whilst he should march on the enemy.

In this way the day passed, anxiously towards the closing hours, for the cavalry did not appear. At last, about 8 o'clock, they arrived, accompanied by four horse artillery guns. There was no more hesitation. Next morning Franks sent his men in two columns against the enemy. The strength of the position did not stop them; Nipálese rivalled European. With the loss of only six men slightly wounded, the stronghold was captured; the rebels hastily fleeing to save as many of their guns as possible. Two of these were captured; but the density of the jungle, first,

and the difficult nature of the ground, afterwards, greatly impeded the action of the cavalry, and the rebels were able to carry the remainder across the Oudh frontier.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.  
—  
1858.  
Jan.—Feb.

After the action, Franks was forced, to his regret, but in obedience to orders, to send the cavalry back to Allahábád.

The cavalry  
sent back to  
Allahábád.

Having destroyed the rebel stronghold, Franks moved to Saraón, re-established the civil authorities in the districts bordering on Allahábád, and then returned to Badlapúr, preparatory to an advance by Súltánpúr on Lakhnao. Thence he moved eight miles in advance to Singramáo, close to the frontier, there to await the action of Jang Buhádúr, on his right, at Gorákhpúr.

Franks moves  
to the Oudh  
frontier at  
Singramáo,

We have seen how the arrival of Rowcroft at Gorákhpúr on the 19th February loosed the hands of the Nipál Mahárájá. Franks set out the same day for Súltánpúr. The distance was thirty-three miles, but the greater portion of it was occupied by the rebels. Their advanced post, Chánda, thirteen miles from Singramáo, was guarded by eight thousand men, of whom two thousand five hundred were sepoy trained by British officers and another strong corps of ten thousand men lay within a few miles of them.

and advances  
to Súltánpúr.

Franks, I have said, marched on the 19th from Singramáo. His plan was to move rapidly and defeat the enemy's forces in detail, and he carried out his programme to the letter. Reaching Chánda about 8 o'clock in the morning, he found the place occupied by the rebel corps I have already mentioned. This corps, eight thousand strong, had

He reaches  
Chánda.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.

February.

Proceedings  
of the enemy.

Franks  
attacks and  
defeats Banda  
Husén

eight guns, a good position, and every incentive to make a sturdy resistance. Its commander, a civil officer, named Banda Húsén, had despatched very early that morning express messengers to his chief, the pseudo-Názim, Mehndi Husén, informing him of the approach of the British, and begging him to move up with his following of ten thousand men to his support. Could he resist but for three hours, that support was assured to him.

But the impetuous onslaught of the British and Nipálese was not to be withstood even for three hours. Sepoys from four trained regiments were there, but they were there only to give way, almost without a serious effort. After a contest, which did not cost the allies a single man, Chánda was occupied, and the enemy were pursued three miles further to Rámpúra.

and Mehndi  
Husén.

At Rámpúra Franks halted—only for two hours. He had become aware that the reinforcements under Mehndi Husén were on their way, and he was resolved to deal with them before they should recover from the panic which the defeat of the Chánda force would certainly inspire. He took ground, then, to the left, and occupied the village of Hamirpúr. Mehndi Husén had been in full march for Chánda when he learned from some fugitives of the defeat of his lieutenant. Surprised as he was, he still hoped to retrieve the day. After a short halt for reflection, he made a circuit, and, as the shades of evening were falling, he appeared on the left rear of Franks's position. But Franks was not so to be caught. At once changing front, he dashed at the rebels. Surprised, when they had



hoped to surprise, they made but the semblance of resistance, and then fled in disorder. Owing to the lateness of the hour, Franks pursued them but a short distance: he then bivouacked on the ground he had occupied before the action.

Book XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
February.

The loss of the allies in these two actions amounted to only eleven wounded—a proof of the slightness of the resistance. That of the enemy cannot be accurately computed; but the speed of their flight and the paucity of cavalry with the victors would induce the belief that it was not considerable.

Losses on  
both sides.

The pseudo-Názim rallied his forces at Wári, intent on renewing the struggle. Between the contending armies and Súltánpúr was a very strong fort, surrounded by a jungle, and completely commanding the approaches to that town—the fort of Budhayan. The Názim was thoroughly well aware of the importance of this position, and he resolved to secure it. But Franks possessed a knowledge not inferior and a determination at least equal. He possessed, too, this advantage, that at Hamirpúr he occupied a position from which he could deal a blow at an enemy who should attempt to attack Budhayan from Wári. The Názim did, nevertheless, make the attempt, and in a manner which entitled him to some consideration as a general. It was far from his desire to encounter the English in the plain. The recollection of the battle of the previous day was strong within him. But he was anxious to mislead his enemy, and gain a post from which he could defy him.

Importance to  
both parties  
of the fort of  
Budhayan.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.

February.

Franks out-  
manœuvres  
the Názim,

who takes up  
a strong  
position near  
Súltánpúr.

Franks is  
constrained  
to act with-  
out cavalry.

The position  
of the rebels  
at Súltánpúr.

But he failed. Do what he would, Franks always put himself in his way. After a long day of manœuvring, it came to this,—that the army which was ready to fight a battle would gain Budhayan. The Názim would do everything but that. Franks would do everything including that. The greater daring gained the day, and on the afternoon of the 21st Franks occupied Budhayan. The Názim, baffled, though not discouraged, made a long detour, and turning the town of Súltánpúr, took up a position at Bádshahganj, two miles beyond it, ready there to dispute the further progress of the allies. On this point, rallied all his scattered partisans, and the troops of Banda Husén. Here, too, he was joined by Mirza Gaffúr Bég, a general of artillery under the ex-king of Oudh, who had been sent from Lakhnao for the express purpose of assuming the command and of driving back Franks. He assumed the command, but he did not drive back Franks.

Franks had halted at Budhayan on the 22nd to await the arrival of the Láhor Light Horse and the Pathán cavalry, urgently required and anxiously expected. But as these had not arrived on the early morning of the 23rd, he felt constrained to act without them. He set out, then, at 6 o'clock in the morning of that day, to attack the enemy.

The position which Gaffúr Bég occupied was very formidable. It may thus be described. His whole front was protected by a deep and winding nullah, which ran into the Gúmti. The main body extended in a line of a mile and a half in the plain

behind that nullah, the left resting on the Súltánpúr bazaar, the centre placed behind the ruined lines of the police battalion; the right covered by a range of low hillocks in advance of the village and strong masonry buildings of Bádshahganj. The nullah which covered his front was crossed by the road leading to Lakhnao, and which Franks must traverse. To prevent such a movement, Gaffúr Bég placed his principal battery on this road. The rest of his guns were distributed along his front, three being posted in the village near the bazaar on his extreme left, six in the masonry building of Bádshahganj on his right.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
February.

Formidable though the position was, it had one great fault. It could be turned on its right. The road from Allahábád to Lakhnao, to the south-west, crossed the nullah at a point out of reach of the enemy's fire, and led to ground behind their right. Gaffúr Bég had forgotten this, for he had pushed neither cavalry nor scouts in that direction.

Its defects.

Franks marched, as I have said, at 6 o'clock in the morning. At about 9 o'clock, or a few minutes after, his advance guard, composed of the twenty-five mounted men of the 10th Foot, and thirty-eight men of the Banáras Horse, which constituted his only cavalry, caught sight of the enemy's outposts on the nullah. Franks at once halted his force. He had detected the weak point in the position of the enemy, and had resolved to profit by it.

Franks detects the weak point of the rebels' position.

Feigning a front attack, occupying the enemy by a demonstration which had all the appearance

Battle of  
Súltánpúr.

Book XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
February.

of being real, he moved his infantry and light guns obliquely to the left, and seized the Allah-ábád road. The feigned attack so completely concentrated upon it all the attention of the enemy, that the movement of the infantry brigades remained unmolested, and those brigades had reached a position completely in rear of the enemy's right before the latter had the smallest suspicion that they were not in front of them. The surprise when the Anglo-Indian force deployed and attacked may be surmised. In vain did the rebels attempt to rectify the error, to bring their guns round to the new front—it was too late. The English pushed forward with a decision that allowed no time to repair mistakes. In advance even of the skirmishers, a gallant officer of engineers, who had during the siege of Lakhnao rendered the most splendid service, Macleod Innes, secured the first hostile gun, as the rebels were abandoning it. Falling back from this, the rebels rallied round another gun further back, from which the shot would, in another instant, have ploughed through the advancing columns. Macleod Innes noticed the danger. He never stopped to consider, but galloping up, alone and unsupported, he shot the gunner as he was about to apply the match, and remaining undaunted at his post, the mark for a hundred matchlockmen who were sheltered in some adjoining huts, kept the artillerymen at bay till assistance reached him.\*

Macleod  
Innes.

His splendid  
gallantry.

\* For this splendid act Macleod Innes received the Victoria Cross.

The British line then swept on. Its left soon reached the high road to Lakchnao. The rest of the enemy were enclosed between the British and the nullah. The latter, which had covered his front, now held in his rear. Soon after, the central battery was captured. Franks himself, cap in hand, led the skirmishers of the 10th Foot right up to the guns, which the enemy's gunners served to the last, dying at their posts. After this, the battle was over. The plain was covered with fugitives who had left behind them twenty guns (one 32-pounder, two 24-pounders, two 18-pounders, four 12-pounders, one 9-pounder, and ten smaller pieces), their camp, their baggage, and their ammunition. It is probable that a considerable number of them were killed and wounded. "Had the Láhor Light Horse and Patháns reached me six hours sooner," wrote Franks, "when the whole plain was covered with fugitives, whom the utmost efforts of my infantry could not overtake, their loss would have been considerably heavier." The casualties on the side of the British amounted to two killed and five wounded. The cavalry referred to—augmenting the cavalry force under Franks to six hundred sabres—arrived on the ground shortly after the action was over.

The next morning Franks was joined by the Jalandhar Cavalry.\* This body of horse, raised on the Guide principle under the auspices of Lake, Deputy Commissioner of Jalandhar, only a few

Book X.  
Chapter VJL.  
—  
1858.  
February.

The enemy  
totally  
defeated,

but not effi-  
ciently pur-  
sued for want  
of cavalry,

who arrive  
after the  
action.

\* This regiment was subsequently absorbed into the 3rd Sikh Cavalry.



Book XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
Feb.—March.  
Aikman joins  
with the  
Jalandhar  
cavalry.

months before, and equipped and drilled by Lieutenant Aikman, had marched from the Satlaj to join Franks in an incredibly short space of time—the last march covering forty miles. “I did not expect you for a fortnight,” exclaimed Franks, as he welcomed Aikman: “had I known you would have been here, I would at any cost have postponed the action.” It will be seen that, though too late to share in the battle of Súltánpúr, Aikman was to inaugurate the arrival of his new levies by an action not yielding in brilliancy to any performed in the campaign.

Gallant deed  
of Aikman.

The road to Lakhnao was now apparently open, and there seemed little chance of any further opposition being offered. But on the early morning of the 1st March, Aikman, who had been posted for the night three miles in advance of the camp with a hundred of his men, learned that a body of five hundred rebel infantry, two hundred cavalry, and two guns, under a noted rebel chief, Mansab Ali, who had long evaded pursuit, was occupying a position three miles off the high road, on the banks of the Gúmti. This was quite enough for Aikman. Despatching a trooper to Franks, begging him to send up in support the cavalry and the guns, he led his men to the spot, charged the enemy, totally defeated them, killed more than one hundred of them, and drove the survivors into and across the Gúmti, capturing the two guns. This most gallant and successful charge was made under every disadvantage of broken ground, and partially under the flanking fire of a hostile fort. Nothing could exceed the

splendid daring displayed by Aikman on this occasion. For some time he was at sword's point with several rebels at the same time, and from one of them he received a severe sabre-cut across the face. The cool and resolute courage with which he continued to fight inspired his men with the supreme resolution which caused the combat to terminate in the successful manner I have described.\* The cavalry and the guns arrived after the fight was over.

BOOK XL  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
March.

After this splendid achievement, Franks pushed on, and, on the morning of the 4th, reached a mosque a mile beyond the town of Améthi, eight miles from Lakhnao. He had received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to advance. Learning, however, that the fort of Dhaorára, two miles to the right of the road, was occupied by a large body of the rebels with two guns, Franks, apprehensive that that body, if unmolested, might annoy his long train of baggage, resolved to drive them out.

The resolution in itself was perfectly sound, but the mode in which it was carried out left much to be desired. Against the fort Franks detached, with a body of cavalry, only two horse artillery guns. In vain did Havelock protest, as far as he could protest, urging the general to use the two 24-pounder howitzers which were available. Franks was obstinate. The result was that the two horse artillery guns, moved up succes-

The repulse  
at Dhaorára.

\* Lieutenant, now Lieutenant-Colonel, Aikman received the Victoria Cross for this gallant act.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
March.

sively to four hundred, three hundred, and even two hundred yards of the fort, failed to breach the walls or to silence the matchlock fire of the rebels. Subsequently the 24-pound howitzers were brought up, the outer defences were forced and the hostile guns were captured; but the rebels barricaded themselves in a house guarded by a massive gate, and still bade defiance to the British. The shot from one of their own guns which had been turned against this making no impression upon it, and a fire kindled against it producing no effect, and the only engineer officer, Macleod Innes, having been severely wounded while trying to burst the gate open, Franks determined to withdraw. The force then resumed its march and joined Sir Colin the same evening.\*

Results of  
Franks's  
campaign.

This was the last action which signalled Franks's successful march from the borders of eastern to central Oudh. He joined Sir Colin on the night of the 4th March, having, in thirteen days, marched one hundred and thirty miles, beaten an enemy immensely superior in four general actions, and captured thirty-four pieces of ordnance with the small loss of thirty-seven officers and men killed and wounded. Such leading needs no comment. Franks was known as one of the best regimental officers in the British

\* It was believed that this check had important consequences for Franks. He had been selected by Sir Colin to command the *corps d'armée* which was to act on the left

bank of the Gúmti; but when, it is said, Sir Colin heard of the slap on the face he had received at Dhaorára, he struck his name out and substituted that of Outram.

army. This short campaign stamped him as qualified to take very high rank among its generals. The repulse at Dhaorára was little more than an accident, arising from over-confidence.

Book XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
March.

It is true he was well supported. In Captain, now Sir Henry, Havelock, he had an Assistant Adjutant-General, who combined to a vigorous frame an ardent love of his profession and a clear head, able to detect the weak points of an enemy's position and to devise the means of profiting by his faults. Havelock was a born general, and, possessing as he did the entire confidence of Franks, his intuition may be discerned in every action but one of this short campaign. That one was the last. Against the attack with insufficient means, when sufficient means were available, Havelock protested with all the energy of his nature. Had his advice been followed, the great opportunity which had been in the grasp of Franks would not have been denied him.

Havelock

But there was another gentleman attached to Franks's staff, whose services deserve special mention. I allude to Mr. Patrick Carnegy, of the uncovenanted service. The son of a general officer in the service of the Company, Patrick Carnegy had wanted the interest which in those days was required to obtain for a man a commission in the military service. Forced to become a civilian in the uncovenanted grade, Carnegy had brought to the performance of his duties an intelligence, an industry, and a zeal which would have won his spurs in any profession. He worked his way up steadily. He gained the confidence

Patrick  
Carnegy.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

1858.  
March.

of the Government and the affection of the people. His tact and judgment enabled him to steer clear through every crisis. In Franks's camp he had charge of the intelligence department, and in this office his knowledge of the people, their language and their customs, made him invaluable. Brought constantly into connection with Have-lock, who was scarcely less distinguished as a linguist, a desire to attain the same ends in the same plain straightforward manner brought about an intimate friendship, in itself most advantageous to the public service.\* "His information regarding the enemy has proved so correct," wrote General Franks, "that on it alone the whole of my operations might have been planned: he has always accompanied me in the field, and assisted in carrying orders under the heaviest fire."

Venables.

Longden.

Another non-military gentleman, Mr. Venables, whose services will be more specially referred to further on, rendered splendid service in this campaign; Colonel Longden, of the 10th Foot, showed, too, special qualifications for the service in which he was employed, that of commanding the advanced guards of marksmen and light guns.

The troops led by these men from the eastern side of the province have at last been brought to the scene of action, their part in which is to be so brilliant. But before I narrate their deeds, or

\* In subsequent years Mr. Carnegy rose as high in the service as it was possible for an uncovenanted officer to rise. Had he had a commis-  
sion, or had he entered the Civil Service, there is scarcely any position in India to which he might not have attained.

the deeds of their comrades now marching from Kánhpúr, it is fit that I should briefly tell how Outram had borne his part in the period which had elapsed since the Commander-in-Chief, on the 26th November, had entrusted to his safe keeping the Álambágh, and to his watchful eye a supervision over Lakhnao.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VII.

---

1858.  
March.

The story  
reverts to  
Outram.

## BOOK XI.

---

### CHAPTER VIII.

IN the second chapter of this book,\* I stated that on the 26th November Sir Colin Campbell, marching with his large convoy to Kánhpúr, had left to occupy the Álambágh and to threaten Lakhnao, until he should return, Major-General Sir James Outram, with a force of between three and four thousand men of all arms, and twenty-five guns and howitzers.† As the period of Sir Colin Campbell's return is now approaching, it is fit that I should relate how Outram and his

\* Page 222.

† The European force consisted of three hundred and thirty-two artillerymen, two hundred and ninety-two cavalry, two thousand seven hundred and seventy-one infantry; the Native, of one hundred and eight artillery, seventy-seven cavalry, and eight hundred and sixty-two

infantry, or in all four thousand four hundred and forty-two. But, of these, five hundred and forty were detached to the Banni bridge. The infantry regiments were the 5th, the 95th, the 84th, the 98th, the 90th, the 1st Madras Fusiliers, the Ferozpúr Regiment, the 27th Madras Native Infantry, and the Madras Sappers.

gallant warriors had comported themselves during the more than three months which intervened between the departure and the return of the Commander-in-Chief.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.  
—  
1857.  
December.

The Álambágh was one of the royal gardens, being a square of five hundred yards, enclosed by a wall about nine feet high, and entered by a handsome gateway. In the centre was a double-storied garden-house of masonry. The garden had been full of fruit trees; but these had been cut down, and all traces of them had disappeared. The wall, on the city side, had been strengthened by a strong ramp of earth; and an interior earthen ramp or traverse had been thrown all round the centre building to protect it from the enemy's fire. Well-formed earthen bastions had been erected at each angle, and the face of the enclosure next the road was protected by a ditch. It lay on the right of the high road coming from Kánhpúr, at a distance of about two miles from the outskirts of the city of Lakhnao.\*

The A'lam-  
bágh.

Outram did not occupy the Alambágh with his main force. Holding it with a small detachment and a few guns, he pitched his camp in the open, about half a mile behind it. He then occupied a position across the road, extending to the right and left on either side; on the right as far as the fort of Jallálábád, and covered on all points by batteries, trenches, and abattis; on one or two by some happily situated swamps.

Position  
taken up by  
Outram.

The artificial defences I have indicated were

The enemy  
greatly dis-

\* Gubbins's *Mutinies in Oudh*.



Book XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1857.

December.

heartened by  
the successful  
withdrawal.

not thrown up at once, they were developed as the energy of the enemy showed them to be required. But that enemy had received a lesson so severe in the storming of the Sikandar Bágh and of the Shah Najíf, and in the bombardment of the Kaisar Bágh, that several days elapsed ere he ventured to show himself on the track of the conqueror who had robbed him of his prey. Nor was it till the early days of December that any indications of life or movement whatever were visible on his part. But on the 2nd December it became apparent that he had recovered heart, and that he was preparing an attempt to dislodge Outram.

Their leader  
devises a  
skilful plan  
to expel  
Outram.

The British right, resting on the fort of Jallál-ábád, was tolerably secure. The leader of the rebels, the famous Moulvi, known as Ahmad Shah, far from meditating an attack in that quarter, had devised a plan, not at all despicable had it been carried out with sufficient force and with energy, whereby, amusing the whole front of the British, he should suddenly turn their left, and pouncing on the Banni bridge, hem them in between two fires.

Recovering  
confidence,  
they begin to  
work out  
their plan.

The manner in which the rebels began to work out this plan indicated a return of confidence. They began, in the first week of December, to throw up batteries in front of the British left. When these were completed, they began to extend them towards their proper left, opposite the right centre of the British. Whilst these were in progress, they threatened the British position, skirmishing up to within grape distance, but

always making their attacks in front. They repeated these until the gunners of Outram's force came to look forward to a daily visitation as a matter of course.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.  
—  
1857.  
December.

At length, on the 22nd December, the rebels threw off the mask, and attempted to carry out the programme they had drawn up. They sent a detachment of four thousand infantry, four hundred cavalry, and four guns, to march by the villages of Gaili and Badrúp to Banni, and there, in the rear of the British force, to intrench themselves, severing the communications with Kánhpúr.

The rebels  
make their  
attack.

Skilful as was this plan, it yet laboured under a fatal defect. Two days before it was executed it had been betrayed to Outram by his spies. Possessing the inestimable advantage of complete acquaintance with his enemy's designs, Outram determined to play their own game against them; and, whereas they were trying to sever his communications with Kánhpúr, he determined to cut them off from Lakhnao.

Their plan  
had been  
betrayed to  
Outram.

The rebels set out on the night of the 21st December, reached the village of Gaili, and, occupying a position between that village and Badrúp, encamped for the night. In that position they were not quite cut off from Lakhnao, for the left of their position was but half a mile from the Dilkúsha, which had, since Sir Colin's departure, been strongly reoccupied by the insurgents.

The rebels  
try to sever  
Outram's  
communica-  
tions.

Against the rebels so encamped, Outram started very early on the morning of the 22nd, with a force consisting of one thousand two hundred and

Outram  
attacks them,

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1857-8.  
Dec.-Jan.

and drives  
them back on  
the Dilkúsha.

After three  
weeks' com-  
parative rest,  
the courage  
of the rebels  
returns

on learning  
that Outram  
has weakened  
his force.

twenty-seven infantry, under Brigadier Stisted, one hundred and ninety cavalry, under Major Robertson, and six 9-pounder guns, under Captain Olpherts. At daybreak he came upon them. Sending his centre against their main position, with his left he drove them from Gaili, doubling them back on Badrúp. Surprised, the rebels scarcely attempted resistance as these manœuvres were being carried out. They lost their four guns and an elephant. They were then again attacked and driven from Badrúp. Changing their line of retreat, they then fell back on the Dilkúsha. The pursuit then ceased, and in sufficient time. For the detachments from the main rebel army, hearing the uproar, were crowding from the Dilkúsha to retrieve the day. They arrived in time only to receive their beaten comrades. The loss of the rebels exceeded fifty killed. That of Outram amounted to two killed and some eight or ten wounded.

This repulse considerably checked the enemy's ardour, and during the three weeks that followed they but once made a manifestation of attack. On this occasion they confined themselves to a long cannonade, ineffective against our position, but too successful in killing a most prominent artillery officer, Lieutenant D. Gordon. Nothing further occurred till the 12th January. But on that day the rebels made a supreme effort for victory.

Circumstances seemed to favour them. They, too, were well served by their spies, and they had learned that on the 8th January Outram had weakened his force by four hundred and fifty in-



fantry, eighty cavalry, and four guns, detached to protect a convoy of empty carts—to be laden and returned—he was sending into Kánhpúr.

A rebel partisan, named Mansúb Áli, was at this time in the district, in communication with the main body of the Lakhnao rebels. The task had been assigned to him to hover about the main line of British communication, and to harass and, when possible, to cut off small detachments and convoys. It had become known to Outram that early in January this man had received considerable reinforcements from Lakhnao. Hence it was that he had detached a large covering party with the convoy I have alluded to.

The Lakhnao rebels waited till they believed that the convoy and its escort had reached Kánhpúr. They then, on the morning of the 12th January, made their long meditated attack.

They came out in force—to the number, it was estimated, of thirty thousand. Massing this large body opposite the extreme left of Outram's position, they gradually extended so as to face his front and his left flank, thus covering nearly six miles of ground. Threatening only with their left, their right centre and right advanced to the attack.

Outram waited till the enemy's movement should take some ascertainable form. He allowed them, therefore, to extend—even round his left flank. But the moment he began to advance he dealt, with rapidity, the counter blow he kept ready for delivery. Forming up his two brigades, the one consisting of seven hundred and thirteen, the

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.

January.

Reasons for  
weakening  
the force.

The rebels  
make their  
supreme  
effort.

Outram de-  
velops his  
plans.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
January.

other of seven hundred and thirty-three European troops, to face the front attack of the enemy, he directed the ever-daring Olpherts to take four horse artillery guns, and, supported by a detachment of the Military Train, to dash at the overlapping right of the enemy. The protection of the rear of the position in case it should be threatened, was confided to the volunteer and native cavalry.

Olpherts foils  
the enemy's  
right.

With the dash and energy eminently characteristic of the man, Olpherts took out his guns at a gallop, and pushing to the front, opened fire on the rebel masses just as they had begun the second overlapping movement, to gain the rear of the British position. The vigorous assault made by Olpherts completely disconcerted them. Renouncing their turning efforts, they fled in confusion and dismay.

Down foils  
their centre.

Whilst Olpherts was thus delivering a decisive blow on the extreme right, a repulse, scarcely less signal, had been inflicted upon the rebel troops opposed to the British left centre. These advanced with considerable spirit into a grove of trees in front of the picket commanded by Captain Down of the Madras Fusiliers, and usually occupied by him. Down allowed them to come rather near; then dashing at them with the bayonet, drove them back with loss. Whilst the enemy's attacks were thus being repulsed on the left and the left centre, they had not been idle on the British right. This part of the British line was covered by the fort of Jallálábád, upon which some rough repairs had been executed, and it was

considered comparatively unassailable. Acting upon the probability that it was, therefore, weakly defended, the enemy, whilst threatening, as we have seen, the left, and making on that side a noisy demonstration, had quietly massed a large body of infantry against the picket connecting the right with Jallálábád, and, bringing three guns to the front, opened upon that picket a heavy fire. But here, too, Outram was equal to the occasion. Bringing to the front, from the left of the right brigade, detachments of the 5th Fusiliers and Brasyer's Sikhs, and two guns of Moir's bullock battery, he took up a position which gave him the right flank of the enemy, and then opened upon that flank. The effect was instantaneous. The rebels abandoned the advanced position, evacuated the village they had occupied, and though for a time they continued the fire from their guns, their practice was bad, and caused no damage.

Book XI.  
Chapter VIII.  
—  
1858.  
January.

Outram foils  
their left,

Simultaneously with the attack just described, the enemy advanced against the Álambágh, and established themselves in a thick cover close to that enclosure. From this, about 12 o'clock, they advanced into the open. Here, however, they became exposed to a heavy fire from Maude's guns and riflemen, and they were soon driven back.

and they are  
driven back  
from the  
A'lambágh,

By 4 o'clock in the afternoon the rebels were in full retreat on all sides. Their losses must have been considerable. Outram's amounted, on that day, to only three wounded.

and the  
rebels fall  
back.

The serious manner in which the rebels were affected by their repulse and their losses was manifested in a very curious manner. The natives of

Religious  
influences  
affecting the  
natives.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
January.

India are peculiarly influenced by religious influences. They believe in fortunate days and periods—days and periods peculiarly auspicious for producing certain results. It happened that the most learned pandit in Lakhnao had declared on the 12th January that unless the British were driven from their position within eight days from that period, they never would be expelled; and, moreover, that the period in question, from the 12th to the 20th inclusive, was peculiarly favourable to effecting their expulsion. In consequence of this prophecy it had been resolved by the rebels to give the British no rest throughout the period indicated.

But when the attack, prepared with so much foresight, and delivered with all the skill of which they were capable, failed, their spirits sank to zero; and, in spite of the pandit, they remained quiescent on the 13th and two following days. Nor was it till the 16th that they made their second attempt.

The Moulvi's  
oath,

But though they made no attack on the British position, they did attempt to intercept the convoy. The active and determined Moulvi had sworn that he would capture the convoy and ride back into Lakhnao through the British camp. He left Lakhnao with a considerable force without baggage, on the night of the 14th, turned the British camp, and took up a position from which he could advantageously pounce on the convoy. Everything seemed to favour him. A violent dust storm was blowing towards the direction whence the convoy was approaching, and its leader had



no warning. But again did Outram's prescience baffle him. Reports as to the Moulvi's movements had reached that general, and he, noting how the weather seemed to favour an attack, ordered out Olpherts with two guns and a detachment of the Military Train, on the road to Banni. He subsequently supported this small body with the rest of the battery and the Military Train, a detachment of Wale's Horse, and the 90th Light Infantry.

Olpherts revelled in danger. He possessed the *coup d'œil* of a dashing leader, was ready in resource, and quick to act as circumstances might require. He waited for the enemy till he came in the open, and then opened on them and killed or dispersed them. The Moulvi was wounded, and narrowly escaped capture.

Early on the morning of the 16th, between 1 and 3 o'clock, the convoy returned with supplies to the camp. The force was thus increased again by about four hundred men. No attack was anticipated, and many officers were about to unpack and distribute some of the private stores arrived, when, about 9 o'clock, the enemy made a sudden and very formidable attack on a picket guarding a battery in the process of erection, between Jallálábád and the camp. No guns were mounted here, and the picket had to fall back on the intrenchment; but the alarm had no sooner been given than Brasyer's Sikhs, ready for any emergency, rushed to the front, and rallying the picket, put the enemy to flight and captured their leader, attired in the imaginary costume of the

Book XI.  
Chapter VIII.  
1858.  
January.

and  
Olpherts's  
performance.

The British  
convoy safely  
arrives in  
camp.

An attack on  
the right is  
repulsed by  
Brasyer's  
Sikhs.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.

Jan.—Feb.

That on the  
left

is driven  
back

by Gordon  
and Olpherts

Thencefor-  
ward till the  
15th Febru-  
ary the  
enemy cease  
to attack in  
force.

god Hanumán. He turned out to be a Brahmin, very influential with his countrymen. The enemy's loss was severe.

On the left the rebels confined themselves for several hours to a cannonade on the position. Their attack, though it ranged along the whole front, seemed specially directed against the picket occupying a village on the extreme left. Their grape and round shot came in very thick at this point, but beyond sending their cavalry within one thousand yards of the British front, only to be driven back, they made no demonstration with the other arms till evening had set in. But as soon as it was dark they pushed forward masses of infantry against the village. The officer commanding at this point was Major Gordon, 75th Regiment. Gordon allowed the enemy's masses to approach within eighty yards, when he opened out upon them with three guns and musketry, and drove them off immediately. The left rear was guarded by Olpherts with four horse battery guns and a detachment of the Military Train. With these he beat back the cavalry demonstration above indicated. The British loss from the enemy on this occasion amounted to one killed and seven wounded.

The failure on this occasion completed the discouragement of the rebels. From that time forth until the 15th February they confined themselves to demonstrations, to attempts to excite alarm—and to incessant bugling. Outram's spies announced attacks for given dates, but the dates passed by and the attacks were not made. Mean-

while the conviction seemed to be stealing into their minds that they were bound to a losing cause. They heard of the loss of Fathgarh, and rumours even reached them of the capture of Baréli. This conviction was not slow in producing discord in their councils, and blows between rival chieftains. On the 22nd January the troops led by the Moulvi and those obeying the orders of the Bégam came to a sharp encounter, resulting in the slaying of about one hundred men. All this time the advance portion of Sir Colin's force was approaching, and on the 23rd January Outram received a reinforcement of ten guns escorted by a party of the 34th Regiment. To counterbalance this, the remnants of the heroic 75th, of Dehlí renown, left on the 14th February for the Himalayas.

At last, goaded by the Moulvi, who, after a brief imprisonment by the Bégam's party, had escaped and assumed an ascendancy in the rebel councils, the enemy hazarded an attack on the 15th. They attempted their favourite plan of turning the left. But Outram was ready for them. The 90th turned out, and Olpherts, always full of zeal, galloped to the front with his guns, accompanied by the cavalry of the Military Train. When within four hundred yards of the rebels, Olpherts unlimbered and poured in round after round. The rebels could not stand it, but broke and fled. The British lost one man killed and one wounded.

On the morning of the 16th they threatened to renew the attack, but after a great deal of show, they retired; in the evening, however, they

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Jan.-Feb.

Contentions  
among the  
rebels.

Outram  
receives rein-  
forcements.

The Moulvi  
attacks on  
the 15th,

but Olpherts  
drives him  
back.

Further vain  
manifestations of the  
rebels.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Feb. 16.

The rebels  
determine to  
attempt one  
last assault.

came on against the whole British front as though they were in earnest. They made four separate advances, and retired as often, coming under musketry fire only on one point, the extreme left of the British. But finding the picket on the alert, they made no serious attack even here. Their advances were accompanied by yells and shouts and the clang of brass instruments. This day they admitted to a loss of sixty killed and wounded.

Stores were now coming in daily from Kánhpúr, and the movements of the various brigades of Sir Colin Campbell's force had become so pronounced as to spread conviction amongst the rebel leaders that unless they could, within the next five or six days, succeed in their projects against Outram, they would be for ever baffled. They determined, therefore, to try one last grand assault—an assault better planned, on a larger scale, and more sustained than any of its predecessors. Having ascertained from their spies that it was the custom of the General and a large proportion of officers and men to attend church parade early on Sunday morning, they fixed upon an early hour on the following Sunday, 21st February, for their great blow.

Sunday, 21st  
February.

They had calculated correctly. The men of the right brigade were attending a Church parade, the General being with them, when masses of the enemy began to concentrate opposite the extreme right and left of the British position. Captain Gordon, whom we have known as aide-de-camp to General Niell, and who was now on the Staff,



noticed the movements of the enemy from No. 2 battery, and rode down to report the fact to the General. Outram at once sent down the Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Dodgson, to turn out the left brigade, whilst the batteries opened all along the line. For the enemy, originally massing their forces on both flanks, had gradually extended inwards, and were threatening the whole position. They had advanced, in fact, within five hundred yards of the British position before the troops were turned out ready to receive him. But then the old story was repeated. On the right the enemy, advancing against Jallálábád, were checked by an artillery fire, whilst Captain Barrow, with two hundred and fifty of the volunteer cavalry and two guns, coming up from behind that fort, dashed upon a party sent to turn the British position, and drove them back to their main body. On the left Olpherts and a squadron of the Military Mounted Train, under Major Robertson, carried out the same plan, with the same success. Forced now to make a front attack, and threatened in turn on their left, the enemy did not long persevere. Once indeed they made as though they would try and overwhelm the left turning party, but at the decisive moment some well-directed rounds of shrapnel and round shot induced them to pause. "He who hesitates is lost" is a truth more applicable even to warfare than to the ordinary affairs of life. They did not renew their design, but, at a quarter past 10 o'clock, fell back, beaten, baffled, and humiliated,

Book XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Feb. 21.

The rebels  
fell back  
beaten.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Feb. 25.

Outram  
receives rein-  
forcements.

to the city. They admitted to a loss of three hundred and forty men killed and wounded. That of the British amounted to nine men wounded.

The last, the most desperate, and the best-fought attack was made on the 25th February. During the few days immediately preceding, troops from Kánhpúr had been gradually pouring in, and up to that date the force under Outram's orders had been strengthened by the arrival of Remmington's troop of horse artillery, of the 7th Hussars, of Hodson's Horse, and of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers. Hence he was now able, should he think fit, to retaliate more effectively on the enemy in the open plain.

The rebels  
make a final  
attack in  
sheer  
desperation.

The despairing attack of the rebels was made with all the pomp and circumstance of war. For the first time the royal Bégam, mounted on an elephant, attended by the Prime Minister and principal nobles, similarly mounted, accompanied the assailants. The proceedings began by a violent cannonade directed against the Álambágh at 7 o'clock in the morning. This lasted an hour. A little later, about 10 o'clock, a strong force was sent to threaten the British left, whilst the main body began to march along the right front, to the right, and out of the range of the guns. Of this force, which consisted of between twenty and thirty thousand men, a moiety, after passing the extreme point of the British right, made a sharp turn to the right again, and continued this until they had gained a position, sheltered by trees, in the right rear of the fort of Jallálábád. The other moiety, with which was the Bégam,

halted at the turning angle, so as to support the attack, or to maintain communications with the main posts, as might be required. The advanced portion began at once to shell the fort of Jallálábád.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Feb. 25.

The movement of the rebels to the right rear of the British position had been so pronounced that, at last, Outram thought he had them. Taking with him his right infantry brigade, four of Olpherts's guns, four of Remmington's, a squadron of the 7th Hussars, the Military Train, and detachments of Hodson's Horse and Graham's Horse, he started, a little before 10 o'clock, to the right, to cut off the advanced moiety of the rebels, whilst Barrow's Volunteers and Wale's Horse, making a detour, should take them in rear.

Outram  
attempts to  
cut off the  
rebels from  
their base.

The line taken by Outram naturally brought him in sharp contact with the second or reserve moiety of the rebel army. The cavalry with this reserve, numbering nearly a thousand, supported by infantry, came up to within seven hundred yards of Outram's left flank, and threatened to come nearer. But the ubiquitous Olpherts, always ready, at once wheeled his four guns to the left, and advancing a short distance, unlimbered and opened fire. The effect was remarkable. The Bégam left the field, the Prime Minister followed in attendance, and the courtiers accompanied to guard the Prime Minister. The consternation caused by the fire of Olpherts's guns had not abated—for the enemy had begun to fall back—when Remmington came up at full gallop, and

He first  
drives back  
their sup-  
ports.

Book XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Feb. 25.

Brigadier  
Campbell  
charges and  
captures two  
guns.

taking up a position about four hundred yards to the left and in advance of Olpherts, opened fire on the retreating enemy; the squadron of the 7th Hussars and Brasyer's Sikhs advanced with them, and kept the enemy in check.

Made secure of his left by the action of these gallant men, Outram pushed forward with the remainder of his force to deal with the first or advanced moiety of the enemy's army. Acting under his orders, Brigadier Campbell of the Bays took with him the Military Train and detachments of Hodson's Horse and Graham's Horse, and advanced beyond Jallálábád. Turning then to the right, he came in full view of the enemy. Alarmed by the sound of Olpherts's and Remmington's guns, the rebels, sensible of the presence of danger, were forming up hurriedly when they caught sight of Campbell's horsemen. Campbell gave them no time for reflection, but at once charged the two guns which had been playing on the fort. The sepoy, surprised as they were, did not flinch. They met the charge with courage, and though, as its result, the two guns remained in the hands of the Military Train, fifty corpses about them testified to the desperate valour of the defenders.

The rebels  
succeed in  
falling back,

The enemy's infantry meanwhile had fallen back on a tope of trees, from the upper branches of which some of their marksmen kept a constant fire on Outram's force as it approached. The defence of this tope was so sustained as to give time for the main body of the rebels to fall back and recover their line of retreat. They even once again threatened the fort, but gave way



before the persuasive powers of Olpherts and Remmington.

It was now half-past 2. The fighting for the day was apparently over. But the rebels were resolved to make one final effort. Strengthening their right with the troops who had fought in the morning, they made a desperate attack, about 5 o'clock, on the village forming the left front of the British position. Never had they fought with greater determination. They took possession of the tops of trees in front of the village, and then pressed on, encouraged by the fact that the British picket, just then short of ammunition, was falling back. But their triumph was short. A reinforcement came up, and forced them to retire. All that night, however, they continued their endeavours to take that village, threatening at the same time the entire left front of the position. Nor was it till the dawn of the following day that they gave up the task as hopeless.

With this attack the defence of the Álambágh may be said to merge into the more exciting drama of Lakhnao. It is, however, impossible to leave the gallant defenders of that important position without endeavouring, however inadequately, to indicate the great service which their prolonged occupation of it had rendered to the country. For more than three months Outram, with a force originally nearly four thousand strong, and subsequently often smaller, had kept in check the main army of the rebels. That army, known in November to count thirty thousand men, most of them trained soldiers, under its banners, had been

Book XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Feb. 25.

and then  
make a final  
effort,

but are  
baffled.

Service rendered to the country by the successful occupation of the Á'lambágh.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Feb. 28.

gradually augmented after the fall of Dehlí to more than treble that strength.\* Between that augmented army and the Ganges lay Outram and his four thousand men—his right, his left, his rear, equally exposed. His nearest base was the Ganges; but between him and that base lay forty miles of road, guarded only at one point, the Banni bridge, and which, if sometimes occupied by the British, was occupied only by long convoys. He was, so to speak, in the air, liable to meet attacks on all sides. In point of fact, he was attacked on all sides—in front, on his flanks, and in his rear. If there be any who might be inclined to make light of the service rendered by his successful defence, I would ask them to consider what the state of affairs would have been had Outram succumbed to the attacks made upon him on all sides. He had no line of retreat but that leading to the Ganges. Driven from the Álambágh, he would have fallen back, hotly pursued, on that river. In the face of such pursuit, could he have crossed by the frail bridge of boats? No one will affirm that to

\* Outram ascertained, on strength of the enemy on that the 27th January, that the date was as follows:—

37 trained regiments of sepoy	-	27,550
14 regiments of new levies	-	5,400
106 Najib, or irregular regiments	-	55,150
26 regiments of cavalry	-	7,100
Camel corps	-	800
		<hr/>
		96,000

This did not include artillery-men, the number of whom was unknown, nor the armed followers of the Talúkdars, estimated at 20,000. Altogether there could not have been less than 120,000 men in Lakhnau on that date.

have been possible. He would have been lost; Kánhpúr would have been reoccupied; Sir Colin's communications would have been severed; the rebels might have captured Allahábád, and—the Āzamgarh district and Bihár being in revolt—they could then have penetrated to Calcutta. All this would have been possible, but all this Outram and his gallant followers prevented by their gallant defence.

Book XI.  
Chapter VIII.  
—  
1858.  
Feb. 28.

Of Outram himself I have often spoken; but who were his followers? First, deserving a large meed of praise, comes Colonel Berkeley, of the 32nd Regiment, occupying virtually the position of chief of his staff. Than Berkeley it would have been difficult to find a more competent officer. To great activity of body he joined a head to devise the most complicated movements, and skill and coolness to carry them into execution. "He possesses," wrote Outram, after bearing testimony to his services, "to an extent I have rarely seen equalled, the power of securing the confidence, acquiring the respect, and winning the personal regard of those with whom he is thrown in contact." He was, in very truth, the right hand of his chief; and the relations between them, founded on mutual respect, were of the most cordial character.\* Fit to be bracketed with Berkeley may be mentioned Vincent Eyre, Brigadier of the artillery force, who sustained to the full the reputation he had gained at Árah. In

The men who  
aided Out-  
ram.

\* This most gallant officer did not long survive the campaign in which he was so gloriously engaged.

Book XI.  
Chapter VIII.

1858.  
Feb. 28.

Olpherts and Maude he had lieutenants of more than ordinary skill and daring, always to the front, and always full of fight. Dodgson, the Assistant Adjutant-General—the most modest, the least pushing, but the bravest of men; always cool, calm, self-possessed, and yet always in the place where his services were most required; Macbean, the able and energetic commissariat officer, without whose fertility of resource the army could not have been fed; Moorsom, the Assistant Quartermaster-General, uniting to the finest qualities of a fighting soldier the skill of the accomplished draughtsman;—it was to his skill, indeed, that Outram and Havelock were indebted for the plan which enabled them to penetrate so skilfully to the Residency; Gould Weston, who had served throughout the long defence of that Residency in command of Fayrer's house, and of whom, now attached to the Intelligence Department, Outram wrote in the despatch he penned after the capture of Lakhnao, that "he has signalized himself by the spirit and gallantry which he displayed on several occasions, and has been of much use to me"; Chamier and Hargood, most efficient as staff officers; Alexander Orr and Bunbury, useful from their knowledge of the country and the people; Barrow and Wale, daring cavalry leaders; Brasyer, of Brasyer's Sikhs—whose name in those stirring times was a household word; Nicholson, of the Royal Engineers, unsurpassed in his profession;—these are but a few names amongst the many of the gallant men who contributed to that splendid defence.

But it has become a thing of the past. On the 1st March the Commander-in-Chief visited the Álambágh, and on the 3rd his troops were seen marching past that post. To the Commander-in-Chief, then, I must now return.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter VIII.  
—  
1858.  
March 3.



## BOOK XI.

---

### CHAPTER IX.

The force at  
Sir Colin's  
disposal.

THE total force at the disposal of Sir Colin Campbell for the siege of Lakhnao amounted to twenty thousand men and one hundred and eighty guns. With such an army Sir Colin was able to act on a scientific plan, at once effective and sparing of the lives of his soldiers.

Sir Colin  
Campbell  
and Brigadier  
Napier.

The plan to be carried out had been the subject of many conversations between Sir Colin Campbell and the Chief Engineer, Brigadier Napier—now Lord Napier of Magdala—who had been his guest for some time at Kánhpúr. From these conversations a thorough understanding had been arrived at as to the general direction of the attack.

Lakhnao.

The city of Lakhnao stretches in an irregular form on the right bank of the Gúmti, for a length from east to west of nearly five miles, and an extreme width at the west side of one and a half miles; the east side diminishes in width to less than one mile.

Two bridges, one of iron and the other of masonry, span the Gúmti, leading the traffic of

the country from the north of the Gúmti into the heart of the city.

A canal of deep and rugged section, enclosing the city on the east and south sides, bears away to the south-west, leaving the approach to the west side of the city open, but intersected with ravines; towards the north-east, where the canal joins the Gúmti, its banks are naturally shelving and passable.

The important positions within the city at the time of the siege were the Kaisar Bágh, a palace about four hundred yards square, containing several tombs or ranges of buildings; not originally fortified, but strengthened since the November preceding; the Farhídbaksh palace, and the palaces adjoining it; the Residency; the ruins of the Machhi Báwan, commanding the masonry bridge and on the south side of it; a series of strong buildings, the Great Imámbára, the Jamania Bágh, the Shésh Mahal, and Áli Nakki Khán's house, extending to the west along the banks of the river, and more or less surrounded by streets and houses; the Músa Bágh, a mile and a half beyond it; the Imámbára and a range of palaces stretching from the Kaisar Bágh towards the canal. Beyond the canal on the east side of the city was the Martinière, a fine range of buildings; and overlooking this and the eastern suburbs, on the brow of a table-land, stood the Dilkúsha.

The enemy, profiting by experience, had strengthened their defences by works exhibiting prodigious labour. Sir Colin Campbell's former route across the canal, where its banks shelved,

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 1.  
The canal.

Description  
of the strong  
places within  
the city.

The enemy  
had strength-  
ened their  
defences.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 1.

Their three  
lines of  
defence.

was now intercepted by a new line of canal of very formidable section, flanked by strong bastions. This line of defence was continued up the canal beyond the Chárbágh bridge, more or less complete, and the banks of the canal were scarped and impassable.

The enemy had three lines of defence. A strong battery of three guns, resting against a mass of buildings called the Hazrat Ganj, supported the outer line, at the junction of three main roads. A second line of bastioned rampart and parapet rested with its right on the Imámbára, a strong and lofty building; thence, embracing the Mess House, it joined the river bank near the Moti Mahal. A third line covered the front of the Kaisar Bágh.

These defences were protected by a hundred guns. In addition all the main streets were protected by bastions and barricades, and every building of importance, besides being loop-holed, had an outer work protecting its entrance.

Napier re-  
commends an  
attack on the  
eastern side.

Brigadier Napier recommended that the east side should be attacked. His reasons were that that side offered the smallest front, and would therefore be more easily enveloped by the attack; that it possessed ground for planting the artillery—a condition not possessed by the western side; that it gave the shortest approach to the Kaisar Bágh; and that the positions in it were better known. The west side, moreover, presented a great breadth of dense, almost impenetrable, city, resting on the strong buildings on the river bank. Even were these obstacles to be overcome, the Kaisar Bágh and the principal defences would

still remain to be reduced.\* This reasoning prevailed, and it was decided to attack Lakhnao on the eastern side.

BOOK XI.  
CHAPTER IX.

1858.  
March 1.

I have not alluded to the northern side. Why the rebels should have neglected to throw up defences on that side seems, at the first glance, most strange. The real reason affords an additional proof to the many already cited of the absence of original thinking power from their ranks. The natives of India are essentially creatures of habit, of custom. When set to repeat a task already once accomplished they follow implicitly the lines previously trodden. So it was now. Havelock and Outram, in their attempt to relieve Lakhnao, had advanced by the Chárbágh bridge; Sir Colin Campbell, in November, had crossed the canal and attacked the Sikandar Bágh. Neither the one nor the other had approached the Gúmti. Hence, drawing the conclusion that the courses pursued before would be followed again, the rebels neglected the Gúmti, and concentrated all their energies on the lines previously attacked.

Reasons why the northern face was neglected.

Sir Colin Campbell detected at a glance the error they had committed, and he resolved to profit by it. He had men enough at his disposal to risk a division of his forces. He determined, then, to send across the Gúmti a division of all arms, which, marching up that river, should

Sir Colin detects the weak point.

\* The foregoing — commencing from the paragraph headed 'Lakhnao' — is almost a literal transcript from the report of the Chief Engineer, Brigadier Napier, dated 31st March 1858 — a report addressed to the Chief of the Staff, but published by Lord Canning, 17th Nov. 1858.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 1.

His plan of  
attack.

take the enemy's position in reverse, and, by the fire of artillery, render it untenable. At the same time, advancing with his main force across the canal, he would turn the enemy's position, and move by the Hazrat Ganj on the Kaisar Bâgh. Whilst a strong force should hold the base of the triangle Outram's force would occupy one side of it. Rather more than one half of the opposite side would be held by the Ālambâgh force and the Nipālese. Neither the remaining part of that side nor the western side could, with the troops at his disposal, be hemmed in, but it was to be hoped that as Sir Colin advanced his base, Outram might move round the angle on one side, whilst the Ālambâgh force and the Nipālese might close up round the corresponding angle on the other. Should the execution equal the design the entire rebel force would be reduced to extremities.

March 2.  
Sir Colin  
advances

Early on the morning of the 2nd March, Sir Colin Campbell began to execute his plan. Taking with him the headquarters of the Artillery Division (Sir A. Wilson and Colonel Wood, C.B.) and three troops of horse artillery (D'Aguilar's, Tombs's, and Bishop's), two 24-pounders, and two 8-inch howitzers of the Naval Brigade, and two companies of sappers and miners; the headquarters of the Cavalry Division (Hope Grant), and Little's Cavalry Brigade (9th Lancers, 2nd Panjáb Cavalry, detachment 5th Panjáb Cavalry, 1st Sikh Irregulars); and the 2nd Division of Infantry (Sir E. Lugard), comprising the 3rd and 4th Brigades: (3rd Brigade (Guy), 34th, 38th, and 53rd; 4th Brigade (Adrian Hope),

42nd and 93rd Highlanders and 4th Panjáb Rifles); he marched on the Dilkúsha park. Passing the fort of Jallálábád within sight of the Álambágh force, Sir Colin drove in the advanced pickets of the enemy, and captured a gun. The palace was then seized and occupied as an advanced picket on the right—a small garden, known as Muhammad Bágh, fulfilling the same purpose on the left. It was found impossible to bring up the main body of the infantry, for the enemy's guns, in position along the canal, completely commanded the Dilkúsha plateau. Sir Colin therefore drew back his infantry as far as was practicable, while he issued orders to erect batteries with all convenient haste at the Dilkúsha and the Muhammad Bágh to play on the enemy and keep down their fire. Until the batteries could be established—and they were not established till late on the night of the 2nd—the British troops were greatly annoyed by an unremitting fire, directed with precision on a point the range to which was thoroughly well known.

But when, on the morning of the 3rd, the batteries established at the Dilkúsha and Muhammad Bágh opened their fire, that of the rebels began perceptibly to decline. They were, in fact, forced to withdraw their guns, and though, from the further distance whence they directed a new fire, the shot occasionally ranged up to and into the British camp, it caused but a trifling loss. On that day and the day following, then, the remainder of the siege-train, together with the 3rd Division (Walpole's), comprising the 5th and 6th

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 2.

on the Dilkúsha,  
which he captures,

and erects  
batteries  
there to keep  
down the fire  
of the rebels.

March 3.

The batteries  
open

and silence  
the enemy's  
guns.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.

March 4.

More troops  
are massed  
on the Dil-  
kúsha.

New line  
occupied by  
the British.

Brigades (5th Brigade (Douglas), 23rd Fusiliers, 79th Highlanders, 1st Bengal Fusiliers; 6th Brigade (Horsford), 2nd and 3rd battalions Rifle Brigade, 2nd Panjáb Infantry); closed up on the Dilkúsha.

The line now occupied by the British force touched the Gúmti on its right at the village of Bibiapúr, then stretching towards the left intersected the Dilkúsha, and proceeding towards Jallálábád, stopped at a point about two miles from that fort. The interval was occupied by one native regiment of cavalry, Hodson's Horse, nearly sixteen hundred strong. Outram's force, from which three regiments had been withdrawn, still occupied its old position.

To complete the position necessary to be occupied, if the complete success at which Sir Colin Campbell aimed were to be ensured, another strong division of troops was yet required. This want was supplied on the morning of the 5th by the arrival of Brigadier-General Franks with the gallant force of Europeans and Nipálese whose gallant deeds have already been imperfectly recorded.

Franks and  
his troops  
arrive.

Sir Colin  
orders the  
conquerors to  
bridge the  
Gúmti.

But before complete communication with Franks had been established, that is, on the evening of the 4th, Sir Colin had directed that two pontoon bridges should be thrown across the Gúmti near Bibiapúr. It was across those bridges that he would despatch the division of the army intended to march up the Gúmti and take the enemy's position in reverse.

A picket is  
thrown across

The engineers worked at the bridges all that



night with so much energy and effect that before the morning of the 5th dawned they had completed one of them. Across this was at once despatched a strong picket, which began without a second's delay to throw up a small earthwork to defend the bridge-heads. As the enemy showed shortly in some force in a village at a distance of about a thousand yards, some guns were brought down to the river-bank close to the bridges to silence the enemy's fire whenever it should become annoying. The precaution enabled the engineers to continue their work throughout that day and during the following night.

By midnight on the 5th the two bridges and the embankments connecting them with the level on both sides were completed. Sir Colin, having counted on this, had directed Outram to cross to the left bank with a strong division at 2 o'clock in the morning to carry out the plan I have already detailed. Outram had with him Walpole's division of infantry, the 2nd Dragoon Guards, the 9th Lancers, the 2nd Panjáb Cavalry, detachments from the 1st and 5th Panjáb Cavalry, D'Aguilar's, Remmington's, and Mackinnon's troops of horse artillery, and Gibbon's light field battery. Hope Grant accompanied him as second in command. It had been intended that he should cross at 2 o'clock in the morning; but the night was dark, the ground broken and full of watercourses, and the troops had much difficulty in finding their way. Outram, who had ridden on in front to the bridges,

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 5.

one of these  
on the 5th.

Both completed on the  
night of the  
5th.

Outram is  
ordered to  
cross.

March 6.

The difficulties of the  
ground delay  
him.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 6.

Sir Colin's  
anxiety for  
the prompt  
crossing.

Importance  
of the posi-  
tion on the  
left bank of  
the river.

dismounted, and knowing that nothing that he could do would hasten the arrival of his corps, sat on the ground and lighted a cigar. It was close upon 4 o'clock when the 2nd Panjáb Cavalry, leading the way, reached the ground. Then the crossing began. Sir Colin, angry at the delay, anxious that the troops should cross before the dawn should discover them to the enemy, came down to stimulate their movements.\* His presence, due to a natural anxiety, really added nothing to the effect. The staff officers were in their places, doing their work calmly and efficiently, and before the day broke the whole force had completed the passage of the Gúmti. The place which it had left vacant on the right bank was at once occupied by Franks's division, the fourth.

The reader will not fail to see that Outram, on the left bank of the river, was in a position to execute the first move in the game. He was to push up the left bank of the Gúmti, and turn and render untenable the strong positions of the enemy on the other side of it. When it should become apparent that he had turned the first line of those works, then, but not till then, would the second move be made by Sir Colin himself with the troops waiting for Outram's success in the position of which the Dilkúsha may be called the centre.

\* "Sir Colin, being anxious to get his men across before the enemy could discover our intention and open upon us, rode down to the river-side and pitched into everybody most handsomely, I catching the principal share."—Hope Grant.

In pursuance of this plan, Outram, drawing up his force in three lines, marched up the left bank of the river for about a mile. The river there made a turn; so Outram, throwing forward his right, and leaving the sinuosities of the river, moved straight on in the direction of the city. A party of the enemy's cavalry which shortly afterwards appeared on his left was charged, routed, and pursued, though with the loss of Major Percy Smith of the Queen's Bays, described as an excellent officer. No further interruption to the progress of the force was offered, and it encamped that evening about four miles from the city, which it faced, its left resting on the Faizábád road, about half a mile in advance of the village of Chinhát.

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 6.

Outram  
pushes forward to the  
Faizábád  
road.

The following day and the 8th were spent mainly in skirmishing—the enemy advancing and being invariably repulsed. Outram, whilst maintaining his position, threw his pickets gradually much more forward. On the 8th, in obedience to instructions from Sir Colin, he sent back D'Aguilar's troop of horse artillery and the 9th Lancers, receiving in exchange twenty-two siege guns. That night he constructed two batteries, armed with heavy guns, within six hundred yards of the enemy's works on the old race-course.

He advances  
his pickets  
and constructs  
batteries.  
March 7-8.

At daybreak the following morning, the 9th, he made his attack. Preluding it with a heavy fire from the newly constructed batteries, he detached a column of infantry under Walpole to attack the enemy's left, and, after forcing it back,

His plan of  
attack on the  
9th.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 9.

Walpole  
beats the  
enemy's left

and Outram  
their right.

to wheel to the left and take them in the rear. He designed, meanwhile, to lead in person the left column across the Kokrail stream to a point whence, on the success of the right column being pronounced, it could attack and occupy a strong building known as the Yellow House—the Chakar Kothi—the key of the position of the rebels, and the occupation of which would turn and render useless the strong line of intrenchments erected by them on the right bank of the Gúmti.

The result corresponded entirely to Outram's soundly based hopes. Walpole drove the enemy's left through the jungles and villages covering their position, and then bringing his right forward, debouched on the Faizábád road, in rear of their most efficient battery, which, however, was found empty. The left column, meanwhile, which had marched at 2 o'clock in the morning to take up the position assigned to it, as soon as it learned that Walpole had reached the Faizábád road, attacked the Yellow House. The rebels were there in numbers, but, with the exception of nine, they did not show fight, but made so rapid a flight along the banks of the river that before the guns could open upon them they were out of reach. The "nine," however, clung to the building, and killed or wounded more than their own number. Amongst them were Anderson of the Sikhs, and St. George of the 1st Fusiliers. It was only by firing salvoes from the horse artillery guns that they were eventually dislodged.\*

\* Hope Grant. They killed or wounded three officers and nine men.



The success of the column was notified to Sir Colin Campbell by the hoisting of the colours of the 1st Fusiliers on the roof of a small room erected on the second storey of the Yellow House.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 9.

The column then pressed forward, following the rebels, drove them rapidly through the old irregular cavalry lines and suburbs to the Bádshah Bágh, and thence to the river, where they effected a junction with the right wing. The whole line then halted, and, occupying the houses and breastworks on the banks of the stream, opened and maintained a heavy fire on the rebels who lined the walls and occupied the gardens. Under cover of this fire three heavy guns and a howitzer were placed in position to enfilade the works in rear of the Martinière. Another battery of two 24-pounder guns and two 8-inch howitzers was likewise erected near the river to keep down the fire from the town.

Pressing the  
rebels,

Outram  
establishes a  
battery  
enfilading the  
enemy's  
works.

The first battery I have mentioned—that composed of three heavy guns and a howitzer—occupied the extreme left of Outram's line. It was commanded by Major Nicholson, R.E., of whose services at the A'lambágh I have already spoken, and protecting the guns was a party of the 1st Fusiliers under a very gallant and capable officer, Captain Salusbury. The guns had been unlimbered when Nicholson remarked that the hostile lines seemed abandoned by the rebels. Salusbury proposed to cross with a party of his men and ascertain the fact, but Nicholson considered it would be too hazardous to leave the guns without protection. At this conjuncture a young lieutenant of the 1st

The extreme  
left of  
Outram's  
line.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 9.

Butler volunteers to signal to the Highlanders on the right bank.

Unable to attract their attention, Butler swims the river,

and attracts the attention of the 93rd.

Fusiliers, named Thomas Butler, and four privates, volunteered to go down to the river-bank and signal their presence to the Highlanders of Adrian Hope's brigade, who were discerned at a distance of about six hundred yards on the other side of the river. They ran down accordingly; but shouting and signalling were alike useless—they could attract no attention. It was very important to open the communication, and, all other means having failed, Butler did not hesitate an instant to try the last and the most hazardous. It was about 3 o'clock in the afternoon; the river was some sixty yards wide, its depth was considerable, the stream was strong. But Butler, caring for no consequences, heedless of the chance that the batteries on the other side might be occupied, took off his coat and swam across. He landed in rear of the batteries, which he found unoccupied. Mounting the parapet of one of the works, he quickly attracted attention, and after some delay caused by the stupidity of a staff officer, who considered it would not be correct to occupy the abandoned works without special orders, the Highlanders and 4th Panjáb Rifles relieved him. During the time that Butler, wet, cold, and unarmed, occupied the works, he was twice fired at by the distant enemy, but he did not leave them to swim back until he had made them over to the men of Adrian Hope's brigade. For his cool gallantry on this occasion Butler received the Victoria Cross.

Outram's movement on the 9th had thus answered every expectation. He occupied the left

bank of the Gúmti as far as the Bádshah Bágh; the hostile batteries on the other side of the river were enfiladed. The enemy were completely taken in reverse. I propose now to show how, on that same day, the 9th, Sir Colin Campbell profited by Outram's manœuvres.

The Commander-in-Chief had waited patiently in his position at the Dilkúsha whilst Outram, on the 6th, the 7th, and the 8th, was executing the manœuvres which were the necessary preliminaries of the attack on the 9th, just described. Early on the morning of that day the guns and mortars, which, by Sir Colin's orders, had been placed in position on the Dilkúsha plateau during the preceding night, opened a very heavy fire on the Martinière. This fire was maintained until, about 2 p.m., the hoisting of the British ensign on the roof of the little room on the second storey of the Yellow House, made it clear to Sir Colin that Outram's attack had succeeded. Then, without the slightest delay, he launched Adrian Hope's brigade (the 4th), supported by the 53rd and 90th Regiments, the whole commanded by Lugard, against the Martinière. The effect of Outram's work that afternoon then became quickly apparent. The enfilading fire from the batteries which he had erected had caused the abandonment of a post which otherwise would have offered a strenuous resistance. It fell, so to speak, without a blow. The rebels, who had withdrawn their guns, fled precipitately across the river. The British loss was extremely small; and but for the fact that the returns re-

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 9.

Result of  
Outram's  
operations on  
the 9th.

Sir Colin, in  
his turn,  
advances,

and carries  
the Mar-  
tinière.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 9.

Adrian Hope  
occupies the  
works

from the  
Gúmti to the  
vicinity of  
Banks's  
house.

Total result  
of the  
fighting on  
the 9th.

Outram  
strengthens  
his position  
during the  
10th.

cord a dangerous wound inflicted by a musket ball on the gallant William Peel,\* they would be too slight to be specially recorded.

Not content with the capture of the Martinière, Adrian Hope's brigade pushed onwards. The 4th Panjáb Rifles, gallantly led by Wylde, supported by the 42nd Highlanders, climbed up the intrenchment abutting on the Gúmti, and proceeded to sweep down the whole line of hostile works till close to the vicinity of Banks's house. It was to this brigade that the men belonged who occupied the fortified place which the gallant Butler had stormed single-handed. This and the works forming a line from the Gúmti to a point not far from Banks's house were occupied during the night by Adrian Hope's brigade and the 53rd Regiment.

The work of the 9th had, then, resulted in success on both the lines of operation. Outram, establishing himself on one side of the parallelogram, had made it possible for Sir Colin to push up the other side of it—and this he had effectively done.

The next day, the 10th, Outram intended to be a day of preparation rather than of conflict. The rebels being in considerable force in the suburbs in his front, he wished to strengthen the position he had already gained. But the rebels, fully aware now of the danger threatening them from across the Gúmti, came on in considerable force

\* "He went out with his usual nonchalance to find a suitable place for some guns to be posted to breach the outer walls of the Martinière, when he was shot in the thigh by a musket ball." — *The Shannon's Brigade in India.*



and attacked a picket held by the 79th Highlanders. They were, however, repulsed with loss, and the work designed by Outram proceeded thenceforward undisturbed. To ensure its rapid execution, the cavalry under Hope Grant patrolled the vicinity of the camp. This patrolling produced occasional conflicts with detached parties of the rebels, and in one of these Major Sandford of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, an officer of much promise, was killed. Throughout this day Outram's batteries at the mosque west of the Chakar Kothi played on Hazratganj and the Kaisar Bágh.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 10.

The same day the Commander-in-Chief contented himself by completing the work of the previous evening by the storming and occupation of Banks's house. This was accomplished by Lugard with the troops already indicated, and with but trifling loss.

Sir Colin  
storms  
Banks's  
house.

By the evening of the 10th two sides of the parallelogram were all but completely occupied. The attempt to pierce its centre—to force the line stretching from Banks's house to a point beyond the Kaisar Bágh—was now to be made. Strong as were the buildings which constituted the value of that inner line, the position of Outram on the opposite bank of the Gúmti, and of Sir Colin Campbell now firmly established across the canal, having in Banks's house a post strong for attack, caused the chances to be very much in favour of the assailants. For whilst Outram enfiladed the enemy's works on one side, Sir Colin was now able to turn them on the other.

Total result  
of the  
fighting on  
the 10th,

and prospects  
of the  
morrow.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 10-11.

Outram is  
directed to  
attack the  
positions  
covering the  
iron and  
stone bridges.

In pursuance of the plan already indicated, Outram was directed to employ the evening and night of the 10th in establishing batteries which should rake the enemy's works, and annoy the Kaisar Bágh with a fire vertical and direct. He was also instructed to resume his offensive movement on the morning of the 11th by attacking the positions covering the iron and stone bridges—the former leading to the Residency, the latter to the Machi Báwan—and, by carrying them, to command the iron bridge from the left bank of the river.

He carries  
the positions  
leading to the  
iron bridge.

Outram carried out these instructions to the letter. He established during the night batteries which bore, in the manner prescribed, on the Mess-house and on the Kaisar Bágh. On the 11th, shortly after daylight, he led Walpole's column—the right—(79th Highlanders, 2nd and 3rd battalions Rifle Brigade, 1st Bengal Fusiliers, Gibbons's light field battery, and two 24-pounders) to gain a position commanding the iron bridge. The column, covered by the Rifles, worked its way through the suburbs till it reached a mosque within an enclosure at the point where the road from the Bádshah Bágh joins the main road to cantonments, about half a mile from the iron bridge. The place being very defensible, Walpole left there the 1st Fusiliers, and proceeded towards the stone bridge. On his way to this bridge he surprised and captured the camp of Hashmat Ali Cháodri of Sandíla, with that of the mutinous 15th Irregulars, took two guns and their standards, and killed many of those soldiers faithless to their salt.

Sending Gould Weston with a troop of the Bays to cut off the fugitives from Makkaganj—a service efficiently performed—Outram pushed on, without serious opposition, to the head of the stone bridge. Finding, however, that it was commanded by the enemy's guns, as well as by musketry fire from several high and stone-built houses from the opposite side of the river, he deemed it more prudent to retire to the mosque at the cross roads, there to remain till the operations I am about to record had been completed. He then fell back on his camp behind the Bádshah Bágh.

Meanwhile the left column (23rd Fusiliers, 2nd Panjáb Infantry, two 24-pounder guns, and three field battery guns), commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pratt, starting twenty minutes after the right column, had met with considerable opposition, and, being exposed to the fire of a hostile battery from the right side of the river, suffered considerable loss. It succeeded, however, in occupying all the houses down to the river's bank and the head of the iron bridge, to the right of which the two 24-pounder guns were placed in battery. It was a difficult and dangerous operation, and though it succeeded, it cost Outram the lives of two of his most gallant officers, Captain Thynne of the Rifle Brigade, and Lieutenant Moor-som, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, a soldier of remarkable talent and promise. He was guiding the column, and was killed whilst reconnoitring in front of it.

It may be convenient, for the sake of clearness, here to add that the positions taken up by Out-

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 11.

Pratt establishes batteries near the iron bridge.

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 11-15.

ram on the 11th continued to be occupied by him on the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th. During those days he carried out, with vigour and accuracy, the purpose he had in view—the maintenance of an enfilading fire, raking the positions which the Commander-in-Chief was assailing on the other side of the river. Having been reinforced on the 12th by four 18-pounder guns, two 10-inch howitzers, and five 10-inch and four 5½-inch mortars, he erected, in addition to the batteries already enumerated, three more to play on the Kaisar Bágh; and when that strong place fell, as I am about to recount, on the morning of the 14th, he turned the fire of those batteries against the Residency and the buildings to the right of the bridge. It can easily be conceived the enormous assistance rendered to the main attack by this heavy enfilading fire, maintained without the slightest intermission. It had been possible to do even more, but he was hampered, as I shall show in its proper place, by restrictions to action placed on him by the Commander-in-Chief.

March 10.

I now return to Sir Colin. I left him, on the evening of the 10th, established on the city side of the canal on a line stretching from the Gúmti to Banks's house. Whilst the Chief Engineer, Brigadier Robert Napier, maintained a heavy fire from Banks's house on the works in front—especially on the block of palaces known as the Bégam Kothi—Lugard, bringing forward his right, occupied, without opposition, the Sikandar Bágh—famous in Sir Colin's first advance for the splendid gallantry

The Sikandar  
Bágh occu-  
pied.



of Ewart and Cooper and their dozen followers, Highlanders and Sikhs—and then prepared to work his way to the Shah Najíf. His operations were greatly facilitated by the noble daring of three engineer officers attached to his column, Medley, Lang, and Carnegie.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.  
—  
1858.  
March 10.

From three to four hundred yards to the right front of the Sikandar Bágh stood an isolated building high on a mound overlooking the river, called the Kaddam Rasúl. Beyond this again, but in close vicinity to it, was the Shah Najíf, the building which, in Sir Colin's first advance, had almost made him falter, and the capture of which was due to the keen observation and happy audacity of Sergeant Paton\* and Adrian Hope. Both these posts were immediately outside the enemy's third line of works, which ran in front of the Moti Mahal, the old Mess-house, and the Tára Kothi. Lang, noticing that the two posts I have referred to, the Kaddam Rasúl and the Shah Najíf, were very quiet, proposed to his companions that they should reconnoitre, and possibly occupy, them. The three officers at once set out, followed by four native sappers. Creeping quietly up to the Kaddam Rasúl, they found it abandoned. Entering it and ascending the little winding staircase, they looked down into the garden of the Shah Najíf. This seemed also abandoned. But not liking to make, with four men, an attack, which, if the interior of the place were occupied, would certainly fail, the engineers, leaving the four

The happy  
audacity of  
three engi-  
neer officers

gains the  
Kaddam  
Rasúl

\* Vide page 194.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 10.

and the Shah  
Najif.

sappers to guard their conquest, returned to the Sikandar Bágh to ask for men to take the Shah Najif. The officer commanding at that post declined, however, to take upon himself a responsibility from which, in the case of the Kaddam Rasúl, the engineers had not flinched, whereupon Medley rode to Banks's house to obtain an order from Lugard. This was at once granted, and Medley, returning, had placed at his disposal one hundred men. With these and fifty sappers, the engineers entered the place and found it abandoned. As it was but two hundred yards from the line of intrenchments already spoken of, the engineers at once set to work to make it defensible on the side nearest the enemy, and, at Medley's suggestion, one hundred men were thrown into the place.\*

Lugard  
effects a  
breach in the  
Bégam Kothi.

Whilst this operation was successfully conducted on the right, the guns from the heavy batteries on the left were pouring shot and shell on the Bégam Kothi. The contiguous palaces known under this designation were extremely strong, capable, if well defended, of resisting for a very long time even the fighting power sent against them by Sir Colin Campbell. But in warring against Asiatics, the immense moral superiority which assault gives to an assaulting party is an element which no general can leave out of con-

\* This deed of happy audacity was not mentioned in the despatches. It was, however, well known in camp. My account of it is taken almost *verbatim* from the statement of one of the actors, to whom it is unnecessary further to refer.

sideration. It is true that on this occasion, about half-past 3 o'clock in the afternoon, a breach was effected which opened a way to stormers; but the breach was so narrow, and the defences behind it were so strong, that if the men who lined them had been animated by a spirit similar to that which inspired the assailants, no general would have dared to attempt an assault.\* As it was, though unaware of the extreme strength of the inner defences, Lugard, on the breach being pronounced, gave, without hesitation, the order to storm.

The storming party consisted of those companions in glory, the 93rd Highlanders and the 4th Panjáb Rifles. It was indeed fit that to the men who, in the previous November, had stormed the Sikandar Bágh and carried the Shah Najíf should be intrusted the first difficult enterprise of Sir Colin's second movement on Lakhnao. Fortunate in their splendid discipline, in their tried comradeship, in their confidence each in the other, the 4th Panjáb Rifles and the 93rd Highlanders enjoyed the additional privilege of having as their leader one of the noblest men who ever wore the British uniform, the bravest of soldiers, and the most gallant of gentlemen. Those who had the privilege of intimate acquaintance with Adrian Hope will recognise the fitness of the description.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.  
1858.  
March 10.

and sends  
Adrian  
Hope's  
brigade to  
storm it.

The block of buildings to be stormed consisted

Description  
of the Bégam  
Kothi.

\* "At the Bégam's palace the defences were found, after the capture of the place, so much stronger than could be observed or had been believed, that the General said that had he known what lay before the assaulting column he should have hesitated to give the order for advance."—*Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India*, page 393, note.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 10.

of a number of palaces and courtyards, one within the other, surrounded by a breastwork and deep ditch. The artillery fire had breached the breastwork and the wall of the outer courtyard, but some of the inner walls had not been seriously injured. They were occupied by a considerable body of sepoy, probably exceeding rather than short of five thousand.

The assault.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon Adrian Hope led his men to the assault, the 93rd leading, the 4th Panjáb Rifles in support. The sepoy, not yet daunted, met their assailants in the breach, and for a short time their greatly superior numbers offered an obstacle difficult to pierce. But individual valour, inspired by a determination to conquer, was not to be withstood. The Adjutant of the 93rd, William McBean, cut or shot down eleven of the enemy with his own hand. His example was followed by many others. The Panjábis, pressing on from behind, added to the weight of the attack. Their behaviour excited the admiration of everyone. When a Highlander chanced to fall, his native comrades rushed forward to cover his body and avenge his death. The splendid rivalry of the two soon made itself felt. Forced back from the breach, the sepoy scarcely attempted to defend the strong positions yet remaining to them. They seemed to have but one object—to save themselves for a future occasion. But the Highlanders and the Panjábis pressed them hard. Quarter was neither asked for nor given, and when the Bégam Kothi was evacuated by the last survivor of the garrison, he left be-

The Bégam  
Kothi is  
gained.



hind him, within the space surrounded by the deep ditch of which I have spoken, six hundred corpses of his comrades! It was "the sternest struggle which occurred during the siege." \*

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 10.

The capture of the Bégam Kothi opened to the Chief Engineer, Brigadier Napier, the means of dealing destructive blows against the remaining positions of the enemy. It brought him inside the enemy's works, and the enclosures the assailants had stormed now served as a cover from the enemy's fire. "Thenceforward," says Sir Colin, in his report, "he pushed his approach, with the greatest judgment, through the enclosures by the aid of the sappers and of heavy guns, the troops immediately occupying the ground as he advanced, and the mortars being moved from one position to another as ground was won on which they could be placed."

Robert  
Napier pro-  
ceeds by the  
sap and  
heavy guns.

The storming had been effected with comparatively small loss on the side of the British. But amongst those who fell was one who had made a name for himself as a most daring and able soldier. Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, was mortally wounded on this day. He had joined the storming party, had entered the breach with Robert Napier, and had been separated from him in the *mêlée*. He was not wounded during the storm; but, after the breach had been gained, he rushed forward to hunt for sepoy who might be concealed in the dark rooms and corners of the palace. Coming suddenly upon a party of these,

Death of  
Hodson.

\* Sir Colin Campbell's Official Report.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.  
—  
1858.  
March 10-11.

he was fired at and mortally wounded. The Highlanders avenged his death, for they bayoneted every man of the group which had fired at him.

My opinion of Hodson has been recorded in an early page of this volume. I have little to add to it. His abilities were great. As a partisan soldier he was not to be surpassed. But the needless slaughter of the princes of the House of Taimúr would seem to indicate that he was born more than a hundred years after the era when all his qualities would have obtained recognition. Trenck and his Pandours were too bloody and too savage for the civilisation of 1756; and Trenck was never accused of shooting unarmed prisoners.

Position of  
the assailants  
the evening  
of the 11th.

The position of the assailing force on the evening of the 11th was in considerable advance of that it had occupied in the morning. It was now pushed forward to the Shah Najíf on the right, and it held the Bégam Kothi on the left. Before the Kaisar Bágh could be assailed, the Mess-house, the Hazrat Ganj, and the Imámbará had first to succumb.

The Nipál  
troops arrive.

On that day the Nipál troops, led by the Maharájá Jang Bahádur, were brought into line. This reinforcement enabled Sir Colin Campbell, as I shall show, to extend the plan of his operations on the succeeding days.

Franks's  
division  
comes to the  
front on the  
12th.

The following day, the 12th, was a day chiefly for the engineers. Their work proceeded steadily and surely. Some changes, however, were made in the disposition of the troops. Lugard's division, the 2nd, which had hitherto been in the

front, was relieved by Franks's, the 4th. The Nipál troops, too, were brought into line, and ordered to advance on the British left, so as to hold the line of the canal beyond Banks's house.

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.  
1858.  
March 12-13.

The 13th was likewise an engineer's day. Avoiding the main road, which was well defended by the enemy's batteries, Napier pressed forward on a line about one hundred and twenty yards to its left and parallel to it, sapping through the houses, out of the line of the enemy's fire. When necessary, the heavy guns opened breaches for his advance, and the sappers, supported by the infantry, pushed on slowly but steadily, enlarging the breaches communicating with the rear, so as to have a way ready for supports, should they be required. The overwhelming superiority of the British artillery fire, supported as it was by Outram's enfilade and cross fire from the other side of the Gúmti, effectually prevented any serious annoyance from the enemy's guns. The rebels maintained, however, from the neighbouring houses, a hot fire of musketry on the advance, to which the men forming the latter replied effectively.\*

Napier  
presses  
forward with  
the sap.

This day, too, the Nipál force, crossing the canal, moved against the suburb considerably to the left of Banks's house. This operation drew the attention of a portion of the rebel force to that quarter at the same time that it covered the left of the British army.

The Nipálese  
operate on  
the extreme  
left.

\* *A Year's Campaigning in India.*—Medley.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 13-14.  
Position on  
the evening  
of the 13th.

By the evening of the 13th the task assigned to the engineers had been completed. All the great buildings on the left up to the Imámbará had been sapped through. The battery which had been playing on the massive walls of that building had effected a breach, and it was hoped that it would be sufficiently practicable on the morrow to permit an assault.

The morning  
of the 14th.

Early on the morning of the 14th, the heavy guns, at a distance of thirty yards, were still pounding at the breach—"the 8-inch shot, at this short distance, walking through three or four thick masonry walls in succession as if they had been so much paper."\* The enemy were replying from the walls with musketry fire. At length, about 9 o'clock in the morning, the breach was reported practicable; and the stormers, who had been drawn up, awaiting the signal, received the order to assault.

Franks  
storms the  
Imámbará.

The storming party was composed of sixty men of Brasyer's Sikhs and two companies of the 10th Foot, supported by the remainder of the two regiments. These men, gallantly led, dashed at the breach with all the impetuosity of their pent-up energies. The defenders waited to receive them; nor was it until after a very sharp struggle that they were forced back in disorder. Once forced back, they fled as though panic-stricken, and in a few minutes the Imámbará was in the possession of the stormers. The support and reserve followed, completing the lodgment. In

\* Medley.

the assault there fell a very gallant officer of the regiment of Ferozpúr, Captain Da Costa, who had volunteered for this special service. He had lived a life which had brought him many enemies, but the hostility of the bitterest of them would have changed to admiration had they witnessed the heroic manner in which he led his men to the assault.

Book XL.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 14.

The gain of the Imámbará did not quench the zeal of the stormers. The rebels were in such haste to save themselves that, emerging from the Imámbará through the great gateway into the road, they ran as fast as they could to the Kaisar Bágh. Brasyer's Sikhs, burning to avenge Da Costa's death, dashed after them as they fled, and a few men of the 10th joined in the pursuit. Following in a parallel line, a portion of the 90th, guided by the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the Division, Henry Havelock, forced their way into a palace which commanded three bastions of the Kaisar Bágh. Once in that position, they brought to bear upon the enemy's gunners below them a fire so withering that one by one the guns were deserted, the last to fire being an 8-inch howitzer, which was only abandoned under pressure not to be withstood. This daring act had the most important consequences. By it the second line of the enemy's defences, the line stretching from the Gúmti, in front of the Mess-house, to the Imámbará, was turned. Its defenders, panic-stricken at seeing their position thus taken in reverse, had no thought but to save themselves. Abandoning, then, the second line, they ran into the

The stormers  
gain a posi-  
tion com-  
manding a  
portion of the  
Kaisar Bágh.



Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 14.

Brasyer's  
Sikhs gain a  
courtyard  
adjoining the  
Kaisar Bágh.

The Sikhs  
and 10th Foot  
turn the  
third line of  
the defences.

The rebels  
evacuate that  
line.

buildings yet intervening between the Imámbará and the Kaisar Bágh, and from behind the walls of these endeavoured to stay the further progress of our troops. Then it was that the engineers proposed to suspend operations for the day, and to proceed by the slower process of sap. But the men, the Sikhs of Brasyer's regiment especially, were not to be restrained. The joy of conquest had mastered every other feeling. Led by Brasyer and Havelock, they effected an entrance into a bastion by a vacant embrasure, and forced their way, cheering, under a terrible fire into a courtyard adjoining the Kaisar Bágh, driving the enemy before them.

Seeing the possibilities before him—the chance of gaining the Kaisar Bágh at a blow—Havelock ran back to the detachment of the 10th Foot, commanded by Captain Annesley, and ordered it to the front. Obeying with alacrity, the 10th dashed to the front and joined the Sikhs. A portion of these latter, led by Brasyer, diminishing by casualties as they went, pushed daringly on, nor did they halt until, expelling the enemy before them, they had penetrated to the Chíní Bázár, to the rear of the Tára Kothi and Mess-house, thus turning the third line of the enemy's works.

The enemy, congregated in numbers at not less than six thousand in the Tára Kothi and the Mess-house, now finding themselves taken in reverse, evacuated these buildings, and endeavoured to re-enter the city by an opening in the further gateway of the Chíní Bázár. Had they succeeded in so doing, they would have cut off Brasyer and

his gallant band, which must then have been overwhelmed. But Havelock, advancing with sixty Sikhs, in support of Brasyer, promptly seized two adjoining bastions, and, turning the six guns found there on the enemy, so plied their masses, issuing from the positions above named, with round shot, grape, and musketry, that he stopped their dangerous movement and turned them back.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 14.

This action assured the posts won by the advanced party. Gradually Havelock's small body was strengthened by a company of the 90th, brought up by Colonel Purnell himself, and from that moment success was certain.

By this time the fourth note sent by Havelock urging him to come on reached Franks, and that gallant officer at once pushed forward with every available man to aid the advanced parties. His arrival shortly after with his supports, accompanied by the Chief Engineer, made the position of the attacking party completely solid. The only question now to be solved was, whether the advantages already so wonderfully achieved should or should not be turned to account by the storming of the Kaisar Bâgh.

Supports  
arrive.

Every consideration seemed to urge the attempt. Although that morning it had been intended to storm only the Imâmbârá, events had moved so quickly, the assailants had displayed so much energy and daring, the enemy had been so mastered by panic, that it seemed advisable to push on whilst the stormers were still eager, the rebels still dejected.

Shall the  
advantage be  
pursued?

Accordingly, after a brief consultation, Franks

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 14.

The Kaiser  
Bagh is  
stormed.

and Napier resolved to push on. Reinforcements were sent for from the rear, and an order was despatched to the troops at the Sikandar Bagh and the Shah Najif on the right to push forward. The reinforcements soon came up, and whilst the troops on the right advanced and occupied, with but little resistance, the Moti Mahal, the Chatter Manzil, and the Tara Koti, Franks sent his men through the court of Sadat Ali's mosque into the Kaiser Bagh itself. The Kaiser Bagh is a rectangular enclosure, made up of a series of courts and gardens, interspersed with marble summer-houses. These were still full of sepoy, who, from the roofs and from the summits of the houses in the adjoining enclosure, poured a heavy musketry fire on the invaders. But the British once within the garden, the game for which the rebels were struggling was lost, and, in a comparatively short space, those of them who had failed to escape lay dead or in death's agony.

The plunder-  
ing which  
followed.

Then began a scene of plunder, of which it is difficult to give an adequate description. The glowing words of an eye-witness, then in the zenith of a literary fame which still lives, mellowed by time and increased by experience, brings it, however, as vividly before the reader as words can bring a scene so rare and so terrible. "The scene of plunder," wrote Dr. Russell, "was indescribable. The soldiers had broken up several of the store-rooms, and pitched the contents into the court, which was lumbered with cases, with embroidered



cloths, gold and silver brocade, silver vessels, arms, banners, drums, shawls, scarfs, musical instruments, mirrors, pictures, books, accounts, medicine bottles, gorgeous standards, shields, spears, and a heap of things which would make this sheet of paper like a catalogue of a broker's sale. Through these moved the men, wild with excitement, 'drunk with plunder.' I had often heard the phrase, but never saw the thing itself before. They smashed to pieces the fowling-pieces and pistols to get at the gold mountings, and the stones set in the stocks. They burned in a fire, which they made in the centre of the court, brocades and embroidered shawls for the sake of the gold and silver. China, glass, and jade they dashed to pieces in sheer wantonness; pictures they ripped up, or tossed on the flames; furniture shared the same fate. . . . Oh the toil of that day! Never had I felt such exhaustion. It was horrid enough to have to stumble through endless courts which were like vapour baths, amid dead bodies, through sights worthy of the Inferno, by blazing walls which might be pregnant with mines, over breaches, in and out of smouldering embrasures, across frail ladders, suffocated by deadly smells of rotting corpses, of rotten ghee, or vile native scents; but the seething crowd of camp-followers into which we emerged in Hazratganj was something worse. As ravenous, and almost as foul as vultures, they were packed in a dense mass in the street, afraid or unable to go into the palaces, and, like the birds they resembled,

BOOK XI.  
CHAPTER IX.

1858.  
March 14.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 14.

Result of the  
day's work.

waiting till the fight was done to prey on their plunder.”\*

The day's work was over. A work great, unexpected, and, in every sense of the word, magnificent. The line which in the morning had stretched from the Shah Najíf to Hazratganj now ran from the Chattar Manzil to the Residency side of the Kaisar Bágh. Two strong defensive lines of works, garrisoned by thirty thousand to forty thousand men, had been turned, and the great citadel on which the second of those two lines rested had itself been stormed!

It was a great, even a magnificent work, but it might, and ought to, have been greater. Its greatness and magnificence were due mainly to the Sikhs and the 10th Foot, to the gallant leading of Havelock and Brasyer, the confident daring of Franks, and the skill of Napier—its want of completeness is attributable solely to Sir Colin Campbell and Mansfield. How this was so I shall explain in a few words.

Outram  
proposes to  
cross by the  
iron bridge.

In a previous page I have narrated how, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th, Outram continued to occupy his positions on the left bank of the Gúmti commanding the direct approaches to the iron bridge, but restricted from further movement in that direction by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. The iron bridge led across the river to a point not far from the Residency. Now, when, on the 15th, the stormers under Franks attacked the Imámbará, and, pushing onwards, dashed

\* *My Diary in India*, by William Howard Russell.

against the Kaisar Bâgh, the enormous effect which would have been produced by the crossing of the river and the penetrating into the very heart of the enemy by Outram's division, may be imagined. Outram wished to carry out such an operation, and applied to the Commander-in-Chief for permission to do so. In reply he was informed by the Chief of the Staff that he might cross by the iron bridge, but "that he was not to do so if he thought he would *lose a single man*." A more extraordinary proviso never accompanied an order to advance given to a general in the presence of the enemy. It was tantamount to an absolute prohibition. Outram had that afternoon reconnoitred the enemy's position across the river. His plans were laid, his troops were ready to attack, but he saw that there was at least one gun on the bridge; that the bridge itself was commanded by a large mosque and by houses which had been loop-holed; and that the rebels, in anticipation of a forward movement on his part, had laid their batteries in such a manner as to render it difficult and dangerous. Not only, then, would he have lost one man, but probably very many. On the other hand, the passage of the Gúmti by Outram that afternoon would have been fatal to the enemy. It would have in a great measure intercepted their retreat. Their slain would have been counted by thousands, and, in all probability, the province of Oudh would have immediately succumbed. The rebels who escaped on the 14th were the rebels who fell back on the forts and strong places of the province, there to renew the re-

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 14.

Unsatisfactory reply of the Commander-in-Chief.

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.

March 14.

Comments on  
the Com-  
mander-in-  
Chief's reply.

sistance which had broken down in the capital. Had they been cut off, that resistance would not have been !

That they were not attacked in their retreat was due solely to Sir Colin's order to Outram not to advance if the advance would cost him the life of *one single man*. Why the hands of a gallant soldier like Outram were thus tied is a question which has not been answered. True it is that Sir Colin had only contemplated on the 14th an attack on the Imámbará. The Kaisar Bágh, in his programme, was reserved for the day following. But he had sufficient experience of war to be aware that the unexpected is always possible, and knowing that, he committed a grave error when he restricted the action of a lieutenant occupying a position which, under certain circumstances, could be made fatal to the enemy. In the camp the order was attributed to the counsels of Mansfield ; but the responsibility rested, and still rests, with Sir Colin.

To return. The 14th, as we have seen, had been a day devoted entirely to work, and to little but work. It was necessary to take early measures to consolidate the progress which had then been made. To this end the 15th was devoted—on the right bank of the Gúmti. Under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief powder was removed, mines were destroyed, and mortars were fixed for the further bombardment of the positions still held by the rebels on the line of advance, up the right bank of the river, and in the heart of the city.

The 15th  
on the right  
bank of the  
river.

The 15th  
on the left  
bank.

On the left bank it was different, Here two movements were ordered, both of which would



have been more effective if directed the previous day. Sir Colin, sensible now that the door of retreat had been left too open to the enemy, despatched Hope Grant, with eleven hundred cavalry and twelve horse artillery guns, to pursue them along the Sitápúr road. Brigadier Campbell was likewise directed to move with his infantry brigade, some guns, and fifteen hundred cavalry from the Álambágh on the Sandíla road. Neither of these operations came to anything. The rebels had taken neither the Sandíla nor the Sitápúr road, and the only effect of the two movements, combined with a third on the 16th, to which I am about to refer, was to leave open to them the road to Faizábád, by which more than twenty thousand of them eventually escaped.

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.

March 15.

Hope Grant  
and Campbell  
are sent to  
pursue the  
rebels,

who, how-  
ever, escape.

The third movement was made by Outram. That general was directed on the 16th to cross the Gúmti, near the Sikandar Bágh, with Douglas's brigade, the 5th, (23rd, 79th Highlanders, 1st Fusiliers), and join the Commander-in-Chief at the Kaisar Bágh, leaving Walpole's brigade still in its position on the left bank watching the iron and stone bridges.

Outram  
ordered to  
cross the  
Gúmti.

March 16

Outram crossed the Gúmti by a bridge of casks, far removed from the fire of the enemy, near the Sikandar Bágh, and, joined by the 20th Regiment and Brasyer's Sikhs, marched towards the Kaisar Bágh by a road made the previous day by the sappers. On the way Sir Colin rode out to the force and gave his final instructions to Outram. These were to push on through the Residency, take the iron bridge in reverse, and

He crosses  
near the  
Sikandar  
Bágh

and moves  
on the  
Residency.



Бокъ XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 16.  
Contrast  
between the  
English and  
the Indian  
defence of the  
Residency.

then, advancing a mile further, to storm the Machhi Báwan and the great Imámbará.

Outram pushed on at once, passed through the Kaisar Bágh, and then moved straight on the Residency. As his little force neared the venerated and battered defences of that monument of British valour, the 23rd leading, it was assailed by a fire of musketry from the line of posts which Aitken and Anderson, Sanders and Boileau, Graydon and Gould Weston, and many noble men had defended so long and so bravely. But now the positions were inverted. Then the assailants were Asiatics, the defenders mostly Englishmen. Now Asiatics defended, Englishmen assailed. The difference showed itself in a remarkable manner. For whereas in the former case the Englishmen defended themselves, unassisted, for eighty-four days, in the latter the Asiatics were disposed of in less than half an hour. One charge of Outram's division, and the enemy fled, panic-stricken and panting, from the classic ground.

Outram,  
pushing  
forward,

The 23rd pursued the fleeing rebels, followed by Brasyer's Sikhs and the 1st Fusiliers. Two companies of the 23rd under Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, guided\* by Gould Weston, pressed rapidly forward, and, taking the enemy's defences in reverse, captured the gun of which I have spoken as commanding the passage across the iron bridge. The force then pushed on, taking in reverse the batteries between the two bridges.

\* Outram's despatch. — one for which his knowledge of the localities peculiarly fitted him. This was a duty often assigned to Captain Weston,

Meanwhile Major Cotter crowned the Residency height with a field battery of Madras Artillery, and opening a heavy fire on the Machhi Báwan, maintained it till he was relieved by two 68-pounder guns of the Naval Brigade. After these had played with effect for some time on the devoted place, the 1st Fusiliers and Brasyer's Sikhs were sent forward to finish the work. This they did without difficulty, and the Machhi Báwan and great Imámbará fell into their hands, the enemy abandoning seven guns. In this advance Captain Salusbury of the 1st Fusiliers and Lieutenant MacGregor,\* doing duty with that regiment, greatly distinguished themselves.

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.

March 16.

Captures the great Imám-bára and the Machhí Bawan.

Whilst these operations were successfully progressing on the right bank of the Gúmti, a number of the enemy, driven from the Residency and other places, poured over the stone bridge, and, the better to cover their design of retreating on Faizábád, made a strong attack on Walpole's pickets. The attack was repulsed, but the rebels made good their retreat.

The retreating rebels attack Walpole, but are repulsed.

A more serious counterblow had been attempted in another quarter.

The garrison of the Álambágh had been reduced by the number of troops withdrawn by Sir Colin to less than a thousand men of all arms. These were made up of about four hundred infantry, the Military Train, a small detachment of the 7th Hussars, and some artillery. The post was commanded by Brigadier Franklyn.

Reduced garrison of the Alam-bagh.

\* Now Colonel MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., author of *Narrative of a Journey through the Province of Khorassan, &c. &c.*

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 16.  
The rebels  
attack it.

At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 16th the rebels came down in considerable masses, of the three arms. Whilst their infantry menaced the front of the British position their cavalry and artillery endeavoured to force back the left flank, and to get round it, with the view of giving their infantry the opportunity they were awaiting.

They are met,

To meet this movement Franklyn ordered four guns and the Military Train and cavalry, under Robertson, to the village in the rear of his position, whilst to Olpherts and the four guns which remained to him he entrusted the defence of his left.

and repulsed  
on the left  
and rear  
by Robertson  
and Olpherts,

These arrangements were made just in time. The rebels had been coming on boldly, but no sooner did Olpherts sweep the plain with his guns than their cavalry first halted, and then began to retire. A few of them did indeed make a sudden dash at the left front picket, and even entered the village in which it was, but eventually these, too, followed the example of their comrades.

in the centre  
by Vincent  
Eyre.

Meanwhile the main body of the infantry attacked the front, throwing out skirmishers, and advancing beyond the British rifle-pits. But Vincent Eyre, who commanded the whole of the artillery, arranged his guns in such a manner as to rake their whole line from left to right, whilst the infantry brigade, commanded by Brigadier Stisted, waited for them to come on.

The fire of the guns first checked the rebels and then drove them back; but the fact that the attack began at 9 o'clock and ceased only at half-



past one will give some idea of its determined nature.

Two days previously, the 14th, the Commander-in-Chief had requested Jang Bahádur and the Nipálese to move to his left, up the canal, and take in reverse the positions which, for three months, the rebels had occupied in front of the Álambágh, the garrison of which was now reduced to two regiments. Jang Bahádur carried out the instructions conveyed to him with ability and success. One after another the enemy's positions, from the Chár Bágh bridge up to the Residency, with their guns, fell into his hands. This operation, which effectually covered, as it was carried out, the Commander-in-Chief's left, occupied several days. The losses the Nipál chief experienced were inconsiderable.\*

The 17th, Outram, pursuing his onward course,

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 16.

Jang Bahádur covers the Commander-in-Chief's left.

Outram continues

\* Jang Bahádur's successful advance was memorable for the recovery from captivity of two English ladies—Miss Jackson and Mrs. Orr. In the first volume of this history (note, page 389) I have given a sketch of the adventures of the Sitápúr fugitives, and have told how it was that on the 17th March only two of these, Mrs. Orr and Miss Jackson, survived. On the 20th March two British officers attached to the Nipál troops, Captain McNeill and Lieutenant Bogle, when exploring some deserted streets near the Kaisar Bagh, were informed by a friendly native of

the place in which the two ladies were confined. They at once procured the aid of a party of fifty Nipálese, and after walking through narrow streets—about half a mile—they reached a house occupied by one Wájid Alí, an officer of the old Court. In a room within the house they found the two ladies dressed in Oriental costume. They at once procured a palanquin, and notwithstanding the opposition threatened by a body of ruffians who would have prevented the rescue, they conveyed the ladies in safety to the camp of Jang Bahádúr.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 17.  
his forward  
movements  
on the 17th

occupied, without resistance, in the morning, the Huséni Mosque and the Daolat Khána. In the afternoon he moved, with a brigade (Middleton's field battery, two 8-inch howitzers, one company native sappers, wing 20th Foot, wing 23rd Foot, wing 79th Highlanders, Brasyer's Sikhs), to occupy a block of buildings known as Sharf-u-Dáola's house. The enemy made no resistance, but hastily evacuated the place. The success, however, was marred by a deplorable accident. In the courtyard in rear of the Jamma Masjid, impeding the progress of the troops, nine carts, laden with gunpowder packed in tin cases and leather bags, were found. Outram directed Captain Clarke and Lieutenant Brownlow of the Engineers to remove the carts, and to dispose of the powder by throwing it into a large and deep well. If the order had been carefully carried out no accident could possibly have occurred. But it is supposed that in the course of the operation a tin case struck the side of the well near the surface and ignited. The fire communicated itself to the powder in the carts, and caused an explosion, which resulted in the death of the two officers and about thirty men. Others were also injured, more or less seriously.

An explosion  
causes loss  
of life.

Further pro-  
gress on the  
18th.

On the 18th, Outram's advanced post (a picket of the 20th under Lieutenant Gordon) cleared the houses and streets in front of it, though not without meeting a sharp opposition from the enemy. In carrying out this operation they captured a very fine brass 9-pounder gun, loaded to the muzzle with grape, and pointed down the

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.

March 18.

Sir Colin  
learns that a  
large number  
of rebels are  
still in the  
Músa Bágh.

street which they had to clear. The enemy, however, abandoned it on their advance, without discharging it.

It had become known during these last two days, to the Commander-in-Chief, that the rebels had occupied, to the number of from eight to nine thousand, the Músa Bágh, a large palace with gardens and enclosures, standing in the midst of an open country filled with trees, about four miles to the north-west of Lakhnao, near the right bank of the Gúmti. These rebels were believed to be animated by the presence of the Bégam and her son, and of the more desperate leaders of the revolt. Sir Colin Campbell was resolved, now that all the strong points in the city itself were in his hands, to expel them from this last stronghold.

On the morning of the 19th, therefore, Outram, under instructions from Sir Colin, marched against the Músa Bágh. His force consisted of two squadrons of the 9th Lancers; one company Royal Artillery; one company native sappers; Middleton's field battery; two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, four 8-inch mortars, under Captain Carleton, R.A.; three companies 20th Regiment; seven companies 23rd Regiment; 79th Highlanders and 2nd Panjáb Infantry. Whilst this force marched against the place from the advanced positions in the city, Sir Hope Grant, still on the left bank of the Gúmti, was directed to cannonade it, and, on the enemy being dislodged, to fall upon those who should attempt to cross the river; at the same time

Outram  
marches on  
the Músa  
Bágh.  
March 19.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 19.

Brigadier Campbell of the Bays was ordered to take up, with a brigade of infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and a due proportion of guns, a position on the left front of the Músa Bágh, ready to pounce upon the rebels when Outram should expel them from their stronghold. The Nipálese troops were likewise directed to enter the city, from the Chárbágh line of road, towards the rear of the Húséni Mosque. This time it was hoped and believed there would be no fugitives. But again expectation was balked.

Captures Ali  
Nakki Khán's  
house  
and the  
Músa Bágh.

Between Outram's advanced posts and the Músa Bágh there stood, near the Gáo Ghát, on the Gúmti, a house belonging to the last prime minister of Oudh, the Nawáb Ali Nakki Khán, at the time a prisoner in Calcutta. A company of the 79th, led by Lieutenant Evereth, attacked and drove the rebels from this place. Outram's further advance was delayed nearly two hours by the necessity of breaking through a thick wall. When at last this obstacle was removed, the troops pushed on through the suburbs to the Músa Bágh. Here the enemy appeared in great strength, but on Outram threatening their flanks, at the same time that his guns opened fire on their front, they hastily abandoned the place, leaving behind them two guns, which had been posted to protect the approaches to it.

They fled by the line which Campbell should have commanded. But where was Campbell? "With his large force of cavalry and artillery," writes Sir Hope Grant, "there was a splendid opportunity for cutting off the large masses of



fugitive rebels, yet nearly all were allowed to escape." The gallantry of Colonel Hagart, splendid as it was, was far from atoning for the mistakes of his chief. I proceed to show the manner in which it was displayed.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.  
1858.  
March 19.

Close to the position taken up by Campbell was a village with a small mud fort, of which the enemy had taken possession. To dislodge them Campbell sent a troop of the 7th Hussars, some of Hodson's Horse, a few of the 78th, and two of Tombs' guns, the whole under the command of Colonel James Hagart of the 7th Hussars. A couple of shells had been fired into the fort, when the rebels, to the number of fifty, rushed out and made a dash at the guns. Hagart ordered the 7th to charge; but before they could be put in motion, the three troop officers, Slade, Wilkin, and Banks, were cut down, the latter mortally wounded. The loss of their officers took the men by surprise, when Hagart dashed at the rebels, who were hacking Banks as he lay on the ground, shot three with a revolver, and knocked over a fourth with the hilt of his sword, which was tied to his wrist by a silk pocket-handkerchief. His men quickly rallied round him, and killed every one of the enemy.\*

Gallantry of  
Colonel  
Hagart.

\* Hope Grant's *Sepoy War*. Sir Hope Grant further adds regarding Hagart's daring exploit: "Everything about him bore traces of his gallant struggle. His saddle and his horse were slashed about both in front and behind, his mar-

tingale was divided, his sword-hilt dented in, the pocket-handkerchief severed as clearly as with a razor, and a piece of the skin of his right hand cut away."—Sir Hope Grant recommended Hagart for the Victoria Cross.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 19.

Remarks on  
William  
Campbell's  
inaction.

Splendid  
pursuit by  
the 9th  
Lancers

This was almost the solitary achievement of Campbell's fine brigade. No attempt whatever was made by him to cut off the fleeing enemy. His conduct was officially attributed to his having lost his way. "But," records an officer who wrote of these occurrences the year following that in which they took place, "his error appears to have partaken of wilfulness. He moved his force in utter disregard of the statement of his guides, in opposition to the protestations and explanations of all to whose information and advice he was bound to listen."\* Consequently the greater number of the rebels escaped.

Not, however, all. Outram, keenly alive to the necessity of following up a victory, no sooner noticed that the rebels were abandoning the Músa Bágh, than he detached in pursuit two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, which had in anticipation taken up a position on the enemy's left flank.

Assuredly no man more deserved it. He alone rescued Banks, though in the end Banks died of his wounds; he gave the cue to his men when the sudden loss of the troop officers had for a moment staggered them. The reason why the recommendation was not attended to is, to say the least, curious. "Sir Colin Campbell," writes Sir Hope, "did not, however, forward the recommendation, as he considered the reward an inappropriate one for an officer of so high a rank as Hagart." The italics are my own.

\* *Calcutta Review*, March 1859; Art. "The Campaign of 1857-8." The writer continues: "But whatever may have been the cause of his erratic proceedings, whether they were accidental or whether they were worthy of blame, we believe that the mischief which resulted from them was incalculable; that to them is attributable such organization as the enemy were enabled to maintain, and the perseverance and pertinacity with which they still carried on a guerilla warfare with the British."

For four miles the men of this splendid regiment, despite of the obstacles offered by nullahs almost impassable and ravines difficult for horsemen, pursued the enemy, nor did they desist till they had captured six guns, and killed about a hundred of the foe.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 19.

Nor were the 9th Lancers alone in the chase. The field artillery and infantry followed them in support as rapidly as possible, and captured the remaining four guns of the twelve possessed by the rebels that morning.

and the  
Artillery.

After this decided success Outram left the 2nd Panjáb Infantry in occupation of the Músa Bágh, and returned to his positions of the previous day.

The following day copies of Lord Canning's Oudh proclamation were received in camp. That proclamation professed to confiscate the whole proprietary right in the soil of Oudh, save in the case of six comparatively inferior chiefs. To rebel landowners who should at once surrender to the Government immunity from death and imprisonment was promised, provided only that they could show they were guiltless of unprovoked bloodshed. To those who had protected British lives special consideration was promised.

Lord Can-  
ning's Pro-  
clamation.  
March 20.

Of the proclamation itself I shall speak in another place. I will only refer here to the effect it produced in the camp. It arrived just when the city of Lakhnao had been gained, but when Oudh was still in insurrection, and when the rebel army, which had vainly defended the city, had cast itself on the provinces, there to

Effect of it in  
the camp.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 20.

A qualifying  
clause added  
to it on the  
suggestion of  
Outram.

March 21.  
The city is  
cleared of  
rebels.

by the 93rd  
and 4th Pan-  
jáb Rifles.

offer a fresh resistance. Every leading man who had taken a part in the campaign was struck with the impolicy, at such a moment, of disinheriting a whole people, that people being still armed and in the field. "I have not," wrote Dr. Russell,\* who was attached to the headquarter staff, "heard one voice raised in its defence; and even those who are habitually silent, now open their mouths to condemn the policy which must perpetuate the rebellion in Oudh." Owing to the urgent remonstrance of Sir James Outram, authority was given to insert in the proclamation a qualifying clause, by virtue of which a further indulgence was held out to those who would throw themselves on British mercy, a claim to which would be strengthened by aid which might be given in the restoring of peace and order. But the other clauses remained.

Something remained to be effected even in the city itself. The Moulvi—the most obstinate of the rebel leaders—had returned to Lakhnao; he was still there, at Shádatganj, in its very heart, occupying, with two guns, a strongly fortified building, whence he bade defiance to the British. To dislodge him, Lugard was detached, on the 21st, with a portion of the division which had conquered the Bégam Kothi the first day of the attack. The troops employed were the 93rd Highlanders and the 4th Panjáb Rifles. Seldom did the rebels display so much pertinacity and resolution as on this occasion. They defended

\* *My Diary in India.*—W. H. Russell.



themselves most bravely, and were not driven out until they had killed several men and severely wounded many others on our side. When at last they were dislodged, they were met by Brigadier Campbell's brigade of cavalry, this time on the spot, and were pursued, with considerable loss, for six miles. The Moulvi, however, effected his escape.

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 21.

The following night, that of the 22nd, Hope Grant was ordered out at midnight with a strong force (two troops horse artillery, two 18-pounders, two howitzers, four Cohorn mortars, nine hundred cavalry, and four regiments of infantry) to attack the enemy, reported to be four thousand strong, at Kúrsi, a small town twenty-five miles from Lakhnao, on the Faizábád road. The mistake of a guide delayed the march, but at 4 A.M. on the 23rd Kúrsi was sighted. The enemy did not wait an assault, but, on the appearance of the British troops, began to evacuate the town. Upon this Hope Grant sent his cavalry at them. Two squadrons of the Panjáb Cavalry under Captain Browne,\* and a party of Watson's Horse led by Captain Cosserat, dashed at them. "Captain Browne, who commanded," wrote Sir Hope Grant, in his diary, "seeing some guns moving off, charged the rebels in the most magnificent style. Five times he rode clean through them, killing about two hundred, and taking thirteen guns and a mortar. His unfortunate adjutant, Lieutenant Macdonald, was shot dead in the act

Hope Grant  
defeats the  
rebels at  
Kúrsi.  
March 22.

\* Now Major-General Sir manding in a portion of Af-  
S. Browne, V.C., C.B., com- ghánistán.



BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 22.

Remarks on  
the cam-  
paign.

of cutting down a sepoy. Captain Cosserat was shot through the face, and died shortly after."

The enemy having been pursued for some time, Hope Grant returned to Lakhnao.

With this action the operations in Lakhnao and in its immediate vicinity ended. The city was captured. It had been gained at a loss—from the 2nd to the 21st March inclusive—of one hundred and twenty-seven officers and men killed, and five hundred and ninety-five wounded. Notwithstanding two errors which I have indicated—the one attributable to the Commander-in-Chief himself, the other, in the first instance, to one of his brigadiers—it is impossible to withhold admiration of the skill with which the operations were planned, of the courage with which they were carried out. The plans of the rebels, based on the conjecture that the British force would advance by the lines of the previous November, were entirely baffled by the masterly movement across the river. That movement, which placed an enemy on their flank, raking their defences, completely cowed them. It took all the heart out of them. Enfiladed from the opposite bank, they could not offer a stern or determined resistance to the foe advancing on their front. The weakness of their defence of the Imámbará and the Kaisar Bágh was due in a very great degree to the moral depression which the position occupied by Outram had caused in their minds.

Claims of  
Sir Colin to a

But if, as has been well asserted,\* the strategy

\* Medley.

of Sir Colin Campbell in his attack on Lakhnao "must ever be the subject of admiration on the part of the military student of this campaign," it is fit that history should mark the blunder which prevented it from being decisive. Outram was a lieutenant to be trusted. He was cool and daring in action, always kept his troops well in hand, and carefully guarded his communications. No living man had a greater or more profound knowledge of the native character. If any man, in the circumstances in which he was placed, might have been trusted to act on his own judgment, that man was Outram. Yet when, at a critical period of the advance, Outram, firmly seated on the left bank, proposed to co-operate with the Commander-in-Chief in a manner which would have rendered the victory of the latter absolutely decisive, the proposal was refused in language totally unworthy of Sir Colin Campbell. He was forbidden to cross "if he thought he would *lose a single man*." The reasons for this prohibition have never been published. Dr. Russell, who was very much in the confidence both of Sir Colin and of Outram, whilst admitting the "blot" caused by Outram's compulsory inaction, does not explain the motive by which Sir Colin was actuated to make it compulsory.\* Whether,

Book XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.

March 22.

high or to the  
highest rank  
as a general.

Reasons  
which are  
decisive  
against his  
claim to the  
highest rank.

\* "The relations between Sir Colin and General Outram, though not unfriendly, are a little stiff, on account of past events, and Outram is not the man to act in opposition to the commands of his superior

officer. Had Sir Colin not bound Outram's hands so tightly the advance would have taken place, and a tremendous slaughter of the enemy must have followed."—*My Diary in India*, W. H. Russell.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX.

1858.  
March 22.

The prohibi-  
tion to Out-  
ram to cross  
the Gúmti.

as some assert, it was prompted by Mansfield, or whether it was the emanation of his own mind, Sir Colin, as the issuer of the order, was responsible for it, and he alone must bear the blame. That order derogates from his claim to be placed in the rank of the greatest commanders. He must be classed as a great general of the second rank, a general who could skilfully plan, carefully carry out that plan, who could achieve a victory, but who could not follow it up.

The appoint-  
ment of  
William  
Campbell and  
the approval  
of his failure.

The second failure to pursue the beaten enemy is due likewise, though in a lesser degree, to Sir Colin Campbell. For the delicate operation he was bound to select an officer specially qualified, and if not acquainted with the country, yet ready to listen to the experienced officers at his elbow or to understand the language of the guides. He appointed, on the contrary, an officer new to the country, who would listen to nobody, who could not understand the guides, and who, consequently, let slip a golden opportunity. Yet this action, which allowed thousands of rebels to escape, was justified by Sir Colin Campbell.

“Brigadier Campbell, in command of the cavalry on the left,” he writes, in his despatch, “performed his detached duty with much vigilance and judgment. His march round the city on the 19th inst., which was a running fight for the greater part of the day, was a very difficult one.” What it really was has been recorded in these pages.

These errors, however, stood alone, and the capture of Lakhaao in March 1858 will remain to all time a splendid achievement of skill and daring.

BOOK XI.  
Chapter IX  

---

1858.  
March 22.



## BOOK XII.

---

### CHAPTER I.

It will be conducive to the clearness of the narrative, if, before recording the events in the north-west Provinces which immediately followed the capture of Lakhnao, I return for a moment to Calcutta, record the progress made towards the restoration of order in eastern Bengal and the Bihárs, and progress thence towards Allahábád by way of Ázamgarh and the adjacent districts. Then I propose to trace the action of Carthew in guarding the important line between Allahábád and Kánhpúr. Returning north-westward, I shall record the action of Seaton in the vicinity of Fathgarh, of Walpole in Oudh, of Lugard, Rowcroft, and Douglas in the Ázamgarh, Gházipúr, and Shahábád districts and in Bihár, of Jones and Coke in Rohilkhand, and of Sir Colin Campbell in Barélí. The book will close with an account in detail of the progress of events in Rajpútáná.

Bengal.

Reasons why  
Calcutta

When Sir Colin Campbell, on the 27th Novem-

ber, had left Calcutta for Kánhpúr, he carried with him the power of the country. For the moment the civil authority, though nominally existing, was in abeyance. The fate of India was in the hands, not of Lord Canning, but of Sir Colin Campbell; and although, as I have noted on one important occasion, the opinions of the Governor-General in Council exercised a potential influence on the general plan of campaign of the Commander-in-Chief, yet to the hands of the latter functionary its execution was committed. From the moment, then, when Sir Colin Campbell left Calcutta to direct the military measures for which he had been preparing, he became the chief centre of interest; and the capital, giving habitation though it did for a time to the Governor-General and his Council, was proportionately shorn of its importance. Thenceforward Calcutta deserves notice as the port for the reception of the troops, and the depôt of stores and supplies from England; the terminus whence the new arrivals started for the seat of war, and the invalids and wounded for Europe. The continuous attacks made upon the rebels satisfied the longings even of those who had been the severest critics of the tardy, the hesitating, and the half-hearted action of Lord Canning and his councillors; while the social tranquillity of the capital, no longer in real danger, was but once disturbed, and then by a panic which had for its foundation a want of confidence in the firmness of the Government.

In the third week of January, 1858, Lord Canning quitted Calcutta and proceeded to Allah-

Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1857-8.  
Nov.-Jan.

ceased, after the departure of Sir Colin, to exercise an all-absorbing influence on the campaign.

Lord Canning proceeds to Allahábád.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1858.  
Feb.—March.

Change in the  
administra-  
tion.

Panic of the  
3rd March in  
Calcutta.

ábád. A few days after his arrival at that place (9th February), he abolished the temporary office of Chief Commissioner of Ágra, till then held by Colonel Fraser, C.B., and drew the whole of the north-west divisions, that of Dehlí excepted, within one lieutenant-governorship. A few days later, Mr. J. P. Grant, who at a trying and critical period had governed with marked ability the Central Provinces, returned to Calcutta to take up the office of President of the Council, the Governor-General assuming the charge which Mr. Grant thus vacated.

It was after the return of Mr. Grant to Calcutta that the panic of which I have spoken occurred. Nothing happened, indeed, which ought to have alarmed men's minds, but in times of excitement the slightest causes often produce the most startling effects. The case was simply as follows. On the 3rd March, a telegraphic message from Barrakpúr was received in Calcutta to the effect that the sepoy of two native regiments stationed there were deserting in bodies of ten and twelve, and making their way to the capital. People did not stay to reflect that the sepoy had been disarmed; that in addition to regular troops there was a fine volunteer regiment—horse, foot, and artillery—in the city. The information conveyed by the telegram was circulated in exaggerated terms; and the inhabitants of the suburbs, consisting mainly of Eurasians, became much alarmed. Pickets of the volunteer guards were promptly posted at the points supposed to be threatened; the streets were patrolled by the

volunteer cavalry; the artillerymen took post at their guns; the regular troops in the fort were placed under arms. But no enemy appeared. Some sepoy had indeed deserted, but with no intention of attacking Calcutta. The panic passed away more quickly even than it had been produced.

Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1858.  
March.

It passes  
away.

In eastern Bengal there had been some cause for anxiety. On the 18th November, the detachments of the 34th Regiment Native Infantry, stationed at Chátgáon, mutinied, plundered the treasury, released the prisoners from jail, burnt down their own lines, fired the magazine, and then left the station, carrying off with them three elephants, the property of Government, and the whole of the treasure they found in the collectorate, with the exception of three hundred and forty rupees in cash. These, as well as the stamps, the Government securities and records, they left untouched. They attacked none of the Europeans, and the only man who suffered at their hands was a native jailer who protested against their proceedings. Him they killed. They then made off in the direction of Tiparah, but at Sítá-kúnd they left the high road, and making for Hill Tiparah, endeavoured to make their way along the hills in a north-westerly direction, avoiding British territory.

Eastern  
Bengal.

1857.  
Nov. 18.

Mutiny of the  
34th at Chát-  
gáon.

Four days later an attempt was made by Lieutenant Lewis, Indian Navy, to disarm the detachments of the 73rd Native Infantry, and Native Artillery, stationed at Dákhá, numbering about three hundred and fifty sepoy. Lewis had

Attempt to  
disarm the  
native troops  
at Dákhá.

Nov. 22.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Nov. 22.

They resist,

but are  
beaten;

many are  
killed;

at his disposal four officers and eighty-five men, English sailors, and two mountain-train howitzers. He was aided likewise by some thirty volunteers, including Messrs. Carnac, Bainbridge, and Macpherson, of the Civil Service, and Lieutenants Dowell and Hitchins of the Bengal Army.

Lewis disarmed, without resistance, the detached guards at the public offices. But when he marched to the lines, he found the sepoy drawn up close to their magazine, with two 6-pounders in their centre. Parties of them also occupied strong brick-built buildings in the vicinity, the walls of which had been carefully loop-holed. Lewis deployed his force, but before the movement was completed the sepoy opened upon him with canister and musketry. Replying with one volley, Lewis then charged with his infantry, whilst the two mountain guns opened on the left rear of the enemy. The charge was most successful. The rebels were driven, one by one, from their strong positions. They had lost one of their guns, but to preserve their second they made a last desperate stand. A young midshipman, named Arthur Mayo, charged it, however, at the head of twenty men, and aided by a flank attack made at the same time, captured it.\* The sepoy then broke and fled. Forty-one dead bodies were counted on the ground, eight men were brought in desperately wounded, three were drowned or shot in the river. This success was not attained without some loss. The list of killed

\* For this act Mr. Mayo received the Victoria Cross.

and wounded contained one man killed, five dangerously, eight severely, and four slightly wounded, in all eighteen. The sepoy who escaped at once went off in a north-westerly direction, making, it was believed, for Jalpáigori, the headquarters of the regiment. Prevented from reaching that place, they found a temporary refuge in Bhútán.

Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Nov. 22.

the survivors  
escape.

The action of the local authorities at Chátgáon

Chátgáon.

was prompt and effective. Whilst arrangements were made at the station for the security of European life in case the sepoy should return to it, the Commissioner communicated at once with the Rájá of Tiparah. This loyal feudatory at once directed his retainers and subjects to check the progress of the mutineers, and, if possible, to close the passes against them. The Commissioner called likewise upon the two principal zamindárs occupying the hill districts which it was thought the mutineers would traverse, to summon their men to arms and follow them up, and either to attack them or to shut them up in the defiles which lay before them. The manner in which this appeal was responded to, and the results it produced, will be related immediately.

The Rájá of  
Tiparah  
exercises his  
influence in  
favour of the  
British.

Nor was the action of the Government at Calcutta less satisfactory. Dealing with the cases of Dákhá and Chátgáon as intimately connected the one with the other, they despatched, on the 26th November, by river from Calcutta, three companies of the 54th Regiment, and one hundred seamen; on the 27th, by the same route, another party of sailors. It was the intention of the Government that whilst the 54th detachment should proceed at

Prompt  
action of the  
Government  
of India.

Nov. 26-27

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
December.

The Chát-  
gáon muti-  
neers

traverse the  
hill ranges

and suffer  
much dis-  
tress.

They attack  
a police

first to Dákhá and thence pursue the Chátgáon rebels in the direction it would be ascertained they had taken, the Indian Naval Brigade should move northwards to Rangpúr and Dínájpúr to protect the country towards which it was believed the mutineers from both stations were making their way. Their arrival at their destination on the 10th December contributed greatly to the preservation of order in the neighbouring districts.

The Chátgáon mutineers were, meanwhile, beginning to experience the drawbacks to a march across the hills, pursued and threatened by enemies. On leaving Sítákúnd, they had followed a northerly course, and, crossing the ferry at Rámgarh ghát, had pushed on towards Udaipúr, thence towards Ágartalá, the residence of the Rájá of Tiparah. That chief, hearing of their approach, despatched a considerable body of men, who stoppped them at Sankhola on the 2nd December. Turning then westward, they entered British territory at or near Mogra, and made their way towards Singár Hill—about one and a half day's journey north of Komillá, and on the direct route to Silhat. In their progress they had been much harassed; they lost the three elephants, and about ten thousand rupees of the treasure they had stolen; of the prisoners they had released from the jail, many were daily being captured; they found the mountain paths difficult, and though the hillmen were ready enough, for payment, to cut a way for them, their progress was necessarily slow. But worse things were in store for them.

Harassed by the opposition of the Rájá of



Tiparah, and of the zamindárs of whom I have spoken, the mutineers resolved to make their way to Manipúr. On their way to that place, they descended from the hills, attacked and plundered, on the 15th December, a police-station in British territory. This attack gave to the British the information they had desired as to their position. Mr. Allen, the chief civil officer at Silhat, had the capacity to discern that the European troops would arrive too late to intercept the rebels. He took upon himself, then, the responsibility of ordering the Silhat Light Infantry, commanded by Major the Hon. R. B. Byng, into the field. That regiment left Silhat in pursuit of the rebels that very day, the 15th, and reached Partábgarh, a distance of eighty miles, by a forced march, in thirty-six hours. At Partábgarh, Byng received information from Mr. Dodd, who had accompanied the force for the special purpose of guiding it, that the rebels had changed their route, and would be at Látú, a place which they had passed through, on the night of that day, the 17th, or early the following morning. Látú was twenty-eight miles from Partábgarh; the men had made a forced march of eighty miles, but with one voice they expressed their willingness to return. The road led through jungles and swamps, but, setting out, they marched back cheerily. Dodd, who had ridden on in advance, met the column as it was entering the village of Látú at dawn on the 18th, with the information that the rebels were close at hand. Before line could be formed, they were seen advancing in good order. In the engagement which followed, the rebels made

Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
December.

station in  
British terri-  
tory.

The Silhat  
Light In-  
fantry are  
sent in pur-  
suit of them.

After forced  
marches,

they en-  
counter them  
at Látú.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857-8.  
Dec.-Jan.

Byng is  
killed.

Sherer suc-  
ceeds, and  
drives the  
rebels into  
the jungles,

where they  
cannot be  
followed.

The Chátgáon  
mutineers  
entering  
Manipúr,

many efforts to seduce the men of the Silhat Light Infantry—one half of whom were Hindústánis—to make common cause with them. But their persuasions were answered by the cold steel of the bayonet. Notwithstanding their long march, the loyal soldiers of the Silhat regiment displayed a vigour and an energy which carried all before them. In the early part of the action their gallant leader, Major Byng, was killed. This occurrence only roused them to greater fury. The post he had held was filled by Lieutenant Sherer, an officer of rare merit—a son of the gallant soldier whose splendid audacity at Jalpaigori I have described in the preceding volume—and Sherer gave the rebels no breathing-time. After a loss of twenty-six men killed and a still larger number wounded, the enemy abandoned the field, and sought shelter in the close and difficult jungles which lie between Látú and Manipúr.

Into these jungles it was impossible to follow them. Detachments having been sent to watch the issues from the jungle into Manipúr, the battalion returned to Silhat. The party of the 54th Regiment, which had been sent on to Silhat and had even marched towards Látú, was ordered back, first to Dákhá, and a few weeks later to Calcutta.

After their defeat by Sherer, the Chátgáon mutineers marched north-eastwards, and entered the Manipúr territory. There they were joined by one of the Manipúr princes, with a few followers. The hopes they might have conceived from this accession of strength were, however, of short duration. On the 12th January they were attacked

by a party of the Silhat corps, under Captain Stevens, and after a fight which lasted two hours, they were driven into the jungles, with the loss of twenty men killed. Ten days later, the same officer, having learnt where they were encamped, succeeded in surprising them while their arms were piled, and putting them to flight, with the loss of all their arms and accoutrements. On this occasion they lost ten men killed. Eight days later another detachment of them was attacked and completely defeated, with the loss of thirteen men, by a small party of the Silhat regiment, led by a native officer, Jemadár Jaggathir. This was the finishing stroke. Since their departure from Chátgáon, the rebels had lost two hundred and six men in battle. The remainder were now blocked up in hilly country, the passes leading out of which were closed, and there the greater number perished miserably.

Thus, by the firm attitude and the fearlessness of responsibility on the part of the civil authorities, especially of Mr. Allen, and by the daring leading of a few European officers and the gallantry of their native followers, order was re-established in the important districts to the east of Calcutta. All this time Colonel Sherer was nobly maintaining his position at Jalpáigori, dominating, by the force of his character, the armed native regiment which he commanded.

I pass on now to eastern Bihár, the division under the control of Mr. George Yule. Although the relief of Arah by Vincent Eyre, in the month of August, 1857, and the subsequent storming by

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1858.

January.

are attacked  
and beaten  
by Captain  
Stevens,  
who again  
surprises  
them.

The sur-  
vivors are  
blocked up in  
the moun-  
tains.

Result of  
firmness and  
promptitude.

Eastern  
Bihár and  
George Yule.

Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Nov.—Dec.

The normal  
difficulties in  
that pro-  
vince

are increased  
by the out-  
breaks at  
Dákhá and  
Chátgáon.

Yule marches  
with troops to  
Púrniá.

The detach-  
ments at  
Madáriganj  
and Jalpáigori  
mutiny.

that gallant soldier of the stronghold of Kúnwar Singh, had, for the moment, averted danger from eastern Bihár, the elements of revolt still continued to smoulder in that province. These elements were fostered by scarcity, caused by long-prevailing drought, and the temper of the people in the vicinity of Manghir was manifested as the year began to wane by an increased and increasing number of highway robberies and other crimes.

Under these circumstances the outbreaks at Dákhá and Chátgáon assumed a very threatening character. The station of Jalpaigori belonged to the division ruled by Mr. Yule. The headquarters and main body of the 73rd Native Infantry, commanded by Sherer, were at that station. The sepoys who had mutinied and resisted so stoutly at Dákhá belonged to that regiment. It seemed only probable, then, that they would make their way to Jalpáigori, and incite their comrades to revolt.

The Government had despatched a body of British sailors to Púrniá, midway between Bhágalpúr and Jalpáigori, and these men were due at that station at the end of November. But this precaution did not seem to Mr. Yule to be sufficient. With the concurrence of the Government, then, he moved, on the 27th Nóvember, the small detachment of the 5th Fusiliers, then at Manghir, to Púrniá, accompanying them himself. He arrived there on the 1st December, and finding all quiet, marched on the next day towards Kishanganj, thirty-one miles distant.

He was not a moment too soon. On the nights of the 4th and 5th December the detachments of the



11th Irregular Cavalry at Madárganj and Jalpáigori mutinied, and went off, spreading alarm throughout the district.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.

December.

The civil  
officers of the  
district.

The conduct of the civil officers in the district at this crisis was worthy of all praise. At many of the stations they had nought to depend upon but their own brave hearts. Not for a moment did their courage falter or their presence of mind fail them. Macdonald, the Collector of Rangpúr, placed all the moneys in the Government Treasury upon elephants, and moved with it into the jungle, hoping that the rebels, finding Rangpúr evacuated, would be too hardly pressed to search him out. The rebels, however, never went near Rangpúr, but made straight for Dínájpúr. The Collector of this place was Mr. Francis Anstruther Elphinstone-Dalrymple, one of the ablest men in the Civil Service, but whose prospects had been ruined by long years of persecution on purely private grounds by those wielding authority in Bengal. But if Dalrymple's worldly fortunes stood low, his courage was as high, and his determination was as unshaken, as they were when, a young civilian, he volunteered for and served in the first China war.\* He had upwards of one

Macdonald.

Francis  
Anstruther  
Elphinstone-  
Dalrymple:

\* Mr. F. A. Elphinstone-Dalrymple accompanied a party of soldiers sent during that war from the *Rustomjee* transport to attack a battery. As there appeared some chance that the party would arrive late, Dalrymple persuaded the mate to beach the boat at once in the centre of the bat-

tery, thus taking the lead of the whole force. He himself was the first man in the battery. At Chusan he accompanied the 55th Regiment in the storm of the steep hill and the intrenched camp. At Chinghai he was on the deck of H.M.S. *Nemesis* with Captain Hall, now an



Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.

December.

his splendid  
resolution.

hundred thousand pounds in his treasury, and a determined to fight for it. He packed off, then, by water, to Calcutta, the solitary missionary of the station and his wife. Then summoning Grant the judge, Drummond the magistrate, Brown the assistant, Harold Holm, a Dane, connected with indigo and well known and much liked in those parts, and a few other Europeans and Eurasians, he posted them, with their rifles and ammunition, in his official court, and, at their head, awaited there the coming of the rebels. Their arrival within twelve miles of the station was announced. Any moment, then, they might appear. But amongst Dalrymple and his companions there was but one thought—to defend the station to the very last, to die rather than abandon the trust confided to them. Fortunately for them, the rebels, when within a short distance of the place, received intelligence of the movements of the British seamen previously referred to. Instead, then, of marching on Dínájpúr, they hurried off to Púrniá, there to fall into the clutches of Yule. Dalrymple and his companions were not attacked. Not the less, however, did they deserve for their splendid resolution the praise and the credit which were never officially awarded to them!

The rebels  
move off to  
Púrniá.

Yule returns  
to Púrniá,

Yule, meanwhile, marching northwards, had reached Kishanganj. There he heard of the

admiral, better known as Nemesis Hall, fighting the batteries, and subsequently at the taking of Ningpo. He carried Sir Henry Pottinger's despatches to Lord Auckland.

revolt, and that the revolted had taken the road leading to Púrniá. No time was to be lost. He set out at once to return to Púrniá, and, marching all day, accomplished the distance, with the aid of his elephants, by sunset. He arrived in good time. The mutineers, ignorant of Yule's rapid march, were entering the town early the following morning with a view to plunder it, when they found themselves face to face with the Europeans. After an exchange of shots, they fell back a few miles, halted, and encamped. It was difficult for Yule, who had only infantry, to bring mounted men to action, but he resolved to try. That night he marched out his men, and at daylight came up with the enemy, just as they were preparing to set out. The rebels, putting on a bold face, charged, but were beaten back with the loss of thirteen of their number. They then fled to the north. Yule had saved Púrniá by his prompt action. He did more. Pushing on rapidly, the morning of the 12th, with his party, he succeeded, notwithstanding the obstructions offered by the numerous and extensive quicksands of the Kúsi, in crossing that river, and reaching Náthpúr before the rebels. Finding their onward progress thus checked; and cut off, by movements of which I shall speak immediately, from a retrograde movement; the mutineers took refuge for the moment in Nipál, only, however, to meet their fate at a later period.

Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
December.

encounters  
the rebels,

saves Púrniá,

and drives  
the rebels  
into Nipál.

Meanwhile, on the first news of the mutiny of the irregular cavalry, all the available troops, European and Gúrkah, amounting to one hun-

Jalpáigori.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
December

dred of the former and three hundred of the latter, had been sent down from Dárjiling to Pankibári, and thence on to Jalpáigori. They served to strengthen the hands of Sherer. Acting on the principle that boldness is prudence, this firm and resolute officer had blown from the guns, in the presence of his armed native regiment, two troopers caught in the act of revolt.

The seamen  
reach Rang-  
púr.

Four days later the seamen of whom I have spoken as having been detached from Calcutta, on the news of the Dákhá mutiny, to protect the districts of Rangpúr and Dínájpúr, arrived at Bagwah, thirty miles east of the former, and, pushing on quickly, reached their destination on the 15th December.

The rebels in  
the Nipál  
territory.

Yule, I have said, had, by his prompt and vigorous movements, saved the British districts on the right bank of the Kúsi from invasion, and forced the rebels to seek refuge in Nipál territory. There, at a place thirty-six miles from the British frontier, they were detained by the Nipálese authorities, pending instructions from Jang Bahádur. It was useless for Yule to wait any longer on the frontier, or to disquiet himself regarding the fate of men no longer able to plunder and destroy. And it happened that just at the moment his energies were required in another part of his division. In a previous page I have recorded how the Dákhá mutineers, resisting the attempt made to disarm them, had set off from that station for Jalpáigori, but finding it impossible to traverse the intervening country, had been forced to take refuge in Bhútán. Yule, as

The Dákhá  
rebels  
threaten  
Jalpáigori.



he lay with his small force at Náthpúr, received an express informing him that the Dháká rebels were threatening Jalpáigorí from the north-east, and urging him to march to that place.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
December.

Yule at once set out, and, marching sixty-four miles in thirty-six hours, reached Kishanganj, thirty-one miles north-east of Púrníá. Another long march of thirty miles brought him, on the 22nd, to Titáliá. Here he received a despatch from Jalpáigorí recommending him to take up a position between Siligori and Pankabári, on the road to Dárjiling, there to await further intelligence. Yule complied, waited patiently till the 26th, but as the promised intelligence was still withheld, he determined to act on his own responsibility. The ideas he had formed on the subject were singularly clear and correct. Granted that the rebels intended to move on Dárjiling or on Jalpáigorí, they must of necessity cross the river Tístá. The Tístá is a river gradually increasing on the plains to a width of from seven to eight hundred yards, deep, rapid, and difficult. To the rebels scarcely any other option was offered than to cross at the Cháwa Ghát, where facilities existed. Now, Cháwa Ghát had not been occupied, and Yule, tired of waiting, resolved to act upon his own instincts, and occupy it. But the delay caused by waiting for intelligence which did not come had been fatal. As he approached the ghát through the jungle, his advanced parties discovered the enemy on the left bank of the river, occupying a position so strong and so favourable for defence, that it

Yule marches  
to meet  
them;

forms correct  
ideas as to  
their move-  
ments.

He moves on  
Cháwa Ghát,



BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.

December.

and occupies  
the road.

The rebels  
turn his  
position,

and eventu-  
ally escape.

would have been madness for him, with his small force, to attack it. But there was still one way open to him to bar their progress. That was to occupy the only practicable road by which they could advance, and give them battle when they should attempt to move forward.

Yule accordingly occupied that road. But the rebels, more wily than he believed them to be, broke up their camp that night, and marching by an unfrequented by-path, turned his position, crossed the Mahánandá river, and made for the Dárjiling road. Yule discovered, early on the morning of the 28th, that he had been thus out-manceuvred. Promptly did he repair his error. Leaving his camp standing, he took up a position on the Dárjiling road, and awaited the approach of the enemy. He waited in vain all that day. As evening approached, there being no signs of the rebels, he determined to move back to the camp to allow his men to break their fast. But they had scarcely left the road when the enemy were seen emerging from the jungle by a path some little distance from the position he had held during the day. Yule at once sent his advanced party in pursuit. But so rapidly did the rebels rush across the road and the open country between the place of their issue and the next thick jungle that the British had only time to fire one volley, and although Captain Burbank and his sailors continued the pursuit for two or three hours, they failed to come up with the enemy.

The Jalpáigorí party, consisting of Europeans and Gúrkahs, commanded by Captain Curzon.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1858.  
January.

52nd Light Infantry, had been equally unsuccessful. False information had sent them to one ford of the Tístá whilst the rebels crossed by another.

But Yule  
follows them  
up,

But the failure he had encountered made Yule only the more resolved to follow the Dákhá mutineers to the bitter end. Occupying as he did the inner line of communication, whereas the rebels, by their flight, had gained the outer line, it was still possible for him, by marching along the edge of the forests which skirt the Nipál frontier, to guard the British territories from incursion. This course he adopted. Marching westward, in parallel lines with the rebels, he having the inner line, he forced them to cross the Nipál frontier. Continuing within the British territory this parallel march, he again, on the 3rd January, crossed the Kúsi at Náthpúr. On that day the rebels were distant from him between forty and fifty miles, at a place called Chattra, at the foot of the hills at the point where the Kúsi issues from them, thirty-six miles within the Nipál frontier—the whole intervening space being jungle.

and marches  
parallel with  
them.

On the 11th Yule's party was strengthened by the arrival of Major Richardson, with the Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry. It was a great accession. Major Richardson was one of the most gallant men living. He had distinguished himself at the storming of Múltán in a manner which would have procured for him the Victoria Cross had that symbol of distinction then existed. As it was, his conduct in leading the stormers elicited

Major J. F.  
Richardson,

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1858.  
January.

and the  
Yeomanry  
Cavalry

an expression of marked admiration from the then Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, and proved the stepping-stone to advancement in his profession. The Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry was composed of men, many of them Eurasians, some Europeans and well born, who had enlisted for that special service, on special terms, to aid in suppressing the mutiny in June and July 1857. When the corps was first raised Lord Canning was specially anxious to select as its commandant an officer who should possess alike the power of attraction and the power of command, who could rule as well as dominate, and inspire affection as well as fear. At the moment Richardson landed from furlough to Europe in Calcutta. He was at once recognised as the man for the situation. The choice was in all respects pre-eminently good.

join Yule.

Jang Bahá-  
dur.

Orders his  
lieutenant to  
attack the  
rebels.

Richardson joined Yule on the 11th January. The rebels were still at Chattra. Just about the same time the practical reply of Jang Bahádur to Yule's representations regarding the mutineers of the 11th Irregulars was received. That reply took the shape of an order to his lieutenant on the spot, Rattan Mán Singh, to attack the mutineers, in co-operation with the English. It unfortunately happened that the force at the disposal of Rattan Mán Singh consisted mostly of untrained infantry militia, and only a few trained artillerymen with their guns. The Nipálese commander was therefore unwilling to assent to any manœuvre which would necessitate division of his own force. After some discussion, then,



it was agreed between himself on the one side, and Mr. Yule and Major Richardson on the other, that whilst the Nipál troops should guard the roads leading eastward, and Richardson with his cavalry should watch the right bank of the Kúsí, Yule's infantry should attack Chattra. Yule and Richardson were aware that it would have been far better that the Nipál commander should watch the left as well as the right bank of the river, for the upper part of the left bank could not, from the nature of the country, be effectually guarded by cavalry. But, under the circumstances, it was the best thing to be done, and, after all, they both believed that the rebels would fight. To give time to the Nipál commander to make his arrangements, the 21st was fixed upon as the day for the attack.

This delay proved fatal to the success of the plan. Yule crossed the Nipál frontier on the 14th, and on the 19th reached Pirára, about ten miles from Chattra. Richardson meanwhile had advanced to Cháoría, a place which commanded the only path by which he believed the mutineers could possibly proceed westward, should they cross the river above it. But whether the mutineers had been warned, or whether they gained information from their scouts, it is certain that as soon as they heard that Yule had reached Pirára, they crossed the river, and marched westward. Yule and Richardson pushed after them, but as it was seen that the rebels were following a line of country totally impracticable for cavalry, Richardson proceeded by rapid marches to Dar-

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1858.  
January.

Plan of the allied forces to hem them in.

Delay in its execution

proves fatal to its success,

and the rebels escape



Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1858.  
January.  
into Oudh.

1857.

Chútia  
Nágpúr after  
October 1857.

Reasons why  
it is unneces-

bangáh to cover Tirhút, whilst Yule\* returned to his division—which was not subsequently disturbed. The mutineers succeeded in making their way into north-eastern Oudh, only eventually to fall by the bullet and the sword.

Before proceeding to western Bihár, I propose to say a few words regarding the extensive district known as Chútia Nágpúr. In a preceding page of this volume† I have briefly recorded how Major English had, on the 2nd October, inflicted a severe defeat upon the rebels at Chattra.‡ But this victory, important as it was in effecting the security of the grand trunk road, was far from restoring order to the country. From that period, and for several months following, the energies of Captain Dalton, Major Simpson, Lieutenant Graham, Lieutenant Stanton, R.E., of Colonel Forster and the Shekawáti battalion, and other excellent officers, were devoted to the arduous task of repelling attack, of checking petty risings, of suppressing pretenders to power, of hunting down armed freebooters, of recovering places which had been surprised, and of avenging the injuries, in some cases amounting to death, inflicted upon the unarmed and unoffending.

To enter into full detail of the various marches

\* In the month of May following, when the return of Kúnwar Singh had again thrown the affairs of Western Bihár into confusion, Mr. Yule offered to the Government the services of himself and twenty well-mounted gentlemen to

act against the rebels in that province. The offer was declined.

† Page 141.

‡ Not to be confounded with the Chattra within the Nipál frontier.

and counter-marches of the companies and small detachments engaged for months in this desultory warfare, would require far more space than could be fairly allotted to a subject which, however important in itself, forms only an adjunct to the main story. No officers deserved better of their country than those who served in Chútia Nágpúr: none exhibited greater zeal, greater energy, greater self-reliance, greater devotion; but after the defeat of the rebels by English at Chattra, their action affected the course of events, not generally throughout Hindustán, but in Chútia Nágpúr alone. For this reason I shall be justified, I believe, if I recount in less detail than I have given to the actions of Sir Colin Campbell and his lieutenants, and to occurrences bearing directly on the main story, the principal events which marked the period of disturbance in the country forming the south-west frontier of Bengal.

In the district called Palámao, affairs seemed, so late as November 1857, to be very critical. There Lieutenant Graham, with a handful of men, occupied a large house containing from three hundred to four hundred native women and children. The house belonged to a loyal Thákur, and was encircled by a strong wall. In this Graham was besieged by a body of rebels, whose numbers, amounting at first to two thousand, gradually rose to six thousand. Whilst a portion of these blockaded Graham, without daring to assault him, the remainder plundered the country all about.

Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.

November.

sary to enter  
into full  
detail.

Palámao in  
November.

To relieve Graham two companies of the 13th

The rebellion  
in Palámao  
collapses.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Nov.-Dec.

Light Infantry, under Major Colter, were despatched from Sahasráram on the 27th November. Thither also was directed the Shakawáti battalion under Major Forster. Colter relieved Graham on the 8th December, but, though the presence of two companies of English troops in the rebellious district would have been invaluable, the necessity of guarding the grand trunk road was paramount, and Colter was ordered to lead back his men to Sahasráram. But though he was forced to leave, the good he had effected remained behind him. Graham had employed the first hours after his relief in seizing the person of Débi Bakkas Rái, a man suspected of being the real prompter of the rebellion. Graham's bold action proved the suspicion to be well founded, for the rebellion in Palámao at once collapsed. Then, too, did well-disposed chiefs, previously held in check by fear of the rebels, declare themselves in favour of the British; and Graham, though not strong enough without reinforcements to assume the offensive, was confident, notwithstanding the departure of Colter, to be able to hold his own.

Singhbhúm

The wave of insurrection passed then into the district of Singhbhúm. A large party, composed of the representatives of no less than three tribes, assembled at a place called Ayúdhya, and proclaimed the brother of one of the local rájás, the Rájá of Porahát, to be their ruler. Fortunately a party of Rattray's Sikhs, commanded by Captain Hale, was in the neighbourhood. Hale, supported by the followers of one



of the local chieftains, attacked and dispersed the followers of the pretender. But for some time the insurrection remained unsubdued.

This victory was succeeded by a multitude of small affairs in the several districts, in most of which the advantage inclined to the side of authority. It was not, however, always so. On one occasion the Commissioner of the Mánbhúm and Singhbhúm divisions, Mr. Lushington, attended by Dr. Hayes and accompanied by Captain Hale, Lieutenant Birch, and fifty Sikhs, who had been engaged in seizing men convicted of murder, found themselves suddenly surrounded by not less than three thousand to four thousand infuriated Kóls, armed with arrows, who had stolen up unperceived. Nothing but the steady gallantry of the Sikhs extricated the party from their perilous position. They had to fight their way through their numerous opponents, and it was only by great perseverance, and at the expense of a large casualty roll that they ultimately succeeded. Twenty-five Sikhs were wounded, one mortally; one was killed. Captain Hale was wounded in four places; Lieutenant Birch had his arm pinned to his side by an arrow: Mr. Lushington and Dr. Hayes were also wounded. Of the enemy one hundred and fifty are said to have fallen. The British party was, however, forced to abandon its camp equipage in order to effect a secure retreat.

Some time before this the spirit of insurrection had travelled to the southerly district of Sambalpúr. Up to the month of September that district had

Book XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.

December.

Dangerous  
position of  
Mr. Lushington and his  
followers.

He is extricated by the  
valour of the  
Sikhs.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 25.

Leigh applies  
for reinforce-  
ments,

which are  
supplied.

Operations in  
the Sambal-  
púr district.

been guarded by two companies of the Rámgarh battalion, and a sergeant's party of Ramgarh Horse. But no sooner had the men composing this small force heard of the mutiny of their comrades at Házáribágh than they displayed a disposition to follow their example. In this emergency Captain Leigh, who represented the civil authority of the Government in the district, applied to Katak for, and obtained the assistance of, two companies of the 40th Madras Native Infantry. In October, finding these troops insufficient to repress the disorder caused by mutinous sepoy and the followers of the rebel landowners, Leigh again applied to Katak for aid. His demand was complied with—Lieutenant Hadow, Madras Artillery, being sent with two mountain guns, escorted by another company of the 40th Madras Native Infantry, to reinforce him.

Hadow reached Sambalpúr on the 4th of November. The next morning he marched out with a small party, commanded by Captain Knocker of the 40th, to storm the pass of Shérgáti. This was effected without much loss. The small column then scoured the district, destroying the villages and mud forts belonging to the disaffected. In these operations, and in those of a similar nature which followed, fever was more fatal to the British officers than was the enemy's fire. At one time all the officers in the district, Captain Leigh and Lieutenant Hadow excepted, were prostrated with this disease.

In spite of the efforts of the authorities the rebellion showed no signs of abating. In Decem-

ber, Dr. Moore, on his way to Sambalpúr, was intercepted and murdered by the rebels. Apothecary Hanson, who was following him, had a narrow escape. Captain Leigh, hearing of his approach, sent a party of native police on an elephant to bring him in. This party started from the one side about the same time as a party of the rebels set out on the other—the distances being nearly equal, and the objects identical—to obtain possession of the person of Hanson. The race was very exciting: the British just won it.

The excesses committed by the rebels reached so great a height at this period that Captain Leigh applied to the Commissioner, Captain Dalton, for further assistance. Such was the demand, however, for troops elsewhere that Captain Dalton was unable to comply with his request. Captain Leigh was in despair. More than half the troops at his disposal were prostrated by sickness, and but one officer, Lieutenant Hadow, was fit for duty.

At this conjuncture, Mr. Cockburn, of the Civil Service, Commissioner of Katak, taking a clear view of the situation, resolved, at all hazards, to support British authority in Sambalpúr. Not only did he write to the Madras Government to transfer a body of its local troops for special service in that district, but he took upon himself the responsibility of ordering thither the remaining wing of the 40th Madras Native Infantry. At the same time he directed the enlistment at Katak, for the same service, of two companies of sepoy known as Sebandis. With

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Nov.—Jan.

The insurgents still gain ground.

Dalton is unable to furnish aid;

but Cockburn supplies it.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
December.

Captain Wood  
defeats the  
rebels,

a view to ensure prompt action the district was temporarily transferred to the zealous and watchful superintendence of Mr. Cockburn. Mr. Cockburn assumed charge on the 19th of December.

Before the wing of the 40th could reach Sambalpúr Captain Leigh was strengthened by the arrival on the 29th of December of a squadron of the Nágpúr Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Wood. Drawing to himself one hundred and fifty men of the 40th Madras Native Infantry and fifty of the Rámgarh Infantry, Wood attacked the main body of the rebels the following morning. Not only did he defeat them and slay three of their chiefs, but he surrounded the village in which the principal leader of the insurrection, Súrandar Sahi, lay concealed. This fact having been ascertained, the men began searching the houses for him.

but misses  
the main  
point of his  
victory.

Then occurred one of those untoward events, wrongly called accidents, which spoil the best-laid plans. The capture of this chief would have probably caused the rebellion in the district to cease, and half an hour's further search would have ensured his capture. But Captain Wood had been wounded, and just as the search promised to be successful, the bugle sounded the recall. That bugle-sound was not only a reprieve to Súrandar Sahi; it gave fresh life to the rebellion.

Tranquillity  
is gradually  
restored.

But, notwithstanding this, affairs throughout Chútia Nágpúr began to mend with the dawning year. On the 7th January Major Bates forced the Shérgáti pass; two days later Captain Shake-

spear stormed the Singhora pass and over-ran the country with his cavalry; on the 21st January Captain Dalton and Lieutenant Graham completely defeated the rebels near the Palámao fort; and about the same time Colonel Forster, with the Shakawáti battalion, restored order in Singhbhúm. These successes were followed by others of a similar character. Captain Dalton pursued the rebels from place to place. Ably seconded by Mr. Cockburn—who had strengthened the disposable force by the addition of a wing of the 5th Madras Native Infantry—and assisted by Colonel Forster, by Ensign Wardlaw, by Captain Moncrieff, and by other officers placed at his disposal, he re-established everywhere British authority. The embers of disaffection continued, however, to smoulder long after every enemy had disappeared from the field, and it was not before the close of 1858 that perfect tranquillity could be said to reign in every corner of Chútia Nágpúr.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter I.  
1858.



## BOOK XII.

---

### CHAPTER II.

Retrospect of  
western  
Bihár.

TAKING the reader with me north-westward, I propose to narrate now the state of affairs in western Bihár; to explain how the communications between Kánhpúr and Allahábád had been preserved; then, proceeding to the A'zamgarh districts, to show how insurrection triumphed there for a moment, only to be driven back to seek a refuge, destined to be of long duration, in the districts and jungles which owned the authority of the remarkable landowner, Kúnwar Singh.

I have told in the first volume how the important division of Western Bihár, saved by Mr. William Tayler during the dark and terrible days of June and July 1857, then exposed, by the wilful blindness of the Government, to dangers more acute, more vivid, more active, had been preserved from immediate destruction by the gallantry of Vicars Boyle, of Wake, of Colvin, and their companions, and finally, completely rescued by the splendid daring of Vincent Eyre. I have recorded the ingratitude with which one of

these gentlemen, Mr. William Tayler, had been treated by the Government he had served with an energy all-absorbing and a success most signal, and how the other principal actor in the drama, Vincent Eyre, after storming the stronghold of Kúnwar Singh, had been ordered to join the avenging army of Outram. From the hour of their departure a new era was inaugurated in western Bihár—an era in which truckling took the place of independence, and a desire to discover mistakes in Mr. Tayler's administration the determination to suppress, before all, the dangers threatening the State.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.  
—  
1857.  
July-Aug.

For some weeks after his departure the effect of Eyre's victories continued to be felt in western Bihár. The Government, alive at last, after one revolt had been quelled, to the advisability of preventing another, had placed under the orders of Mr. Samuells, the successor of Mr. Tayler, two hundred Europeans, for the safeguard of Patná, and had despatched a gun-boat, under the orders of the Magistrate of Chaprá, to patrol the banks of the Ghághrá. But as time went on, the misguided spirits in the province began to be sensible that Eyre had left them, and that the spirit of William Tayler no longer inspired the administration. Though Patná, thanks to the presence of British troops, was reported to be quiet, strong precautionary measures were not the less taken. The opium godown was fortified, six guns were placed in position bearing on the town, and the most stringent measures were taken to avert a collision between the townspeople and the Europeans.

Patná under  
Mr. Tayler's  
successor.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Aug.—Sept.

The aspect in the district was even less assuring. Kúnwar Singh, with one thousand men, had taken up a position on the Són river, and it became known that dangerous and discontented characters, such men as his brother Ammar Singh, Nisban Singh, and Júban Singh, were flocking to his standard. At the same time, the 5th Irregular Cavalry, whose disarming Mr. Tayler had before ineffectually recommended, and whose mutiny in eastern Bihár I have already recorded,\* were allowed to spread over the districts in the western province, and to plunder with impunity.

The difficulties in western Bihár aggravated by risings elsewhere.

The difficulties of the position in western Bihár were greatly aggravated by the evacuation of Gorákhpúr by the British civil authorities, one alone excepted,† on the 13th August, and subsequently by all; by the consequent pressure of rebels into British districts from Oudh; and by the exposure of the districts of Chaprá, Champáran, and Mozaffarpúr to the incursions of the leader of the Oudh rebels, Mehndi Husén.

The mutinous 5th Irregulars approach Gayá.

These difficulties soon came to a head. The mutinous 5th Irregulars, finding no one to oppose their course, destroyed the public buildings at Noáda, and marched in the direction of Gayá. Rattray, with a small force of Sikhs and Europeans, numbering about two hundred, had been posted to protect Gayá. But, learning that the rebels were approaching that place, he, acting on the strongly pressed advice of Mr. Alonzo Money, marched out on the 8th September to attack

Rattray marches to meet them,

\* *Vide* page 133.

† The exception was Mr. F. M. Bird, the joint magistrate.

them. But the rebels, almost all mounted,\* took advantage of Rattray's advance from his base to go round his position—inflicting upon him in his vain attempts to hinder them, a loss of twenty wounded—and to reach Gayá some hours before he could fall back. Arrived at Gayá, they liberated four hundred prisoners from the jail, and attacked the fortified house which the residents had prepared as a place of refuge. But in this attempt they were repulsed, owing mainly to the spirited conduct of Mr. Skipwith Tayler, son of the late Commissioner of Patná.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
Sept.—Oct.  
and is de-  
feated.

The disorder was subsequently further aggravated by the mutiny, on the 9th October, of two companies of the 32nd Native Infantry at Déogarh and by threatened movements on the part of Kúnwar Singh. The Commissioner had at his disposal Rattray's Sikhs, a portion of the Naval Brigade, under Captain Sotheby. Colonel Fischer's brigade of Madras troops entered the western Bihár districts early in October. Besides which, Lieutenant Stanton of the Engineers was at Sahasráram and its vicinity, and the energy, the zeal, and the activity of this officer compensated to a very great extent for the paucity of fighting men.

Two compa-  
nies of the  
32nd mutiny.

Forces at the  
disposal of  
the Commis-  
sioner.

Rattray was the first to come in contact with the rebellious sepoys. This officer had avenged his disaster of the 8th September by defeating a body of rebels on the 7th of the following month

\* They consisted of the 5th Irregulars and other horsemen who had mutinied, amounting to six hundred. Accompanying them was a large party of marauders, some mounted on ponies, some on foot.



Book XII.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
November.

at Akbarpúr, and he now went in pursuit of the mutinous 32nd. On the 6th November he caught them at the village of Dhanchúa. The numbers on both sides were equal, and the contest was severe. Night fell whilst the combat was raging; then, covered by darkness, the rebels effected a retreat.

The events which followed each other in western Bihár until the formation of Colonel Rowcroft's force in November, present a constant succession of skirmishes, of movements against petty forts, and similar occurrences of a purely local character. To Rowcroft I shall return shortly. But before doing so it seems incumbent upon me, for the clearness of the subsequent narrative, to describe, as concisely as may be, the occurrences in the districts and on the grand trunk road between Allahábád and Kánhpúr during the period intervening between Sir Colin Campbell's battle of Kánhpúr and the final fall of Lakchnao.

The road  
between  
Kánhpúr and  
Allahábád.

Carthew at  
Fathpúr.

After the battle of Kánhpúr Brigadier Carthew was detached, with the Madras brigade, to command at Fathpúr. The command was an important one, as it was exposed to attacks from the districts south-west of Kánhpúr—from Kálpi, from Jhánsi, from Bandalkhand. Fathpúr, moreover faced—a narrow strip of land on the right bank of the Ganges alone intervening—the south-western frontier of Oudh, and was at any moment liable to incursions from flying parties of rebels. It devolved, therefore, upon Carthew, not only to thrust back attacks from these opposite quarters, but to guard intact the trunk road

—the line of communication between Kánhpúr and Allahábád. The fact that troops and well-guarded convoys were constantly marching up the road doubtless facilitated his task, and enabled him to employ advantageously such passing troops to aid him in clearing the districts lining the road.

Book XII.  
Chapter II.

1857.  
December

The task  
which  
devolved  
upon him.

The duties devolving upon the officer commanding at the south-eastern end of the line of which I am writing—the station of Allahábád—were of not less importance. Situated at the confluence of the great rivers the Jamná and the Ganges, abutting alike on Bandalkhand, on Oudh, and on the disturbed districts of A'zamgarh and Jánpúr, Allahábád was a place always threatened, and yet to be preserved at all risks. Allahábád was, in fact, at once the outlying frontier fortress of the province of Bihár, and its key.

Campbell at  
Allahábád.

At the time of which I am writing, December 1857 and January 1858, the officer commanding at Allahábád was Brigadier Campbell.

Carthew took up his command at Fathpúr on the 19th December. Just before he arrived (11th December) a small party under Colonel Barker, R.A., had made a raid amongst the disaffected villages in the district, had burned some, and had expelled the turbulent villagers from others. In this way the district had been purged of its disloyal citizens. The revenue returns and the supply of provisions to the headquarters proved, almost at once, how very beneficial had been these domiciliary visits.

Fathpúr.

The expelled villagers had fled across the

The rebels  
assemble on

BOOK XII  
Chapter II

1857-8.  
Dec.-Jan.

the right  
bank of the  
Jamná.

Jamná, and it was on the right bank of this river, from Kálpi down to Bandá, that mutineers from Gwáliár, Jhansi, and Bandalkhand, even fugitives from Fathgarh, now began to assemble. Amongst them were the Rájá of Chikáni and a brother and nephew of Náná Sáhib; some accounts even spoke of Náná Sáhib himself. Certain it is that the rebel leaders who had their headquarters at Julápúr on the Bétwa, near Kálpi, exercised the right of sovereignty by calling upon the landowners west of the Jamná to furnish money and recruits for the service of the representative of the Péschwá.

Carthew  
clears the  
country on  
the left bank.

Across the Jamná it was not possible to act. The Commander-in-Chief, however, deemed it especially advisable that the districts to the east of that river should be kept clear of the mutineers. In accordance, then, with instructions which he issued, Carthew marched on the 10th January with a small force (two horse artillery guns, four companies Rifle Brigade, two hundred 17th Madras Native Infantry) along the Kánhpúr road. On reaching Jahánábád, he turned westward towards Kálpi, communicated with the 34th Regiment, sent from Kánhpúr to co-operate with him, and then moved on Bhognipúr. The occupation of this place, the locality of which has already been indicated,\* forced the several rebel parties who had come over from Kálpi to recross the river. Carthew then, in compliance with an order received from Brigadier Inglis, pushed on to Sikan-

\* *Vide* page 228.

dra, and then returned leisurely, *viâ* Kánhpúr, to Fathpúr. He had thoroughly purged the district of rebels.

About the same time (5th January) Brigadier Campbell, with a brigade composed of the 79th Highlanders, a regiment of the Rifle Brigade, some foot and horse artillery, and a newly-raised cavalry levy, the Banáras Horse, effectually cleared the districts near Allahábád, on the left bank of the Ganges. His operations were in every respect successful, and in three encounters which he had with the rebels the latter admitted a considerable loss.

But the efforts of these columns occasionally despatched into the districts could not prevent a fresh appearance of the enemy after their departure. It was natural that so long as the Lakhnao question remained unsolved the delta west of Kánhpúr, that is the narrow strip lying between the two great arteries the Ganges and the Jamná, should be constantly threatened, and almost as constantly invaded. It was necessary, therefore, to patrol the entire district. In March a moveable column,\* commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Christie, engaged in this work, moved down to the village of Dhána, near the left bank of the Jamná, to prevent a threatened passage of the river at that point. Christie found the enemy occupying Siráoli, a town in the Hamirpúr district,

BOOK XIV.  
Chapter II.

1858.

January.

Brigadier  
Campbell  
clears the  
country  
across the  
Ganges.

Moveable  
columns  
patrol the  
district.

\* One 12-pounder howitzer, men, 80th Foot; two hundred  
one 6-pounder gun; seventy and fifty-seven, 17th Madras  
men, 8th Irregular Cavalry; Native Infantry.  
two hundred and forty-four



BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
March.

Effect on the  
district of  
the fall of  
Lakhnao.

on the right bank opposite Dhána, and engaged in firing on that village. By a judicious advance of his artillery, he drove the enemy from Siráoli, and set fire to the town, but the want of boats prevented him from crossing in pursuit.

Occasional raids still continued. On the 26th March a corps of rebels crossed the Jamná near Hamirpúr, plundered and burned the village of Ghátampúr, and then returned. But this was an expiring effort. The fall of Lakhnao placed an overwhelming force at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, whilst, on the western side of the Jamná, another active leader, whose name will occupy a most prominent part in the succeeding volume, was pressing, with all the decision and enterprise of a great commander, the chiefs and leaders whose troops had so long been attempting to harass the British line of communications. It was just after the fall of Lakhnao that the action of Sir Hugh Rose and General Whitlock began to make itself felt. Just then, too, Sir Colin Campbell despatched a small force, under Colonel Maxwell, to Kálpi. The proceedings of these several forces will be narrated in their due course. Meanwhile it may be stated that the work of supervision and control exercised by Brigadier Carthew had been eminently useful to the Commander-in-Chief.

Rowcroft and  
Sotheby.

What Rowcroft and Sotheby had effected with their brigades up to the time of their occupation of Gorakhpúr, I have already narrated.\*

I propose now to take up the story of their action from the point where I left them, and to show how it was that the Ázamgarh and Jánpúr districts fell again into extraordinary confusion.

BOOK XII.  
CHAPTER II.

1858.  
Feb.—March.

Rowcroft, arriving at Gorákhpúr on the 19th February, had defeated the rebels on the 20th, and on the 25th had been left, by the departure towards Lakhnao of the Nipalese, in command at Gorákhpúr. Two days prior to his arrival, Captain Sotheby, R.N., of the Naval Brigade, who was escorting boats up the river Gághrá with a force of one hundred and thirty men of that brigade, thirty-five Sikhs, and sixty Nipalese, had attacked and captured the fort of Chandipúr, garrisoned by three hundred men. This fort was situated on the left bank of the river, in the midst of a dense bamboo jungle. Yet so well planned was Captain Sotheby's attack, that the capture of the fort and the guns and the property it contained cost his force a loss of only four wounded! Amongst these was Captain Charles Weston, of the 36th Native Infantry, a very gallant officer. It is due to add that the attack was most efficiently aided by the guns of a river steamer—the *Jamná*.

Sotheby  
defeats the  
rebels at  
Chandipúr.

Within the British district of Gorákhpúr, sixty-eight miles to the west of it, and nine miles east of Faizábád in Oudh, is the town of A'mórha. Thither Rowcroft now marched, and on the 4th March took up a position not far from the intrenched camp of Bélwá, then occupied by a large rebel force. The rebel force alluded to was com-

The in-  
trenched  
camp of the  
rebels at  
Bélwá.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
March.

They march  
to attack  
Rowcroft,

posed of upwards of fourteen thousand men, led by the pseudo-Názim Méhndi Húsén, the Rájás of Gondah and Chardah, and other disaffected chiefs. Included in their ranks were two thousand five hundred trained sepoy, composed of the 1st, 10th, and 53rd Native Infantry, recently completed to five hundred men each, seven hundred men of the 2nd Oudh Police, and about three hundred of the 5th Regiment Gwáliár contingent.

The approach of Rowcroft disconcerted the hopes which these rebel chieftains had entertained of taking advantage of the concentration of the main British army before Lakhnao to make a raid down into A'zamgarh and Jánpúr districts, and if possible to reach Banáras. But there was, it seemed to them, one mode—and a very certain mode—whereby to rid themselves of Rowcroft and his following, and then to prosecute their intentions. This was to attack him, with the vastly superior force at their disposal, as he lay at A'morha.

and are  
totally  
defeated.

Thus thinking, they acted. Early on the morning of the 5th March they marched towards the British camp, distant from them some seven miles. They had approached at half-past 8 within a mile of it when they were met by Rowcroft and Sotheby and Richardson. A severe contest ensued. The trained sepoy of the rebel force fought with great courage and determination, but they lacked the cool leading of the European officer, which, under other circumstances, had so often led them to victory. Sotheby's Naval Brigade greatly distinguished itself



The enemy were already shaken when Richardson ordered the Yeomanry Cavalry to charge. The first charge caused the enemy to waver, another compelled them to give ground, a third drove them in headlong flight from the field. They were then pursued to their intrenchments at Bélwá, losing between four and five hundred killed and wounded, and abandoning eight guns on the field. The intrenchments at Bélwá gave them a safe refuge, for the cavalry could not penetrate within them.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
March–April.  
The charge of  
the Yeo-  
manry  
Cavalry.

Rowcroft remained at A'mórha waiting for reinforcements to enable him to attack the strong position of the rebels. Subsequently, on the 17th April, and again on the 25th, he met and defeated them in the plain between the two positions; but before this had happened, events had occurred in the districts to his left rear—the districts of A'zamgarh and Jánpúr—which compel me to return thither.

Rowcroft  
remains at  
A'mórha.

I have already related how Kúnwar Singh, after his expulsion by Vincent Eyre from Jagdispúr, had hung about the districts of western Bihár to the terror of the successor of Mr. William Tayler and of the Government of Bengal. One of the three natives of India thrown up to the surface by the mutiny, who showed any pretensions to the character of a strategist—the others being Tántia Topi and the Oudh Moulvi—Kúnwar Singh had carefully forborne to risk the fortunes of his diminished party by engaging in a conflict which, however favourable might be its commence-

Kúnwar  
Singh in  
western  
Bihár.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
March.

His policy.

His force.

He resolves  
to make a  
diversion in  
eastern  
Oudh.

ment, must certainly end in his complete defeat. Shahábád, though the region of his birth, the district in which lay his confiscated estates, was too carefully watched, he felt, to present the chances which would alone justify in his eyes a departure from his system of reserve. His actual force was small. He had with him about twelve hundred sepoy, trained in the Indian army, and a few hundreds of untrained adherents, dependents of himself, his brother, and other discontented land-owners of the province. With such a force he could not hope to make a serious impression. But when he saw how British troops were being hurried up from every quarter to take part in the attack on Lakhnao, when he heard that the Nipálese and Franks had pushed on for that city, leaving the western frontier of the British provinces bordering Oudh comparatively denuded of troops, then he saw his opportunity, then he resolved to make a push for eastern Oudh, and combining with the numberless rebels still at large in that part, to make a dash on A'zamgarh, and, successful there, to avenge the storming of Jagdispúr by a dash on Allahábád or Banáras.

Fortune greatly favoured him. At the moment when he crossed into Oudh, Rowcroft at A'mórha was confronting the intrenched camp of the rebels at Bélwá. His inability to storm that position had singularly encouraged the enemy. They, too, like Kúnwar Singh, had designs on A'zamgarh, and though their main plan had been for the moment baffled by the defeat inflicted upon their attacking columns on the 5th March, yet Rowcroft's inability

to follow up his victory had incited them to pursue their original design by other means. Still holding the camp at Bélwá, they detached then a considerable force to the south-east, and this force, during its march, attracted to itself many detachments which had escaped the bayonets and horsemen of the victorious Franks. With these troops, Kúnwar Singh succeeded in effecting a junction at A'tráolia on the 17th or 18th March.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
March 17.

The Ázamgarh district was then guarded by a small British force consisting of two hundred and six men of the 37th Regiment, sixty Madras cavalry, the 4th, and two light guns, under the command of Colonel Milman of the 37th. At the time when Kúnwar Singh and his rebel allies took up their position at Atráolia, Milman was encamped in the district at Koelsa, not far from Ázamgarh. The distance between Ázamgarh and Atráolia is twenty-five miles. The reader will recollect that Atráolia is the fortress which, on the 9th November preceding, had been captured by Colonel Longden, and by him partially burnt and destroyed. Dependent upon it was a small fort, comparatively insignificant. The fortress itself covered a number of strong buildings, all loop-holed. The outer wall was fifteen feet high.

Atráolia.

On the afternoon of the 21st March, Milman received from Mr. Davies, magistrate of Ázamgarh, the intelligence of the vicinity of the rebels. He at once broke up his camp, marched all night, and at daybreak on the 22nd, came upon the advanced guard of the enemy's force, not occupying the forts, but posted in three or four mango-

Milman beats  
the enemy  
near Atráolia,

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
March.

then halts to  
breakfast,

when the  
rebels march  
on him.

Milman's  
position as  
Kúnwar  
Singh pic-  
tured it.

Milman  
endeavours to  
check the

groves, contiguous to each other. Without giving them time to recover from their surprise, he attacked and defeated them, the 4th Madras Cavalry behaving with great dash and resolution. The enemy being dispersed, Milman determined, before advancing further, to give the men their breakfasts. He accordingly halted in the mango-groves whence he had expelled the rebels, and his men, piling their arms, prepared to enjoy the matutinal meal. But the cup was dashed to the ground just as the hand was about to raise it to the lips. The breakfast was almost ready when information was suddenly brought to Milman that the enemy were advancing in great force!

It was too true. At last the opportunity for which Kúnwar Singh had longed through so many dreary months had come to him. An enemy, though European, yet vastly inferior in numbers; an enemy worn out by a long march, by deprivation of sleep, by fasting; an enemy twenty-five miles from his base and with no supports! What more could a general long for? Everything was in his favour. Kúnwar Singh, then, marched to a victory which he deemed assured. The imagination can almost picture him making to the confident by his side an exclamation near akin to that which burst from the lips of Wellington when he noticed the false movement of Marmont which brought on the battle of Salamanca! \*

Yes, Milman was lost. Galloping forward, followed by some skirmishers, as soon as he re-

\* "Mon cher Alava, Marmont est perdu."



ceived the news of which I have spoken, the English leader beheld the enemy in great strength, some covered by a mud wall, others in fields of sugarcane and in topes of trees. Still, hoping that a daring movement on his part would check their further progress, he ordered an advance. But the numbers of the enemy exceeded his in the proportion of eight to one. Outflanked, it was impossible to advance. Forced back, he at least maintained a bold front. The enemy, never attempting to charge, contented themselves with a steady advance and a steady musketry fire. Once, indeed, as the British troops neared the camp at Koelsa, which they had quitted the previous evening, the rebels made a desperate effort to outflank them. But a timely charge of the 4th Madras Cavalry, which had shown remarkable steadiness, frustrated this movement. Then it was that, tired, worn out, wearied, having lost many men in killed and wounded, the survivors found their way into the encamping ground of Koelsa.

Not, however, to find a refuge there. The rumour of their mishap had preceded them. A panic had seized the camp-followers, most of whom had fled taking their bullocks with them. The foe was still near; the camp was not defensible; there was no food. Milman, then, abandoning the camp equipage, continued his retreat to Ázamgarh. He reached that place the same day, and whilst making every preparation to defend it in case it should be attacked, sent off expresses to Banáras, Allahábád, and Lakhnao for assistance.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
March.

advance of  
the rebels.

He falls back  
on Koelsa.

Thence on  
A'zamgarh,  
whence he  
despatches  
messengers  
for aid.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
March.

Some rein-  
forcements  
reach  
Ázamgarh.

The express despatched to Banáras reached that station on the 24th March. Forty-six men of the Madras Rifles were instantly despatched to Ázamgarh. The following day one hundred and fifty men of the 37th Regiment from Gházipúr, and two days later one hundred and thirty of the same regiment, reached Ázamgarh, and penetrated within the intrenchment before it had been attacked by the rebels. Colonel Dames of the 37th then assumed the command. On the 27th he attempted a sortie with two hundred Europeans, two guns, and sixty Madras cavalry, and though successful at first, was repulsed with the loss of one officer and eleven men killed and wounded. He then retreated into the intrenchment, and thenceforward acted on the defensive.

Lord Canning  
hears of  
Milman's  
disaster,

and at once  
realises its  
magnitude.

The express despatched to Allahábád reached that place on the 27th. Lord Canning was at Allahábád. The news caused him anxiety. Knowing what sort of a man Kúnwar Singh was, that he possessed audacity and courage, and that he knew the value of time in military operations, he realised at once the danger of the situation. He saw how possible it was for the Jagdispúr chieftain, reinforced as he daily was by troops who had escaped from Lakhnao, to overwhelm Milman at Ázamgarh, and then rapidly traversing the eighty-one miles which separated that place from Banáras, then almost ungarrisoned, to seize that important city, and thus sever the communications between Calcutta on the one side and the Governor-General of India at Allahábád and the Commander-in-Chief of the army at Lakhnao on the other.

Just then the headquarters and right wing of the 13th Light Infantry happened to be at Allahábád. The officer commanding that regiment was Colonel Lord Mark Kerr. Lord Canning at once ordered Lord Mark to proceed with all haste with his regiment to Banáras, and picking up there whatever troops might be available, to push on to Ázamgarh and check Kúnwar Singh.

Lord Mark Kerr, responding promptly to the call, set out that same evening, reached Banáras on the 31st March, picked up there a troop—fifty-five men and two officers—of the Queen's Bays, seventeen gunners and one officer, with two 6-pounder guns and two 5½-inch mortars, and started thence for Ázamgarh at 10 o'clock on the night of the 2nd April. With the wing of the 13th were three hundred and seventy-two men and nineteen officers. His entire force consisted, then, of twenty-two officers and four hundred and forty-four men.

Marching with all speed, Lord Mark Kerr reached Sarsána, eight miles from Ázamgarh, the evening of the 5th. There he received, and during the night continued to receive, most pressing letters from the staff officer at Ázamgarh, begging him to push on without a moment's delay. But to march a force of four hundred and forty-four men across a country utterly unknown to any of them, to relieve a place besieged by an army whose numbers certainly exceeded five thousand, and might amount to fifteen thousand, was an idea not to be entertained by a prudent commander. Defeat would

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.

March-April.

He orders  
Lord Mark  
Kerr to push  
on to A'zam-  
garh.

Lord Mark  
Kerr arrives  
within eight  
miles of  
A'zamgarh,  
and halts for  
the dawn.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
April 6.

He marches  
on the 6th  
and comes on  
the rebels

but precipitate the evil he had been sent to avert. Lord Mark Kerr, then, wisely resolved to defer his march till the day should approach its dawn.

He set out at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 6th—a reconnoitring party of the Bays, with whom was Lord Mark, leading the way. After a march of two hours, Lord Mark observed some buildings and a mango grove to the left of the road, and the banked ditches of the fields to the right of it, to be crowded with sepoy's lying in ambush and evidently on the look-out for him. Making as though he had not observed them, he made his cavalry dismount, and halted till his train of elephants, camels, and carts had closed up; he then despatched a company of the 13th to the right with the view of forcing back the enemy's left, and of thus opening a way for the progress of the train. In this he so far succeeded, that the rebels fell back on the left, but almost at the same time a heavy fire opened from the buildings and the mango groves of which I have spoken, and which, on the left of the road from the British advancing line, constituted the enemy's right. Lord Mark threw out his men in skirmishing order and brought up the guns, which, at a distance of five hundred yards, began to throw shrapnel into the buildings. The enemy, however, were so numerous, and were so completely on all four sides of him, that it required all the soldierly skill of the British leader to keep them at a distance. His position was complicated by the necessity of defending the large train of animals accompanying the force, and the capture of which would, naturally, be a special object of

and fights  
them.

Great diffi-  
culties of his  
position.



BOOK XII  
Chapter II.

1858.  
April.

the rebels. These animals, when the action had begun, had turned round with fright and bolted to the rear, the mahouts clinging to the elephants, whilst the drivers, descending from the carts, had run off, calling upon the trees and bushes to cover them. Everything now depended upon Lord Mark's ability to make head against the enemy. Up to this time, when the fight had lasted an hour, though he still held the position he had taken up, he had made no impression upon them; and just at the moment he could discern in rear of their skirmishers their reserves forming up in quarter-distance column, whilst a large body was being detached with the evident purpose of penetrating between him and the baggage animals. In this, before long, the rebels partly succeeded; for they set fire to many of the carts.

The rebels  
receive  
accession of  
strength.

The situation was critical. The two 6-pounders had been gradually brought to within sixty yards of the main building, without, however, producing the required effect. Lord Mark was anxious to try the effect of shelling, but the two mortars were so located, that, to use them with effect, it had become necessary to cause the gunners and their supports to fall back, and Lord Mark had noticed that the smallest retrograde movement caused the enemy to rise to their feet and, with loud shouts, display their numbers with a view to encircle him. But he felt the main building must be carried at any price. At last the two 6-pounders effected a small breach, and volunteers being called for, some thirty or forty men rushed to the storm. They found the breach not quite practicable, but,

Critical  
situation  
of Lord Mark  
Kerr.

The slightest  
hesitation  
would have  
lost him.



BOOK XII.  
CHAPTER II.

1858.  
March.

His splendid  
perseverance

is crowned  
with success.

The rebels  
are repulsed  
in an attack  
made, mean-  
while, on the  
baggage.

Lord Mark  
leaves the  
baggage with  
Major Tyler,

far from falling back, they set to work vigorously to enlarge it. Their labours disclosing an inner wall yet uninjured, Lord Mark recalled them, and resumed practice with his guns. Before the men fell back, they set fire to the wooden portions of the building. The guns then re-opened fire, but the effect they produced was slight, since, to maintain his position, Lord Mark was forced to use one of them to throw shrapnel at the rebels in the rear of his right flank. Gradually, however, progress was made, and Lord Mark was meditating a second assault, when the flames, which, despite the efforts made to subdue them, had been gradually spreading, forced the rebels to evacuate the building. Instantly, a pursuit was ordered, the Bays rushed to the front, and the day was won!

But while the position of the rebels in front was being thus forced, they had completed the circle, and were now attacking the rear of Lord Mark's small force. In this part of the field a high embankment crossed the road. This embankment the enemy now seized. Captain Wilson Jones of the 13th, commanding the company of that regiment which formed the rear guard, at once faced about and charged them. He drove the enemy back, but lost his own life.

Lord Mark's position was now peculiar. He had pierced the enemy's centre; the way to Azamgarh lay open to him; on his left, the rebels, terrified by the defeat in the centre, were rapidly falling back; but on the right, notwithstanding the success of the charge just narrated, they still occupied a menacing position. The

drivers and the cartmen had run away, and the baggage remained exposed. Under these circumstances, Lord Mark resolved to leave a sufficient force to hold front to the right, whilst he should push on to Ázamgarh, and return with the Madras sepoy he might find there, who, on a pinch, would drive the carts. No doubt he calculated that the enemy, believing themselves threatened by the movement, would be glad to retreat while they could. Sending, then, Major Tyler of the 13th, a cool and capable officer, to command the rear and baggage guards, he pushed forward on the Ázamgarh road. The enemy's right wing, noticing the movement, beat a hasty retreat.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
April.

and moves on  
A'zamgarh.

No sooner had the enemy retreated than many of the carters and drivers and mahouts reappeared, and Major Tyler pushed on rapidly after his chief. No further opposition was offered. A village which had to be traversed, and which might have been easily defended with a few men, was abandoned. The bridge across the river leading to the intrenchment was reached at 11 o'clock. This bridge had been rendered impassable by the rebels, and after their flight they still continued to maintain a heavy fire on it. It was repaired under this fire by Lieutenant Colomb, R.A., acting under the orders of Lord Mark. As soon as it had been rendered serviceable, the Madras Rifles crossed it in compliance with a request made by Lord Mark, and the convoy was brought in in safety.

He is rejoined  
*en route*  
by Major  
Tyler,

and enters  
A'zamgarh.

This gallant little action reflects the greatest credit on the troops and the commander. Lord

Credit due to  
Lord Mark  
Kerr.

Book XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
April.

Mark was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Longden of the 10th Foot and Mr. Venables, the daring indigo-planter, whose previous gallant achievements have brought him more than once before the reader; and no doubt the previous experience of these two gallant men was useful to him. But he was the leader; upon him it depended whether to advance against numbers or to retreat before numbers. Upon his shoulders rested the responsibility, and to him must be accorded the praise. When it was urged upon him to abandon the convoy and to make for the intrenchments, he merely replied "Wait a bit: we'll win yet," and persevered. The number against whom he contended did not, at the lowest computation, fall short of four thousand men, and probably greatly exceeded it. Against these, deducting his baggage guards, he could not put in line more than three hundred men. In the daring, the conduct, and the success of the achievement, Lord Mark Kerr's relief of Ázamgarh may be classed with Vincent Eyre's relief of Árah.

His prudence  
equalled his  
daring.

• Nor, whilst awarding Lord Mark Kerr this high praise for his daring, can History deny him the not inferior merit of military prudence. The imploring letters he received for immediate aid on his arrival at Sarsána might have induced a less prudent commander to start that night on an errand, the accomplishment of which successfully might well be supposed to depend on the most absolute promptitude. There can be no more tormenting pressure on the mind of a commander than the knowledge that his countrymen within a few



miles of him may perish for want of immediate relief; that the few hours of the night, well employed, would bring them that relief; but that prudential considerations compel him not to use those hours. Lord Mark Kerr felt that pressure, and yet had the wisdom to resist it.

Book XII.  
Chapter II

1858.  
April.

The state of affairs at Ázamgarh was bad indeed. Milman's force, after its precipitate and disastrous retreat, had marched straight into the intrenchments within the jail, leaving the town to the mercy of the rebels. But these moved so cautiously that the reinforcements of which I have spoken \* were able to enter. Two days later the rebels occupied the town and beleaguered the jail. Fortunately, this was surrounded by a deep ditch, and Kúnwar Singh did not care to risk an assault. He invested the place, and trusted to the effects of famine and an unremitting fire. He even had it in contemplation to blockade the jail and to march on Banáras, and there can be no doubt that this programme would have been carried out but for the splendid achievement of Lord Mark Kerr.

State of  
affairs in  
A'zamgarh.

The action fought by Lord Mark had cost the British a casualty list large in proportion to the number engaged; eight officers and men being killed and thirty-four severely or dangerously wounded. At such a price the defeat of Kúnwar Singh was cheaply purchased. That leader had showed himself greater as a strategist than a tactician. His plan of campaign was admirable, but

Defects in  
Kúnwar  
Singh's

\* *Vide* page 458.



Book XII.  
Chapter II.

1858.  
April.

in carrying it into execution he committed many serious errors. Milman gave him a great, an unexpected opportunity. He had that officer at his mercy. When Milman's men were waiting for their breakfast in the mango grove near Atráolia, it was in the power of Kúnwar Singh to cut them off from Ázamgarh. He preferred to attack them in front. Then the pursuit was not pressed on with sufficient vigour. A capable commander would still have cut them off. Once having seen them housed in Ázamgarh, he should have left a portion of his force to blockade them, pressed on with the remainder towards Banáras, and occupied a position in which he could have engaged Lord Mark Kerr with advantage. He had at his disposal, it subsequently transpired, about twelve thousand men. To oppose these the few men led by Lord Mark were alone available. Everything was within his grasp had he dared to stretch out his hand. The chances are that, capable man as he was, he saw all this. It was his misfortune to have under him many petty leaders, all wishing to be supreme!

Probable  
cause of his  
false tactics.

I have now recorded the result of the message sent from Ázamgarh to Banáras and Allahábád. Another result was produced by the message despatched to Lakhnao. What that was will be narrated when I return to the army still massed in the conquered city.

## BOOK XII.

---

### CHAPTER III.

I LEFT Sir Colin Campbell master, on the 21st March, of Lakhnao. I propose to narrate now the measures which he adopted to reap every possible advantage from his conquest.

Three main objects first presented themselves to his attention. The first was the strengthening of the weak places which had been threatened during his advance; the second, the formation of a moveable column for the reconquest of western and north-western Oudh; the third, the reconquest of Rohilkhand. Combined with this last was the necessity of holding out a hand to the brigade of Seaton, left at Fathgarh, and to the columns of Jones and Penny still accomplishing, or about to accomplish, the work which had remained to be carried out in the north-west.

The action  
still remain-  
ing to be ac-  
complished.

On the 24th March Sir Colin detailed a considerable force to constitute, for the moment, the

Book XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
March.

Sir E. Lugard  
is ordered to  
A'zamgarh.

garrison of Lakhnao.\* The command of this force was entrusted to Sir Hope Grant.

On the 28th the Military Train, the 10th Regiment, and a field battery left for Allahábád. The same day Sir Colin received information of Milman's disaster near Ázamgarh, narrated in the previous chapter. His movement to repair the misfortune was as prompt as could be desired. On the 29th Sir E. Lugard was despatched, with a brigade of infantry (10th,† 34th, 84th), seven hundred Sikh sabres, and eighteen pieces of artillery, by the direct road to Ázamgarh, taking *Atráolia en route*. Whilst Lugard would thus relieve Ázamgarh, the advance of Jang Bahadúr's force towards Faizábád, on their return to Nipál, would, it was hoped, relieve Rowcroft, whom I left encamped at Amórah.

I propose, in the first instance, to follow the course of Sir E. Lugard. But before setting out with him I may state that there still remained at Lakhnao four regiments of cavalry and eight of infantry, with artillery in proportion, to be accounted for. These were constituted as a moveable column, at the head of which was placed Brigadier-General Walpole. To him I shall revert in due course.

\* Two troops horse artillery; two field batteries; four garrison batteries; one company engineers; three companies pioneers.

The 2nd Dragoon Guards; the Lahór Light Horse; 1st Sikh Cavalry; Hodson's Horse; the 20th, 23rd, 38th,

53rd, 90th, 97th Regiments, and 1st Madras Fusiliers; Headquarters 27th Madras Native Infantry; 5th Panjáb Infantry.

† The 10th had started on the 28th *en route* to England, but were recalled by an express that night.

Lugard left Lakhnao on the 29th March. The distance to Ázamgarh was fifteen marches. Pushing on as rapidly as possible he reached Súltánpúr the 5th April. It had been his intention to cross the Gúmti at this place, and march direct on Ázamgarh. But to carry out this plan would have necessitated a week's delay. The bridge had been destroyed by fire, and there were no boats. Under these circumstances he resolved to continue his march down the right bank, and to make, in the first instance, for Jánpúr.

A few miles only from Jánpúr, to the north-west of it, and on the direct road from Sultánpúr, lies the village of Tigra. Within four miles of this village a rebel force of three thousand men, one third of whom were trained sepoy, and two guns, under the command of Ghúlám Húsén, had appeared on the 10th April, threatening Jánpúr. The following day this rebel force attacked and burnt a considerable village within six miles of Tigra. The afternoon of that day Lugard reached Tigra, and heard of the vicinity of the rebels. He had made a sixteen-mile march, his troops were exhausted, the heat of the day excessive. He therefore resolved to remain where he was for the day. Towards evening, however, he received information that the rebels were on the move. He at once turned out his men, dashed after them, caught and attacked them. The rebels attempted for a moment to stand, but they could not resist the terrible onslaught of the cavalry. After a short resistance, they turned and fled, leaving eighty killed and

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
March-April.  
He sets out  
29th March,

and defeats  
the rebels  
near Tigra.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
April.

Death of  
Charles  
Havelock.

A'zamgarh.

Plans of the  
British gar-  
rison.

their two guns on the field. On the side of the victors six sowars were wounded. There was but one killed—but the loss was the loss of a most gallant officer, who had rendered excellent service during the mutiny. He who fell was Lieutenant Charles Havelock, a nephew of the renowned general.

Lugard marched on the next day to Didarganj, relieved the Gúrkahs at Jánpúr by three companies of the 37th Regiment, and then pushed on for Ázamgarh. On the 14th he was within seven miles of that place. Ázamgarh was still invested by the force under Kúnwar Singh, computed to be thirteen thousand strong; but if that leader had been unable to force his way into the British intrenchment when it was occupied by Milman's small force, still less was he capable of making an impression upon it after the reinforcements from Ghazipúr and Banáras had reached the place. Indeed, the British garrison had been so greatly increased that, had it taken the field, it might have ended the campaign at a blow. Colonel Dames, who commanded, was, however, restrained from action by the express orders of Sir Colin, and directed to await in his intrenched position the arrival of Sir E. Lugard. The rebels, therefore, still occupied the town, and still threatened the intrenchment. On the approach of Lugard, on the 15th, Kúnwar Singh drew up his forces along the banks of the little river Tons, commanding the bridge of boats across it, and resolved to dispute the passage. But the wily chieftain had matured plans far deeper than even

those about him could fathom. He knew very well that the soldiers who had failed to stop the small force of Lord Mark Kerr would have no chance against the more considerable brigade of Sir E. Lugard. He therefore so arranged his forces that whilst those upon whom he could most depend should defend the passage of the Tons as long as possible, the great bulk, traversing the town, should march with all speed to the Ganges, and, crossing that river at or near Gházipúr, should endeavour to reach his native jungles at Jagdispúr, there to renew the war.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.

April 15.

Plans of  
Kúnwar  
Singh.

Lugard attacked the rebels with great vigour. But for some time he failed to make any impression upon them. They held the bridge of boats with a resolution and perseverance worthy of veterans, and it was not until they had by their long resistance ensured the safety of their comrades that they fell back. Lugard then crossed the Tons, and at once detached half a troop of horse artillery, the Military Train, and two squadrons 3rd Sikh Cavalry in pursuit. In this action Mr. Venables, the indigo-planter, always to the front, always daring, and always, from his intimate acquaintance with the country, eminently useful, was severely wounded. To the regret of every soldier, he died of his wounds. He had rendered splendid and unpaid service to his country. In the earlier days of the mutiny, when all had been clouded and gloomy, he had set a noble example to everybody, and, when his station had been abandoned by the civilians, had

Lugard forces  
the passage  
of the Tons.

Death of  
Mr. Venables.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.

April 15.

The rebels  
retreat, but  
are not  
beaten.

shown the power of preserving order which even one resolute Englishman can wield in India.

The rebels had taken every advantage of the firm resistance made by their comrades at the Tons, and the pursuers had a gallop of twelve miles before they caught sight of them. And when they did see them, the sight was far from reassuring. Instead of a defeated and scattered host seeking safety in flight, they came upon a body of men retiring unbroken and in good order. They were the men of the old Dánápúr brigade, of the 7th, 8th, and 40th Native Infantry. But the pursuers did not hesitate. They charged—to make, however, no impression. “It was all we could do,” wrote one of the officers engaged, “to hold our own against such odds. Immediately our cavalry charged they stood and formed square, and used to abuse and tell us to come on.” The loss of the British was considerable. Hamilton of the 3rd Sikhs, a very gallant officer, was killed charging the squares. And although, by greatly daring, the British force succeeded in cutting off three of the enemy’s guns, they found it useless to continue the pursuit. They therefore halted at Nathupúr, where they had fought, watched the enemy disappear in the direction of the Ganges, then sent their killed and wounded into Ázamgarh, with a request for reinforcements.

The pursuers  
make little  
impression  
upon them.

Lugard sends  
Douglas in  
pursuit.

Lugard, after crossing the Tons, had encamped at Ázamgarh, and drawing to himself the garrison of the place, was preparing to move actively against two rájás, allies of Kúnwar Singh—who, after the battle, had taken a northerly direction



towards Oudh—and to watch the reuniting portions of Ghúlám Husén's force. But the moment he received the report of the pursuing column halted at Nathupúr, he detached Brigadier Douglas at the head of a wing of the 37th, the 84th, one company Madras Rifles, four guns Major Cotter's battery Madras Artillery, two 5½-inch mortars, to reinforce them. Douglas started at once, and reached Nathupúr that night (16th April).

Book XII.  
Chapter III.  
1858.  
April 16-17.

Meanwhile Kúnwar Singh had halted at the village of Naghai, near Ázamgarh, about fourteen miles from Nathupúr. The reasons which influenced Kúnwar Singh, at so critical a conjuncture, cannot be divined. It is fair to believe, however, that knowing, from the custom of his enemy, he would be pursued, he hoped to be able to strike him a blow so disabling as to permit him to continue his retreat without further molestation. Certain it is that he had occupied a strong position, and arranged his forces with considerable skill. Occupying groves of large trees, he had covered his front with breastworks, and had disposed his guns so as to reap the greatest possible advantage from their working. Here Douglas found him on the morning of the 17th, and here he attacked him. But again did Kúnwar Singh display great tactical ability. He kept Douglas at bay till he had secured two lines of retreat for his main columns, which he had divided. He then fell back leisurely, and though many of his men were cut up, they maintained to the end of the day their determined attitude. As soon as

Kúnwar  
Singh halts  
at Naghai.

Douglas  
attacks him  
there.

Kúnwar  
Singh falls  
back skill-  
fully.



Book XII.  
Chapter III.

—  
1858.  
April 17-20.

Douglas  
pursues,

Douglas's pursuit—continued for four or five miles—relaxed, the two divided columns reunited, and took up a position for the night.

Douglas lay that night at Ahúsi, within six miles of the rebels. Early next morning he started again in pursuit. But the rebels had been equally prompt, and marched that day without molestation to Nagra, eighteen miles distant. They were followed all day by the British cavalry and horse artillery, but the infantry did not come up in time to permit Douglas to engage. He encamped that night within three or four miles of the enemy's position. But Kúnwar Singh was well served by his spies. No sooner had he heard that the British had halted for the night than he broke up his camp, marched to Sikandarpúr, crossed the Ghágrá by the ford near that place, and pushed on to Mannahar, in the Gházipúr district. There he and his followers halted, wearied and hungry, hoping they might have time for sleep and food before their pursuers should appear.

and  
Kúnwar  
Singh  
retires.

Douglas  
tracks and at  
last reaches  
him.

But Douglas would allow them time for neither. At midnight on the 18th he heard of their move towards Sikandarpúr. At 2 o'clock in the morning he was on their track, and marching all day, picking up many stragglers as he proceeded, he bivouacked that night within four miles of Kúnwar Singh's position. He did not rest there long. Hoping to catch the enemy, he turned out his men at a very early hour on the 20th, and marching rapidly, found himself at daylight in front of his enemy.

That position was neither so strong nor so well

chosen as that at Naghai. The defence consequently was less determined, and the disaster was greater. Douglas advanced his infantry under cover of a fire from his guns, at the same time that he threatened the enemy's right with his cavalry. The rebels made no stand, but fled in disorder, leaving on the field a brass 9-pounder gun, several limbers and waggons, an immense quantity of ammunition, a large amount of treasure, a number of carts and bullocks, four elephants, and the colours of the 28th Regiment Native Infantry, which were found wrapped round the body of a Súbadár who was shot. The rebels were pursued for six miles, but, in pursuance of a preconceived plan, their several columns took different routes, to reunite again at a given hour of the night at some settled spot. What was this spot Douglas found it impossible to find out. Accordingly, when darkness set in, he bivouacked, prepared to move early on the morrow.

But Kúnwar Singh had displayed his accustomed subtlety. His object was to cross the Ganges. He had impressed the country people and many of his own following that having no boats it would be necessary to cross the river on elephants, of which a certain number still remained. By this report he hoped to deceive the English general. But, meanwhile, he had, by means of his agents, collected a sufficient number of boats at Sheopúr Ghát, ten miles below Balliah. When, therefore, night fell, he marched off to this point, and outwitting Colonel Cumberlege, who with two regiments of Madras cavalry was waiting to

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.

April 20.

Douglas  
completely  
defeats the  
rebels at  
Mannahar.

Kúnwar  
Singh eludes  
Cumberlege  
and crosses  
the Ganges  
into Bihár.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
April 21-22.

He retires to  
Jagdispúr.

pounce upon him at Balliah, succeeded in embarking all his men except two hundred before the British appeared on the scene. Douglas, indeed, had started in pursuit at 2 o'clock in the morning, but misled by the false information circulated by Kúnwar Singh, he only reached the right track in time to cut off the two hundred men of whom I have spoken, to capture some elephants and another brass gun, and to sink one—the last—of the enemy's boats.

Kúnwar Singh thus crossed the Ganges in safety. He made his way without delay to his ancestral domain at Jagdispúr. Here he found his brother, Ammar Singh, with several thousand armed villagers ready to support him. Kúnwar Singh posted these and the few men who, after crossing the Ganges, had adhered to his fortunes, in the jungles covering his castle—the same thick jungles which Vincent Eyre had forced on the 12th August of the preceding year.

But if, as I have already had occasion to remark, there was no William Tayler to exercise a vigilant supervision over the several districts of western Bihár, neither was there a Vincent Eyre to retrieve the errors of the Bengal Government. It happened that Árah was at this time occupied by a party of one hundred and fifty men of the 35th Regiment, one hundred and fifty of Rattray's Sikhs, and fifty sailors of the Naval Brigade, the whole under the command of Captain Le Grand of the 35th. Le Grand, knowing well what Vincent Eyre had accomplished in the same locality, how, with a smaller force at his disposal, he had beaten

Captain Le  
Grand  
resolves to  
attack him.



an enemy certainly not less numerous, and far better armed and disciplined, determined, if possible, to emulate his example. Accordingly, on the 23rd April, he marched from Árah with the force I have mentioned, and two 12-pounder howitzers. Early on the morning of the 23rd he came upon the little army of Kúnwar Singh. It consisted of about two thousand men, dispirited, badly armed, and without guns. It occupied the thick jungle, about a mile and a half in depth. Le Grand began the action with a fire from his two howitzers. These, however, seemed to make no impression on the enemy, and the infantry were then brought up to make the charge which, against Asiatics, has never failed. The exact course of the events which followed has never been clearly explained. But this is certain, that at a critical moment of the advance into the thick jungle, when the men in extended order were about to rush forward with a cheer, the bugle sounded the retreat. By whom the order to sound was given, or whether it was intended to sound the retreat, is not known. The effect of it on a scattered body of men unable to see each other was to cause irretrievable confusion. To repair it Le Grand used every means in his power, but in vain. The evil had been done. The men fell back in disorder, followed by the enemy, and abandoning the howitzers, fled to Árah. The 35th suffered very severely. Two-thirds of their number, amongst them Le Grand and two officers, were either killed\*

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
April 23.

He attacks  
him,

and is com-  
pletely  
defeated.

\* The casualties were in two men, sailors nineteen, killed, 35th, one hundred and Sikhs nine, officers three.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
April.

Brigadier  
Douglas  
crosses into  
Shahábád.

or died from apoplexy on the retreat. The gunners, refusing to retire, were killed at their guns. The disaster was complete.

This disaster threw the district once more into disorder. A panic ensued at the station of Chaprá, and expresses were sent from Danápúr to Brigadier Douglas, urging him to cross the river without delay. Douglas, whose incessant pursuit of Kúnwar Singh without tents had tried his men to the utmost, had been inclined, when the rebel chief had escaped his clutches, to wait till his heavy baggage should arrive. But on receipt of the expresses from Dánápúr, he crossed the Ganges, 25th April, at Sína Ghát, pushed on the 84th Foot and two guns to Árah on the 29th, and followed himself two days later.

Death of  
Kúnwar  
Singh.

But before Douglas could act against the rebels, a material change had taken place in their affairs. Whether Kúnwar Singh was wounded at the action fought at Mannahar, or, whether, as some of his followers aver, as he was crossing the Ganges, this is certain, that immediately on his arrival at Jagdispúr he underwent amputation of the wrist. He was an old man, and the shock was too much for him. He died three days after he had defeated Le Grand.

Ammar  
Singh suc-  
ceeds him.

Kúnwar Singh was succeeded by his brother Ammar Singh. Though hardly the equal of his brother in military skill, Ammar Singh was not one whit behind him in energy and resolution, and the manner in which he conducted the operations which followed left little to be desired in a partisan leader.

The rebels, after defeating Le Grand, had followed up their victory by an attack on Árah. Though repulsed, they still continued to threaten it, and as their numbers were daily augmenting, Douglas thought it advisable to await the arrival of Lugard, who had warned him of his approach.

Book XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
May.

Douglas  
waits the  
arrival of  
Lugard,

who arrives  
early in May.

Lugard, who, since I last spoke of him, had remained at Ázamgarh, occupied in clearing the surrounding districts, had no sooner heard of Kúnwar Singh's successful passage of the Ganges and the disaster of Le Grand, than he set off with a portion of his brigade, crossed the sacred stream on the 3rd and two following days of May, and marched at once to the neighbourhood of Árah.

The news he received there led Lugard to believe that the rebels, who were reported to number eight thousand, were intrenching themselves in the jungle between Bihía and Jagdispúr. He resolved, therefore, to occupy with his main body a position in front of the western face of the jungle, guarding Árah with a detachment, whilst Colonel Corfield, commanding a small force at Sahasráam, should march from that quarter to his aid.

Plans of  
Lugard.

Lugard reached Bihía on the 8th, sent back thence the detachment to guard Árah, and then marched on the 9th to a plain a little to the west of Jagdispúr. Here he intended to halt to await the arrival of Corfield. But the enemy's movements forced him to change his plan. On the afternoon of that day Ammar Singh, covering his movement by a threatened attack on Lugard's camp, marched from the jungles with the bulk of

Lugard  
occupies  
Jagdispúr.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
May.

Progress of  
the cam-  
paign.

his following in the direction of Árah. Lugard resolved, then, to attack at once. Checking the advance on Árah with his cavalry and guns, he then divided his force into three columns, and driving the enemy before him, occupied Jagdispúr. In this operation he did not lose a single man killed, and only a few were wounded. The rebels fell back on Satwarpúr, a village in the jungle district.

The day following, Lugard, sensible of the necessity of following up his advantage, set out in pursuit. On the 11th he was joined at Pirú, seven miles south-west of Jagdispúr, by Corfield, who, fighting almost daily and always successfully, had made his way from Sahasráram. That same day he surprised and defeated the rebels at Hétampúr. From this day, skirmishes were of daily occurrence. On the 12th, he beat them at Jathin, whilst Corfield drove them from Dúvím. On the 20th they were again beaten, though they managed to kill an officer, Dawson, of the Military Train. Lugard, however, avenged his death on the 27th by inflicting a crushing defeat upon them at Dalilpúr, recapturing the two howitzers they had taken from Le Grand. On this occasion he did not lose a single man.

The per-  
sistent dis-  
persion of the  
rebels,

But these victories did not crush the rebellion in the district. On each occasion the rebels, knowing every inch of the country, dispersed to reunite in nearly the same strength as before. Dividing themselves into small parties, they organised a system of freebooting, dangerous to life and property, and threatening to the stations, the peaceful villages, and the isolated posts all over

only to  
reunite.



the country. It was impossible to wage a war of extermination. Yet the jungles offered the rebels a means of defying for a series of months disciplined soldiers led by skilled and capable generals. In vain were their positions marked, encircled, and then marched upon from different quarters. The smallest delay on the part of one of the converging columns gave them the opportunity, of which they were ever prompt to avail themselves, to escape. Nor was it until the genius of a staff officer serving under Douglas devised a plan, based upon his experience of its efficiency elsewhere, that a certain means was attained for the extermination or expulsion of the persistent rebels. The nature of that plan will be developed in the pages which follow.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.

May.

The defy  
pursuit, until  
a new scheme  
is devised by  
a staff officer  
with the  
force.

After the defeat at Dalilpúr on the 27th, the rebels broke up into small parties, and commenced their new trade of marauding on a large scale. One party attacked and destroyed an indigo factory near Dúmraon, another plundered the village of Rájpúr near Baksar, a third threatened the railway works at Karamnásá. These proceedings spread dismay and disorder throughout the Shah-ábád district.

They harry  
the district.

In the campaign up to the point which I have now reached, the British troops had suffered greatly from the heat and exposure to the sun. But in the presence of the occurrences just recorded, Lugard was compelled to keep them actively employed. To facilitate their movements and to lessen the chances of the escape of the enemy, he set to work to intersect the jungles by

Lugard again  
defeats them,



BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
June.

but many  
escape.

Lugard  
resigns his  
command  
from ill-  
health.

roads. On the 2nd June, he divided his force into two parts, the one at Késhwa the other at Dalilpúr, opposite points on the edge of the jungle. Between these he cut a broad road. Occupying this with a line of posts as a base, he attacked the rebels from the outside on the 4th, and defeated them with great slaughter, the 10th and 84th showing great dash and daring. But still many managed to escape.

It would be tedious to follow the course of every skirmish; to show how Douglas pursued the rebels with energy and vigour towards Bak-sar, and how the main body yet managed to elude his pursuit; how they again and again baffled Lugard. He could beat but could not clutch them. He had not, in fact, the means of maintaining a continuous and crushing pursuit. The rebels, therefore, though repeatedly beaten, were able to rally at a distance and return by a circuitous route to the corner of the jungle. But by the 15th June Lugard had so far succeeded that the rebels had been expelled to a further distance from the jungles than had ever been the case previously, and he was able to report that the task entrusted to him had been completed. Wearied and broken down by the unparalleled hardships of the contest, Lugard was then forced to resign his command and proceed to England. The troops were ordered into quarters. But they had scarcely retired from the field, when the rebels, strong in a conviction of real success in the past, and confident that the rainy season would secure them immunity for the four

months to come, reoccupied their old positions, their numbers daily increased by recruits from all parts of the country.

It was under these circumstances that Brigadier Douglas, C.B., was appointed to succeed Lugard. He had no sinecure. He had not even assumed command when he heard that owing to the manœuvres and intrigues of Ammar Singh, the rebel prisoners in the jail at Gayá had been released, and, joined by the police and the convicts, had driven the English into their intrenchment. This outrage—which was speedily repaired—was followed up by a raid into the station of Árah, the garrison of which had been cunningly enticed away, and by the burning of a gentleman's bungalow. The civil authority had, in fact, everywhere disappeared.

Under these circumstances stronger measures were resorted to. Douglas was placed in command of the whole of the disturbed districts as far as Dánápúr. The troops under his command were augmented to a numerical strength of seven thousand. He began at once to work on a system. He organised strong posts at easy distances from each other in all directions. He located his troops in such a manner that it would be easy to mass them at short notice on one particular point. He sent out trusted sepoys in disguise to penetrate the designs of the mutineers, and even to bring in their leaders, alive or dead. He continued with great effect the practice, initiated by his predecessor, of covering the jungles with roads. Finally, as a supreme remedy, he

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.

June—Sept.

Douglas succeeds him.

Difficulties of Douglas on first assuming his command.

Douglas devises means to baffle and subdue the rebels.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
June-Sept.

Operations  
are neces-  
sarily de-  
ferred till  
after the  
rains.

The rebels  
continue  
active,

in spite of  
frequent  
defeats.

elaborated a plan for driving the rebels into Jagdispúr, as a common centre, and for there finishing the campaign—as he had every right to expect—by the assault and capture of that stronghold.

This plan, it will be observed, involved the deferring of larger operations until October or November. Meanwhile it was necessary to secure the grand trunk road. On this road, which traverses the lower portion of the district from east to west, and the safety of which was of vital importance to Sir Colin Campbell and his army, large bodies of troops under Colonel Turner, C.B., 97th Regiment, were constantly employed. For the four months that followed Turner was unremittingly engaged on this arduous but necessary service.

The rebels on their side were very persevering. Ammar Singh reoccupied Jagdispúr, and his adherents, in small parties, kept the districts in continued disturbance throughout July, August, and September. They seemed to be ubiquitous. Many places in opposite directions were attacked about the same time. Their principal depredations, however, were confined to the country south of the Ganges and west of the Són river.

It is true they met several reverses. On the 9th September, Colonel Walters defeated them at Rámpúr; on the 20th Captain French and a party of the 35th destroyed their boats on the Són; on the 14th October, Mr. Probyn, of the Civil Service, and twenty Sikhs, ran up a creek on the Shahábád side of the river and destroyed four large boats defended by three hundred and seventy-five sepoy



and one hundred horsemen—a most gallant performance. Not the less, however, did the rebels continue to threaten Árah; they even attacked the cavalry picket at that station.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.  
—  
1858.  
October.

But the end was now approaching. The rainy season was passing away. In one point of view it would have been advisable to defer serious operations until it had actually passed. It was feared, however, and not without reason, that on the complete cessation of the rains, the rebels, thoroughly aware of the preparations made against them, would cross the Són and carry rapine and the sword into the districts which had up to the time been free from their presence. Consequently Douglas resolved to begin operations on the 13th October.

Reasons for  
beginning  
operations on  
13th October.

On the 9th of that month he set out from Dánápúr to carry into execution the plan he had carefully and elaborately devised. The ground was still swampy, but, though this was likely to prove a material disadvantage in a campaign the success of which depended upon the exact punctuality of arrival at a given point of several converging columns, it was at least a guarantee that the rebels were still within the district.\* From three opposite points of this district, Douglas set in motion, on the 13th October, seven different columns, the object of all being to drive the rebels before them to the common centre of

On the 13th  
October  
Douglas  
causes seven  
columns to  
converge near  
Jagdispúr.

\* It may be convenient to state that the district in question may be roughly described as a triangle, each side of which measured fifty miles.

It was bounded on the north by the Ganges, on the east by the Són, and on the west and south transversely by the hilly districts of Mirzapúr.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
October.

The rebels  
are pressed  
within the  
Jagdispúr  
jungles.

Douglas  
orders the  
columns to  
converge on  
Jagdispúr.

Owing to  
Colonel  
Walter's  
mistake the  
rebels escape.

Jagdispúr, there to fall upon them and finish the campaign at one stroke.

Success crowned his earlier combats. On the 14th Douglas drove the rebels out of Kárisát. On the 16th, Durnford, leading the Baksar column, defeated them, though after a determined resistance at Kámpságar. On the 17th Turner's column headed and defeated them at Pirú, and followed hotly in pursuit. These movements had been so thoroughly executed that the rebels, numbering four thousand five hundred, were pressed in on all sides towards the centre, and it was known on the evening of the 17th that they were all within the circle, the outlets on the outer ring of which were watched by the seven converging columns.

Douglas believed that he had them, and he had a right to believe it. Nothing but a mistake on the part of one of the leaders of the seven columns could save them, and he had impressed his orders so strongly on those leaders, and had made them see so clearly the issue at stake, that he had every reason to feel confident. He fixed the assault for noon of the following day. The result showed the mistake of reckoning with absolute certainty on the success of a manœuvre, the threads of which are in the hands of seven men, the failure of any one of whom, whether from accident or stupidity, would spoil the combination. The failure of one man out of the seven effectively ruined Douglas's well thought out plan. Six of the columns converged punctually to the common centre, only to find the place

evacuated. The seventh column, commanded by Colonel Walter of the 53rd, had been delayed five hours by inundation consequent on the cutting of embankments, and the rebels had escaped by the outlet he had given them!

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
October.

It was at this period that the staff officer to whom I have alluded in a preceding page submitted to the general a plan which he believed would meet the difficulties of the case. The staff officer, who was no other than Major Sir Henry Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the force, had, in his experience of Franks's advance without cavalry from the eastern frontier of Oudh to Lakhnao, noticed the enormous service which a few mounted soldiers of the 10th Foot, carrying rifles on horseback, had been able to render. Conceiving the idea, some time before Douglas had set out from Dánápúr, that the services of a few men might be advantageously utilised in a similar manner, he had caused forty riflemen of the 10th Foot to be hastily trained by Captain Bartholomew of that regiment. He now proposed to Douglas, and received permission, to employ the men so trained as mounted infantry—as men, that is to say, who could pursue and overtake the enemy, then, dismounting, hold them in check till the main force should arrive. He increased the forty men to sixty by volunteers from the 10th, and then, learning that the rebels were marching towards the Són, he set out to head them, having three troops of the Military Train and sixty cavalry as supports.

Havelock's  
plan

approved and  
adopted.

Havelock  
sets out.

The plan of  
his cam-  
paign.

The orders given to Havelock were to en-

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
October.

Havelock  
heads the  
rebels;

who try to  
escape by  
pushing  
westward.

The mounted  
riflemen  
overtake  
them,

deavour, by a forced march, to interpose between the rebels and the Són, whilst two columns of infantry should be despatched in the same direction, one north, the other south, of their line of flight, so that should he succeed in turning them they would find themselves surrounded.

Havelock set out from his post near Jagdispúr at a little past 8 o'clock on the night of the 18th; he reached Árah at 1 o'clock in the morning of the 19th, halted there for six and a half hours, and starting again at half-past 7, reached the Són before the rebels. The latter, finding themselves headed, halted, remained irresolute for twelve hours, and then retraced their steps south-westward.

Havelock's mounted column followed, maintaining by patrols a constant communication with the infantry detachments, and guiding their movements. The mutinous sepoys, now fairly aroused to a sense of their danger, put forth their best efforts to out-march their pursuers, and, after an ineffectual attempt to re-enter the Jagdispúr jungle, pushed directly westward. But the mounted riflemen were sadly embarrassed by rice-fields, inundated to a depth of from one to two feet, making one continuous swamp for miles. These the rebels on foot avoided by moving along the "bands," or ridges used to confine the water. Still Havelock gradually gained on them. Overtaking their rear-guard of four hundred infantry on the afternoon of the 20th of October near Nonádí, he succeeded, by a dismounted rifle-fire on two faces, one towards the main body, one de-



taining the rear-guard, in cutting them off from the main body, and hemming them into that village till the arrival of Colonel Turner's infantry column. Turner then stormed the village, and slew three hundred rebels. About one hundred, desperately breaking out, were "ringed" in an adjoining field by Havelock's mounted riflemen, who shot them down till their numbers were so reduced that the supporting cavalry, bursting in on them, sword in hand, sabred almost every man. Only three or four, amongst whom was Ammar Singh himself, disguised, found safety in a neighbouring cane-crop. This was the most effective blow that had been struck against the Shahábád rebels. Its success is to be attributed solely to the new use of the mounted riflemen, without whose presence the enemy would, as on every former occasion, have escaped unscathed through their superior speed.

The main body of rebels had meanwhile continued its flight, after several doubles, finally due west. Following on its track, Havelock again overtook it after a forty miles' march, on the afternoon of the 21st. The infantry column, under Brigadier Douglas's personal command, guided by reports from the mounted rifles, had been able to follow the foe in straight lines from point to point of his numerous twistings and doublings, so that when the sepoys, thoroughly fagged, halted on that afternoon to cook, it was sufficiently near to be expected to take part in the combat. Havelock's column came on the rebels while thus employed. Passing beyond

Book XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
October.

and cut them  
up.

Havelock  
resumes pur-  
suit, and  
overtakes the  
rebels,



BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
October.

who escape,  
from the mis-  
take of a  
guide, and get  
a ten hours'  
start.

them by a circuit, it again headed them towards the infantry, drove them from their cooking, and circling them in on three sides with skirmishers, kept them in check for three hours in the plain, waiting for the infantry to come up. There was now every hope that the success of the previous day would be repeated, but this expectation was not realised. By a mistake of the person guiding Douglas's infantry, they were brought up in the rear of Havelock's force instead of behind that of the rebels, who at once availed themselves of this error, and slipped out of the opening left for them. Evening, setting in at the same time, gave them ten hours' darkness to cover their flight. But, thoroughly terrified now at finding that they could not shake off their pursuers, they abandoned all attempt to do mischief in the district, and confined all their efforts to the one object of escape. Favoured by the long hours of darkness, and by the whole population of the district, who constantly and systematically misled the pursuers by false information, they marched in the next forty hours sixty-three miles further without being overtaken, making for a range of hills which bound the south-west of the district, and are accessible from the plain only by three difficult passes.

Havelock a  
third time  
overtakes the  
rebels and  
punishes  
them.

But Havelock's mounted riflemen, not to be shaken off, again overtook the enemy on the evening of the 23rd. The horses were by this time so exhausted that it was impossible either to head or to charge the rebels, who, drawing up in two solid squares flanking each other, steadily continued

their way to the hills. But at every step men and horses fell in their very midst under the long-range rifles of the pursuers, who, while thus inflicting a severe punishment, were themselves beyond reach of the enemy's muskets. Not a minute but witnessed the capture of baggage-animals, including Ammar Singh's elephant, carrying a howdah containing his suit of chain armour. The rebels continued their hurried flight to the Kaimúr hills. But so great had been the terror inspired by the new arm, now for the first time in India employed against them, and from which escape seemed impossible, that even the telegraph wire, which it had always been their main object to destroy, remained uncut along the trunk road which they crossed in their flight; and the whole of the dépôt establishments there—of vital importance to the regular supply of troops and stores to the army under Lord Clyde—remained uninjured. Havelock's loss in this singular pursuit, which covered two hundred and one miles in five days and nights, was only three men killed and eighteen wounded. But forty-three horses died of fatigue. The rebel loss in the three actions of the 19th, 20th, and 21st October was not less than five hundred killed, including those hemmed in and subsequently destroyed by Colonel Turner's column at Nonádí.

Thus sixty men, organised on a novel plan, and aided by a handful of cavalry, had effected, with almost nominal loss, in five days, what three thousand regular troops had for six months failed to accomplish—viz. the complete expulsion of four thousand five hundred rebels from the pro-

BOOK XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
October.

Terror of the  
rebels at the  
practice of  
the new  
Enfield rifle.

Success of  
Havelock's  
plan of  
mounted  
riflemen.

Book XII.  
Chapter III.

1858.  
Oct.—Nov.

Complete  
collapse of  
the rebels.

vince, and the infliction on them of a punishment the impression of which has not to this day been effaced. When once the inhabitants of the district became aware that the enemy was opposed by troops against whom they could not only hope for no success in the field, and whom it was impossible for them to shake off in flight, their confidence in British power returned, and the restoration of order was an easy task.

Meanwhile, the Jagdispur jungle had been cut down and cleared away. The rebels were gradually driven from place to place, their hiding-places being occupied as the pursuers advanced. It is true that in the long pursuit the rebels managed once or twice to pounce upon the baggage of their enemies. But, in its results, the plan inaugurated by Havelock was most successful. On the 24th November Douglas surprised, by a night march, the main body of the rebels at Salia Dahár, in the Kaimur hills, killed many of them, and took all their arms and ammunition. Before the year ended he could boast that the districts under his command had been completely cleared. The campaign had been more trying, more fatiguing than many which are counted more glorious in their results. Never had troops in India made longer, or more continuously long, marches. On one occasion, I may repeat, the British infantry marched twenty-six miles a day for five days; and the average daily march of Havelock's cavalry was scarcely less than forty miles.

---

## BOOK XII.

## CHAPTER IV.

I RETURN once more to Lakhnao. Of the army which conquered that city, one division, that commanded by Sir E. Lugard, has been disposed of in the preceding pages. There remain still the *corps d'armée* under Hope Grant, and the division under Walpole. I shall deal first with the former.

On the 9th April, Sir Hope Grant, commanding the force already noted,\* received instructions in person from the Commander-in-Chief, to march at once with a column to Bári, twenty-nine miles from Lakhnao, to drive thence a body of rebels who had collected there under the famous Moulvi; then marching eastwards to Muhammadábád and following the course of the Ghágrá, to reconnoitre a place called Bitáoli, where it was rumoured the

Hope Grant  
is ordered to  
the districts.

\* *Vide* page 468, note.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

Composition  
of its force.

Bégam of Lakhnao with six thousand followers had taken post ; thence to march to Rámnagar to cover the march of the Nipálese troops on their return to Nipál.

To carry out these instructions, Hope Grant marched from Lakhnao on the morning of the 11th April. He took with him Middleton's battery, Mackinnon's troop of horse artillery, two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, two 5½-inch Cohom mortars, the 7th Hussars, one squadron 2nd Dragoon Guards, Wale's Panjáb Horse, the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, the 38th Foot, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, five hundred men of Vaughan's Panjáb Corps (the 5th), one hundred sappers and miners with a proportion of engineer officers—in all, about three thousand men.

Daring recon-  
noitring by  
the rebels.

A curious incident, emblematic of the progress made by the rebels in the art of daring yet cratty reconnoitring, occurred on the night of the following day. Hope Grant had encamped about three parts of the way between Lakhnao and Bári. As he lay there that night, a troop of irregular cavalry penetrated within the line of pickets, which at that point were drawn from Wales's Horse. When challenged, they replied, with the most absolute truth, that they belonged to the 12th Irregulars. They did not add that their regiment had mutinied so far back as July of the previous year, and murdered their commandant.\* The pickets, replied to in this confident manner, suspected nothing, and allowed them to pass on. The

\* Vol. i. page 72.

mutineers, having seen all they cared to see, quietly slipped out and returned to Bári.

Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858,  
April

The Moulvi's  
plan

The plan which the rebel leader, who was no other than the Moulvi, adopted on receiving the information which the men of the 12th had acquired, did credit to his tactical skill. He at once occupied a village about four miles on the Bári side of the British encampment with his whole force. This village was covered all along its front by a stream, the banks of which on the side nearest to it were high, and the ground leading up to which was honeycombed. It was a very strong position. The idea of the Moulvi was to hold the village with his infantry, whilst he sent his cavalry by a circuitous route to fall on the flanks of the attacking force. It was really a brilliant idea; for the British force, he was aware, would march at daybreak, entirely unsuspecting of his presence, and, could he but conceal his infantry from view till the British were well within range, and restrain his cavalry till the resistance from the side of the village had begun, the chances of success seemed to be all in his favour.

shows great  
skill.

But the brilliant idea was spoilt by the mode in which it was executed. Hope Grant did indeed march at daybreak, unsuspecting of danger. The bulk of the enemy's cavalry, avoiding the line of march, was rapidly gaining a position on his rear, there to fall upon the six thousand carts which were carrying the baggage of the force, when their leaders were tempted by the sight of two guns in the British advance, lightly guarded

His cavalry  
are tempted  
to spoil it.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

! Their easy  
success

is changed  
into defeat.

The rebels  
are forced to  
retreat,

and evacuate  
the village.

by Walf's Horse, to throw to the winds the plan of their general and attempt to capture the guns. For a moment fortune seemed to favour them. They surrounded the picket, wounded the officer commanding it, Lieutenant Prendergast, and had the guns in their power. Just as they were about to carry them off, however, they caught sight of a troop of the 7th Hussars, led by Captain Topham, on the point of charging them. Without awaiting the charge, they abandoned their prey, galloped off, and endeavoured to recur to the original plan. But they had spoilt it. The British were now thoroughly awake. Hope Grant made prompt arrangements for the protection of his rear guard, and though the enemy made two considerable efforts to capture the baggage, they were baffled, first by a splendid charge of the 7th Hussars troop under Topham, and secondly by a volley, delivered within thirty yards of them, by two companies of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers. Completely defeated in their plans, they then retreated.

Meanwhile, Hope Grant pushed forward with his infantry to the village. He noticed the strength of the position, the difficulty it might give him were it well defended. But the premature action of the cavalry, while it had ruined the plan of the Moulvi, had taken all the heart out of his followers. Prepared to surprise the British force and even to resist should the cavalry charge throw it into disorder, they did not care to meet the assault of the troops which had already repulsed the cavalry. Under the circumstances they preferred to wait for a more favourable



opportunity, and evacuated the village without firing a shot.

Pushing on to Bári and eastward from that place, Hope Grant reached Muhammadábád on the 15th, and Rámnagar on the 19th. Rámnagar was but six miles from Bitáoli, the spot where it was rumoured the Bégam and her followers had taken post. But the Bégam, wise in her generation, had not awaited the arrival of the English general, and Bitáoli was found evacuated.

Bitáoli evacuated, Hope Grant proceeded to look after Jung Bahádur's Nipálese. He found them at Masáoli, midway between Rámnagar and Nawábganj. In his journal, the general gives a vivid description of the condition of our allies. "The European officer in command," he writes, "had great difficulties to contend with in marching through a country so filled with rebels. His force consisted of eight thousand men with twenty guns; yet he could only reckon on two thousand men for actual fighting purposes. He had two thousand sick and four thousand carts; and each of the latter being filled with tents, private property, and loot, required, according to the usages of these troops, a man to guard it." \* From this place Hope

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

Hope Grant  
rushes on  
to Rámnagar.

Jung Bahá-  
dar's Nipá-  
lese.

Their condi-  
tion described  
by Hope  
Grant.

\* Hope Grant's *Incidents of the Sepoy War*.

As these troops took no further part in the war, it may be convenient to state here that they continued their retreat from Masáoli towards their own country and effected

it without molestation. They reached Gorákhpúr early in May, and resumed their march thence on the 17th *idem*. In consequence of the number of their carts they experienced some difficulty in crossing the Gandak at Ba-



Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May.

Hope Grant  
returns to  
Lakhnao.

Grant marched southwards to protect the road between Kánhpúr and Lakhnao, then threatened at Onáo. After some skirmishes of no great moment, in which the rebels were invariably dispersed, he reached the fort of Jallálábád, near Lakhnao, on the 16th May. Here, for the present, I must leave him, to follow the plans of the Commander-in-Chief with respect to Rohilkhand.

Sir Colin's  
plans for the  
reconquest of  
Rohilkhand.

It had been determined by the Governor-General, the reader will recollect, that the reconquest of this province should follow the recapture of Lakhnao, and Sir Colin Campbell found Lord Canning still firm in this respect. He himself would have preferred to wait till the hot season had passed. But Lord Canning, with a clear idea of the necessities of the situation, insisted on immediate action. The rebels who, by Sir Colin's own carelessness, had been allowed to escape into Oudh, had fled into Rohilkhand. Thence at all costs they must be expelled, with promptitude and energy.

In accordance with this view, Sir Colin arranged to converge three columns, starting from different points, on the doomed province. One of these, commanded by General Penny, was directed to cross the Ganges at Nadáli and join Walpole's division, marching from Lakhnao, at Miránpúr Kátra. A third, starting from Rúrki, would penetrate into the province from the north-

gaha. Marching thence by they crossed the Nipál frontier early in June.  
way of Bhetía and Sigáli,

west. Connected, to a certain extent, with these operations was the force at Fathgarh under Seaton, guarding the south-east entrance into Rohilkhand on the one side, and the districts between the Ganges and the Jamná on the other.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

Seaton, left by Sir Colin Campbell, at the end of January, in command of the Fathgarh district, had employed the time which passed till the fall of Lakhnao in strengthening the fort of Fathgarh, in removing the bridge of boats to a point under the walls of the fort, and in practising his artillery at marks on the other side of the river near the positions which an advancing enemy would be likely to take up. The rebels meanwhile continued to threaten him from the Rohilkhand side of the Rám-ganga, though they took care to keep out of the range of his guns.

Seaton at  
Fathgarh.

But, as time went on, and Seaton made no move, whilst reinforcements flocked into the rebel camp, the situation became critical. Still more so when the rebel Rájá of Mainpúri, Téj Singh, entered their camp, and incited them to profit by the supineness of the British at Fathgarh to cross the Ganges and raise the Doáb.

The rebels  
think of  
resuming the  
offensive.

But Seaton, supine as apparently had been his action, had been neither blind nor indifferent to the proceedings of the enemy. He had held his hand so long as it seemed probable that they would remain on the left bank of the river; but the moment they showed a disposition to attempt to burst the door of the Doáb, he resolved to attack them.

Seaton  
watches their  
proceedings.

Hazardous as it was, with his slender force, to

Consequences  
had he

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

remained  
supine.

He resolves  
to attack the  
central posi-  
tion of the  
rebels.

He defeats  
them.

and baffles  
their main  
plans.

assault a powerful enemy, he could not act otherwise. For the occupation of the Doáb by a large rebel force would close the grand trunk road, and cause the preparations, now about to be set in action, against Rohilkhand, to be indefinitely delayed.

Seaton ascertained that the rebels occupied three strong positions: one at Álíganj, seven miles from Fathgarh, on the further bank of the Rámghanga; a second at Bangáon, three miles from a ferry on the Ganges, twenty-four miles above Fathgarh; and a third at Kankar, in the same direction, twenty-two miles distant. Now, in the opinion of Seaton, Álíganj was so strong as to be proof against attack; Bangáon was too far off for a night's march. He resolved, then, to attack Kankar. Kankar being situated between Álíganj and Bangáon, he believed, to use his own expression, that "if he knocked out the middle post the upper one would collapse on the lower."

So, indeed, it proved. Leaving Fathgarh with his small force (one thousand infantry, three hundred cavalry, and five guns) at 11 o'clock on the night of the 6th April, Seaton reached Kankar by daylight, drove back the enemy's cavalry, and then stormed the villages occupied by the infantry, inflicting upon them a loss of two hundred and fifty killed and wounded, and taking three guns. In this action Lieutenant de Kantzow greatly distinguished himself. Seaton had only five men killed and seventeen wounded. The immediate effect was still more important. The



invasion of the Doáb was renounced, and so terrified were the rebels at Álíganj that they broke down the bridge across the Rámghanga.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.  
1858.  
April.

Whilst Seaton was thus keeping fast the door of the province, Penny was moving down from Balandshabr to join in the operations contemplated by the Commander-in-Chief in Rohilkhand. His force consisted of two hundred of the Carabineers, three hundred and fifty-three of the 64th, three hundred and sixty Bilúch Battalion, two hundred and fifty Múltáni Horse, three hundred and twenty 2nd Panjábis, and six heavy and six light guns. Penny met Sir Colin Campbell at Fathgarh on the 24th, then crossed the Ganges, and pushed on to Úshait, a town on the further side of one of the confluent of the main stream. Úshait was found deserted, and Cracroft Wilson, the political officer with the column, brought the general information that the enemy had fled into Oudh, and that his march to Badáon would not be opposed. Penny accordingly started on the night of the 30th April to make a night march of upwards of twenty miles to that place. He had reached Kakráoli, riding with Cracroft Wilson at the head of the advanced guard, commanded by Captain Curtis, when some dusky forms and some lights were noticed a short distance ahead. It was quite dark, and before the nature of these appearances could be ascertained, a discharge of grape came into their midst. Penny was never seen again alive, and it was supposed that his horse, frightened by the sudden discharge, over-

General  
Penny

occupies  
Úshait.

and marches  
to Badáon;

he is suddenly  
attacked by  
the rebels and  
killed.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May.

The rebels  
are eventually  
beaten.

powered and carried him into the ranks of the enemy. Certain it is that his body was found there after the fight, shot, stripped, and sabred. When the discharge occurred the infantry were some distance in the rear. The Carabineers at once charged, took the gun, and then, it being dark, dashed forward into a trench full of Gházis (fanatics). A desperate contest ensued, many of the officers being cut down. As soon as they could extricate themselves, the village, which the enemy occupied in force, was shelled. When the guns had done their work, the infantry charged and carried it—the enemy retreating with but small loss. The column, falling under the command of Colonel Jones of the Carabineers, then continued its march, and joined the Commander-in-Chief at Miranpúr Katra on the 3rd May.

Walpole's  
division.

Walpole's division had left Lakhnao for that place on the 7th April. He had with him the 9th Lancers, the 2nd Panjáb Cavalry, the 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Highlanders, the 4th Panjáb Rifles, two troops of horse artillery, two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, some mortars, and a few engineers and sappers.

Nature of the  
task entrusted to  
Walpole.

The name of General Walpole has been mentioned more than once in these pages, but once only as an officer holding independent command. The expedition upon which he was now about to enter was not one likely to test the qualities of a commander. It offered no difficulties. A fort here or there might require to be taken, a disorganised

band of rebels to be dispersed. To carry it to a successful issue, then, demanded no more than the exercise of vigilance, of energy, of daring—qualities the absence of which from a man's character would stamp him as unfit to be a soldier.

BOOK XII.  
CHAPTER IV.

1858.  
April.

Walpole, unhappily, possessed none of these qualities. Of his personal courage no one ever doubted, but as a commander he was slow, hesitating, and timid. With some men the power to command an army is innate. Others can never gain it. To this last class belonged Walpole. He never was, he never could have been, a general more than in name. Not understanding war, and yet having to wage it, he carried it on in a blundering and haphazard manner, galling to the real soldiers who served under him, detrimental to the interests committed to his charge.

Character of  
Walpole as a  
general.

It may be remarked that this censure, however justly applicable, is out of place as a preface to a short campaign conducted by the commander in question—a campaign which I have already described as “offering no difficulties.” If the campaign offered no difficulties, it may be urged, surely any man, even a Walpole, might have carried it to a successful issue. Thus to brand a commander with incapacity when the occasion did not require capacity, is as unnecessary as ungenerous!

Possible  
objections to  
such a de-  
lineation.

It might be so, indeed, if the campaign, devoid of difficulty as it was, had not been productive of disaster. But the course of this history will show, that though there ought to have been no difficulties, Walpole, by his blundering and obsti-

The objec-  
tions replied  
to.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

Walpole  
marches to  
Rúiya.

April 15.

Description  
of Rúiya.

nacy, created them, and, worse than all, he, by a most unnecessary—I might justly say by a wanton—display of those qualities, sacrificed the life of one of the noblest soldiers in the British army—sent to his last home, in the prime of his splendid manhood, in the enjoyment of the devotion of his men, of the love of his friends, of the admiration and well-placed confidence of the army serving in India, the noble, the chivalrous, the high-minded Adrian Hope.

Walpole, I have said, set out from Lakhnao on the 7th April. His orders were to advance up the left bank of the Ganges, and so to penetrate into Rohilkhand. For the first week the march was uneventful. But on the morning of the 15th, after a march of nine miles, Walpole found himself in close vicinity to Rúiya, a small fort fifty-one miles west by north from Lakhnao, and ten miles east of the Ganges. The fort was enclosed by a mud wall high on its northern and eastern faces, loop-holed for musketry, and defended on those sides by a broad and deep ditch. It was provided with irregular bastions at the angles, and had two gates on the northern and eastern sides, where it was covered by a thick jungle. It belonged to a petty landowner named Nirpat Singh, a man who was a rebel as long as rebellion seemed profitable, but who had not the smallest inclination to run his head against a British force. Walpole had received information the previous day that Rúiya was occupied by rebels, and there can be no doubt that their number was, as usual, greatly exaggerated. The two or three hundred



men who followed Nirpat Singh had been increased by report to fifteen hundred.

It happened that one of the troopers of Hodson's Horse, who, taken prisoner in some previous encounter, had been confined within the fort of Rúiya, found means that morning to escape, and to penetrate into the British camp. Taken to the general, he informed him of the state of affairs within the fort, and that Nirpat Singh was prepared, after making a show of resistance, sufficient to save his honour, to evacuate it that afternoon, leaving one gate open for the British to walk in.

Walpole gave no credit to the man's story. What was worse, he would not even reconnoitre. He clung to the belief that the fort was garrisoned by fifteen hundred men, and, it would seem, he was anxious to win his spurs by driving them out of it.

He did not take the trouble to reconnoitre. The slightest examination would have shown him that whilst the northern and eastern faces were strong, covered by dense underwood and trees, the western and southern were weak and incapable of offering defence. These faces were approached by a large sheet of water, everywhere very shallow, and in many places dried into the ground, and the walls there were so low that an active man could jump over them. But, as I have said, Walpole made no reconnaissance. Without examining the fort at all, he sent his men in a blundering, haphazard manner against its strongest face!

The rebels were prepared to evacuate the fort,

Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

Information  
given by a  
trooper of the  
state of  
affairs within  
Rúiya.

Walpole dis-  
believes the  
story.

Actual state  
of the south-  
ern and  
western faces  
of Rúiya.

He attacks it.

The rebels  
resolve to  
defend it.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 15.

The attack on  
Rúiya is  
repulsed.

and they had intended to fire a few rounds and retreat. But when they saw the British general sending his infantry in skirmishing order against the face which could be defended, they changed their minds, and determined to show fight.

Two companies of the 42nd Highlanders and one hundred and twenty of the 4th Panjáb Rifles were sent, in skirmishing order and with no supports, to the front on this dangerous errand. The enemy meanwhile had not only manned the wall, but had sent skirmishers to mount the numerous trees within the fort. The fire from these men considerably annoyed the infantry as they advanced. When at length they neared the fort, they perceived the deep ditch, till then invisible, and at the same time encountered a concentrated fire from the loop-holed walls. The skirmishers still persevered, some of them even penetrated into the ditch; but their valour was useless, the enemy remained unseen, there was no breach, there were no ladders, and the hostile fire continued. Several feats of splendid valour were performed. Edward Willoughby, a young officer of the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, now attached to the 4th Panjáb Rifles, though on the sick list, had left his dooly to join in the fight. Mortally wounded by a shot in the throat, he still pressed on up to the glacis, and there dropped dead. Of the one hundred and twenty men who composed his regiment that morning, forty-six were killed and two wounded. Nor was the gallantry and devotion of the 42nd less conspicuous. Lieutenants Douglas and Bramley and fifty-five of their fol-

Gallantry of  
officers and  
men.

lowing were killed; \* and when, about 2 o'clock, as I shall presently relate, the order to retire from the scene of useless slaughter reached them, there were men amongst that following who could not resolve to leave there the bodies of the officers who had so nobly led them on. Conspicuous amongst these was the Quartermaster-sergeant of the regiment, Simpson by name. No sooner had this man heard the order to retire than he rushed back into the ditch, and brought back the body of Bramley safely in spite of the shower of musketry he encountered. He returned to do the same with Douglas, and then with seven other of his comrades. Not alone was he in this noble work. Private Davis was his able coadjutor at this point; whilst at another not remote, Lance-Corporal Thomson and Private Spence, all of the 42nd, brought back the body of the gallant Willoughby. It is a satisfaction to know that these men, Spence alone excepted, received the coveted Cross—and Spence was only excepted because he died two days later from a wound received in carrying out his gallant exploit.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 15.

Gallant  
conduct.

Before these gallant deeds had been performed, Walpole, alarmed at the consequences of his own rashness, had caused his heavy guns to open out on the wall; but as their fire seemed to make no impression, and the slaughter of the infantry continued, he ordered a retreat. This retreat was the signal for the display of the splendid devotion just recorded.

Walpole  
orders a  
retreat.

\* Two other officers of the 42nd were wounded, and Lieutenant Harington of the Artillery was killed.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 15.

Adrian Hope  
is about to  
ride up to  
Walpole,

when he is  
shot dead.

The commu-  
nication  
Adrian Hope  
was about to  
make.

Nirpat Singh  
evacuates  
Rúiya.

All this time Adrian Hope had, after vain remonstrance against the madness of the mode of attack, seen, with grief and rage with difficulty suppressed, the useless sacrifice of his gallant soldiers. At last he could bear it no longer. Before the order to retire, of which I have spoken, was given, he had made up his mind how to act. He turned his horse in the direction where he believed Walpole to be, and was about to ride up to him, when one of the skirmishers in the trees within the fort marked him and shot him dead.\*

What was Adrian Hope going to say to Walpole? It can never perhaps be accurately known, but a general belief prevailed that he was about to take from him the command. That he would have been justified in virtually superseding him cannot be doubted. The image of helplessness, whilst his soldiers were being uselessly butchered, Walpole was then no more than a lay figure. It would have been kind to treat him as a lay figure.

Adrian Hope fell. Then, the retreat having been ordered, Brigadier Hagart was directed to bring off the dead. Walpole rode back to camp. That same night the rebels evacuated the fort. Nirpat Singh kept his word. He marched out after vindicating his honour! But, thanks to Walpole, at what a cost to us!

The loss the country sustained by the deaths of Willoughby, of Douglas, of Bramley, of Har-

\* I have received these particulars from an officer present on the occasion.



ington, and of the hundred and odd men uselessly sacrificed before Rúiya was great—but the loss of Adrian Hope was a cause for national sorrow. His death was mourned on the spot by every man in the camp. Loud and deep were the invectives against the obstinate stupidity which had caused it.\* Nor, though twenty-one years have since passed away, is he yet forgotten.

Adrian Hope was indeed a man to be loved. “A gentler, braver spirit never breathed—a true soldier, a kind, courteous, noble gentleman, in word and deed; devoted to his profession, beloved by his men, adored by his friends—this indeed is a sad loss to the British army.” So wrote on the spot William Howard Russell. Nor was the testimony of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief less genuine. “No more mournful duty has fallen upon the Governor-General in the course of the present contest,” wrote Lord Canning, “than that of recording the premature death of this gallant young commander.” “The death of this most distinguished

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 15.

Mourning for  
Adrian Hope  
in the camp.

By the public  
and by the  
authorities.

\* Dr. Russell writes: “I found the officers of the 42nd and 93rd in a state of furious wrath and discontent with their general. They told me they were afraid of mutiny, or worse, when poor Hope was buried! Nirpat Singh drew off his men in the night, and when Walpole was told the next morning that the place was evacuated, he said, ‘Thank God!’”

on the principle, then, as now, in fashion, of conferring honours on men, not for the deeds they achieve, but for the high positions they occupy, that the general who lost more than one hundred men and Adrian Hope, in failing to take this petty fort, was made a K.C.B.

Though he failed to take the fort, he was yet a divisional commander!

It is a curious commentary



Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 22.

Walpole  
expels the  
rebels from  
Sirsa,

and gallant officer," wrote Sir Colin Campbell, "causes the deepest grief to the Commander-in-Chief. Still young in years, he had risen to high command; and by his undaunted courage, combined as it was with extreme kindness and charm of manner, had secured the confidence of the brigade in no ordinary degree."

Walpole pushed on the following day, and on the 22nd reached the village of Sirsa, forty miles beyond the fatal fort. Sirsa is a strong village on the right bank of the Rám-ganga, not far from Álaganj, the place occupied by the rebels who had so long annoyed Seaton. And, in fact, they were the same rebels, who had now crossed the river. The experience he had gained at Rúiya had made Walpole careful of his infantry. This time he brought his artillery to bear on the village in front, whilst he sent his cavalry to turn their flank. The manœuvre was so far successful that the enemy were driven out of the village, leaving their four guns behind them, and forced to cross the river in such disorder that they did not destroy the bridge which spanned it. But no proper arrangements had been made for following up the victory, and the great bulk of the rebels escaped.

but the bulk  
of them  
escape.

The Com-  
mander-in-  
Chief joins.

Five days later, 27th April, Walpole was joined by the Commander-in-Chief on the Rohilkhand side of Fathgarh. The force then marched on Shahjahánpúr, which the enemy had evacuated. It then pushed on without opposition to Miranpúr Katra, where it united with the troops lately commanded by Penny, on the 3rd May.

I proceed now to trace the course of the Rúrki column, commanded by Brigadier-General Jones of the 60th Rifles.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.

April.

A brigade  
formed at  
Rúrki.

Sir Colin Campbell had, in the first instance, decided that the force forming at Rúrki to march thence across Rohilkhand to Baréli should be merely a brigade force, and he had appointed Colonel John Coke, commanding the 1st Panjáb Infantry, to lead it.

Colonel Coke was one of the best known and most distinguished officers of the Panjáb Frontier Force. To a thorough knowledge of his profession he added an acquaintance with the natives of India not to be surpassed, and a rare power of bending them to his will. He had seen much service. He had been with Sir Charles Napier in Upper Sind, with Gough at Chilianwála and Gújrat, with Gilbert in pursuit of the Sikhs. After the conclusion of the second Sikh war, he served continuously, up to the outbreak of the mutiny, on the frontier. There his name became a household word. Scarcely an expedition was undertaken against the wild border tribes but Coke bore a part in it. Twice was he wounded; but his unflinching demeanour, his power of leadership, whilst it gained the supreme confidence of his men, extorted respect and admiration from his enemies. Wherever he might be, his presence was a power.

Colonel Coke.

His previous  
service.

Summoned to Dehlí early in August, Coke brought to the part assigned him in the siege all the qualities which had made his name on the

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

The troops  
composing  
his brigade.

frontier. He was always prominent in the fight, always daring and self-reliant.\*

The force into the command of which he suddenly fell was such as might well have inspired

\* I may be pardoned if I relate here one special act, amongst many, which illustrated his conduct at this period. On the 12th August Coke received instructions from Brigadier Showers to turn out the European picket at the Metcalfe stables, and taking the men composing it with him, to proceed through the Metcalfe gardens and attack the guns which had been firing on the picket the preceding day. No information was given him as to the locality of the guns; but having been quartered at Dehli before the outbreak, Coke imagined that he would find them in the vicinity of Ludlow Castle. He directed, then, the officer commanding the picket to extend the men on his right, and to follow the direction he should take. At the same time he ordered Lieutenant Lumsden, commanding his own regiment, to skirmish through the gardens on his left—the direction in which he expected to find the enemy in force. He then rode through the gardens towards Ludlow Castle. On reaching the boundary wall of the gardens on the main road leading to the city, he found that an embrasure had

been made in the wall of the garden. At the same moment he saw the enemy's guns—two 9-pounder brass guns—in the road with horses attached, but no one with them, the enemy having apparently taken refuge in Ludlow Castle when driven out of the Metcalfe gardens by Lumsden. The horses' heads were turned towards the city. An alarm—a stray bullet—a discharge close to them—might start them off at any moment. Quick as lightning the idea flashed into Coke's brain that if he could but turn the horses' heads towards the camp, it would little signify how soon the horses might be alarmed: they would, of themselves, capture the guns for the British. On the instant he alighted from his horse, got down through the embrasure into the road, ran to the horses of the leading gun, and turned them up the road towards cantonments. Whilst doing this he was shot in the thigh by the enemy in Ludlow Castle, but the guns were captured. He had done his self-allotted task, and reaped his only reward in the admiration of all who witnessed his splendid audacity.



him with the hope of gaining distinction as an independent commander. It was composed of a troop of the 9th Lancers, of Cureton's Múltáni Cavalry, of a wing of the 60th Rifles, of the 1st Panjáb Infantry, of the 1st Sikhs, and of the 17th Panjáb Infantry. The artillery portion of it was formed of Austin's light field battery and two 18-pounders.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.  
—  
1858.  
April.

Coke had arrived at Rúrki on the 22nd February, but April was approaching, before, with the assistance of Baird Smith, who was then at that station, he had been able to complete his commissariat arrangements. The country, in fact, had been so thoroughly exhausted that but little carriage was procurable. In this dilemma Coke's practical knowledge and fertility of resource came into play. He had read how, in the olden days of Indian warfare, the Brinjáris—dealers who carry their grain on pack cattle—had made themselves eminently serviceable. Calling to mind, then, that at the actual season these men were accustomed to pasture their cattle in the Terai, he sent thither, found them, and made such arrangements with their head men as enabled him to conquer a difficulty which many another man would have found insurmountable.

Scarcity of carriage.

His practical knowledge causes the deficiency to be supplied,

The carriage had been supplied, all the arrangements for the march of the force had been completed, the force was about to march, when Coke was suddenly superseded. It had seemed good to Sir Colin Campbell to make the command of the field force a divisional command. The other wing of the 60th Rifles was accordingly

Brigadier-General Jones supersedes him.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

The real  
command of  
the force

is still with  
Coke.

The force  
crosses the  
Ganges at  
Hardwár.

The position  
and hopes of  
the rebels.

added to it, and with that wing came Colonel John Jones, with the rank of Brigadier-General, to command the whole. Coke acted as brigadier and second in command under Jones.

In reality the change was only in name. General Jones was a very brave man, but he was unwieldy in body, and incapable of very great activity. But he had no jealousy, and he was gifted with rare common sense. He saw at a glance that Coke was the man for the work, and he was content to leave it in his hands. In the campaign that followed, then, and of which he reaped all the credit, he never once interfered with Coke's arrangements. That officer continued to be supreme—in all but name.

General Jones—nicknamed at the time, from his habit of denouncing vengeance against the rebels, "The Avenger"—joined the force early in April. On the 17th of that month he opened the campaign by crossing, unopposed, the Ganges at Hardwár.

The rebel troops were occupying the thick forest on the left bank of the river in considerable force. They were aware that the British force would be compelled to march through this forest, and, as it was traversed in many places by deep canals, they hoped to find opportunities for attacking them at advantage.

Jones had learned from Coke the general position of the enemy, and he had authorised that officer, as brigadier commanding the advance, to make the necessary arrangements for forcing it. When, then, he had crossed the Ganges,

Coke pushed on rapidly with the advance in the direction of the town of Nágál, near which it was known the enemy's main force was located. But he had marched only four miles when he fell in with a considerable body of rebels posted in a thick jungle, and their front covered by a canal, at a place called Bhogniwála. They had six guns, which at once opened on the British. But Austin, bringing up his field battery, promptly replied to them, whilst the infantry, in skirmishing order, steadily advanced. When they reached the canal, the water in which was nearly dry, they had a fair view of the rebels. At that moment Lieutenant Gosling, commanding a troop of the Múltáni Horse, let loose his men, and forced them back. This was the decisive moment. Coke, bringing the bulk of Cureton's regiment (the Múltáni Horse) and Austin's battery well to the front, charged the rebels whenever they attempted to form. The retreat soon, then, became a rout, the rebels abandoning their camp equipage and guns, casting away their arms, and even throwing off their clothes to facilitate escape. The Múltánis followed them for some miles, cutting up a large number of them, and capturing four guns. On this occasion Lieutenant Gosling killed eight men with his revolver. The loss of the victors was small, amounting to one man killed and sixteen wounded. That of the conquered was considerable.\*

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

Coke pushes  
on  
and finds the  
rebels at  
Bhogniwála.

He com-  
pletely  
defeats them.

\* That it was very great saying of the natives, "that may be inferred from the the spirits of the dead

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 18.

Brilliant feat  
of arms by a  
native officer.

The following morning a very brilliant and very daring feat of arms was accomplished, under the inspiration of Cureton, by a native officer of the Múltáni Horse, Jamadár Imám Bakhsh Khán. Conceiving that the rebels defeated on the previous day might have taken refuge in the thick jungle to the north of Najibábád, Cureton despatched the Jamadár mentioned and forty troopers to patrol in that direction. The Jamadár, in carrying out this duty, received information from villagers that a rebel Nawáb with five hundred followers was in occupation of a fort called Khót, a few miles distant. With happy audacity, Imám Bakhsh Khán proceeded at once to the fort, and summoned the garrison to surrender. He so imposed on them by his bearing and threats that they yielded unconditionally. Imám Bakhsh disarmed and dismissed the garrison, made prisoner of the Nawáb, and then returned to camp to report his brilliant exploit.\*

The force  
pushes on to  
Naghína.

That day, the 18th, Jones pushed on first to Najibábád, and, finding that place abandoned, to the fort of Fathgarh, also deserted by the enemy. In these two places he captured eight guns besides ammunition and grain. On the 21st, having in the interval been joined by four heavy guns and a squadron of the Carabineers, he

still haunt the scene, and that their groans may be heard in the night."—*Vide Cornhill Magazine* for January 1863, article "Indian Cos-sacks," containing a spirited

account of this little campaign by an actor in it.

\* He received the third class of the Order of Merit—an insufficient acknowledgment of such a deed.

marched to Naghína, where, he had been informed, the rebels, numbering ten thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, with fifteen guns, had taken up a strong position.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 21.

The position was strong. Its front was covered by the canal, guarded by ten of their guns; a bridge on the left was protected by a battery of five guns, whilst a tope of trees protected the right.

Position of  
the rebels  
near  
Naghína.

The British force marched directly on to the canal. Whilst the guns on the right attacked the enemy's battery on the bridge, the 60th Rifles and the 1st Panjáb Infantry, with the Múltáni's on their left, crossed the canal and formed up to the right—the 1st Sikhs, under Gordon, clearing, meanwhile, its banks. By the time the canal had been cleared, the force which had crossed it had gained a position completely turning the enemy's right. The order was then given to charge. Never was a charge more successful. The rebels, panic-stricken, made no attempt to defend their guns, but fled in wild confusion. On this day Cureton rendered splendid service with his Múltánis. He pursued the enemy for five miles, and notwithstanding the resistance of despair which he and his followers encountered, he did not rest until he had slain their chiefs and captured their elephants and guns. It was a greater glory for him to rescue an unfortunate English telegraph signaller, who, previously taken prisoner by the rebels, had been brought into the field that he might witness the defeat of his countrymen!

They are  
completely  
defeated.

Gallantry of  
Cureton.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 21.

Cureton  
defeats the  
remnant that  
had escaped.

Cureton rescued this man at great personal danger to himself.\*

But the toil of the day was not yet over. On returning from the slaughter of the chiefs with his two hundred mounted followers, Cureton descried approaching the main body of the defeated enemy, a compact force of eight hundred infantry five hundred cavalry, and some guns. The presence with him of the captured elephants of the Nawábs made it probable, he thought, that the rebels would regard the Múltánis as a party of their own friends. Cureton accordingly drew up into a grove by the roadside to await their approach. On they come, and the grove containing their supposed friends is almost reached. "Still not a sound issues from the trees, not a greeting strikes the ear, not a signal meets the eye. Suddenly a clear English voice rings out the word 'Charge!' and in an instant the Múltánis are in the midst of the panic-stricken foe. Taken by surprise, daunted by the fury of the onset, the rebels do not resist long, but flee in all directions, leaving upwards of one hundred dead on the ground, and a green standard and several guns as trophies."†

\* "Indian Cossacks." —  
*Vide supra.*

† The *Cornhill Magazine*,  
January 1863, Art. "Indian  
Cossacks." The author of  
this article, who is believed  
to be a distinguished officer  
of the British army, thus pro-  
ceeds: "With this feat of  
arms end the gallant deeds

of Cureton and his Múltánis  
in the action of Naghína.  
They may well be proud of  
that day; for to defeat cavalry  
and artillery, then infantry,  
then again cavalry, artillery,  
and infantry combined, in  
the latter case contending  
against enormous odds, were  
exploits of which even a

In the combat of Naghína the British loss was small in comparison with that of the rebels. The army had to regret, however, the death of Lieutenant Gosling, a gallant and meritorious officer, who fell in the final charge of which I have spoken. Where all so distinguished themselves it is difficult to single out any officer for special notice, but I cannot omit to record that the cavalry leading of Cureton\* was talked of in camp at the time, and has been handed down to the new generation as a most brilliant example of the combination of skill, daring, readiness of resource, and practical ability.

Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 21.

Death of  
Lieutenant  
Gosling.

How Cure-  
ton's feat of  
arms was  
regarded.

Amongst the volunteers present whose gallantry was marked was a young student of the Rúrki Civil Engineer College named Hanna. The desperate gallantry of this gentleman, who accompanied Cureton, procured him two serious wounds. It was then believed that he was a young officer, nor was it till after the fight was over that his real calling was discovered. Thanks to the strong recommendation of Cureton and his own intrepid spirit, Mr. Hanna obtained an unattached commission in the Indian army.

Mr. Hanna.

The victory was decisive. Thenceforward the progress of the column was not seriously opposed. Bijnor was reoccupied without opposition. Jones did not delay there, but pushed on rapidly to Morádábád.

The force  
reaches  
Morádábád.

veteran corps might boast. that day in its second ac-  
How much more, then, a tion!"  
young regiment only three \* Now Lieutenant-General  
months raised, and engaged Cureton, C.B.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV

1858.  
April 21.

State of  
affairs in  
Morádábád.

The loyalty  
of the inha-  
bitants is

shown by the  
expulsion of  
Prince Firoz  
Shah.

April 26.

Coke captures  
several rebel  
chiefs.

The course of affairs at this station had not impressed the inhabitants with the advantage of the native rule of Khán Bahádur Khán,\* and they had heard with anxious and beating hearts of the progress of the columns of the Avenger. The pent-up longings of their hearts had been confirmed and strengthened by the loyal attitude of a neighbouring native chieftain, the Nawáb of Rámpór, who had from the first exerted himself to maintain the authority of the British. As Jones advanced nearer and nearer these feelings displayed themselves in action. It happened on the 21st April, Firoz Shah, a prince of the royal house of Dehlí, who had cast in his lot with the Rohilkhand revolt, marched upon Morádábád, and demanded money and supplies. The townspeople refused, whereupon the prince, after some negotiation, endeavoured to take them by force. But the townspeople still holding out, the news of the approach of the avenging column forced Firoz Shah to beat an ignominious retreat. But the following day he returned secretly into the native part of the town.

Jones arrived in the vicinity of Morádábád on the 26th April. His camp was there joined by Mr. Inglis, C.S., a gentleman thoroughly acquainted with the characters and doings of the rebel chiefs then figuring in Rohilkhand. Inglis informed Brigadier Coke that many prominent leaders of the revolt were at the moment in hiding in the city of Morádábád, and that it would not



be impossible, by the exercise of daring and prudence, to seize them. These two qualities shone conspicuously in the character of Coke. He at once made arrangements to effect the capture of these men. Placing the Múltáni cavalry to guard the outlets of the city, he entered with his infantry and proceeded to the houses indicated to him. The task was difficult and dangerous, but it resulted in success. Twenty-one notorious ringleaders of the revolt were actually taken. Others were slain defending themselves. In this affair Lieutenant Angelo greatly distinguished himself. Bursting open the door of one of the houses, he seized a prominent rebel leader and one of his sons. Whilst engaged in this work he was fired at from one of the upper rooms of the house. He at once rushed upstairs, forced the door of the room whence the firing had proceeded, and found himself face to face with seven armed men. Nothing daunted, he shot three of them with his revolver, and kept the remainder at bay with his sword till reinforced from below. Firoz Shah, unhappily, escaped.

A few days later Jones again started to take part in the operations which the Commander-in-Chief was directing against Baréli, and to which I must now return.

I have already stated that the Commander-in-Chief, with the force from Fathgarh joined to that of Walpole, had reached Shahjahánpúr on the 30th April, and had found it evacuated. It was not so much the evacuation of this important place as the escape of the rebel army

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 26.

The force  
moves on  
Baréli.

The rebels  
evacuate  
Shahjahán-  
púr.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April 30.

The consequent failure, to a great degree, of the plan of the campaign.

Sir Colin moves on Baréí.

State of affairs in Baréí.

which had held it, commanded by the notorious Moulvi, accompanied, it was believed, by Náná Sáhib\* and his followers, in the direction of Oudh, which caused vexation to Sir Colin. It was a proof that, notwithstanding his great efforts, the campaign had failed in one important particular. Though he had planned that four armies, starting from different points, should converge on Baréí and Shahjahánpúr, enclosing the rebels on four sides, their most formidable enemy had managed to break through the meshes, and to break through them, too, on the side for which he and Walpole were mainly responsible! However, there was no help for it. The Rohilkhand rebels were still in Baréí. They, at all events, he was resolved, should not escape him.

Leaving at Shahjahánpúr five hundred men of the 82nd under Colonel Hales, De Kantzow's Irregular Horse, and four guns, Sir Colin pushed on, picked up Penny's column—commanded by Jones of the Carabineers—at Miránpúr Kutra on the 3rd May, and on the 4th arrived at Faridpúr, a day's march from Baréí.

Khán Bahádur Khán was still holding sway in the capital of Rohilkhand. The exact amount of his force cannot be stated with certainty. Spies had rated it at thirty thousand infantry, six thousand horse, and forty guns, but it certainly did not reach anything like that number. The

\* Before evacuating Shahjahánpúr, Náná Sáhib is said to have caused all the official buildings to be destroyed, in

order that the Europeans, on their arrival, might find no shelter.

feeling that animated leader and men was the reverse of sanguine, for they knew that the town was threatened on both sides. Nevertheless there were amongst them a certain number of fanatics (Gházis) who were resolved to sell their lives dearly, neither to give nor to accept quarter.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 4.

Barélí itself did not offer a strong defensible position. The town consisted of a main street, about two miles long, having occasionally narrow offshoots on both sides. Outside these streets were large suburbs formed of detached houses, walled gardens, and enclosures; outside these again were wide plains intersected by nullahs. One of these, called the Nattia Naddi, covered the town on the south side. Its banks were steep, and, if well protected, it was capable of presenting an obstacle to an advancing enemy. But it was bridged, and the bridges had not been broken.

Defensive  
position of  
Barélí.

Khán Bahádur Khán heard on the 5th of the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief at Faridpúr. He was likewise aware that Jones was advancing from Morádábád. There was yet a way of escape open to him—the way he subsequently followed—in the direction of Pílíbhít. But the hot Rohilla blood of the descendant of Háfiz Rahmat forbade him to flee without striking a blow for his cause. He determined to meet the British force in the open plain outside the town.

Khán Bahá-  
dur Khán  
resolves to  
look Sir  
Colin in the  
face.

On the evening of the 4th May he took up his position. Crossing the Nattia Naddi, he placed his guns on some rising ground—sand-hills—which commanded the line by which the British

He takes up  
a position.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 4.

Composition  
of Sir Colin's  
force.

must advance, covered by his first line of infantry, whilst he guarded both his flanks with his cavalry. His second line occupied the old cantonments nearer to the town.

To force this position Sir Colin Campbell had under his orders a very considerable force. He had two brigades of cavalry,\* the first commanded by Brigadier Jones, 6th Dragoon Guards, the second by Brigadier Hagart, 7th Hussars; Tombs's and Remmington's troops of horse artillery, Hammond's light field battery; two heavy field batteries under Francis; and the siege-train with Le Mesurier's company and Cookworthy's detachment, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Brind; some sappers and miners under Colonel Harness; the Highland brigade under Leith Hay, consisting of the 93rd, 42nd, 79th, 4th Panjáb Rifles, and the Bilúch battalion; Brigadier Stisted's brigade, consisting of seven companies 64th Foot, 78th Highlanders, four companies 82nd, 2nd Panjáb Infantry, 22nd Panjáb Infantry.

Sir Colin  
marches on  
Baréí;

Very early on the morning of the 5th Sir Colin broke up from Farídpúr and marched on Baréí. As he approached the place the vedettes reported the presence of the enemy. It was 6 o'clock. Sir Colin halted his troops and formed them in two lines. In the first line he placed the High-

\* The first cavalry brigade was composed of two squadrons 6th Dragoon Guards and Lind's Múltáni Horse; the second, 9th Lancers, 2nd Panjáb Cavalry, detachments Lahór Light Horse, 1st Panjáb Cavalry, 5th Panjáb Cavalry, and 15th Irregular Cavalry.



land regiments, supported by the 4th Panjáb Rifles and the Bilúch battalion, with a heavy field battery in the centre, and horse artillery and cavalry on both flanks. The second line, consisting of the remainder of his force, he disposed to protect the baggage and siege-train. The numerous cavalry displayed by the enemy seemed, in the opinion of Sir Colin, to render this precaution necessary.

It was striking 7 o'clock just as these dispositions were completed. Sir Colin then moved forward. He had not marched a hundred yards, however, before the enemy's guns opened upon him. But the British force advanced with so much steadiness and precision that the rebels promptly abandoned their first line, and made no attempt to defend the stream. Their infantry fell back on the old cantonments, covered by their cavalry and horse artillery, both of which occasionally made as though they would charge the British line. Nothing came of it, however. The British force still continued to press on, capturing as they reached the rivulet the guns which the rebels had failed to remove.

The rivulet, not defended, offered but a slight obstacle to the advance of the British army. Whilst the left of their first line held the bridge, the right crossed it. The first line then advanced about three-quarters of a mile towards the town. The heavy guns were then rapidly passed over in succession, and were placed in a position to rake the enemy's second line. The troops then halted

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 5.

forms up his  
troops in  
order of  
battle.

The rebels  
fall back  
before him.

Sir Colin  
crosses the  
Nattia rivu-  
let,

and takes up  
a fresh posi-  
tion.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 5.

The rebels  
make a  
counter  
attack.

to allow time for the siege-train and baggage to close up.

Whilst the troops formed up, thus halted, the 4th Panjáb Rifles in some old cavalry lines on the left, the enemy made a desperate effort to change the fortunes of the day.

In my description of the troops led by Khán Bahádur Khán I stated that there were amongst them a certain number who were resolved to sell their lives dearly, and neither to give nor accept quarter. I alluded to the Gházis, men who believed that the taking the life of an infidel opened to the slayer the gate of Paradise, and who were thus impelled by the most self-appealing of all motives to court, sword in hand and desperation in every act, the death which was to give them a glorious immortality.

The on-  
slaught of  
the Gházis.

The line, formed up, was halting, when a considerable body of these fanatics, "fine fellows, grizzly-bearded elderly men for the most part, with green turbans and kammarbands, every one of them wearing a silver signet-ring, a long text of the Koran engraved on it," \* rushed out from the right, and dashed at the village held by the 4th Panjábis. "They came on," wrote the eye-witness I have already quoted, "with their heads down below their shields, their talwars flashing as they waved them over their heads, shouting 'Dín, Dín!'" † dashed at the village, swept the surprised Sikhs out of it with the impulse and force of their rush, and then hurled themselves

\* W. H. Russell.

† Faith, Religion.

against the 42nd Highlanders, who were moving to the support and to cover the re-formation of the Panjábis. Fortunately Sir Colin happened to be close to the 42nd. He had just time to call out "Stand firm, 42nd; bayonet them as they come on!" The 42nd did stand firm. The Gházis could make no impression upon their serried ranks. They killed some of them indeed; and they acted up to their professions. Not one of them went back. Killing, wounding, or failing to kill or to wound, every man of them who had flung himself against the Highland wall was bayoneted where he had fought.

Book XII.  
Chapter JV.  
-----  
1858  
May 5.

But a portion of them had swept past the 42nd and had dashed to the rear, where were Cameron commanding that regiment, and, a little further back, Walpole, of Rúiya renown. Three of the Gházis dashed at Cameron, pulled him off his horse, and were about to despatch him, when Colour-Sergeant Gardner of the 42nd dashed out of the ranks and bayoneted two of them, whilst a private shot the third.\* Walpole narrowly escaped death from a similar cause, and was delivered by men of the same regiment.

Danger of  
Cameron,

and of  
Walpole.

This attack repulsed, the 42nd, supported by the 4th Sikhs and a part of the 79th, advanced, sweeping through the empty lines and pushing forward for about a mile and a half into the old cantonments. The heat was intense; the men had suffered greatly from the heat, from thirst, and even from sunstroke, that Sir Colin thought

The British  
troops  
advance,

when Sir  
Colin sud-  
denly halts  
them.

\* Gardner received the Victoria Cross. I regret to be unable to record here the name of the private.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 5.

The rebels  
attack the  
baggage, but  
are repulsed.

Sir Colin  
orders the  
baggage  
guards to  
close up.

Fresh  
encounter  
with the  
Gházis.

it advisable to sound the halt for the day, even at the risk of leaving a door of escape to the enemy—for Barélí had not been entered.

Another reason weighed to a certain extent with him in arriving at this conclusion. During the attack of the Gházis the enemy's cavalry, skilfully handled, had galloped round the British left, with a view to plunder the baggage. The amount of alarm, confusion, and panic created by this movement amongst the drivers and camp-followers is not to be described. A few rounds from Tombs's guns, and a threatened counter-attack from the Carabineers and the Múltáni Horse, soon dispersed the enemy. But Sir Colin deemed it nevertheless desirable that the *impedimenta* should close up with the main force. Directing, then, a portion of the 79th and 93rd to seize all the suburbs in their front, he placed the troops as far as possible in the shade, and halted for the day.

The attack thus made on the suburbs led to fresh encounters with the Gházis. One company of the 93rd—led by Lieutenant Cooper, whose gallant bearing at the Sikandar Bágh was the theme of admiring comment\*—sent on this duty, arrived at a spot near the suburbs where some artillery guns under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind were posted. Brind pointed out to Cooper the position which he believed the Gházis were occupying. That officer, carefully noting the place, posted his men in some ruined houses and under cover of

\* Vide page 183.



some walls to the left and left front of it. The guns then opened fire. After a few rounds the buildings occupied by the Gházis caught fire. The Gházis rushed out. Some five or six made a dash at Cooper. Two of these he shot dead, a third he killed after a brisk pursuit; with a fourth he then engaged in a sword fight, when the Gházi was shot dead by a private. The others were disposed of by the men.

The halt ordered by Sir Colin, desirable as it was for the health of the troops, was, in a military point of view, fatal. It gave Khán Bahádur Khán a chance which he eagerly seized. No sooner had the shades of darkness fallen than the wily Rohilla quietly withdrew the bulk of his trained forces from the town and stole away to Pílibhít, thirty-three miles north-east of Baréli, leaving only a rabble to maintain a show of resistance.

When, then, the following morning, the guns of Sir Colin Campbell began to play upon the city, they met with no reply. The sound of artillery fire was indeed heard on the opposite side, but that fire proceeded from the guns of Brigadier General Jones.

I left that officer marching from Morádábád towards Baréli to attack that city on the side opposite to that by which Sir Colin Campbell had approached. The march was one long-continued skirmish. At Núrgarj, twenty-one miles from Baréli, the Múltáni cavalry and Pathán horse again did admirable service, completely defeating the rebels, and capturing several guns. As ne

Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 5.

The halt enables Bahádur Khán to withdraw.

and the city is virtually evacuated.

May 6.

General Jones closes in on the other side.



Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 6.

Coke presses  
on with the  
advance,

and effects a  
junction with  
Sir Colin.

approached with the advance of the force to Baréli, Coke could obtain no tidings of Sir Colin or his movements; but whilst waiting for information, some Hindú retail dealers announced to him that the rebels had deserted their guns placed at the entrance to the city. With a combined caution and daring adapted to the circumstances, Coke determined to proceed himself, and, should the story prove true, to take possession of the guns. He took with him a detachment of the Pathán cavalry. But he had hardly come within sight of the guns, barely within range, when the falsehood of the traders' tale became apparent—for the guns at once opened fire on his party. Fortunately the rebels were unable to control their impatience, or the consequences might have been disastrous. As it happened, one trooper only was killed. Coke at once sent back for the heavy guns and the infantry; then, placing a company of the 60th Rifles in a walled garden commanding the entrance to the city, ordered the guns to open fire. Ten minutes later the enemy's guns were silenced. Coke then led the Panjáb infantry regiments into the city and penetrated as far as the great mosque. Cureton's cavalry had meanwhile been sent to operate outside with the double view to cut off the rebels from their line of retreat to the north and to open out communication with Sir Colin. The action of the cavalry outside speedily made itself felt within the city, for the rebels, fearing for their line of retreat, evacuated the place with so much haste, that when Coke proceeded to make arrangements to

force his way further, he discovered that none were required, as the city had been deserted. The next day, the 7th May, a junction was effected with Sir Colin.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 7.

The town had indeed been conquered, but the bulk of the rebel army had escaped. This was the second occasion in this short Rohilkhand campaign in which the rebel leaders had outmanœuvred the British commander: on the first, the Moulvi had doubled back from Shahjahánpúr into Oudh; on the second, Khán Bahádur Khán had succeeded in escaping to a point not far from the Nipál frontier, along which it would not be difficult to penetrate into the same kingdom.

The second time the rebels had eluded Sir Colin.

But the Moulvi was influenced by motives nobler than those indicated by a mere avoidance of his powerful enemies. With the prescience of a capable general he had counted on the probability that Baréli would offer to the British army a certain resistance; and he had resolved to avail himself of the opportunity thus offered to make a raid upon Shahjahánpúr and overpower the small garrison which he hoped would be left there.

Skilful strategy of the Moulvi.

Sir Colin Campbell had left in Shahjahánpúr a wing of the 82nd, a detachment of artillery with two 24-pounders and two 9-pounders, and De Kantzow's Irregular Horse—the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hale, C.B., of the 82nd. The habitable houses in Shahjahánpúr having been unroofed by order of Náná Sáhib, Hale had pitched his camp in a tope of trees near the jail, indicated to him by Sir Colin

Force left in Shahjahánpúr under Colonel Hale.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 2.

The Moulvi  
resolves to  
surprise  
Hale's force.

His plan is  
ruined by a  
halt on the  
road.

Hale is in-  
formed of his  
approach.

as the place to be held should he be attacked. The enclosure round this building he at once proceeded to make defensible, placing in it his guns and as large a stock of provisions as he could procure. Working with great zeal and energy, Hale completed his preparations in one day—the day on which the Commander-in-Chief left him to proceed to Barélí—the 2nd May.

Meanwhile the Moulvi and his army had reached Mohamdi. There he found, eager to join him in any attack on the British, the Rájá of that place, and one Mián Sáhib, one of the old Lakhnao chiefs, each at the head of a considerable body of armed men, most of them mounted. Their plans were quickly formed. Learning that the bulk of the British force would leave Shahjahán-púr for Barélí on the morning of the 2nd, they resolved to attempt to surprise the place and cut up the detachment left to guard it the following morning.

They marched that day and part of the night of the 2nd to carry out this resolve. But again an excellent plan was spoiled by inefficient execution. Had the Moulvi pushed on he would have reached the town in the dead of night, and it is possible that he might have reaped all the advantage of a complete surprise. But, when within four miles of the place, he halted to rest his men. The halt was fatal to his complete success. Native spies employed by the British were on the alert, and one of these flew with the intelligence of his dangerous vicinity to Colonel Hale.

Hale acted at once with the prudence which



the circumstances required. He had been ordered to remain on the defensive. Instantly, then, he moved his stores and camp equipage into the jail, covering the transfer with four companies of the 82nd. He then went forward with De Kantzow's Horse to reconnoitre. The sudden apparition of vast bodies of cavalry, numbering about eight thousand, covering the plain, proved the truth of the spy's story. De Kantzow,\* truly one of the heroes of the mutiny, always ready for action, always cool and resolute, was for a charge to check their advance. Hale, mindful of his orders, would not permit it, but falling back, brought all his men within the jail enclosure, thence to bid defiance to the enemy.

Meanwhile the Moulvi and his allies, pressing on, speedily mastered the undefended town, seized the old fort, and then imposed a money requisition upon the wealthier inhabitants. In acting thus he simply conformed to the customs of war as practised in Europe. Simultaneously he placed his guns, eight in number, in position against the jail. From this day, the 3rd, till the morning of the 11th, he bombarded the British position incessantly, without, however, producing any other effect upon Hale and his comrades than an increasing resolve to hold out until assistance should arrive.

Intelligence of the state of things at Shahjahánpúr first reached Sir Colin Campbell on the 7th. On that very day he had become master of Baréli, and had effected a junction with the Rúrki

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 3.

He recon-  
noitres,

and then  
falls back on  
the jail.

The Moulvi  
occupies and  
plunders the  
town.

Sir Colin  
learns of the  
state of  
affairs at  
Shahjahán-  
púr.

\* *Vide* vol. i. pages 157-9, and page 500 of this volume.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 7-11.

He orders  
Jones to  
march on  
Shahjahán-  
púr.

Composition  
of Jones's  
force.

He advances  
on Shahja-  
hánpúr,

column under Jones. The news was like a message from heaven. Fortune gave him a chance to repair the error by which the Moulvi had been allowed to escape him on his march, and this time he was determined that there should be no mistake. He at once sent for Brigadier John Jones, and directed him to march the following morning with a brigade, the nature and composition of which he indicated, to Shahjahánpúr, there to deal with the Moulvi. He gave him further discretionary power to pursue his success, and, should he think it advisable, to attack Mohamdi.

The troops composing the brigade ordered on this duty were the 60th Rifles, the 79th Highlanders, a wing of the 82nd, the 22nd Panjáb Infantry, two squadrons of Carabineers, the Múltáni Horse, with some heavy guns and some horse artillery. With this little force Jones marched on the morning of the 8th. Shortly after sunrise on the 11th he reached a point close to Shahjahánpúr, where the road branches out to the city and cantonments. Immediately afterwards the advance guard reported the presence of the enemy. Jones at once drew up his men, the heavy guns in the centre, and then moved forward. He soon came in sight of the enemy, huge masses of horsemen, formed up, and ready, apparently, to dispute the further progress of the British. A few shots from the heavy guns checked them, and, the Highlanders and Rifles pushing on in front whilst the horse artillery guns opened on their flanks, their hesitation developed into retreat, and, very soon after, by a continuance of the same tactics, retreat

into flight. They still held the old fort, the bridge of boats over the river, the stone bridge over the Kánárat Naddi, the houses in the town, all loop-holed, and the position was in all respects formidable. But Jones was too quick for them. Pushing forward his skirmishers and horse artillery, he drove the enemy to the banks of the river opposite to the entrance to the city, and by a heavy and continuous fire forced them to abandon the idea they had attempted to put into execution of destroying the bridge of boats, and drove them within the city. Bringing up then his heavy guns and mortars, he compelled them to abandon, one after the other, the old fort, the stone bridge, and other commanding positions. He had now only the town to deal with. Made aware, by the reports which reached him, that all the houses in the main street had been loop-holed, and that the enemy counted upon his forcing an entrance through that street, Jones resolved to baffle them by avoiding the route indicated, and by taking the road which led through the eastern suburb. He met with no opposition as he traversed the suburbs, but no sooner did he emerge into a plain near the new schoolhouse, than he discovered a body of rebel cavalry. He at once attacked them, drove them back, and then quickened their movements by a few rounds of shrapnel. The Carabineers, who came up in the nick of time, were at once sent in pursuit. At first the rebels seemed inclined to measure swords with that gallant regiment, but second thoughts came to their aid, and they fled, leaving

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 11.

and presses  
back the  
enemy.

Jones  
traverses the  
suburbs

and drives the  
rebels before  
him.

Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 11-14.

He effects a  
junction with  
Hale,

and waits for  
reinforce-  
ments.

Reinforce-  
ments, too,  
flock to the  
Moulvi.

a gun and ammunition waggon in the hands of their pursuers. Jones halted for a quarter of an hour in the open space I have mentioned, to allow his men to form up, and then pushed on by the church and across the parade ground to the jail, still held by the gallant Hale and his comrades. But there commenced the difficulties of the relieving force. The main body of the enemy was here found assembled. Their advanced positions—leading through the main street, and which could only have been forced at great risk and with enormous loss—had been turned by the skilful manœuvre of Jones. But in this open plain, where the masses of their cavalry could act freely, they were too strong to be attacked with any hope of success. Jones, therefore, was forced to maintain himself on the defensive until reinforcements should reach him from Baréli. To wait for these he established himself in a strong position, flanked on one side by the jail.

So passed the 11th. The 12th, 13th, and 14th were spent in preparations for the encounter looming in a very near future, Jones engaged in increasing his means of resistance, the Moulvi in welcoming fresh allies. And, indeed, those allies poured in with an alarming celerity. It was not alone the rabble escaped from previous fights, the discontented landmen, the freebooters by profession, who flocked to his standard. There came, likewise, one after another, the Bégam of Oudh, the prince Firóz Shah, and although Náná Sáhib did not himself appear, he sent a body of his followers, whose presence gave colour to the rumour



that he too was not afraid to meet in fair fight the countrymen of those whom he had murdered. Rumour lied. Náná Sáhib loved his life too well to risk it in a battle with the English.

By the evening of the 14th all these reinforcements had poured into the Moulvi's camp. On the 15th he struck his great blow. He attacked Jones with his whole force. But the troops led by Jones were men unaccustomed to show their backs to a foe. Charged and charged again, they repelled every assault. Jones's deficiency in cavalry would not permit him to retaliate, to carry the war into the enemy's camp. But at least they gained no ground from him. His men clung, then, with all the stubbornness of their natures, to the positions which they had been ordered to defend; and when evening fell, and the baffled enemy ceased their attack, they could boast that they had not lost so much as an inch. They could make the same boast when, three days later, the Commander-in-Chief appeared in person on the scene. To him I must now return.

When Sir Colin Campbell had despatched Jones to Shahjahánpúr on the 8th, he imagined that he had certainly disposed of the Moulvi and had cleared the country as far as Mohamdi in Oudh. Regarding, then, the Rohilkhand campaign as virtually settled, he began at once to distribute his forces. He nominated General Walpole as divisional commander of the troops in Rohilkhand. Some regiments were ordered to remain at Barélí itself; some to proceed to Lakhnao; one or two to march to Míráth. A column, consisting of a

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 14-15.

The Moulvi  
attacks  
Jones.

Sir Colin, on  
detaching  
Jones to  
Shahjahán-  
púr, distri-  
butes his  
forces,



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 15-18.

wing of the 42nd Highlanders, the 4th Panjáb Rifles, the 1st Sikh Infantry, a portion of the 24th Panjáb Infantry, a squadron of the Carabineers, a detachment of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, and a considerable force of artillery, with three weeks' supplies for the Europeans and four weeks' for the natives, was directed on the 12th to proceed, under the command of Brigadier Coke, towards Pílibhít, the line of retreat taken by Khán Bahádur Khán.

and sets out  
for Fathgarh.

Having made these arrangements, Sir Colin deemed that he might safely return himself to some central station on the great line of communication, whence he could more easily direct the general campaign. Taking with him, then, his headquarter staff, the 64th Foot, two troops of the 9th Lancers, the Bilúch Battalion, Tombs's troop of horse, and Le Mesurier's company of foot, artillery, he started from Baréli in the direction of Fathgarh on the 15th.

Hearing, on  
the march, of  
Jones's posi-  
tion, he turns  
towards  
Shahjahán-  
púr.

On the 16th, at Faridpúr, he received Jones's message. Sir Colin at once sent to Baréli for the remainder of the 9th Lancers, and the next day moved cautiously forward to Tilhar. That evening he received information that the Moulvi, whilst still pressing Shahjahánpúr, had withdrawn the bulk of his troops in the direction of Mohamdi, the entire length of the road to which he commanded.

He effects a  
junction with  
Jones.

The next morning, the 18th, Sir Colin marched towards Shahjahánpúr. As he approached the place, a strong force of the enemy's cavalry, calculated to number fifteen hundred men, with

five guns, threatened to attack him. But it was little more than a demonstration, and Sir Colin, passing the ground on which he had previously encamped, made a partial circuit of the city to the bridge of boats. Crossing this, unopposed, he traversed the city, and effected a junction with Brigadier General Jones.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 18.

But even then the British force was too weak in cavalry to encounter the enemy with any hope of a decisive result—a result, that is to say, fraught not only with defeat but with an annihilating pursuit. The truth of this presumption was fully shown that very day. Sir Colin had no intention whatever to engage the enemy. It happened, however, that a reconnoitring party of horse was fired on by the enemy from four guns posted in a fortified village called Panhat; the sound of the guns brought out the masses of the enemy's cavalry; and these again attracted to the field the Commander-in-Chief and his whole force. The battle then partially engaged. The 82nd, pushed forward, occupied the village of Panhat, on the right front. They were followed by the horse artillery, and a field battery, and part of the 9th Lancers and the Irregulars. The 79th then took possession of a grove of trees in the centre of the position, near a small rising ground, on which were posted a couple of heavy guns; whilst a heavy field battery, supported by a wing of the Rifles, with parties of the Carabineers and Bilúchis, covered the left flank. It was a strong defensive position, on which the enemy could make no impression. In the artillery and cavalry

His cavalry  
skirmish  
with the  
rebels,

which brings  
on an action,

which, for  
want of  
cavalry, is  
indecisive.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May 18-24.

Sir Colin  
sends for  
Coke's  
brigade.

He then  
marches to  
attack the  
rebels,

who fall back  
into Oudh.

Close of the  
summer cam-  
paign.

skirmish which followed, the rebels displayed more than ordinary skill and courage, and although in the end they gave ground, no attempt was made to pursue them.

Sir Colin, in fact, was quite satisfied with the repulse of the enemy. He preferred to defer a decisive battle till he should have more troops, especially more cavalry. He sent off, then, a despatch to Brigadier Coke, directing him to bring down his brigade with all possible speed.

Coke at once turned back, and joined the Commander-in-Chief on the 22nd. On the 24th the whole force marched to attack the enemy. But again the Moulvi baffled him. Whilst his light cavalry did their utmost to hinder the British advance on Mohamdi, retiring the moment the pursuers halted to discharge their guns, the Moulvi and his allies evacuated that place, after destroying the defences. They had similarly treated Katchiáni, the mud fort which had previously given shelter to European fugitives. The expulsion of the rebels from Rohilkhand was the one result of the campaign.

How they were followed up and hunted down in Oudh I shall tell in another chapter. The occurrences in Rajpútáná, long neglected, demand immediate attention. It will suffice here to state that on the expulsion of the Moulvi from Rohilkhand, the Rohilkhand and Rúrki field forces were broken up, the regiments of which they were composed being detailed for other duties. The Commander-in-Chief himself, and the headquarter staff, resumed his journey to Fathgarh; Brigadier



Seaton, relieved by Colonel M'Causland in his command at that place, was appointed to Shahjahánpúr, having under him the 60th Rifles, the 82nd, the 22nd Panjáb Infantry, the Múltáni Horse, two squadrons of the Carabineers, and some artillery. Coke turned with his force to Moradábád, to act as Brigadier commanding the district; the 64th went to Miráth; the 9th Lancers to Ambála; the 79th to Fathgarh. The army was broken up. In south-eastern India, Oudh alone remained to be thoroughly subjugated.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
May.

But I cannot leave the scene of so many combats without recording events which, either from their historical interest, or from the deep personal sympathy they excited, demand special notice. The first of these, not in date, not in importance, not in the sympathy it excited, but in the connection which it bears to the contents of this chapter, is the death of the Moulvi of Faizábád. The Moulvi was a very remarkable man. Sir Thomas Seaton, who had many opportunities for arriving at a just opinion, has described him as “a man of great abilities, of undaunted courage, of stern determination, and by far the best soldier among the rebels.” It has been surmised, and with great reason, that before the mutiny occurred the Moulvi was travelling through India on a roving commission, to excite the minds of his compatriots to the step then contemplated by the master-spirits of the plot. This at least is known: that such a commission was undertaken; that the Moulvi travelled to the parts of India which subsequently proved most susceptible to

The Moulvi.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV

1858.  
May.

the revolt; that he was the confidential friend and adviser of a very prominent member of the deposed royal family of Lakhnao. If, as I believe, the mutiny was really caused not less by the annexation of Oudh than by the sudden and treacherous manner in which that annexation was carried into effect—that the greased cartridges were simply a means used by the higher conspirators to force to revolt men who could be moved only by violence to their faith—the story of the action of the Moulvi only seems natural. Certain it is that in April 1857 he circulated seditious papers throughout Oudh; that the police did not arrest him; and that to obtain that end armed force was required. He was then tried and condemned to death. But before the sentence could be executed, Oudh broke into revolt, and, like many a political criminal in Europe, he stepped at once from the floor of a dungeon to the footsteps of a throne. He became the confidential friend and adviser of the Bégam of Lakhnao, the trusted leader of the rebels.

His appearance and ability as a leader.

In person the Moulvi was tall, lean, and muscular, with large deep-set eyes, beetle brows, a high aquiline nose, and lantern jaws. Of his capacity as a military leader many proofs were given during the revolt, but none more decisive than those recorded in this chapter. No other man could boast that he had twice foiled Sir Colin Campbell in the field!

His death follows immediately the close of the summer campaign.

His death he owed, strange to say, not to his enemies, but to his *quondam* allies. After his retreat from Mohamdi, determined to use every

means in his power to hinder the complete success of the British, the Moulvi started off, armed with the authority and money of the Bégam, for Powáin, a town on the frontiers of Oudh and Rohilkhand, thirteen miles north-east of Shahjáhpúr. The Rájá of this place was supposed to possess a certain amount of influence, and it was the Moulvi's object to induce him and others to join in a new league against the British.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
June.

The Moulvi started for Powáin, with a small following, on the 5th June, having previously sent forward a messenger to make known his wishes to the Rájá. The Rájá, Jaggarnáth Singh by name, was a fat unwieldy man, not given to martial feats, desirous to sit at home at ease, and particularly anxious to avoid giving offence to the British in the hour of their triumph. He, however, consented to grant the Moulvi a conference. Upon this the Moulvi pushed on to Powáin.

The manner  
of it.

On reaching that place he found, to his surprise, that the gates were closed, the walls manned, and the Rájá, his brother, and his armed retainers, were lining the ramparts which overlooked the gateway. Amid these unpromising appearances the conference began. But the Moulvi soon satisfied himself that unless he could overawe the Rájá his eloquence would be wasted. To overawe him, then, he made the driver of the elephant upon which he was mounted urge the animal forward to burst open the gate. The elephant advanced, and applied his head with such force to the barrier, that in a second or two it must inevitably have yielded. In this crisis the Rájá's brother, inspired

The Moulvi  
attempts to  
force an  
entrance  
into Powáin.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
June.

and is shot  
dead.

His head is  
exposed.

Tribute due  
to the Moulvi.

by the urgency of the occasion, seized a gun and shot the Moulvi dead. His followers at once turned and fled. The Rájá and his brother then and there cut off the Moulvi's head, and, wrapping it in a cloth, drove to Shahjahánpúr, thirteen miles distant. Arrived at the magistrate's house, they entered, and found that official and his friends at dinner. They immediately produced the bundle, and rolled the bloody head at the feet of the Englishmen. The day following it was exposed to view in a conspicuous part of the town, "for the information and encouragement of all concerned."\*

Thus died the Moulvi Ahmad Úlla of Faizábád. If a patriot is a man who plots and fights for the independence, wrongfully destroyed, of his native country, then most certainly the Moulvi was a true patriot. He had not stained his sword by assassination, he had connived at no murders: he had fought manfully, honourably, and stubbornly in the field against the strangers who had seized his country, and his memory is entitled to the respect of the brave and the true-hearted of all nations.

Naturally enough, the British Government rejoiced to be rid of a formidable enemy. But another death, occurring a few weeks earlier, caused an outburst of the deepest sorrow in the heart of every Englishman serving in India—throughout the homes and the hearths of England. The reader who has accompanied me so far will

\* The Government paid thousand pounds for killing the Rájá a reward of five the Moulvi.



have marked with pride and pleasure the record of the splendid achievements of the Naval Brigade under its gallant and accomplished leader, William Peel; they will remember that on the 9th March, when seeking a suitable place for the posting of some guns to breach the outer wall of the Martinière, William Peel was shot in the thigh by a musket-ball. The ball, however, was extracted, and the progress to convalescence after the extraction, if slow, was solid and hopeful.

Book XII.  
Chapter IV.  
—  
1858.  
April.  
William Peel

With the capture of Lakhnao the work of the Naval Brigade was regarded as completed. On the 1st April, then, the sailors struck their tents, and started for Kánhpúr on their way to Calcutta. Great preparations were made to receive them in that city. The Government had decided to notify their sense of their splendid services by giving them a public reception, and the Calcutta people, for once in accord with the Government, were resolved that the reception should yield, in heartiness, in sincerity, and in splendour, to none by which a body of public men had ever been greeted in their palatial city. No one foresaw that the daring leader, for whom the greatest ovation was reserved, would be called to his last home too soon to witness the admiration of his non-combatant countrymen.

Reception  
designed for  
him and his  
brigade in  
Calcutta.

One gratification, indeed, had been reserved for William Peel. On the 2nd March he had received the mark of the approval of his Gracious Sovereign, intimated by his nomination to be an Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, and by the bestowal of the Knight Commandership of the Bath. They

Honours  
awarded to  
William Peel  
by the Crown.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

He is attacked  
by small-pox,  
and dies.

Universal  
grief at his  
death.

General order  
issued on the  
occasion by  
Lord Canning.

were fit honours for his noble service, rewards of the nature he would prize the most, as constituting spontaneous testimony from his Sovereign of the efforts he had made to suppress the rebellion, the possible mischief of which, if unchecked, no one had recognised more clearly than had the First Lady in the Realm.\*

William Peel reached Kánhpúr in safety. Though still weak, he was still slowly gaining strength, when, on the 20th April, he was attacked by confluent small-pox. His frame had been too much weakened to bear the shock. On the 27th he succumbed to the disease.

In him England lost one of the worthiest, of the noblest of her sons. How thoroughly he had impressed his spirit on the men whom he led may be gathered from the journal of one of them. "I cannot say," wrote Lieutenant Verney, on the 30th April, "what a sad loss we all feel this to be, and how deeply his death is felt and regretted by every officer and man; the mainspring that worked the machinery is gone. We never felt ourselves to be the *Shannon's* Naval Brigade, or even the *Admiralty* Naval Brigade, but always *Peel's* Naval Brigade." But the grief was not confined to the gallant men who had followed him. It was overpowering; it was universal; it was realised that England had lost a king of men.

The Government were not slow in giving expression to the universal feeling. On the 30th April Lord Canning issued a general order, in

\* Life of the Prince Consort, vol. iv. chapter 78.

which, after notifying the sad fact and recapitulating his services, he thus eloquently recorded his sense of the extent of the catastrophe, of the greatness of the man:—"The loss of his daring but thoughtful courage, joined with eminent abilities, is a heavy one to this country; but it is not more to be deplored than the loss of that influence which his earnest character, admirable temper, and gentle kindly bearing exercised on all within his reach—an influence which was exerted unceasingly for the public good, and of which the Governor-General believes it may with truth be said, that there is not a man of any rank or profession who, having been associated with Sir William Peel in these times of anxiety and danger, has not felt and acknowledged it."

Book XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

The memory of his great name and his great deeds still survives. In the Eden Gardens of Calcutta a statue in white marble recalls to the citizens, by whom those gardens are nightly thronged, the form and fashion of him who was indeed the noblest volunteer of this or any age, who was successful because he was really great, and who, dying early, left a reputation without spot, the best inheritance he could bequeath to his countrymen.\*

Marble  
statue of him  
in Calcutta.

I have already recorded the death of Venables. Venables.  
This gentleman, an indigo-planter, had, by his un-

\* The death of William Peel was a double misfortune to the officers of the *Shannon* brigade. He had been very sparing of praise in his despatches. It had been his intention personally to press the claims of the officers whom he knew to be deserving. His premature death frustrated this idea.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

flinching daring, saved the district of Ázamgarh in June 1857, when its natural guardians had withdrawn from it. Subsequently he had struggled bravely against the invaders from Oudh, and had ridden with Franks, as a volunteer, in his glorious march from the eastern frontier of Oudh to Lakhnao. Withdrawing thence to Allahábád, “broken in health and spirits, anxious for rest, looking forward eagerly to his return to England,”\* he was

\* Letter from Lord Canning to the Committee of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, assembled in June 1858, to devise a fitting monument to Mr. Venables. The letter ran thus:—“It will be a satisfaction to me to join in this good work, not only on account of the admiration which I feel for the high qualities which Mr. Venables devoted to the public service, his intrepidity in the field, his energy and calm temper in upholding the civil authority, and his thoroughly just appreciation of the people and circumstances with which he had to deal, but also, and especially, on account of circumstances attending the last service which Mr. Venables rendered to his country. After the capture of Lucknow, where he was attached to Brigadier-General Franks’s column, Mr. Venables came to Allahabad. He was broken in health and spirits, anxious for rest, and looking forward

eagerly to his return to England, for which his preparations were made. At that time the appearance of affairs near Azimghar was threatening; and I asked Mr. Venables to forego his departure from India, and return to that district, with which he was intimately acquainted, there to assist in preserving order until danger should have passed away. He at once consented cheerfully; and that consent cost him his life. I am certain that the Court of Directors, who are fully informed of all particulars of Mr. Venables’ great services and untimely death, will be eager to mark, in such manner as shall seem best to them, their appreciation of the character of this brave, self-denying English gentleman; and I am truly glad to have an opportunity of joining with his fellow-countrymen in India in testifying the sincere respect which I feel for his memory.”

persuaded by the Governor-General to return to Ázamgarh, once again seriously threatened. The reader will recollect how useful were the services he then rendered to the gallant Lord Mark Kerr. Nor were those subsequently given to Sir E. Lugard less remarkable. It was in the performance of "these great services," inspired by the highest sense of duty, that, on the 15th April, he was struck down. The wound was mortal. "A few days afterwards," wrote in eloquent language some years ago an able and conscientious historian,\* "death, resulting from the wound, cut short the sufferings and belied the hopes of this 'brave, self-denying English gentleman,' one among many such who in those days of sharp trial proved their right to be held in equal honour with the best rewarded officers of the East India Company and the Crown."

BOOK XII.  
Chapter IV.

1858.  
April.

The noble  
service he  
rendered to  
his country.

\* Trotter's *History of the British Empire in India*.



## BOOK XII.

## CHAPTER V.

Rajpútáná.

I HAVE brought the history of events in Rajpútáná up to the end of June 1857, and have shown how the foresight and energy of General G. St. P. Lawrence, had till then baffled all the efforts of the mutinous soldiers who had been sent to support British authority in that extensive country.

Continues  
tranquil.

The tranquillity restored in June continued throughout July. General Lawrence maintained his headquarters at Ájmir, but he moved thence occasionally, as his military and political duties required, to Biáór and Nasirábád. To show ~~his~~ confidence in the Mairs, he would have no other guard but a native officer's party of the Mairwára battalion, and it is only fair to those loyal men to add that the events which followed, many of them peculiarly trying, fully justified that confidence.

It was a considerable evidence of the satisfaction felt by the princes and people of Rajpútáná with the mild but effective suzerainty of the British that they showed no sympathy with the revolted sepoy. The exactions of Amír Khán and the grinding tyranny of the Maráthás were not so remote but that the recollection of them could be entirely forgotten. The forty succeeding years of peace and prosperity, of protection against outer enemies, had been a proof of the advantage of the British connection, too practical to allow the existence of a wish that the connection should be severed. They felt keenly, that whatever might be the result of such severance, even were it to be effected, it would not be to their advantage; and they knew from the experience of the past that complete success in the field of military hordes was the certain prelude to unbridled license, to a condition of rule without law.

These sentiments of the people were fully displayed on more than one occasion during the months that followed the outbreaks at Nimach and Nasírábád. The air was infected with panic; the movement of a corporal's guard was magnified into a great military demonstration: rumours, slight in their origin, were multiplied by every mouth that repeated them, until the resemblance to the original disappeared altogether. In this state of affairs the merchants, the bankers, the trading community in the great centres of Rajpútáná, terrified by the reports, would send away their families for security, and then come to "their father," the Governor-General's agent, for

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
July.

Effect on the  
princes and  
people of the  
mild sway of  
the British.

The confi-  
dence  
bestowed by  
them in  
General  
Lawrence.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
July-August.  
General  
Lawrence's  
demeanour.

advice and protection. In every instance General Lawrence succeeded in calming their fears, and in inducing them to recall their families. His own example tended not a little to inspire them with confidence. When at Ajmir he never once allowed the routine of civil duties to be interrupted, but held open court, almost daily visiting the city, where, in spite of the fierce and sullen looks of the disaffected, he was always regarded with respect. Treating the people with a generous confidence, General Lawrence was nevertheless stern, even severe towards all wrongdoers, and never once relaxed the reins of strict and efficient discipline.

The dis-  
affected few.

I have spoken of "the fierce and sullen looks of the disaffected." In all great cities, in all large countries, there must be some who hate restriction. The criminal class, the men who having nothing would live by other means than by labour, answer to this description. But above all, in the circumstances of 1857, were the soldiery. Throughout this period there was, there could not help being, a considerable amount of sympathy between the native soldiers of the Company and the native soldiers of the indigenous princes. They were of the same caste and the same class; they often came from the same recruiting-ground. The causes which impelled the British sepoys to mutiny could not fail to influence greatly their comrades in other services. These were the men whose looks were fierce and sullen, these the classes from whom danger was to be apprehended.

An émeute in  
the Ajmir

From these classes the danger came. On the

9th August an outbreak took place in the Ajmir jail, and fifty prisoners escaped—an outbreak of the criminal class. But General Lawrence was prompt. He sent out a detachment of the mounted police, previously warned by him to be in readiness, to pursue them, and rode after them himself. The fugitives were cut up or captured. It was a sign of the good feeling of the respectable classes, that when he set out on this pursuit, many leading Mahomedans of the city volunteered to accompany him.

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.

Aug. 9-10.

jail is suppressed.

On the day following, one of the other classes referred to—the military class—showed its teeth. One of the regiments accompanying the force for which Lawrence had made a requisition on Dísá, and which had reached Nasírábád on the 12th June, was the 12th Bombay Native Infantry. A trooper of the 1st Bombay Lancers, suddenly mounting his charger, had galloped in front of the lines of his regiment, endeavouring by cries and threats to induce his comrades to mutiny. The Bombay Lancers, however, were staunch, and some of them mounted their horses to pursue the rebel, whereupon, discharging his carbine at one of them, a native officer, he fled to the lines of the 12th, where he was received and sheltered. Meanwhile the Brigadier, Henry Macan, had come on to the parade ground. He at once ordered the men of the 12th to turn out. Only forty obeyed. Upon this the Brigadier called out the guns, and bringing up a company of the 83rd, proceeded to the lines of the 12th. The original mutineer, the trooper of the 1st Cavalry, fired at him but missed.

Slight outbreak at Nasírábád

is easily suppressed by Brigadier Macan.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
Aug. 10-12.

The rebel himself was then shot by an artillery officer. The men of the 12th were paraded, and all who had disobeyed the order to turn out were disarmed. Their muskets were found loaded. The ringleaders were then tried by court-martial, five were hanged and three sentenced to imprisonment for life. Twenty-five had previously deserted. To the remainder their arms, on their expression of contrition, were restored, and they behaved well in the field ever afterwards.

A similar  
occurrence at  
Nimach

A similar feeling displayed itself about the same time at another station. I have already stated\* that after the revolt of the native troops at Ní-mach, General Lawrence, having no other soldiers at his disposal, had caused that place to be occupied by detachments from Méwa, Kotá, and Búndí. Subsequently, placing little trust in these men, he had ordered up a force composed of one squadron of the 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry, one hundred men of the 83rd, and two hundred of the 12th Bombay Native Infantry to relieve them. But some of the relievers were as bad as the relieved. About the 12th August some disaffected men of the 2nd Light Cavalry and the 12th Native Infantry endeavoured to promote a disturbance. But Colonel Jackson, the commanding officer, acted with great promptitude. Before the mutiny had actually declared itself, he brought up the 83rd, and seized the ringleaders. Some of these were arrested, eight escaped, one man of the 83rd was killed, an officer and two men were wounded, but the mutiny was nipped in the bud.

is success-  
fully met by  
Colonel  
Jackson.

\* Vol. i. page 256.

But the mutinous feeling had been too widely spread over the province to be checked by one or two failures, nor had the officers at the out-stations at hand the same means of repression as those possessed by the commandants at Nímach and Nasirábád.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
August.

The station of Mount Ábú, in the native state of Sirohí, was the summer residence of the Governor-General's agent, and generally of the wives and families of the officers serving under him. There, at this time, were congregated the wife and two daughters of General Lawrence, and the wives and families of many officers serving in the field. In the European barracks were likewise thirty convalescent soldiers of the 83rd. To protect the station was a detachment of sixty to seventy men of the Jodhpúr legion—whose headquarters were at Írinpúrah—under the command of Captain Hall.

Mount A'bú,  
the summer  
residence in  
Rajpútáná.

The Jodhpúr legion consisted of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The artillery—two 9-pounders—was drawn by camels and manned from the infantry. The cavalry consisted of three troops, each having two native officers, eight non-commissioned officers, seventy-two troopers, and a trumpeter. The infantry was formed of eight companies of Hindústánis, each having two native officers, twelve non-commissioned officers, and eighty privates; and three companies of Bhíls, each counting seventy men besides native officers. The legion, especially the cavalry portion of it, had a good reputation for efficiency.

Composition  
of the Jodh-  
púr legion.

On the 19th August a company of the infantry

A company  
and a troop

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V

1857.

Aug. 19-21.  
of the legion  
meet at  
Anádra.

portion of the legion, which had been sent with the view of holding in check a rebel chief in the neighbourhood, arrived at a place called Anádra, two miles from the foot of the mountain pass leading to Ábú. A troop of cavalry of the same legion had arrived there a few days previously, and had been distributed in small parties in the different villages to protect the road from Dísa to Ábú.

Captain Hall  
inspects  
them and  
finds them  
cheery.

The following afternoon Captain Hall arrived at Anádra to give orders for the occupation by the detachment of certain villages. The sepoy and their baggage had been soaked by heavy rain, but the men seemed cheery and well-disposed. Having given the necessary orders, he returned to Ábú. But on his way he met a havildár belonging to the detachment at that place, who, in reply to his question, said that he was going to see his newly arrived friends. This was true so far as it went: but the havildár deemed it unnecessary to add—what nevertheless was proved from subsequent inquiry to be the fact—that “he had been deputed to manage the attack which was to come off the following morning.”\*

The men at  
Anádra  
mutiny,  
climb the hill,  
and fire into  
the barracks.

The morning of the 21st was thick and hazy, and the people residing at Ábú, under the influence of murky atmosphere, kept their beds late. Not so the men of the Jodhpúr legion at Anádra. They rose very early, climbed the hill, and, under the cover of the dense fog, crept unseen to the door of the barracks, in which lay,

\* Prichard's *Mutinies in Rajpútáná*.



buried in sleep, the thirty sick and invalid British soldiers. The native assassins then peeped through the window and saw their intended victims sleeping. Then raising their muskets, they poked the muzzles through the windows—and fired.

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
Aug. 21.

They aimed too high! The British soldiers starting from sleep at that sound, unwonted at Ábú, divine the cause, seize their muskets, and begin to load. But then another volley is poured in, harmless as its predecessor. By this time their muskets are loaded, they rush out, they reply. The result is “singular but satisfactory; one mutineer fell—the rest ran away.”

Complete  
failure of the  
mutineers.

While the main body were thus engaged at the barracks, another party of mutineers had crept round to Captain Hall's house, to dispose, if possible, of a man whom they knew to be capable and resolute, and whose influence they dreaded. Arrived in front of the house, they became aware that Captain Hall was asleep. They at once extended in line in front of it, and by word of command fired a volley within. Again was the result futile. Hall, awakened by the noise, managed to escape by a back door with his family into the schoolhouse, which had been fortified as a place of refuge. Leaving his family there, he took with him a small guard of four men of the 83rd, and, charging the assailants, drove them off. He was speedily joined by the remaining men of the 83rd, and the mutineers were driven from the hill. The state of the weather rendered pursuit impossible.

They fail also  
to kill Cap-  
tain Hall,



Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
Aug. 21-22.

but wound  
Mr. Lawrence.

The muti-  
neers set out  
for Irin-  
púrah.

The Jodhpúr  
legion muti-  
nies at that  
place.

Trying  
position of  
Lieutenant  
Conolly.

He appeals to  
the Bhíls,

Only one European was wounded, and that was Mr. Alexander Lawrence, son of the General. Hearing the firing, he had started for Captain Hall's house, when the sepoy's noted and shot him—in the thigh. The wound was severe, but he recovered.

The mutineers, baffled first by their own clumsiness, and secondly by the spirit of the men they had tried to murder, made at once for the headquarters of the regiment—the station of Irinpúrah. The only Europeans at this station at the time were the adjutant, Lieutenant Conolly, two sergeants and their families. Early on the morning of the 22nd, a letter from one of the baffled mutineers was brought to Conolly by his orderly, Makdún Bakhsh by name. This letter, addressed to the men at headquarters, called upon them to revolt and join their comrades “who had been to Ábú, fought with the Europeans, and taken all precautions.” Conolly immediately mounted his horse and rode down to the parade ground. A glance showed him that the spirit of mutiny had infected the troops. The gunners were running to their guns, shouting to Conolly, as they ran, to keep off. Conolly then determined to appeal to the Bhíls, who had no sympathies of caste, of kindred, or even of a common origin, with the men of the other branches of the légion. But to reach the Bhíls he was forced to pass the lines of the cavalry. These, too, he saw were mutinying, and though he stopped to order them to turn out under arms, but not to stir from their lines, his orders were not attended to. At last he reached

the Bhils. He found them loyal and ready to obey him, except so far as to march against the loaded guns and muskets of their more numerous comrades. As a last resource, Conolly rode back to make an appeal to the infantry. He found them mad with excitement, and refusing to hear a word. He then tried the gunners. But, as he neared the guns, the men shouted to him to keep off; as he persisted in advancing, they wheeled their guns round, and pointed the muzzles at him, holding the portfires ready. Conolly then turned his horse's head, and changing his direction, rode again at the guns, taking them in flank. Upon this several troopers rode at him, between him and the guns, and pointing their carbines at him, exclaimed, "Go back, or we will fire." Conolly then called out with a loud voice that those on his side should join him. A few troopers rode over.

Meanwhile the sepoy had begun the work of plunder. The two English sergeants with their wives and families, two men, two women, and five children, unable to stem the tide, had abandoned their houses, and were seeking refuge in vain flight. Conolly sent for them to join him in the cavalry lines. They came. "Here, then," writes the chronicler of the story of the mutinies in Rajpootáná,\* "the little band of English men and

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
Aug. 22.

then to the  
infantry,

then to the  
gunners,

and falls with  
all.

The small  
English  
colony is in  
great straits;

\* Lieutenant Itudus Thomas Prichard, of the 15th Regiment Native Infantry, a soldier and a scholar of no mean capacity. The mutiny of his regiment disgusted Mr. Prichard with military service. He left the army

after 1858, and devoted himself to literature, in which he played, in India, a conspicuous and honourable part. His work on the mutiny is styled *The Mutinies in Rajpootáná: a Personal Narrative*.

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
Aug. 22.

women were collected, utterly helpless, surrounded by blood-thirsty villains, every instant plunging deeper and deeper into their career of crime, from which there was no drawing back, and becoming more and more intoxicated with the unbridled indulgence of their passion for plunder, lust, and rapine."

soon to  
become still  
greater,

It was indeed a terrible and a trying position. It was soon to become worse. Gradually the men who had responded to Conolly's call began to show a disposition to desert him. There were a few noble and loyal spirits, however, who in this dark hour dared to show that they preferred honour to life. A rasaldár,\* Ábbás Áli by name, came forward, and taking off his turban in a solemn manner before the more infuriated of the rebels, declared to them that before they should offer violence to the English, they would have to pass over his body. His example was followed by another native officer, Ábdúl Áli. The orderly, too, Makdún Bakhsh, exerted himself to save his officer. Ultimately forty-five troopers swore to stand by Conolly or to die in his defence.

when a slight  
reaction  
occurs.

The "loyal"  
rebels are  
willing to  
spare Conolly  
and the  
children,

but not the  
sergeants and  
their wives.

With a strange inconsistency, however, they would not ride off with Conolly and the sergeants and sergeants' families: they would not allow them to depart alone. They offered to allow Conolly to ride away, and to take charge of the children—but as for the parents, it was impossible, they said, to save them. With a spirit becoming a British officer, Conolly under those circumstances

A native cavalry officer—a squadron commander.

declined to leave. He resolved to save his comrades with himself, or to share their fate.

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

Meanwhile the rebels had brought their guns to bear upon the cavalry lines. To prevent the escape of the Europeans and the loyal troopers, they then insisted that all the cavalry horses should be picketed close to the guns, and that the Europeans, now their captives, should be sent to occupy a small tent on the parade ground, carefully guarded.

1857.  
Aug. 22.  
The crisis  
continues.

So that long night passed. The next morning the Anádra mutineers, fresh from their baffled attempt on Ábú, marched into the station with a swagger scarcely consistent with their actual performances. However much minded they may have been to avenge their defeat on the prisoners, they were unable to do so without a fight with their own brethren. For the faithful "forty-five" still kept jealous guard. They contented themselves, then, with an outpouring of abuse.

The Anádra  
mutineers  
arrive.  
Aug. 23.

The ways of the mutineers throughout the mutiny were inscrutable. They were so specially on this occasion. We have seen that on the day of the revolt of Írinpúrah, the revoltors were willing to allow Conolly to go, but not the sergeants and their wives. On the evening of the second day they came to a resolution to permit the two sergeants, their wives and children, to depart, but to retain Conolly. In consequence of this resolve, the sergeants and their families were sent away. The mutineers then marched from the station in the direction of Ájmír, taking

The rebels  
dismiss the  
sergeants and  
their families,  
and carry  
away Conolly.



Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.

Aug. 23-24.

The rebels  
allow Conolly  
to depart.

The "loyal"  
rebels offer  
to submit on  
promise of  
a pardon,

which the  
political  
agent has no  
power to  
grant.

Conolly with them, a prisoner, mounted but carefully guarded.

Conolly had given up all hope of life. But never was he in outward appearance more cheery. He has left in a letter to a friend a vivid account of the occurrences of that and the following day. On the third day he was allowed to depart, and he rode into Írinpúrah, followed by three faithful troopers.\* The rasaldár who had first proved his loyalty, then wrote to Captain Monck-Mason, the political agent at Jodhpúr, offering to desert with a large body of the cavalry, and the guns, provided he and his comrades should be pardoned and reinstated in the service of the Government.

It may be convenient to state here that Monck-Mason was anxious to accept the offer, but his hands were tied by the order of Government, which prohibited all officers from making terms with rebels while they had arms in their hands. Monck-Mason therefore replied that though he was precluded by recent orders from accepting the terms offered, yet that if Ábbás Áli would act as a faithful soldier and servant of the British Government, and weaken the cause of the rebels by deserting in the manner he proposed, there was no doubt but that his case would be leniently dealt with by the Government, and he would probably receive an unconditional pardon and a suitable reward. Ábbás Áli, regarding this reply as a refusal, became an active leader of the rebel force. The results were serious to the British

cause, and especially serious to Captain Monck-Mason himself.

The rebels, after dismissing Conolly, pushed on towards Ájmir with the intention of taking it. Their line of march lay through the Jodhpúr country. To stop them, and, if possible, to annihilate them, the Rájá, acting in conformity with the advice of Monck-Mason, despatched his own army, commanded by his favourite officer, a very daring and a very gallant man, who had given several instances of his courage—Anár Singh—to Páli, a place on the high road to his capital. To aid Anár Singh with his counsels, a British officer, Lieutenant Heathcote, was, by order of General Lawrence, despatched from the Rájputáná field force, of which he was Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General. The Jodhpúr troops intrenched themselves at Páli.

Meanwhile the rebels, advancing towards that place, had arrived at Áwah. The Thákur or baron of this stronghold was in rebellion against his liege lord, the Rájá of Jodhpúr. The Thákur, a man of a long and proud lineage, of great repute throughout the country, was unwilling to enter into any bond of alliance with men whom he regarded as the revolted hirelings of the European. But revenge is sweet. And he, probably the second man in importance in Márwár, believed that his wrongs cried out for vengeance. A rebel against his Rájá, he was likewise to that extent a rebel against the British suzerain of that Rájá. Before, however, he would consent to the terms which the rebel sepoys, in their anxiety to gain

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.

August.

The Rájá of  
Jodhpúr  
sends an  
army against  
the rebels.

The Thákur  
of Áwah

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.

Aug.-Sept.

makes offers  
of submission  
to Monck-  
Mason,

him, pressed upon him with urgency, he despatched a messenger to the British agent, Monck-Mason, to tell him that if the British Government would accord him certain conditions, which he named, he would return to his allegiance, would keep the gates of his fort closed against the mutineers, and, if co-operated with either by a British force or by the troops of the Rájá, would open fire upon their camp, which was within gunshot of his walls.

which that  
officer has no  
power to  
accept.

Again was Monck-Mason tempted. Sound policy would have induced him to accept the Thákur's offer. The conditions named were of no great practical importance, relating as they did more to sentimental than to real grievances. But his hands were tied. He had no authority to treat with rebels still in arms. He had no authority at all to treat with this Thákur, whose first complaint lay against the Rájá. He was obliged to send a reply to this effect by the messenger; to inform him in addition that the Thákur's quarrel was with his own Rájá, and that the Rájá had frequently expressed his determination to hold no communication with him unless he should confess his error, throw himself upon his mercy, and pay up his arrears of revenue. The result of this reply was that the Thákur and the ~~rebel~~ sepoy came to terms, and together marched towards Páli.

He therefore  
coalesces  
with the  
rebels.

The rebels  
march on  
Páli.

They marched towards Páli; but when they saw the intrenched position of the Jodhpúr troops, they did not care to attack it. The delay which ensued, trying as it was to men situated as were

the Jodhpúr troops, might have been endured but for the evil effect it was sure to produce on the native courts and the native troops of Rajpútáná. These could not understand the utility of a Torres Vedras. Royal troops who would not advance were half beaten. The moment was especially full of anxiety for the officer responsible for the security of this important part of India, and General Lawrence was justified in the desire he expressed to the Rájá that some more active measures should be taken by his troops than those involved "in dancing attendance on the rebels, like orderlies."

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
September.

Considera-  
which moved  
the Jodhpúr  
troops not to  
remain quiet.

But before General Lawrence's letter reached Jodhpúr, the commander of the royal troops, Anár Singh, had left his strong position and encamped in close proximity to the rebels. Here, on the early morning of September 8th, his camp was surprised by the enemy, his men gave way, and though he, with a few, a very few, kindred spirits, fought bravely to the last, giving their lives for their Rájá, he could not redeem the day. His camp, his guns, his military stores, fell into the hands of the rebels. Heathcote, after using every effort to induce the men to stand, had mounted his horse and galloped from the field.

The rebels  
attack and  
defeat the  
Jodhpúr  
troops.

General Lawrence was at Ájmir when the events I have recorded occurred. From the 21st to the 26th August he received no intelligence from Ábú, but on the 22nd a letter had reached him from Conolly at Írinpúrah, telling him of the anticipations he entertained of an outbreak at that

General  
Lawrence



BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
September.

assembles a  
small force to  
coerce the  
rebels.

The rebels  
fall back on  
A'wah.

General  
Lawrence  
arrives before  
A'wah.

station. Five days later he received the bare outline of the mutinies at both stations.

We have seen that the European forces at the disposal of Lawrence were all required for the maintenance of order at the great military centres in Rajpútáná, and that few, if any, could really be spared for service in the field. No one can wonder, then, at the anxiety expressed by the Governor-General's agent for the prompt and energetic action on the part of the Jodhpúr troops. But, after the defeat of those troops at Páli, Lawrence considering, and rightly considering, that the effect on the country would be very injurious if the course of the rebels were not promptly checked, assembled as soon as possible a small force at Bíáor for the purpose of co-operating with the Jodhpúr troops. This force was composed of one hundred and fifty men, of the 83rd, a portion of the Mairwára battalion, the 1st Bombay Lancers, two 12-pounders, three 6-pounders, and two mortars.

The rebels, after their victory over the Rájá's troops, had fallen back on Áwah, the fortifications of which they proceeded to strengthen. Áwah is surrounded by a high wall, and is only approachable through a dense júnгле. Being well supplied with guns, it could claim to be defensible against the small force which Lawrence was marching against it.

He arrived before it on the 18th, and proceeded at once to make a reconnaissance in force. This had the effect of causing the enemy to bring a strong fire to bear upon his men from every

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
September.

gun on their walls. It was seen that the place was strong and could scarcely be carried by an assault. Lawrence, then, hoping that the enemy would come out and attack him, fell back on the village of Chulawáss, about three and a half miles distant. Here he was to have been joined by Monck-Mason, but that officer, on arriving within three hundred yards of the place where the General was standing, was decoyed by the enemy's bugle-sound—similar to those of the British—and was shot dead. His death was a loss to the State, for he was a man of many and varied accomplishments, with a noble heart and a lofty mind—one of the old school of soldier-politicians who constituted one of the glories of the Company's rule.

Monck-  
Mason is  
killed.

Lawrence remained three days at Áwah. The rebels left him in peace, busily occupied in strengthening their position. Unable with his actual force to take the place, and having to a certain extent impressed the people of the country through which he marched, Lawrence then fell back leisurely on Ájmir and Nasirábád. Áwah bade him defiance, but with the exception of Kótá, the remainder of Rájpútáná remained for the three months that followed loyal and submissive. It may be convenient to add a word here regarding the proceedings at Áwah. Not many days elapsed before the proud Thákur and his rebel allies quarrelled. Instead of coming to blows, however, they sensibly agreed to separate. The Thákur remained at Áwah; the sepoy took their way towards Dehlí. They were en-

Lawrence  
falls back on  
Ájmir.

Ultimate fate  
of the Jodh-  
púr legion.

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
October.

Kotá.

countered, completely defeated, and many of them cut up by a British force under Gerrard at Nár-núl on the 16th October following.\*

Kotá, an offshoot from the more ancient principality of Búndí, is a native State bordering on the south-west frontier of Sindia's dominions, having an area of five thousand square miles, and a population of four hundred and thirty-three thousand souls. In 1857 the ruling chief was Maháráo Rám Singh. An auxiliary force of the three arms, commanded by European officers, had been maintained in the State since 1838. The entire cost of this force was maintained by the Maháráo. The political agent, representing the British Government, was Major Burton.

Troops from  
Kotá temporarily occupy  
Nímach.

The reader is aware that, when the troops of the regular army revolted at Nímach, Lawrence had caused that station to be reoccupied by detachments from the contingents of Mewár, Kotí, and Búndí, until such time as the Europeans he had sent for from Dísá should arrive.† Major Burton had accompanied the Kotá troops on that expedition. He did not, however, return with them, General Lawrence having requested him to remain at Nímach for some three weeks, as "in those unsettled times he could not have confidence in his troops."

Major Burton  
and his sons  
return to  
Kotá.

Major Burton, consequently, remained at Nímach. But, after the occurrences at A'wah to which I have adverted, deeming his presence at

\* Page 112. I may add that the rasaldár, Abbás Ali, was ultimately pardoned by Lord Canning.

† Vol. i. page 256.

the capital of the State to which he was accredited necessary for the assurance of the policy of the Mahāráo, he set out to return to Kotá, accompanied by two of his sons, the one aged twenty-one, the other sixteen, but leaving behind him, under the safeguard of the British troops at Nímach, his wife and four remaining children. He reached Kotá on the 12th October, was visited by the Mahāráo in state the following morning, and returned the visit on the 14th. The Mahāráo subsequently stated, that at the return visit Burton gave him the names of some of his officers whom he knew to be disaffected, and impressed upon him the advisability of punishing or at least dismissing them. Whether Burton gave this advice can never be certainly known; but this is certain, that that same day the Mahāráo caused the officers and men of the contingent to be informed that he had given it!

Officers and men were, in very truth, alike disaffected, and, being so, the communication made to them by order of the Mahāráo determined them to take the law into their own hands. Accordingly they assembled the following morning, and killing Mr. Salder, the Residency surgeon, and Mr. Saviell, the doctor of the dispensary in the city, who resided in houses in the Residency grounds, attacked the Residency itself. The guards and servants fled from the premises and hid themselves in the ravines close by. Major Burton and his two sons, left with a single servant, a camel-driver, took refuge in a room on the roof of the house. The revoltors then

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
October.

The Mahāráo  
betrays  
Burton to the  
men whom  
he had  
denounced,

who attack  
the Resi-  
dency,



BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
October.

and murder  
Burton, his  
sons, and  
other Euro-  
peans.

The Mahārāo  
excuses him-  
self.

fired round shot into the Residency. "For four hours," writes General Lawrence in his graphic account of the mournful transaction,\* "these four brave men defended themselves, till at length the Residency was set on fire, and Major Burton, feeling the case desperate, proposed to surrender on condition of the mob sparing his son's lives. The young men at once rejected the offer, saying they would all die together. They knelt down and prayed for the last time, and then calmly and heroically met their fate. The mob had by this time procured scaling-ladders, and thus gaining the roof, rushed in and despatched their victims, the servant alone escaping. Major Burton's head was cut off and paraded through the town, and then fired from a gun, but the three bodies were by the Maharājā's order interred that evening."

The Mahārāo at once communicated the occurrence to General Lawrence, accompanying the communication with the expression of his regret and with the excuse that the troops had taken the law into their own hands and that he was powerless. He may have been powerless, but he had, perhaps unwittingly, set the troops on. The Government of India subsequently signified their opinion, that though innocent of fore-knowledge, the Mahārāo had not wholly performed his duty, by reducing his salute from seventeen to thirteen guns.

*Reminiscences of Forty-three Years' Service in India,* by Lieut.-General Sir George Lawrence, K.C.S.I., C.B.

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
October.

Disturbances  
near Nimach.

The tragedy at Kotá was not the only outrage which disturbed the peace of the country during the month of October. About the same time that Burton was being besieged in the Residency of the former place, a party of rebels from Mandisúr, led by a chief who pretended relationship to the royal house of Dehlí, marched on and seized Jíran, a fortified town with a very strong defence, within ten miles of the cantonment of Nimach. It was impossible to allow such an outrage to pass unnoticed. On the 23rd October there was sent from Nimach to attack them a force of four hundred men, with two guns and a mortar. The men were chiefly Bombay native troops, cavalry and infantry, but they were headed by fifty men of the 83rd, the whole commanded by Captain Tucker. They found the enemy still at Jíran. Tucker at once opened fire with his guns, and when they had played some time upon the defences, he sent his infantry to attack the town. The rebels then sallied out in overwhelming numbers, drove back the infantry, and, pushing on, captured the mortar. Upon this the cavalry charged, recovered the mortar, compelled the enemy to re-enter the town, and silenced their fire. But the place itself was too strong for the efforts of a force so small and so lightly provided; the loss already incurred had been heavy, two officers, Tucker and Read, having been killed, and three wounded; a retreat was therefore ordered. Strange to say, the enemy evacuated Jíran that night.

The repulse  
at Jíran.

Their retreat, however, was only the prelude

The rebels  
advance

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1857.  
November.  
again in  
greater  
numbers  
and attack  
Nimach.

Lawrence  
applies for  
reinforce-  
ments.

1858.  
January.

On the  
arrival of  
some of them  
he besieges,

and captures  
A'wah.

to an advance in larger numbers. On the 8th November a body of them, numbering four thousand, advanced on Nimach, occupied the station, and forced the European and native troops to take refuge within the fortified square. This they attempted, but vainly, to escalate; then, after a siege of fifteen days' duration, hearing that reinforcements were advancing to the aid of the British, they fell back.

On receiving intelligence of the murder of Captain Burton and his sons, General Lawrence had made an urgent requisition to Bombay for troops. The first and smaller detachments of these began to arrive in Rajpútáná in January 1858, but it was not until March that the reinforcements assumed a sufficient strength to justify decisive action on a large scale.

The detachments which arrived in January, however, enabled General Lawrence to throw off the quiescent attitude which he had till then deemed it politic to assume. In January he was able to detach a force of eleven hundred men, with a due proportion of guns, under Colonel Holmes, 12th Bombay Native Infantry, against A'wah. Holmes invested the place on the 19th, and the same day his guns opened fire. At the end of five days a practicable breach had been made, and the assault was ordered for the following morning. The garrison, perfectly cognisant of all that was going on in the British camp, resolved not to wait. Fortunately for them there raged that night a storm so fearful, and there ruled a darkness so intense, that sentries only a

few paces apart could neither see nor hear each other. Under cover of these portents they evacuated the place in the night.

The strength of the fortifications of A'wah, when it was occupied next morning by the British troops, were such as to justify to the full General Lawrence's determination regarding it in the previous September. It had a double line of defences, the inner of strong masonry, the outer of earthwork, both being loop-holed. Thirteen guns, three tons of powder, and three thousand rounds of small arms ammunition were found in the place. The keep, the bastions, and all the masonry works were blown up and destroyed, so as effectually to prevent the stronghold becoming a nucleus of rebellion for the future.\*

This act of vigour had a very salutary effect. Order was maintained in the country; and in March, when the reinforcements from Bombay poured in, the difficulty of the task for which troops had been required in the previous November had in no way increased.

The reinforcements numbered five thousand five hundred men of all arms. They were composed of the 92nd, 83rd, and 95th Regiments, the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, the 8th Hussars, the 1st Bombay Lancers, the Sind Horse, Brown's battery of artillery, eighteen field-pieces, of which ten were 8-inch mortars and howitzers, and a corps of sappers and miners. They were commanded by Major-General H. G. Roberts of the Bombay army.

*Forty-three Years in India, Sir G. Lawrence.*

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1858.

Jan.-March

The fortifications of  
A'wah

justify  
Lawrence's  
previous  
retirement.

The main  
reinforce-  
ments arrive



Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1858.  
March.

under  
General  
Roberts.

The state of  
Kotá after  
the murder of  
Burton.

On the arrival of General Roberts in March, General Lawrence resigned the military command into his hands, and reverted to his civil and political functions as agent to the Governor-General. In this capacity he accompanied the force.

The first operation to be attempted was the recovery of Kotá. Ever since the murder of Captain Burton disorder had prevailed in that State. The sepoys, having tasted the pleasure of revolt, drained the cup to the very dregs. They imprisoned the Maharáo in his palace. They then forced him to sign a paper consisting of nine articles, one of which was to the effect that he had ordered the murder of Major Burton. The Maharáo endeavoured by compliance to keep the rebels in good humour, but meanwhile he despatched secretly messengers to the Rájá of Karáolí, begging him to send troops to his aid. The Rájá complied, and his troops, faithful to their liege lord, drove the rebels from the part of the town of Kotá in which the palace was situated, and released the Maharáo. They were still occupying it, for the defence of that prince, when Roberts arrived in Rajpútáná. The rebels, however, occupied the other part of the town, reduced already by pillage and other excesses to extreme misery.

The road  
between  
Nasirábád  
and Kotá.

A military march from Nasirábád, the headquarters of Roberts's force, to Kotá, was not one which a general could regard as being necessarily a pleasure trip. Not only did the town of Kotá occupy a formidable position, covered by the river Chambal on one side and by a large and deep lake

on the other, but the approach to it offered many positions capable of easy defence by a small force against one much larger. Chief amongst these was the Mokandára pass—a long and narrow valley between two ranges of hills.

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1858.  
March.

But once more the want of true military instinct was manifested. None of the difficult positions were defended. Roberts, marching from Nasirábád on the 10th, encamped on the north bank of the Chambal, opposite Kotá, on the 22nd March. He found the rebels in complete possession of the south bank, on which they had planted their guns, many in number, and some of them large in calibre. Roberts ascertained at the same time that the fort, the palace, half the city, and the ferry over the river, were held by the Maháráo with the Karáli troops.

Roberts  
penetrates  
to Kotá.

Early on the morning of the 25th, information reached him that the rebels were making an assault on the palace with a view to seize the ferry. Roberts instantly sent across three hundred men of the 83rd, under Major Heath, to aid the Maháráo. The attack was repulsed. On the 27th he crossed over himself with six hundred of the 95th, and two 9-pounders, and having placed the heavy guns in the fort in position to bear on the enemy's camp, he opened upon it on the 29th a heavy fire of shot and shell. On the 30th, whilst the remainder of the force cannonaded the rebels' position from the north bank, he, marching from the fort in three columns, moved on it on the south bank, and gained it with very small loss. By this brilliant manœuvre he not only

He attacks  
and com-  
pletely  
defeats the  
rebels.

Book XII.  
Chapter V.

1858.

March-April.

The authority  
of the Mahá-  
ráo is re-  
stored.

completely defeated the enemy but captured fifty guns! The cavalry, however, failed to intercept the rebels, and they almost all escaped.

The British troops occupied Kotá for three weeks. At the end of that time, the authority of the Maháráo having been completely re-established, General Roberts evacuated it and returned to Nasirábád, despatching a portion of his force to garrison Nímach. With the fall of Kotá peace and order had been completely restored throughout Rájputáná, and although, two months later, both were broken by Tántia Topi, the action of this famous leader was strictly an invasion. Tántia induced neither prince nor peasant to join his standard.

The reason  
why Rájputáná was, by  
comparison,  
little affected  
by the  
mutiny.

Of all the large tracts of territory inhabited mainly by a people boasting a common origin, not one passed through the trying period of 1857-58 with smaller injury to itself, with less infliction of suffering and bloodshed, than the territory of Rájputáná. Parcelled out into eighteen sovereign States, each ruled by its own independent chief, the circumstance may seem surprising. But the causes of it are not far to seek. I attribute the result mainly to the fact that no people in India had suffered so much or so recently as the Rájputs from the lawlessness which characterised the sway immediately preceding the suzerainty of the British—the sway of the Maráthás. When the policy of Marquess Wellesley towards the Rájput States was reversed in 1805 by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, a system of oppression and misrule was inaugurated, under which the buffalo

BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.  
1858.

was to the man who held the bludgeon, and the fair daughters of the land were to the strong arm of the marauder. For twelve years the sufferings of Rájputáná cried to heaven for redress. That redress came only when, in 1817, the Marquis of Hastings reverted to the policy of his great predecessor. Under that policy the princes of Rájputáná have been secured against invaders from outside and against each other. Once more has every man been able to lie down in his own mango-grove and to eat of his own date-tree. Security has prevailed throughout the land. The honour of every man and of every woman has been secured. It was the sense of this security, enjoyed under British suzerainty, that ensured the loyalty of the great bulk of the Rájputés during the troublous times of the mutiny.

It is proper to add that this recollection of past and present benefits was stimulated and enforced by the choice made by the Government of India of the agents to carry out their policy. Foremost among these was George St. Patrick Lawrence. His tact, his energy, his fearlessness, his readiness of resource, when he had not a single European soldier at his disposal, stamp him as a man eminently fitted to rule in troublous times. The display of these qualities begat confidence in the minds of the native princes, fear and dismay among the adventurers who welcomed turmoil. His presence, thus, proved itself to be worth an army. But for his promptitude, Ájmir would have fallen, and with Ájmir occupied by two or three regiments of British sepoys, British authority

George  
St. Patrick  
Lawrence.



BOOK XII.  
Chapter V.

1858.

The story  
reverts to  
Bombay.

would have disappeared. The preservation of Rájputáná, then, will ever be connected with the name of this gallant and distinguished officer.

The inroad of Tántia Topi into Rájputáná, and the campaign in pursuit of that famous leader, will be treated of in its proper place in the next volume. Before dealing with him it will be my pleasing duty to record the statesmanlike measures by which Lord Elphinstone caused Bombay to become a strong wall of support to the threatened edifice of British rule in India, and to narrate how Sir Hugh Rose illustrated the highest genius of the inspired warrior by his daring and successful campaign in Central India.

## APPENDIX A.

## 1.—(Page 39 of text.)

MAJOR REID's plan of attack on the strong position of Kishanganj has never been published. I therefore give it verbatim. On the 2nd February, 1858, after he had in a measure recovered from his wound, he wrote as follows:

"With regard to Kishanganj I can only say that were I ordered to attack the place to-morrow, supposing the enemy's heavy guns to be in the same position they were in on the 14th September last, my plan of attack would be just what it was then.

"You have seen the position, and know the localities and great strength of the place, and will therefore understand me when I say the hugging the garden wall on the left of the road before you come to the canal bridge, and then the loop-holed serai wall, as also the garden wall which runs parallel to it, places one, comparatively speaking, out of harm's way. The heavy guns in the two batteries could not be brought to bear, nor could the loop-holes be made use of for musketry, so long, mind you, as the column *hugged* the

walls above alluded to 'four deep,' as I had my troops on the 14th September.

"I was just about to carry out this plan and make a feint in front of the heavy batteries whilst I made a *real* attack in rear of the serai,\* when I was knocked over, but my intentions were to have attacked the strong works at the end of the road—their second line of defence—and had this been successful, I should have entered the serai through the breach which was made by my order in rear of the heavy batteries, as also through the gate, which I could have blown in, and through which I entered when I took the place on the 17th June.

"My object in detaching four hundred infantry, two hundred cavalry, and four guns of the Jammoo contingent to the Eedgar was to make a diversion and, place Trevelyan-ganj between a cross fire, as also to watch the enemy and prevent my right flank being turned; and I had a still further object in view, namely, to make the enemy believe that our *real* attack was to be on the right! That they were deceived by this movement there can be but little doubt, otherwise they would not have reinforced Kishanganj in the way they did, for at the time I fell the enemy mustered at least fifteen thousand strong.

"After getting possession of Kishanganj I should have turned the four captured heavy guns, as also the two 8-inch mortars, on Trevelyan-ganj. Their fire, coupled with that of the four guns of the Jummoo contingent, would have made it too hot for them, and I calculated on their retreating into the city. Had they done so, I should have left half the reserve in the serai, and proceeded with my column along the dry bed of the canal up to the Kábul gate, which Nicholson would have opened for me after he had reached that point with his column inside the city walls.

A loop-holed stone wall enclosure round a village.

"A good deal would have depended on circumstances, but certain it is I should not have attempted to enter the city so long as the enemy were in force on my right.

"My desire was to attack Kishanganj before daybreak, but I was over-ruled by the General, and it was decided that I should wait for the explosion—the blowing in of the Cashmere gate. But after all, I could not wait, as the detached party of the Junmoo contingent became engaged with the enemy. Had my orders been obeyed they would have got into the Hedgar without firing a shot long before daybreak, but the party was late in starting from the camp, and before getting half way to their destination the day had dawned, and the enemy were on the alert and at once attacked them, eventually driving them back and capturing their four guns."

---

2.—(Pages 42 and 43 of text.)

A great difference of opinion having been expressed at the time regarding the action of the fourth column after the fall of Major Reid, the matter was referred by Captain Lawrence, with the approval, I understand, of Major, now Lieutenant-General, Sir Henry Norman, to the late Colonel Sir Herbert Edwardes, K.C.B., for investigation. Sir Herbert Edwardes, after examining many witnesses who were present on the occasion, and giving to the subject the most patient attention, recorded his opinion in the manner stated below. It will be observed that, for reasons which seem to me sufficient, I have not adhered implicitly to Sir Herbert's conclusions, but I consider it only fair to General Richard Lawrence that they should be placed on record in this volume.



MEMO.: on a correspondence connected with the operations of the fourth column of attack on Delhi, on the 14th September, 1857, referred to me for arbitration by Majors Norman and Lawrence.

1. Major Lawrence complains of three passages in a *Narrative of the Siege of Delhi*, published by Major Norman. The passages are as follows:

"No. 4 column, under Major Reid, advanced from the Subzee Mundi towards Kissengunge, the *Cashmere contingent* co-operating on its right. *The latter*, however, was so sharply attacked by the insurgents, who were in great force, that, after losing a great number of men and four guns, *they were completely defeated, and fell back to camp.*"

"Major Reid's column met with the most strenuous opposition, *greatly increased, doubtless, by the failure of the Cashmere contingent.*

"Captain Muter, 60th Rifles, *the next senior officer* (a) judiciously *withdrew the troops to their former posts* (b) at Hindoo Raos and in the Subzee Mundi."

2. The sentences in italics contain the statements objected to; and I proceed to express the opinions I have formed on the documentary evidence placed before me by Majors Lawrence and Norman, aided by conversation on the matter with Brigadier-General Chamberlain *previous* to my perusal of the papers; and a fuller personal inquiry made by me now from Captain Boisragon (who was in the action) *after* perusing the documents, for the sake of clearing up doubtful points.

3. The first passage is certainly *very inaccurate*, inasmuch as it conveys the impression that either the whole, or at all events the main body, of the Cashmere contingent was co-operating on the right of No. 4 column, and lost four guns; whereas the contingent on that occasion acted in two bodies. First, the main one (eight hundred strong, under Major R.

Lawrence) as reserve to No. 4 column in its attack on Kissengunge, which shared in the failure of that column, and lost no guns; and secondly, a detachment of four hundred, under Captain Dwyer, which acted separately against the Edgah at a distance of three-fourths of a mile on the right of No. 4 column, which *was* completely defeated, and *did* lose four guns. This inaccuracy is fully admitted by Major Norman in his reference to me, and it is unnecessary to discuss it farther than to mention that it arose apparently from the official report of Major Muter.

4. The second passage would similarly be admitted by Major Norman to be so far inaccurate as he spoke of the "Cashmere contingent" instead of a *detachment* of the Cashmere contingent; but with that exception he is still inclined to think that the passage is correct, that Captain Dwyer's detachment attacked the enemy at the Edgah before Colonel Reid attacked at Kissengunge, and that its defeat was sufficiently early to bring down a greater pressure on Colonel Reid's column, and so to contribute to its repulse. The evidence on these points is not always positive, and is very conflicting. Lieutenant Evans, who was in the Crow's Nest battery, evidently saw Captain Dwyer's detachment engaged with the enemy at the Edgah while No. 4 column was forming up; and I consider his testimony decisive upon that point. His evidence is not precise about the time of the retirement of Captain Dwyer's detachment, though it leans apparently to its having occurred previous even to Colonel Reid's assault. This cannot be the case, as Colonel Reid precisely states that some time after he had been wounded, and was making over the command to Major Lawrence, one hundred yards in rear of the canal, he told Major Lawrence "to support the four hundred Jummoo troops on the right, who were *becoming hotly engaged with the enemy.*" This establishes that the two engagements were going on simultaneously at Kissengunge and Edgah, and the inquiry

is thus narrowed to which of the two repulses occurred first. Major Muter says that No. 4 column attacked thus twice, and failed in being able to get up another attack, the loss was so heavy, the confusion so great, and the men so disheartened. This all occurred within a quarter of an hour of the fall of Major Reid, who was one of the first hit; in that quarter of an hour we lost two hundred men out of the seven hundred and fifty. Here it is precisely stated that No. 4 column had been finally repulsed a quarter of an hour after Colonel Reid was wounded; Colonel Reid describes himself as having been "for some time" insensible on the ground after being hit, and when he became conscious he was carried to the rear, where he met Major Lawrence. It would seem, then, that the second attack must have been about failing, if it had not failed, when Colonel Reid asked Major Lawrence to send aid to Captain Dwyer's detachment, which was then "becoming hotly engaged with the enemy"; but Colonel Reid goes on to say that "up to this time the troops were well in hand, and were as steady as possible, and I made sure of success," which would be irreconcilable with Major Muter's account, if we did not remember that Major Muter was in front engaged in the action, and therefore cognizant of the facts, while Colonel Reid was in the rear after having been some time insensible. Again, Captain Shebbeare is clear that one reason for the retirement of No. 4 column was the running in of Captain Dwyer's men upon the right flank of No. 4 column, which allowed the enemy to work round to the rear; on the other hand, Lieutenant Manderson, who was with Captain Dwyer's party, is equally clear that as he was returning he met two Cashmere guns coming back from No. 4 column, and the native officer in command related how No. 4 had been repulsed. The opinion I form upon these statements (which are perhaps not more conflicting than those of officers engaged in different parts of a field usually are) is that the two engagements

at Edgah and Kissengunge were raging simultaneously, and that the repulse of neither was long enough before the other to have any effect on the result, considering that they were nearly a mile apart. The loss of more than one-fourth of No. 4 column, as described by Major Muter, sufficiently accounts for its repulse. It was obviously too weak for the operation, and I should say this alone was the cause of its failure.

5. The third passage contains two statements which Major Lawrence objects to.

1st. That Major Muter was "the next senior officer" after Colonel Reid's withdrawal.

2nd. That Major Muter "withdrew the troops to their former posts."

It is now acknowledged by all that the next senior officer in the field on the occasion was Major R. Lawrence, who was commanding the main body of the Cashmere contingent, which formed Colonel Reid's "reserve"; and Colonel Reid states that, on recovering his senses after his wound, he called out for Major Lawrence, and meeting him one hundred yards over the bridge, gave over the command to him: therefore, by military usage, Major Muter could not be described as "the next senior officer," though in point of fact he was the senior officer of all those who were in front with the troops which formed the column of attack, and, that being the case, in an affair wherein minutes were hours, while two desperate attacks had crowded themselves into one quarter of an hour, been overwhelmingly repulsed, and followed by hopeless confusion, Major Muter might fitly have retired with the attacking column, at all events as far as the reserve, and there have left the real senior officer to resume the attack or not. But I do not consider that he could fitly have withdrawn from the field the column which he knew was not under his command. But it does not appear in these documents that Major Muter ever assumed



the command of the troops in front, or organised the retirement. Captain Shebbeare describes "all the officers in front as agreeing among themselves, in the absence of a commander, to retire, as the attack was a failure, and as having reported what they had done to Major Lawrence, when they found him after recrossing the canal, knowing him to be the next in command to Colonel Reid, on which 'he,' i.e. Major Lawrence, confirmed the order, but shortly after ordered an advance, which he again countermanded almost immediately. When he reached the serai in the Subzee Mundi, he, at my suggestion, ordered me to occupy the Crow's Nest and the line reaching right up to the battery. These are distinct acts of command amounting to this, that the final relinquishment of the attack, and the retirement of the majority of the troops in No. 4 column 'to their former posts,' were really carried out under the orders of Major R. Lawrence, who was also the proper person to issue them. Captain Wriford states that on Colonel Reid being wounded he considered Major Lawrence in command, but getting no orders from either him or Major Muter, he thought both were *hors de combat*, and withdrew his men, on his own judgment, to Subzee Mundi, where he found that Major Muter was present, and resigned the command to him as senior officer, *and some little time after this* Major Lawrence came into the Subzee Mundi picquet, when he of course became senior." This tallies with Captain Mocatta's account that he was sent by Major Lawrence to the posts in rear to bring up the European troops again, who had clearly been withdrawn without his authority, and, as he seems at first to have judged, without necessity (though in that matter I cannot agree with him). Major Muter himself puts the above testimonies beyond doubt, for in reply to a question whether during the day he received any orders, directly or indirectly, from Major Lawrence, he says he has "some recollection of a requisition for European sol-

diers *long after* the men had been reposted in our old position"; therefore Major Lawrence must have kept the field "long after" Major Muter, and he must have had troops with him. He could not have been alone. This is, in other words, what Captain Boisragon stated, that "the native portion of the column, Ghoorkas, Guides, and Sikhs, were in the field as long as I was present, hotly engaged with the enemy," and he explained that he was in the field for upwards of an hour after Major Reid was wounded. Farther, Doctor Corbyn, in a letter to Major Lawrence, testifies that he "went into the Subzee Mundi serai, where Parker and myself were of great assistance to the wounded Europeans. Here I found Captain Muter, Wriford also I think, and a number of Europeans. You did not retire with the Cashmeres, I know, for nearly an hour afterwards." And this brings me to the difficulty which I judge from the papers, more than anything else, prevented Major Norman from modifying the passages in his narrative; I mean the difficulty of understanding how the Europeans, Ghoorkas, and Sikhs of distinguished regiments, who were in the column of attack, could be repulsed, and retreat to their former posts, while the Jummo reserve, consisting of troops of inferior discipline and armament, still kept the field. It seemed to Major Norman to involve an incredible reproach to the column of attack. But having very carefully analysed these papers, and corrected my notions of the localities by a published plan of the "City and Cantonments of Delhi," and by interrogating Captain Boisragon, who was in the action, it seems to me quite clear that the two statements are perfectly reconcilable with the honour of both corps. As I understand it, Colonel Reid disposed the Jummo reserve on his right rear. The attack failed from being totally inadequate, Colonel Reid fell and was removed. The confusion in the column of attack, in consequence of the repulse, and of the enemy following hotly up, was very

great. The next senior officer being in the rear with the reserve, could not possibly give any timely orders, or know that Colonel Reid had been wounded. No orders were consequently issued for retiring in good order, and the officers at the head of the column agreed together to withdraw, and did so to the best of their ability. Major Muter and Captain Wriford reached Subzee Mundi with the majority of their men without even meeting Major Lawrence, and Captains Shebbeare and Boisragon, commanding the Guides and Ghoorkas, both fell in with Major Lawrence, and placed themselves under his orders. A new advance was thought possible but abandoned, and Captain Shebbeare's party was ordered to occupy certain posts. But Major Lawrence remained out with the Jummoo reserve and Captain Boisragon's men, and (as Captain Boisragon informs me) fragments of almost every detachment, European or native, that had made up No. 4 column, for the following up of the enemy after the repulse of the column was very hot, and it became indispensable to check them; and this was effectually done by our broken parties and the reserve lining the banks of the canal and occupying the jungle on the right of the road, while Lieutenant Evan's guns continued to fire over their heads, and completed the check of the enemy. Things seem to have remained in this position for a couple of hours at least, till the firing ceased and both sides withdrew. Thus the Jummoo reserve never renewed the attack on Kisingunge after the repulse of No. 4 column, and, as I understand, does not pretend to have ever advanced to the point between the first and second breastworks, where the column had been repulsed, and in no way puts itself in invidious comparison with any of the other troops, but did remain in the field with numbers of native and some European soldiers of No. 4 column, exchanging a hot fire with the enemy, and losing of its own number forty-three killed and wounded.

While, therefore, it shared in the general failure of the column of which it was the reserve, I cannot see that it in any way contributed to that failure; and, on the contrary, it took its full share in covering the retreat. Some opinions are offered in the correspondence that it was useless to keep the troops out a moment longer than could be helped after the main object of the column had failed; but in this I cannot concur, for every rebel sepoy held engaged at Kissen-gunge was a loss to the garrison in the city. The siege of Delhi has been often compared with the siege of Sebastopol, and I should think that No. 4 column was to the other three columns at Delhi much what the English at the "Redan" were to the French at the "Malakoff."

6. The whole of the present misunderstanding has arisen, as it seems to me, from Major Muter taking the irregular course (as he admits to Major Lawrence) of reporting direct to General Wilson instead of through Major Lawrence. Had he pursued the regular military course, his due share of credit as the senior remaining officer of the attacking column would have accrued to him; Major Lawrence would have appeared as having done the best with a command to which he succeeded when the day was lost; Major Muter's mistake as to the two divisions of the Cashmere contingent (of which he seems to have only now become aware) would have been corrected in time; and no blame would have been attached to that contingent for sharing in the general failure of the fourth column which the disparity of numbers and artillery rendered perfectly inevitable.

(Signed) HERBERT B. EDWARDES,

Commissioner and Superintendent.

*July 1st, 1879.*



## APPENDIX B.

---

(Page 197 of text.)

SINCE I wrote the remarks in the text, a case of neglect, as remarkable as that of Cooper of the 93rd, has been brought to my notice. It is very curious that the neglect in this case should apply to an officer also of the name of Cooper—  
 a near relative, I am informed, of Richard Cooper of the 93rd. I extract the case from Colonel Pack's Memoirs, published in 1878.

“As dawn approached, it became known that the guns were not to open, and that instead of our waiting for the signal to attack after two hours' bombardment, we were to look for it shortly after the French assault on the Malakoff. The Brigadier (Yea) came across from the Quarries and took post at the extremity of the Boyaus, that he might there watch for the commencement of the action.

“Whilst watching the Malakoff, probably a few minutes, the Rifles, stationed close to the Quarries as a covering party, having evidently mistaken one of the French rockets for the British signal, commenced firing from their hiding-places, when round shot dropping about from the Redan proved our red jackets were observed. The error of the coverers was great, and considerably annoyed the Brigadier,

who, pointing to a flagstaff near the 8-gun battery, said, 'A flag will be hoisted there when Lord Raglan stands.' He added, 'That fire,' (alluding to the covering party of the Rifles) 'must be stopped. Somebody must go across the open: it is no use attempting to get through the trenches.'

"Moments like these try the mettle of men and prove of what they are made. No mere bravado answers; for that always fails when actual and perilous deeds of cool and deliberate courage have to be performed. Whoever volunteered to fulfil the Brigadier's mission knew he must go as it were with his life in his hand. Not only every step, but every inch of the distance between the trenches and the covering party was strewn with peril, and carrying the message and escaping with his life was not for an instant to be looked for.

"A momentary silence ensued. The fire from all arms was pounding away in every direction, and the service was very perilous. To cross the open and reach the Quarries we saw and knew exposure to the fire from the Malakoff was certain, and the able marksmen and the guns of the Redan were also to be encountered. The duty was seen to be so momentous that all hesitated to undertake it, not from fear, but from the feeling of all but certain failure. Brigadier Yea then repeated his desire, saying, 'Who will go?' Then there was another pause, when every soldier who heard his leader's request felt his heart beat with intense rapidity, and every mental energy of his mind awakened. For a few moments there was intense silence amongst us, and then quickly and nervously Captain Cooper, one of his aides-de-camp, answered, 'I will, Sir!' And out this gallant officer went.

"Springing over the trench, commencing with a quick walk, he increased his pace gradually till he ran. His eyes were fixed upon the Rifles, all eyes were upon him. All expected to see him fall; but Providence guarded him. He

reached the Quarries, and stopped the fire, his life most probably preserved by this courageous act of gallantry, for the crowd and confusion at the opening of the miserably small trench whence the stormers issued were so great, he never could have rejoined his lamented chief had he gone by the way of the trenches.

"Yet, though many an officer and many a man have received the Victoria Cross for the common act of humanity—aiding or assisting to bring in a wounded officer or comrade under circumstances of *gallantry*—acts which most of us at the time they happened thought little about, and certainly never regarded them as deserving the designation of 'distinguished,' for *the above gallant act, setting an example of the highest devotion to the service of his Queen and country in the face of hundreds, this officer received no reward.*"\* The officer in question was Captain Joshua Cooper, 7th Fusiliers.—*Sebastopol Trenches, and Five Months in Them.* by Colonel Reynell Pack, C.B., 7th Fusiliers.

\* The italics are Colonel Pack's.

## APPENDIX C.

---

Page 562 of text.

LIEUTENANT CONOLLY thus wrote to Captain Black, regarding his escape: "Such a scene of confusion I never saw; some sepoy firing at Bhils, they shot seven poor wretches on the parade-ground, who, I declare, were only looking at the novel scene. During the day we halted. The first day we marched to —, and a greater rabble never crossed country than our once smart legion; not a sepoy hardly saluted me. I was taken to Abbas Ali's tent at —, and the infantry were a little behind, when a tremendous row commenced. Some Minas made a rush at the carts; the infantry thought it was an attack; away went the cavalry to see to matters, cut up a few Bhils, and, seeing no one else, pulled up to look about them. Another row, and rush towards where I was standing near my saddled horse. I can't say I was desperately alarmed, for all hope of life I had cast aside some hours before, when we marched. The rush towards me was caused by some amiable sepoy taking the opportunity to make a run at me. Abbas Ali and his men saw it, and were soon between us; but I cannot enter into details of self;



once again they attempted to get at me at Doola. What made them so mad was, that my strenuous attempts to seduce the cavalry had been made known to Mihrwan Sing, and he swore I should die. At Doola they had three or four rows—councils they called them—about me. At last, Mihrwan Sing and the other beauties, seeing Abbas Ali would not give me up, said I might go solus. Next morning, they sent again to say, no, I should not go. However, Abbas Ali and his men surrounded my charpoy all night; we none of us slept, and on the morning of the 27th, when the force was ready, the guns were loaded, the infantry shouldered arms, and I was brought up. I was told to ride to the front; poor Dokul Sing, the havildar-major, and some others, ran out blubbering; Abbas Ali and Abdul Ali, rode up on each side, made me low salaams, and told me to ride for it; that not a sowar should be allowed to interfere with my retreat. My three sowars, who, I have forgotten to say, had stuck to me as if I had been their brother since the very beginning, by a preconcerted plan, were ordered to see me off a little way. I could not help giving a farewell wave of the hand to the infantry in irony; they shouted and laughed, the band struck up, and that is the last I saw of the legion. I rode right in to Erinpoora with three sowars; I came straight here, and the people seemed ready to eat me with joy. The names of the three sowars are, Nusseeroodeen, second troop; Elah Bux, third troop (the man who used to ride my grey); and Momin Khan, first troop. They left everything behind, and, I must say, are three as fine fellows as I wish to see. By-the-by, the cavalry said if I would agree to turn Mussulman, to a man they would follow me. Very-kind of them. They offered me money when I was coming away, and also on the march. I took twenty rupees from Abbas Ali; now I wish I had taken my pay; they twice offered it. Now is our time, the legion is divided. Jawaan Sing, golundaz, and his party, about seven other golundaz (gunners), will play the

infantry a trick if they can. I have told Jawan Sing I will myself give him five hundred rupees if he breaks with the infantry. Abbas Ali, the havildar-major, and Abdul Ali, are in danger on my account, and they are kept with their men under the guns night and day. I feel most glad to think I did them as much harm as I could. Makdun Bux had a musket put to his breast for letting me ride with my sword on. I was a bone of contention. I have this morning sent a sharp kossid to Abbas Ali, telling him, for his own sake, to try and communicate with Maseen, who, I believe, is at Pali, and to whom I have written to try and communicate with Abbas Ali."

## APPENDIX B.

---

(Page 168 of text.)

From Sir James Outram to the Officer commanding the  
Relieving Force.

[Along with the following important and deeply interesting letter, Sir James Outram forwarded a plan of the ground intervening between the Alum Bāgh and the Residency, together with minute descriptions of every position and building capable of being held by the enemy. The plan was based on the surveys made by the late Captain Morrison prior to the outbreak, the only surveys that had been made of Lucknow. The copy of this plan, which will be found at the end of the volume, should be consulted in the perusal of the following letter. It is Plan No. I.]

My communication of the 14th instant informed you I consider your first operation should be the occupation of the "Dilkhusha" house and park, by a direct movement to that place from the Alumbāgh. The Fort of Jellalabad, which is situated a mile or a mile and a half to the right of that route, is said to be occupied by the enemy, with two guns; but it is too distant to interrupt that line of communication, and it is not likely to be maintained after the Dilkhusha, in addition to Alumbāgh, has been occupied in

its rear. I think it hardly worth while, therefore, to waste time against that place, which at the commencement of the outbreak was little capable of defence, and is not likely since to have been repaired or stored sufficiently to admit of its retention. The guns now there appear to have been sent merely to interrupt the forage parties from Alumbágh. (A description of Jellalabad, as it was just before the outbreak, is appended.) Yet it will be prudent, in afterwards communicating with Alumbágh, to afford strong escort until it is known whether or not Jellalabad is evacuated.

The direct advance from Alumbágh *via* Char Bágh, and the main street marked (1), (1) (1) on the plan, should *not* be attempted, very formidable opposition being prepared on the other side of the Char Bágh bridge, the bridge itself being destroyed, and the passage strongly fortified; besides which there are two miles of street to pass through, in which every means of obstruction has been prepared, the houses loopholed, and guns in position at various points, with ditches, mines, and other obstacles. For the same reason I would deprecate any attempt to force the street which runs from the junction of the Dilkhusa and Martinière roads to the Kaiser Bágh, marked (2) (2) (2).

At Dilkhusa, it is stated, there are at present only some Rajwarra matchlockmen, with cavalry at Beebeepore village perhaps, and at the Martinière; but these are almost certain to decamp when you approach, and may perhaps suffer considerably ere they get across the canal, if followed up sharply by cavalry and horse artillery. Two guns were said to be at Dilkhusa some days ago, probably those now at Jellalabad. If still there, they would have to be abandoned ere they could be crossed over the canal, if followed up.

It is possible that some of the so-called Regular Infantry may be sent over to the Dilkhusa when they hear of your approach. If so, they will but add to their own confusion and panic flight when you attack, for never by any chance do



they stand in the open. Two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, sent out to oppose Major Barston's convoy, fled at his approach without firing a shot; and on every occasion where whole hosts of them were opposed to ourselves it was just the same. The Dilkhusa palace cannot be maintained under fire of our artillery, having large windows on every side. If any force of the enemy is assembled there, they must suffer awfully from your guns in escaping across the canal. Or should they fly to the Martinière, they will be in a similar predicament when you follow them up.

On seeing the Dilkhusa occupied by your troops, the enemy would most probably evacuate the Martinière. After lodging your baggage in the garden to the rear of, and commanded by, the Dilkhusa house (and surrounded by walls without houses, something like Alumbágh, and easily defensible), you would proceed against the Martinière through the road marked (3) (3) (3). But it would be well, ere getting within musket-range of the building, to throw a few shells and round shot into it, in case it should be occupied by the enemy, whose fire from the terraced roof might cause much loss ere you get near enough to rush up and blow open doors for entry. It would be well for you to have some one with you well acquainted with the Martinière building. And it may be a matter for your consideration whether it would not be better, if the place appears strongly fortified, to mask it by encamping your troops between the road (3) (3) and the canal, contenting yourself by bombarding the Martinière during the day and night, which will almost ensure its evacuation before morning. The mound marked (4)\* would be a favourable site for a 24-pounder battery, which would command the opposite bank of the canal, where you purpose

Sir J. Outram afterwards availed himself of this mound to plant a 24-pounder battery of the Shannon Brigade, which effectually kept down the enemy's fire opened on the rear division under his command, when he finally retired to the Alumbágh.

effecting your passage to protect the sappers in making a road for your guns.

It is possible the bridge leading to the Martinière may not be destroyed, and that you may prefer advancing over it. But, on reconnoitring, you will, I believe, find places where the canal may be crossed without much difficulty farther down, towards (6), which would enable you to turn any defensive works the enemy may prepare on the main road (2) (2) (2). If you cross the bridge, therefore, I would recommend your turning to the right after passing it, and making your way through the mud huts (indicated by the brown colour on the plan) until you get into the road running from (6) to (W) (W) (W)—W denotes some deserted and destroyed infantry lines,—leaving the houses, marked D D D, on your left, and thus making your way into the road (7) (7), which passes the open front of the enclosure in which the barracks are situated. Should the barrack buildings be occupied (they were precipitately abandoned when we advanced from the same quarter), it may be prudent to throw a few shot and shell ere the infantry advances to the attack. Having large doors, open on both sides, as is customary in European barracks in India, I anticipate little difficulty in your effecting an entry. Staircases lead to the terrace roof from the interior of the centre room. The terrace is considerably raised above, and therefore commands, the houses of the Huzrutgunj, and a few rifles placed there could keep down any musketry fire from thence (Huzrutgunj), which alone could disturb the party left in occupation of the barracks when you advance farther. But it would be necessary to throw up a parapet of sand-bags, or screens of shutters, to protect the riflemen on the roof, as it has no parapet. The south wall of the enclosure is, however, sufficiently high to afford some protection against direct fire.

Should you cross by the bridge, your whole force would, I presume, come that way. And your next operation, after

leaving an adequate guard for the barracks (say 300 or 400 infantry, some cavalry, and a couple of guns; or, probably, you might secure a gun, or two guns, which the enemy are said to have there), would be to proceed by the road (7) (7) to the Sikundra Bágh (G), which, if held, could easily be breached by 24- or 18-pounders—the wall being only about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet thick—*vide* enclosed description.\* It is said to be occupied by Maun Sing, with some 200 or 300 Rajwaras and two guns; the former are pretty sure to bolt when your guns open upon the place, and two or three shells are thrown into it.

If you cross the canal at (6), the main body of your force should proceed by the road from (6) to (W). A regiment and portion of artillery might, perhaps, make their way by the road which leads direct to the Secundra Bágh (8) (8); but as it is not well defined, it may be more prudent to keep all together till you occupy the barracks.†

Should you have met with opposition, or been delayed much in crossing the canal, the day will be pretty far advanced ere you have occupied the barracks and Sikundra Bágh. These might be the limit of your operation that day—encamping your force between, and a little in advance of, those two points, with its right rear on Sikundra Bágh, and

The Commander-in-Chief's force met with serious opposition at the Sikundra Bágh, owing to their having approached it by a cross-road from the rear, whence their breaching guns could not be brought up until the troops had been exposed for some time to a heavy fire. Had they come by the broad pukka road leading from the barracks, as suggested, their heavy guns could have opened upon the place while the infantry remained out of musketry fire. A practicable breach would then have been made, or the shelling would have driven the enemy out. As it was, however, the occupants, greatly more numerous than reported, had no means of egress, and were destroyed to a man; but our own troops also suffered severely in taking the place.

† Neither the roads (7) (7) or (8) (8) were followed by Sir Colin Campbell's force, which was taken by a more circuitous and intricate road than either, and suffered greatly before its guns could be brought to the front.

the barracks on its left rear—thus obtaining a tolerably open plain to encamp on, with almost clear space in front, from which your guns would play upon the buildings which still intervene between your camp and our position, namely, the Shah Nujjif (H), Moti Mahal (K), Mess-house (M), and Tara Kothi (N), which, if held, might be bombarded from both our positions prior to commencing combined operations next morning. You would then decide on the garrisons to occupy the barracks and Sikundra Bágh, to maintain communication with Dilkhushe, where your baggage would, I trust, be secure in the garden, protected by 200 men occupying the house, and a couple of guns. About the same strength (with convalescents) would suffice for Alumbágh, aided by the enemy's guns we have there. And, perhaps, two of our own guns, supported by 100 riflemen, would hold the Martinière, with a small body of cavalry to command the plain down to the canal. A strong picquet also should be placed in the nearest huts to the road by which you cross the canal. You would, perhaps, occupy the houses D D also, as further security for your communications.\* Another point to which you should turn your attention while delayed in breaching the Sikundra Bágh is the destruction of the bridge of boats some few hundred yards thence.† If a troop of horse artillery and cavalry are sent off rapidly to any point commanding the boats, many men would be destroyed with the boats that would be sunk by your guns; and the destruction of the boats will prevent the enemy's force on the other side of the Gúmti coming over to molest you at night.

The signal that you are crossing the canal will be my notice to spring certain mines, and storm the posts now held by the

All this was carried out, with the exception that the barracks and the houses D D were refused in the *advance* to the Sikundra Bágh, and had, therefore, to be taken afterwards, and (it is believed) at a greater loss than had they been assailed in the first instance.

† The enemy's leaders themselves caused the bridge to be broken up to prevent the flight of their followers.



enemy in my immediate front (9) (9) ; and once in possession of these, I shall open my guns on the buildings above mentioned, and endeavour, also, to silence the fire of the Kaiser Bágh, which commands the open space between us, to favour our junction next morning\* when our united batteries could be turned upon the Kaiser Bágh. And they would, I hope, in a day or two, effect its capture, which is necessary to ensure the entire submission of the city.

\* This was done. Sir James Outram's troops stormed and took the buildings (9) (9) on the day Sir Colin took the Sikundra Bágh. Sir James then opened his batteries on the Mess-house, Kaiser Bágh, &c., exactly as here proposed, until the junction was effected; and the Kaiser Bágh could have soon after been taken, had it had not been determined to withdraw our forces for a time.—(See the Despatches of General Havelock, Brigadier Eyre, Colonel Napier, &c., in reference to these operations.)

NOTE BY THE AUTHOR.—*This extract has been taken from Sir James Outram's General Orders, Despatches, and Correspondence, published in 1860 (Smith, Elder, & Co.). All the notes attached to it were made by the Editor of that volume.—*  
G. B. M.

## WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

---

*In Demy 8vo., Price 20s., Cloth.*

### HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY, 1857-58.

Commencing from the close of the Second Volume of Sir John Kaye's History of the Sepoy War. By Colonel G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. Vol. I. Contemporaneous with Sir John Kaye's third volume. London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1878.

"Colonel Malleeson is executing, in a manner deserving marked commendation, the task he has set himself. His research is untiring, and his love of his subject amounts to a passion. The equitableness of his judgments will rarely be challenged. Praise and blame he distributes very freely indeed; but he is judicially careful, while awarding his judgments, to justify them to the full; and his discrimination of character, in introducing or dismissing the various actors whom he brings on the scene, is marked by equal sagacity and thoroughness. Though a warm eulogist of sterling worth and merit, he leans, unquestionably, to the side of lenity, when called upon, as he is, ever and anon, to arraign and stigmatize incompetence."—*The Nation* (New York).

"If the literary quality of the rest of the work be equal to that of this volume, Colonel Malleeson's history will in that respect be a worthy sequel to Kaye's. The style is always strong and vigorous, and the treatment characterised by that ease which thorough familiarity with the subject alone can give. It is probable that some of Colonel Malleeson's statements and criticisms will provoke controversy, for he is no punctilious respecter of persons or reputations, and gives fearless expression to his views. Throughout his volume, however, there is abundant evidence that he has spared no pains to get at the exact truth about every transaction he describes; and, though he is sometimes strong in condemnation, he is never ungenerous."—*Scotsman*.

*In one Volume, 8vo., Price 18s., Cloith.*

HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN, from the earliest Period to the Outbreak of the war of 1878. By Colonel G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. Second edition. London, W. H. Allen & Co. 1878.

“There is no doubt whatever that the present volume amply sustains the author’s past reputation. He has spared no pains to give us a vivacious, readable; and accurate account of the regions lately under the sway of Shir Ali, and his performance is most creditable to his literary skill.”—*Daily Telegraph*.

“The name of Colonel Malleeson on the title-page of any historical work in relation to India or the neighbouring States is a satisfactory guarantee both for the accuracy of the facts and the brilliancy of the narrative. An Italian critic has recently spoken of one of his recent books on this subject as combining the attractiveness of a romance with the higher qualities which we naturally look for in such works. The author may be complimented upon having written a History of Afghanistan which is likely to become a work of standard authority.”—*Melbourne Argus*.

---

*In one Volume, 8vo., with Six Maps, Price 15s.*

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA IN SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. With Notices of the Mediatised and Minor States. By Colonel G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. London: Longmans & Co. 1875.

“Colonel Malleeson is recognised as one of the masters of Indian history; and his acquaintance with the past vicissitudes, as well as the actual state of the Feudatory States of Hindostan could not easily be surpassed.”—*The Times*.

*In one Volume, 8vo., Price 16s., Cloth.*

**HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA**, from the Founding of Pondichery in 1674, to the Capture of that Place in 1761. By Colonel G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. London: Longmans & Co. 1868.

“Colonel Malleison has produced a volume alike attractive to the general reader and valuable for its new matter to the special student. It is not too much to say that now, for the first time, we are favoured with a faithful narrative of that portion of European enterprise in India which turns upon the contest waged by the East India Company against French influence, and especially against Dupleix.”—*Edinburgh Review*.

*In one Volume, Crown 8vo., Price 10s. 6d., Cloth.*

**FINAL FRENCH STRUGGLES IN INDIA AND THE INDIAN SEAS.** Including an Account of the Capture of the Isles of France and Bourbon. By Colonel G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1878.

“How India escaped from the government of Prefects and Sub-Prefects to fall under that of Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners; why the Penal Code of Lord Macaulay reigns supreme instead of a Code Napoléon; why we are not looking on helplessly from Mahé, Karikal, and Pondichery, while the French are ruling all over Madras and spending millions of francs in attempting to cultivate the slopes of the Neilgherries, may be learnt from this modest volume. Colonel Malleison is always pains-taking and generally accurate: his style is transparent, and he never loses sight of the purpose with which he commenced to write.”—*Saturday Review*.



*In one Volume, Crown 8vo.. Price 10s. 6d., Cloth.*

STUDIES FROM GENOESE HISTORY. By

Colonel G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. London: Longmans. 1875.

"These studies are very pleasant and interesting reading, and are fraught with information and matter for reflection."—*Standard.*

"To the political student such a book as Colonel Malleeson's is invaluable, and it is invaluable for just the same reasons as those which make the investigation of the Republics of Ancient Greece the best of all preliminary disciplines for the historian."—*Hour.*

"A whole series of general propositions of universal and eternal truth might be formulated from this little book of Colonel Malleeson's on the subject of the Genoese constitutions, as to the nature of oligarchies—a form of Government impotent against democratic usurpation on the one hand, or individual aristocratic despotism on the other. Colonel Malleeson has done well in preferring to give us rather a series of pictures of the salient points in Genoese history, than a mere methodical narrative or a succinct epitome. The incidents selected by him are thoroughly typical, and their grouping genuinely dramatic. The sketches of Jacopo Bonfadio and of the Doria are specimens of literary work of a high order.—*The World.*